The debate about Europe’s crisis response capacity

Over the last five years we have witnessed an extraordinary sequence of events including an increase in global terrorism, natural disasters of unprecedented scale, outbreaks of HIV in conflict zones, rape and mutilation of political leaders, and crimes against cultural and religious sites. Such events have posed new challenges for global action. The European Union, as an increasingly global security actor, has been responding to humanitarian crises and conflicts and is addressing the demands of natural disasters.

Faster and more united? The debate about Europe’s crisis response capacity leads the discussion on how the European Union can use its resources to respond more effectively to the contemporary challenges in civilian crisis response. The book is a comprehensive collection of essays written by experts from the European Commission and from organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the Red Cross, and the Red Crescent. It brings together experts and practitioners from the EU institutions, European think tanks and universities, as well as high-ranking officials from the EU and national governments and organisations. Pictures from renowned photojournalists complement the texts throughout.

Faster and more united? The debate about Europe’s crisis response capacity is one of the few comprehensive accounts of European policy in this field.

Foreword by Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner and President Martti Ahtisaari
Faster and more united?
The debate about Europe’s crisis response capacity
The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the opinion or position of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for External Relations.

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PRINTED ON WHITE CHLORINE-FREE PAPER
The European Union has a responsibility to contribute to solving conflicts and assisting war-torn countries in the process of becoming stable democracies. This is one of the greatest challenges for the EU today.

The recent EU interventions in Aceh and in Moldova/Ukraine illustrate well our pragmatic approach to crisis response. In Moldova/Ukraine, the Community is running a Border Assistance Mission with the support of the Member State’s border guards and custom experts. In Aceh the Community has supported the peace process negotiations and the EU has deployed a Monitoring Mission with a heavy involvement in DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation) and electoral processes.

After the tsunami the Commission worked hard to improve the capacity of its crisis response mechanisms. The Civil Protection Mechanism, ECHO, and the Rapid Reaction Mechanism have delivered good results, some of which are illustrated in detail in this book. The Crisis Platform recently established in the External Relations Directorate-General of the European Commission will help the enhancement of crisis response with better coordination and more efficient implementation. As of 2007 a major new Community Instrument (the Stability Instrument) will support conflict resolution measures, mediation and peace-building, as well as early recovery. The financial resources devoted to crisis response on a yearly basis will triple. In the coming years, there will also be a substantial increase in the budget supporting the EU foreign policy mission, such as the EU police mission in Bosnia and in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The combined effect of the Stability Instrument and the CFSP budget will markedly enhance the EU’s capacity to engage in civilian crisis management around the globe.

A changing security environment poses however new challenges to the effective usage of these new financial resources: multiplication of the conflict areas, new security threats against the personnel on the ground, issues related to the rapid response, complex project identification and management, increased importance of intelligence and early warning.

Only by confronting our experiences can we hope to learn and to avoid the shortcomings of the past. For this reason in November 2005 the European Commission, in cooperation with the Crisis Management Initiative, organised “From needs to solutions: enhancing civilian crisis response capacity in the EU”, the first major European practitioners’ conference in this field.

With this book we want to continue the Brussels debate and stimulate a larger public discussion on how the European Union can efficiently combine and modernise all the resources and instruments available to respond more effectively to contemporary challenges in civilian crisis response.

What you are about to read is a truly collective work which mirrors, without filters, the challenges of missions in the field and the sometimes dissenting voices within the community of European crisis responders. It is from this confrontation that we will find new energy for the road ahead.

For this reason we invite you to enjoy all the contributions of this book (in words and in pictures): those describing what has been achieved so far and those that, usefully, remind us of the work that remains to be done to improve our actions.

To respond faster and to be more united, as the title of his book suggests.

Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner

President Martti Ahtisaari
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ENHANCING THE CIVILIAN CRISIS RESPONSE CAPACITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Introduction by the editors

Crisis: a time for judgement

The word “crisis” comes from the Greek κρίσις, which is derived from the verb κρίνων “to decide”, but also “to judge”. A crisis is therefore “a time of intense difficulty, trouble, or danger”, where we have to judge a situation and decide and get judged.

In the last five years a rather extraordinary sequence of diverse critical events (terrorism, conflicts, natural disasters, kidnappings of EU citizens in conflict zones, coups, assassinations of political leaders, international disputes) has shown that often responders have been (judged and) criticised worldwide for having been incapable of anticipating crises, for having responded too slowly to them, for having contributed to a confused and uncoordinated action on the ground, for not having been effective in managing the reconstruction phase, or for having badly explained and presented the rationale of their actions to their constituency, to other donors and to the beneficiaries.

Reports from the Red Cross and the BBC coverage of the Tsunami highlighted just some of the major failings of the crisis response.

According to the Red Cross, “...Rivalries between hundreds of groups led to a duplication and in some places a delay in aid reaching those affected”, the international director of the British Red Cross, Matthias Schmale, told the BBC that 300 to 500 charities arrived in Sri Lanka following the disaster, some of which had little or no experience. “It is simply very complex and chaotic when a disaster like this strikes,” he said.

...Correspondents say the scale of aid raised was partly to blame for a lack of coordination between agencies. Mr Schmale stated that although the majority of the agencies involved were established groups, like Oxfam, Save the Children and the Red Cross, in some cases, new charities were set up which simply showed up on the scene and tried to help.

...The report also highlighted the fact that scientists monitoring the Indian Ocean detected the giant earthquake off the coast of Indonesia, but had no way of alerting people. “Early warning is the most obvious way in which accurate, timely information alone can save lives,” Markku Niskala, Secretary General of the Red Cross, wrote in the introduction to the report. The report contrasted the lack of coordinated information about the impending tsunami disaster with the efficient warning systems in place when four strong hurricanes swept through the Caribbean during 2004.

Everyone is expecting more from the international community of crisis responders. Yet the challenges are significant, proportional to the main four changes which have occurred in the security policy environment.

A changing global conflict map

Security analysts have shifted their focus from the confrontation between “successful states” to a wider, fragmented chart of internal crises, ethnic and religious conflicts. The 2006 edition of the “Failed States” Index’s lists 28 countries where (among other indicators) the State is either criminalised or not legitimate, public services have deteriorated, the rule of law is suspended or applied arbitrarily, the security apparatus operates as a “State within the State”, elites act as conflicting factions, and neighbouring countries alter the country’s stability as external political actors.

The term “rules of war” (the set of “acceptable” practices while engaged in a conflict) remains meaningless against the background of the ever-increasing number of conflicts where systematic violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law are perpetrated. Often, warring parties do not have any clear or stable political objectives. The actors of insecurity have no easily definable or comprehensible structure. They may well represent economic interests or organised crime. They may use religion or ethnicity to conceal what they really are. They have become good at exploiting the rules and the modus operandi of the international community to create spaces of institutionalised illegality.

The geography of “rebel worlds” is constantly redefined, not only because of the evolution of geopolitics, but also due to the lack of a universally accepted risk assessment.

1 The Oxford English Dictionary
3 The ranking is developed by Dr. Pauline H. Baker, President of The Fund for Peace and has been published for the first time in Foreign Policy, July/August, 2005. The 2006 results together with the methodology and the 12 indicators used in the ranking can be found at: www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php

Andrea Ricci designed and runs the Crisis Room of the Directorate-General for External Relations of the European Commission. He conceived both Tariqa and the Directorate-General for External Relations’ internal training programme for Open Source Intelligence. He represents the Commission in the working group that defines the EU watchlist. Previously he was responsible for the EuroMediterranean Information Society Initiative (EUMEDIS). Mr Ricci holds a Master’s degree in European Studies from the College of Europe (Bruges). He is currently working on his PhD on “Digital Propaganda” with the Catholic University of Brussels and the Université Libre de Bruxelles.

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model. Everyone perceives, measures and responds to risk in a different way. Furthermore we lack a universally accepted conflict taxonomy. That is why there is significant disagreement both inside the political arena and in media discourse on how the international community qualifies situations in third countries. Terms such as "guerrilla", "resistance", "emergency", "crisis", "clash", "terrorism", "freedom fight", "rebellion" and "revolt" are either used (or one should say misused) interchangeably, or are deliberately used (for political reasons) to portray one specific sub-modality of a conflict. On the other hand, everyone would agree that there are many, often too many hot spots around the world. Hot spots in excess if compared to the means made available to respond to them, too many if related to the global attention economy; too numerous for the analysts to understand them thoroughly.

According to the categories of the HIIK (Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung) and the data of the last Global Conflict Barometer during 2005, there were 249 political conflicts worldwide. “Two of these were wars and 22 were severe crises, making a total of 24 conflicts being carried out with a massive amount of violence. A further 74 conflicts were classified as crises, meaning violence is used only occasionally. In contrast, 151 non-violent conflicts, which can be differentiated in 86 manifest and 65 latent conflicts.7"

The nature of conflict, the nature of risk has evolved. As Pauline Baker suggests:

“[Conflict] has been privatised, democratized and globalised. And non-state actors, as well as rogue states, have acquired vast new capabilities that present security threat globally.

Both state and non-state actors have the ability to acquire, transfer and manufacture weapons of mass destruction. Arms control treaties are no longer containing the threat. Small arms – from machetes and box cutters to AK-47s and SAM missiles – have been used to attack civilian aircraft, commit ethnic cleansing and carry out genocide. The Internet, mobile phones, videotapes, and CNN have revolutionised communications for everyone and in some instances become weapons of terror. Warlords and criminal gangs are using resources, such as drugs, diamonds and other minerals, to self-finance their illicit activities. Such groups no longer have to be backed by an outside power and they are less constrained by the norms of the international community.”

The conceptual and operational changes in crisis response

The European Security Strategy has acknowledged these changes by stating that the main security threats do not spring from hostile states, but from terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime.8 Just as the nature of conflict has changed, so too has the way Europe responds to crises.

European institutions and donors in general are trying to connect root causes of conflict with country-specific strategies. This logic connection is materialised both in terms of analysis and with regard to concrete indicative programmes for cooperation. Nobody doubts that stability requires fundamental social changes. If the accelerating or structural conflict factors are not tackled head on, tensions may flare up again and a fragile peace may relapse into violence. A strong link between development cooperation, conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding is fundamental for long-term stability: “Without security there can be no development, and without development no security”, notes Commissioner for External Relations Dr Benita Ferrero-Waldner.

Another visible evolution is the increased multilateralism both in conflict prevention and crisis response, both at field level and at headquarters level. As the majority of modern security problems flows freely across state boundaries, at field level the traditional state administration has neither the capabilities nor the resources to master contemporary security problems. That is why security orientated policy-making and project management must involve a broader range of local actors from government, private business and civil society organisations, including religious ones.

At headquarters level, the gamut of contemporary crises has meant that governments have to widen their crisis response models. For example, there has been a visible evolution from peacekeeping, to peace enforcement and to large-scale civilian capacity-building operations. The crisis management community has by consequence widened too. The result is community of actors that is equally motivated and non-homogeneous. National, trans-national, international, governmental, military and non-governmental organisations must work together today, in complex situations, over (sometimes) indefinite periods of
time and with divergent organisational cultures, missions and agendas. This evolution in crisis response clearly requires a strong effort of adaptation from all sides, but it is far from being irrational or unmotivated. Complex situations require complex solutions.

A deteriorating security environment

The most worrying evolution in modern crisis response is the increasing security risks to staff in the field. Threats against the safety of international and local staff (regardless of their affiliation) have escalated at an unprecedented pace.

Some evidence of this new trend started to appear in 2000 when Mani Sheik of the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health reported 375 deaths (most of which caused by intentional violence) among civil UN and NGO aid workers and UN peacekeepers in the 14 years from 1985. Martin Griffiths, Director of the Geneva Office of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, reported that between 1992 and 2001 small arms accounted for 75% of the deaths of the 204 UN personnel killed and those of more than 800 peacekeepers killed in the same period. The events that followed 9/11, the "War on Terror", and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have made absolutely clear the increasing (and in certain countries established) disregard for humanitarian agencies' neutrality.

Dennis King, head of USAID Humanitarian Information Unit published a white paper where he stated that: "aid workers experienced more fatal attacks in 2003 than in any prior year," coinciding with "an increase in terrorist tactics targeting UN and NGO activities." In 2004, a year of "rude awakening”, the UN honoured 111 of its staff killed in action, most of which during the bombing of its headquarters in Baghdad. In Afghanistan, as reported by some of the authors of this work, since the beginning of 2005 24 humanitarian workers have already been killed. Actors on the ground all face the same dilemma: safety versus mission. Field offices with military-like protection contradict, in the view of many operators, the spirit of dialogue with which projects are conducted on the ground. But the deterioration of security is unquestionable.

Humanitarian personnel have been confronted for years by threats associated with crime, banditry, and civil conflict, but today's workers are increasingly targeted in their own right. This is true particularly in areas where their presence is perceived to be associated with a party to the conflict.

Many organisations fail to acknowledge the changing perceptions of international assistance in some areas of the world and the changing profile of the security threats that endanger not only their operators but the recipient communities as well. The rapid escalation in security threats has not yet been matched with a similarly rapid development of corresponding strategies to mitigate operational risks. Counting on acceptance of the local population and showing the flag as a sign of impartiality is no more sufficient in ensuring the safety and security of field personnel.

A new information environment

In the last 15 years the simultaneous emergence of three key technologies (the web, miniaturised camcorders and commercial satellite based imaging services) has changed the way the whole diplomatic, security and crisis response community operates.

The first effect is the multiplication of open sources. At any given moment anyone can (at least theoretically) exploit, in addition to the web and the traditional sources of information, more than 15 000 pay-per-view databases; 44 million blogs (at the time of writing); 60 000 newsgroups; thousands of satellite based radio and television channels; and so on. This single element has created two centrifugal dynamics: on one hand crisis responders resent the widening gap between what they understand and what they ought to understand. On the other hand, everyone acknowledges that the barrier between what is secret and what is open has become a movable one, and therefore there is an opportunity (notably in crisis prevention) to know more, because a lot more is open or being created.

The increase in real-time coverage has generated, and is still generating, a profound and yet to be fully understood effect (the so-called "CNN effect") on the making of foreign policy. The following quotes suggest how influential this...
effect has become for the entire community of crisis responders:

“The CNN effect” can be, in some instances, an acceleration of policy; in other instances, it can be an impediment to policy. In other instances, it’s a dialogue between diplomats taking place instantaneously. At other instances, it’s a dialogue between warring parties: the Scud missile crew on the one end, the Patriot missile crew on the other.”

Observers often argue that public support for foreign relief activities is directly in proportion to the amount of media coverage given to specific emergencies. These days, few humanitarian crises seem to produce a public response unless they have first attracted the attention of the press and television—the so-called ‘CNN effect’:15

“Where there is no camera, there is no humanitarian intervention.”

Some researchers, such as Professor Susan Moeller, have suggested that in the present, unstable, “attention economy” the intensive coverage of certain conflicts or crises risks generating “compassion fatigue”16:

“Very often, ‘compassion fatigue’ or donor fatigue is the result of the feeling, no matter what we do, it is ineffectual. […] We the public need to connect to stories, and when we do, it helps to circumvent our feelings that we are hopeless.”

From the perspective of policy-makers and risk analysts, the multiplication of open sources of information is also reinforcing the structural asymmetry between strong signals and weak signals. Entire regions of the world could virtually disappear from the radar screens of many information brokers because their signal is “covered” by much stronger signals coming from other countries and other crises. Early warning in these conditions can become a complex exercise, suspended between the mistrust of the newest sources and the dependency from the bias of old ones.

Even the strongest signals – such as the situation in Iraq – may generate such an overabundant and redundant signal to confuse the analysts with a sort of white noise, which constantly reproduces the same pattern over and over again (car bomb, 20 people killed while queuing in front of a police station).

All in all, the identification of priorities and the early detection of warning signals are challenged by the new information environment in which all crisis response actors – aid workers, military, media, private sector risk analysts, intelligence community – are called to operate. This environment is capable of creating strong and visible discrepancies even in the way two successive natural catastrophes are reported and also dealt with, as the recent survey conducted by the German institute for media analysis, Media Tenor, suggests with regard to the case of the 2004 tsunami and the Kashmir earthquake:

“There was a perceptible difference between the coverage on the tsunami that hit South-East Asia in December 2004 and the earthquake that hit Pakistan in October 2005. The tsunami received far more extensive coverage in all countries analysed in both television and print media. The earthquake in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan did not cause as high a death toll as the tsunami but left more than 3 million people homeless in freezing weather in comparison to 1.5 million displaced people in tsunami affected areas of moderate temperature. Low media presence contributed to the fact that timely help did not reach the thousands of people living in rugged, mountainous areas that could be accessed only by 70 available helicopters. By contrast 4000 helicopters were available to the areas affected by the tsunami. Both disasters also resulted in an outpouring of global donations and fund drives. The magnitude of both disasters was different in terms of the death toll and economic devastation and this could be a factor as to why the tsunami received far more coverage, which in turn affected private donations. The tsunami affected tourist areas, which could also explain why there was more reporting and global solidarity. In any case, the volume of coverage was very low given the fact that hundreds of thousands of lives were lost. If this reporting trend continues,
it will lead to lower international awareness and consequently an avoidably high death toll from lack of aid and relief efforts.\textsuperscript{22}

The new information environment in which crisis responders are called to operate is however also providing new opportunities both for policy-makers and practitioners. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is for example rapidly emerging as an increasingly important discipline in contemporary Crisis Prevention and Crisis Response.

“Open source information […] is publicly available information (i.e. any member of the public could lawfully obtain the information by request or observation), as well as other unclassified information that has limited public distribution or access.”\textsuperscript{23}

The link between public information and intelligence is an essential part of any intelligent analyst’s job. Intelligence, which is “restricted” or “closed” information can only be extracted from what is “open” or publicly available. So therefore they need to know everything that is “open” or being opened to the public on a regular basis.\textsuperscript{24}

If adequate technical resources are available to tame the information overload generated by the multiplicity of sources, Open Source Intelligence can provide security analysts the ability to send out early warning signals sooner and responders can obtain in the shortest time possible an adequate information picture to take mission-critical decisions.

OSINT enables life-saving information to be shared across networks (both on the ground and at headquarter level). This is particularly needed today, when European Institutions, governments of “third countries”, international donors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), local/regional authorities and peacekeeping forces are called to operate in a seamless and coordinated way.

Finally, from a donor’s perspective, OSINT can also provide a real time project monitoring system capable of providing the widest visibility on other donors’ pledges, on the impact of projects carried out on the ground and on local needs from a beneficiary perspective.

\textbf{Why this book}

This book attempts to present the lively debate surrounding all the above-mentioned changes in the field of civilian crisis response in Europe. The book stems from the conviction that the modernisation of diplomacy and crisis response activities can indeed contribute effectively to addressing many of the issues that continue to emerge from the ground. This work has been conceived to further the discussions held during the Conference “Enhancing Civilian Crisis Response in the EU,” organised by the European Commission and the Crisis Management Initiative in Brussels in November 2005.

When we gathered more than 400 practitioners in the Charlemagne Building in Brussels in November 2005, all evidence from the field pointed to the need to approach conflicts and crises in a holistic, multi-dimensional and multi-functional way.\textsuperscript{25} For this reason we wanted to gather in a single publication, in a sort of manual, what the entire community of crisis responders (photojournalists, scholars, political leaders, civil servants, aid workers, peacebuilding advocates, intelligence analysts, military), with all its different voices and often its dissonances, thought were the main lessons of the first years of integrated European civilian crisis response.

Scholars or practitioners in the field of early warning and civilian crisis response will find personal accounts of major operations and sets of policy recommendations emerging from selected case histories. The public at large will understand the greatest challenges related to Europe’s activity in the field of contemporary civilian crisis management through a set of introductory chapters and interviews.

This book has been written from a practitioner’s point of view. Every author is a direct witness, a practitioner.

\textsuperscript{23} Director of Central Intelligence Directive 2/12 Community Open Source Program (Effective 1 March 1994), www.fas.org/irp/offdoc/dcid212.htm.
As photographers, we are witness and messenger. I endeavour to preserve moments which faithfully portray the people and the situation in which they find themselves in as accurate and compelling a manner as possible. My photographs say, unambiguously, “this is the situation”. This is what these people are facing each and every day of their lives.

The underlying question is always the same. What are you going to do about it? The closer you can come to feeling a place and immersing yourself in a situation, the more revealing your images. It is very rare that I do not feel moved by the people I spend time with. Moved to the point of tears and anger, and so many times left in awe of their spirit and selflessness.

If my photographs, taken in these pathetic theatres, fail to disturb and anger viewers where I myself have been so disturbed and angered, the work is of no merit. My search for the image is always free of thematic or storyline constraints. Arriving in a place with a fixed idea of what you expect to see and photograph is a recipe for disaster.

The Tsunami coverage is a perfect example of this. You had this holocaustic insanity extending as far as the eye could see. I found it completely overwhelming. The very action of isolating a frozen moment of loss or horror in the viewfinder was suddenly an absurd thought. I’d find my eyes being sucked sideways by the vacuum. What do you do when, no matter what you try to isolate within your viewfinder, the reality outside your frame is ten times more shocking and threatens to swallow you up as you pick your way through it. Walking from the capital to the coast, I had the very real and disturbing feeling that I was the last person left on the planet. The feeling was one of incredible vulnerability and it took a degree of will power to banish the imaginary walls of liquid death and debris that surged towards me. This was the overpowering feeling that accompanied me for kilometres to the sea, and it was this feeling that I knew I had to try and recreate with my work. The join-ups (or reconstituted panoramas, if you prefer,) which I made in Aceh, were the most effective way I could think of to convey the extent of the devastation.

**Equipment:**

For my reportage work I use the fully manual Leica M series cameras with 35mm lenses exclusively. Quite simply, for this line of work, they have no equal. Mamiya 6.6 rangefinders with standard lenses can either complement the Leica frames or, as in the case of the Tsunami panoramas they can take centre stage.

I couldn’t work with just one format. There are too many occasions when a situation screams for a different treatment and if that is what it takes to put the viewer in your shoes, I carry the extra weight.
The cameras and my light-meter (Pentax spot meter) are tools that never change. I have three lenses for my Leicas; all of them 35mm. The same goes for my Mamiyas: three 75mm lenses. My film only changes due to availability but it is almost exclusively 400 ASA black and white. And I am the only person who ever touches it.

[ Philip Blenkinsop ]
A man tries to console a grieving relative on the road in front of where their house used to stand. Near the coast, Banda Aceh. (3 January 2005)

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Aceh, after the tsunami
(2-3 January 2005)
Banda Aceh. Along the road to the coast at the mouth of the Aceh River.
(3 January 2005)

© Philip Blenkinsop / Agence Vu
Aceh, after the tsunami
(2-5 January 2005)
Banda Aceh. Along the road to the coast at the mouth of the Aceh River.
(3 January 2005)

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Aceh, after the tsunami
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Banda Aceh. Along the road to the coast at the mouth of the Aceh River. (3 January 2005)

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Aceh, after the tsunami (2-5 January 2005)
Father and sons pass the site of mass graves on their way into Banda Aceh.
(3 January 2005)

© Philip Blenkinsop / Agence VU
Aceh, after the tsunami
(2-5 January 2005)
A woman breaks down grieving at the site of her house, where now only rubble remains. Banda Aceh. (3 January 2005)

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Aceh, after the tsunami
(2-5 January 2005)
A Thai man with a photograph of a young girl, looking for relatives among the dead collected at the Takuapa Temple. Near Khao Lak. South Thailand, 28 December 2004

© Philip Blenkinsop / Agence VU
Tsunami aftermath - Thailand
December 2004
PART I: EU RESPONSE TO CONFLICT
CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF CRISIS RESPONSE IN THE EU’S EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Summary

In order to take up its global responsibility in responding to crises in the future, the European Union is putting renewed emphasis on improving its crisis response capacities. It aims to achieve this by raising the level of coherence and coordination of the EU’s civilian response in terms of better support to reconciliation and mediation initiatives; increased cooperation with other donors, and UN agencies and institutions; and harnessing the potential of open source intelligence for early warning and situation analysis. It actively supports initiatives that encourage crisis management debate and coordination, as crisis management only works, as previous experience has shown, if all actors, organisations, governments and non-governmental organisations are committed to working together towards a common, achievable goal.

The practicalities of crisis management

In today’s world the danger of war between great powers has diminished. Instead, failing states, ethnic or religious ideologies, extreme poverty, organised crime and uncontrolled migration pose the major challenges to the international community. They threaten not only international security but also our humanitarian and development goals and our fundamental values of democracy and human rights. Conflicts in far away regions can develop into a security threat for the entire international community. And conflicts increasingly involve civilians, both as active participants in the hostilities and as direct targets.

And, as we have seen in 2005 with the tsunami, hurricane Katrina, and the Kashmir earthquake, there is a growing need to respond to large-scale natural disasters.

Public expectations of the European Union to respond effectively are huge, and rightly so. After all, it is often a question of life and death. The EU has made important strides in increasing the effectiveness of its response to crises, both man-made and natural, but we must go further. Complex issues require a complex set of responses. All our combined efforts are necessary to make needed progress.

So where does the EU’s civilian crisis response capacity stand today? The EU is already able to mobilise a formidable crisis response capacity: the EU’s civil protection mechanism gives us a new ability to deal with natural and environmental disasters. This draws upon Member States’ specialised services, and proved its worth, for instance, in our response to the tsunami. Establishing specialised human resources on standby in order to be quickly on the ground and address the most urgent needs will further strengthen our quick reaction capacity in emergency situations. And a coordinating platform in the European Commission reinforces early warning and disaster preparedness.

The European Union is the biggest donor of humanitarian assistance. Through our humanitarian office (ECHO) we are able to mobilise the resources and expertise of the UN System, the Red Cross and international NGOs. Our rapid reaction mechanism and long-term development instruments have a good record in responding to major political crises. The quick deployment of fact-finding missions allows immediate identification of needs and appropriate planning. This way the EU is in a position to support both short-term crisis interventions and strategic stabilisation efforts, such as in the Balkans.

An additional intervention capacity is being developed to support the Union’s foreign policy, in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy. This enables the EU to send civilian experts in policing, rule of law and civil administration to crisis situations. Combined with the EU’s military capacity, this gives us a comprehensive range of tools.

The challenge for us is to use these tools coherently, giving a unified overall response to crises, and a response that is well coordinated with the many different actors in the international community.

Improving coherence and coordination

So how can we improve the coherence and coordination of the EU’s civilian crisis response capacity?

Policy level

First, at the policy level, there is an emerging consensus that development and security are
interlinked. Without security there can be no development, and without development no security.

Similarly, short-term interventions turn quickly into mid- or long-term engagements. Very few international crises allow for a ‘quick fix’. Just as we have to face the challenges of immediate crisis response, we must accept our responsibility for long-term follow-up commitments.

Recognising the link between security and development, we have established innovative ways to support reconciliation and mediation initiatives. We are also following international best practice in integrating disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, and security sector reform into our development policies. The Africa Peace Facility is another illustration of how we are linking development and security in our programmes.

In the context of the UN, the post-conflict situation is being tackled by the Peacebuilding Commission that foresees measures from humanitarian aid to reconstruction to institution building. This has always been our task and thus it is only logical that we wish to play a strong part in the Peacebuilding Commission that has recently been set up.

We are also addressing the appropriate use of military assets in humanitarian response. As the tsunami and the Kashmir earthquake showed, military means can prove crucial in getting assistance rapidly to the places where it is needed. It is an example of the interlinking of different tools to achieve a common goal. There is also the need to preserve the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence. Reconciling these two is a sensitive issue, but important.

Finally, the creation of the Stability Instrument reflects our desire to streamline our crisis response. The Stability Instrument will allow us to anticipate and prevent a crisis turning into violent conflict; support mediation and reconciliation efforts; and utilise the full range of post-crisis reconstruction and peacebuilding measures. It is also designed to ensure continuity between short- and long-term interventions. In particular, it is desirable to use the Stability Instrument to strengthen the collaboration between the European Council, the European Commission and Member States.

**Working together**

Secondly, coherence and coordination. The EU’s approach to foreign policy is rooted in its belief in effective multilateralism. We are firmly committed to working hand in hand with other donors and with UN agencies and institutions right from the very beginning of a crisis. Because, as we all know, that is the only way to optimise the effectiveness of international assistance. Just as importantly, the EU has to work hard to ensure that our foreign policy, trade, development and humanitarian instruments work closely together. This starts of course with efficient coordination within the Commission and encircles our cooperation with the Council and the Member States. The Council, the Commission and Member States all have work to do to ensure a joined-up approach to civilian crisis response. We have a good basis on which to build.

Take the example of the work we are doing to support peace and reconstruction in Aceh. Here we adopted a comprehensive approach. The Commission financed peace negotiations using the Rapid Reaction Mechanism. The EU launched the Aceh Monitoring Mission to monitor compliance with the Peace Agreement. And at the same time the Commission and Member States, working with the international community, put in place a package of long-term measures to support the peace process. This addresses the structural issues: reintegration of Free Aceh Movement combatants and prisoners; and reforms of the local administration and promotion of the rule of law and democracy. We also set up a “Europa House” as a forum for information, coordination of assistance efforts to the victims of the tsunami and dialogue with all stakeholders.

The border mission at the Moldovan/Ukraine border where we help prevent trafficking of people, smuggling of goods, proliferation of weapons and customs fraud represents a further example of our comprehensive approach. And, together with the Council, we are just negotiating to play a part in the customs monitoring at the Rafah border crossing between Palestinians, Israelis and Egyptians.

This proves that a joined-up approach is possible. I hope this will be a precedent for future EU assistance for post-conflict or post-natural disaster situations. With regard to public expectations, I am convinced that our success to satisfy them will be the bigger the more we are in a position to give a well-coordinated and coherent overall response to crisis situations and to live up to our pledges.

**Information and communication technologies**

Finally, we must address the practical needs for effective communication on the ground. Perhaps one of the greatest contributions to improving the current situation is better information flows – ensuring that the right information gets to the right people at the
right time. This is crucial for planning our operations. We need to have a better information picture about the situation, we need security for our people on the ground, and we need to coordinate better with the whole crisis response community.

Technology has opened up domains of information which only some years ago were unthinkable. We need to harness the potential of open source intelligence for early warning and situation analysis.

When our aid workers now seek the right road to get to the Pakistan disaster areas they should be able to access open sources in a simple and effective way. And they should be able to obtain other crucial data such as real-time satellite imagery. We also need to make sure that soldiers, civilians, UN officials, and NGOs on the ground can communicate with each other easily and securely. The EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana rightly said that “Action is better than concepts”. That is why our work in this field is orientated towards practicalities, not abstractions.
**LATEST STEPS IN STRENGTHENING EU CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITIES**

*Interview with Eneko Landaburu*

**Interview with Eneko Landaburu**

**Eneko Landaburu:** Director-General for External Relations, European Commission, since September 2003. Born in Paris in 1948, he became a Member of the Basque Parliament in 1980. From 1983 to 1986 he served as Director of the Institute for Research on Multinationals in Geneva. In 1986 he became Director-General for Regional Policy and Cohesion at the European Commission, and from 2000 to 2003 he was Director-General for Enlargement and Chief Negotiator with the candidate countries.

The tragedy of the tsunami has brought out the deficiencies in, and the need to strengthen, the crisis response capacities of the EU. Where does the EU stand at this point in time and what has the European Commission done to address this issue?

Europe’s citizens and the outside world expect the European Union to be able to deliver when confronted with crisis situations. Recent EU missions in Aceh and Moldova/Ukraine have demonstrated how the EU can be made to work as a coherent whole when addressing crises. On the basis of this experience, complementary use of Community and Common Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP) instruments needs to address the rule, not the exception.

The Commission has already done a lot to improve the effectiveness of the crisis response instruments at its disposal, be it the Civil Protection Mechanism, ECHO or the Rapid Reaction Mechanism. The crisis platform in Directorate-General for External Relations is to further improve implementation through ensuring better coordination within the Commission and with the Council.

**What can the Commission do to improve the speed of EU crisis response?**

We have already created permanent teams of humanitarian experts. That means that EU experts are usually deployed within hours to the site of a major natural or man-made disaster. We are also further strengthening the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, which can mobilise search and rescue teams, specialist environmental protection teams and co-ordinate the delivery of EU Member States’ aid.

In addition, we have streamlined the funding arrangements for post-disaster and post-conflict situations.

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**The Crisis in the Middle East of summer 2006 plunged the region into chaos. What role did the EU play in this conflict?**

Well, we have tried very hard to move "faster and be more united" in our response, and I think that we have achieved good results on five fronts. On the diplomatic dimension we have insisted with the Israeli authorities on the need to secure humanitarian access to the areas most hit by the strikes; a ministerial mission to Israel, Gaza and Lebanon will immediately follow the Rome Conference, the purpose of which will be to underline EU solidarity with the region; the External Relations Council issued a united call for an immediate cessation of hostilities to be followed by a sustainable ceasefire. And this action was followed up in the UN Security Council by those EU Member States who are members.

On the humanitarian side the EU has committed almost €100 million: we worked – as we often do – in cooperation with OCHA (UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), WFP (World Food Programme), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and WHO (World Health Organisation). Some EU Member States have also provided military logistical assistance to secure the transport of humanitarian aid into Lebanon.

Concerning the large oil spill which endangered both the public health and the economic prospects for quite a large coastal area the EU activated the Community Civil Protection Mechanism responding to calls for assistance coming from the Lebanese authorities; the Commission’s Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) sent an assessment mission with environmental experts and together with the Joint Research Centre in Ispra they carried out an assessment of the marine pollution. Detailed satellite images and a scientific committee, which included the Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC), the German Space Agency and the Universities of Cyprus and Ljubljana contributed to the assessment.

The EU also actively participated in the evacuation of EU and third country nationals. Consular cooperation between Member States and EU institutions led to the evacuation of some 40 000 EU citizens. The External Relations Directorate-General, in cooperation with the International Organisation for Migration allocated, through a Rapid Reaction Mechanism project, €11 million to assist in the evacuation and repatriation of 10 000 third country nationals.

The fifth front concerns crisis recovery. On 31 August 2006 during the International Donor Conference on Lebanon in Stockholm, Commissioner Benita Ferrero Waldner pledged €42 million as a first contribution to Lebanon’s rehabilitation efforts. The pledge included provisions for the immediate post-crisis needs as well as measures to support the process in the medium term. Specifically the EU offered a reconstruction assistance facility (€10 million) with the aim of supporting damage assessment and reconstruc-
tion planning and coordination by the Lebanese Government; a package to foster security and rule of law (€4 million) in line with the objectives of UN Security Council Resolution 1701; a package for the reinforcement of private sector competitiveness (€18 million) whose essential aim is to help restore incomes for those businesses that have suffered most from the crisis. A further €10 million is ready to meet other needs identified by the Lebanese Government.

**What will be the next steps?**

From 2007 the Stability Instrument, a major new Community instrument, will be operational. It will replace the RRM and provide an integrated response to crises by supporting conflict resolution measures, mediation and peace building, as well as early recovery. Its average annual budget will exceed €200 million, of which €100 million will be devoted to short-term crisis response as compared to the current €30 million under RRM. In addition, the CFSP budget to support EU missions, such as the one in Aceh, will be substantially increased. The combined effect of the new Stability Instrument and an increased CFSP budget will further improve the EU’s response to crisis situations in third countries. It will also improve our ability to support the UN engagement in crisis management and peacebuilding, thus allowing us to contribute to making a success of the newly created UN Peacebuilding Commission.

With a view to creating a long-term vision for improving the Union’s crisis response the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Council have asked former French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier to come up with proposals. His forward-looking report “For a European Civil Protection Force: Europe Aid” has been welcomed in the Presidency conclusions of the June 2006 European Council as an important contribution to the debate. It contains a number of useful ideas that are currently being studied in detail by the Commission services. (see Annex I for extracts from the report).
**Chapter 2: Europe’s security today: a challenge for all**

**Summary**

The European Union (EU) has entered the world scene as a conscious security actor just at a time when the security agenda has grown wider, and the range of those involved in it more diverse, than ever before in modern history. Since correct choices in any given field of action demand understanding of the environment, this contribution will look at the context for EU policy-making under two headings: what does “security” mean today, and what roles do different types of actors play in providing it? At the risk of simplification, each of these two questions is answered with the image of a triangle.

**The security triangle**

There is no universally accepted way of setting the limits of the present-day security spectrum or of subdividing the challenges within it. Some notions that became popular overnight after 11 September 2001, such as “new” and “asymmetrical” threats, look less satisfying now that we have had several more years to reflect on the real origins and impacts of phenomena like terrorism and proliferation. The attention of policy-makers and the general public at least in the richest, most “mediatised” parts of the world community tends to swing from one end of the spectrum to the other under the impact of individual events – from terrorist strikes and genocides, to hurricanes and pandemics. The threefold division that will be adopted here puts phenomena linked to the large-scale use of armed force – war and conflict – at the sharp tip of the triangle. The second comer represents the rest of what is normally defined as the “security sector” (e.g. internal, “homeland”, or border security); while at the third corner we find a varied set of challenges of non-intentional or non-human origin – accidents, breakdown of supply and infrastructure, natural disasters, climate change, disease etc – that some writers would sum up as problems of “human security”. A little more will be said here about the way each set of threats or risks presents itself today.

The use of armed force in its historically most typical form, i.e. war between states, is now very rare. Of 19 major “live” conflicts documented by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 2004, every single one was classified as an “intrastate” struggle over power or territory or both. In such conflicts, while the central government is commonly a party, the other combatants are by definition of a “non-state” nature – regional, ethnic, ideological etc. movements – even if their aim in fighting is often to establish themselves as leaders of a state. Other non-traditional actors like terrorists, criminals, arms traffickers and smugglers are commonly part of the problem; while policy increasingly recognises the need to mobilise positive forces in the economy and civil society – right down to family level – as part of the “peacebuilding” solution. That said, external involvement of some malign or benign kind is present in almost every civil war, and a number of “strong” states – not just “weak” states where unofficial forces outnumber the centre – are still implicated in some of the world’s most stubborn conflicts.

The conflict defined by SIPRI in 2004 as an internal one in Iraq was triggered by the US-led invasion; the insurrection in Indian-controlled Kashmir is a sub-aspect of the wider India-Pakistan confrontation; and Israel’s “internal” conflict with the Palestinians has blocked peace in the wider Middle Eastern area for decades. At the heart of the non-military security sector lies the task of ensuring internal law and order, which can face challenges ranging from high rates of individual lawlessness (including family violence) through organised crime to long-term insurrections (albeit with limited casualties) of the Northern Ireland or Basque country type. Tackling these is still almost universally understood as a task for the domestic, civil administration of the country concerned, not least because many of the necessary responses take place in the mode of national law enforcement.

However, the lines between external and internal security agendas, in Europe as elsewhere, have become blurred for several reasons. New patterns of migration, including refugees and...
asylum seekers, have combined with drugs and other smuggling to raise the profile of border security. Defence of the homeland against terrorism has become a multi-layered task arising not just from “native” terrorists but also from the kind of universally aggressive network typified by Al-Qaeda – and from the ways such movements may exploit discontentment at home. The threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) has taken on new dimensions with the rising concern about terrorist use of such techniques and their diffusion through illicit transfer – both things that could also infect territories far removed from any state-to-state nuclear confrontation. Since September 2001 people have come to see that large catastrophes in the realms of infrastructure, utilities and supplies, environment and public health would have much the same effect on populations whether caused by terrorists or not. Consequently, preventing and tackling such emergencies is now typically seen as part of a single civil, internal or homeland security agenda potentially involving all agencies of the state. Last but not least, internal security can be a subject of international cooperation in the context of post-conflict intervention, where the aim is to help re-establish central control of all aspects of internal order, justice and law enforcement.

One of the ironies of the “human security” agenda is that the perils involved, while in principle common to all humanity, actually hit different regions in very different ways. Up to now the “asymmetry” has all been to the detriment of the poorer and weaker countries, and not only because of the devastating effects of hunger and poverty. Natural disasters and common diseases strike more often in the Equatorial belt and Southern hemisphere, and kill far more people per event than they would in richer countries. Mass deaths from AIDS are so far limited to the same regions, though now growing fast also in the former Soviet Union. Interruptions of supply, other infrastructure problems, and even minor shifts in climate have much greater impact on populations who are already on the edge of survival. Nevertheless, the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 and the hurricanes of autumn 2005 have shown that more privileged (by global standards) communities can still be hit hard either in their own homelands or while travelling. Europe itself has many features of vulnerability – crowded urban populations with minimal survival skills, complex cross-border infrastructures, intense dependence on foreign energy supplies and trade in general – that could allow certain types of disaster to cause havoc here on a truly “asymmetric” scale. The outsourcing of important, real-time economic services to remote regions is also making Europeans more vulnerable “by proxy” to the different, and usually worse, set of human security hazards that surround the suppliers.

All three points of the security triangle are interconnected. Conflicts weaken the delivery of law and justice, cause refugee flows and famines and leave states more exposed to natural emergencies as when, for example, Pakistan/India tensions in Kashmir complicated bilateral cooperation to assist the earthquake victims in 2005. Indirectly at least, the USA’s heavy involvement in the Iraq conflict also had an impact on its chances of making a speedy response to Hurricane Katrina. AIDS is weakening the armed and police forces of many African countries; natural disasters can lead to looting and brigandage; and climate change and exhaustion of resources has been in the past and could be again in future a source of actual armed conflict. In sum: no defence and security policy can be called a good one today unless it takes account of all three of these types of risks and their interconnections, and unless it allocates human and cash resources to each of them according to their respective priorities and needs.

The triangle of security governance

In modern conditions, the shaping of policies and practical responses for any given security challenge can involve:
- governments, and international organisations made up of governments;
- the private business sector; and
- the rest of civil society including NGOs, social and professional groupings, religious movements and individual citizens.

The three points of this triangle are also highly dependent on each other for playing their proper and successful roles in the public interest; and it will be argued here that every point of the second, “governance” triangle is relevant to every point of the first, “security” triangle.

Governments and intergovernmentalism

Fifteen years ago when the Cold War - the biggest ever confrontation between two blocs of states - came to an end, it was fashionable to argue that the state as such was losing its grip on events in many fields, including security.

3 As an example, recent proven or suspected instances of WMD smuggling have come from Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and the Western Balkans.

4 As in so many respects, Iraq has furnished a sobering example of what can happen if this aspect is not handled properly, and arms stocks remain available and frontiers porous to the advantage of non-state adversaries.
The great majority of modern security problems flow freely across state boundaries; are almost impossible to block by the methods of traditional state administration; and are very difficult for any individual government to master alone. Terrorism, SARS and avian flu, and global warming are all clear examples of this. Shifts in the security environment since the end of the Cold War have also posed challenges for the efficiency and credibility of intergovernmental organisations made up of states, and forced just about all of them into far-reaching changes. The European Union itself has given ample evidence of this with its successive enlargements (more than doubling membership from 1994 to 2004), its entry into new security-relevant domains including military crisis management, and its successive Treaty revisions culminating in the proposed new Constitution. As this last point illustrates, however, the speed of transformation at times put a breaking strain on the political foundations or operational capacities—or both—of such organisations. Loss of communication and trust between leaders engaged in the multinational integrative process, and their peoples, is always a risk; and in this respect, the historically unique degree of democracy built into the EU’s way of working is one of its liabilities. However, even institutions working in a more traditional, interstate fashion have had their headaches, as shown by the recent stories of NATO, OSCE and the UN itself, including the limited results of the 2005 UN Summit.

Despite all this, theorists are starting to turn back and emphasise the importance of the state or groups of states for security, in the light of some very practical lessons of experience. In the field of conflict, it is now understood that a country cannot maintain peace at home or with its neighbours unless it has strong central structures able to exercise the state’s proper monopoly of force, and to delivering all necessary security services to its people. In rich developed countries, people still expect the state to protect them against new as well as old threats, even if—like the tsunami—the former hit them when away from home. Similarly, however embattled intergovernmental institutions may be, the international community still seeks to impose new tasks on them because there is simply no better alternative. Threats arising in non-military dimensions and across borders can only be met by strong international standards, rules and emergency procedures and by the widest possible cooperation among governments, including where necessary the transfer of resources to the places most in need. Only governments and groups of governments are authorised to make such internationally enforceable laws and rules (e.g. UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540 criminalising terrorist financing and WMD trafficking respectively, the Kyoto Protocol, or current pressure to increase the WHO's powers in case of international pandemics); and government decisions are needed to move resources in ways that the normal workings of the market would not permit.

The balance of importance may be subtly shifting as a result, from the groups with the most traditional power (large armed forces), to those that have both rule-making or law-making powers and the possibility to hold large centralised funds and transfer them quickly. Both things are true of the European Union, but neither is true of NATO. And as NATO turns to focus on military operations outside Europe, it is vulnerable to the fact that such actions can be launched in several other ways, including by ad hoc coalitions. Here, however, the lesson of the Iraq experience seems to be that in terms of “what works”—let alone morality—a limited group of self-mandated countries is more likely to fall apart under pressure. The urgency with which the USA had to seek various enabling UN decisions after the occupation of Iraq, and with which it has since pressed for NATO to develop an institutional role in that country, tells its own story.

**Business and security**

Many Europeans are conscious above all of the ways in which business can make today's security problems worse: undermining weaker states through the effects and side-effects of globalisation; damaging the environment by misuse of scarce resources; trafficking in dangerous commodities including conflict diamonds and small arms; and colluding with violent and oppressive actors in intrastate conflicts or even using excess force for its own protection in insecure localities. Concern about both human rights and commercial abuses by private military and security companies has been aggravated by revealed abuses in Iraq. Now, none of these concerns and accusations is without a certain foundation. Business people are as imperfect as any other humans and the profit principle can easily get linked with an attitude of profiting at other people's expense, including in the security field.

However, even if a minority of businesses can always find ways to profit from causing more violence and increasing the demand for arms, the majority of companies will always flourish better in a non-violent, stable and cooperative environment. This is all the more true today when business depends increasingly on the working of complicated and sensitive links between different regions of the globe including those connected with outsourcing; when companies' own operations can be devastated by illness, infrastructure failure or natural disasters, let alone terrorism and criminal sabotage; and when the global insurance industry that cushions companies' losses
is itself generally thought to be on the point of collapse. It is worth considering, therefore, what more positive roles business might be able to play at all points on the security triangle.

In traditional military operations and conflicts business has two main potential roles, as a supplier and as an actor directly involved. As the former, it can best help by obeying the export controls that are set up by nations and institutions, including the EU, on trade in weapons and other dangerous goods and technologies, and supporting other methods (or even inventing them) to stop high-value commodities like diamonds and oil being traded in ways that strengthen bad states and non-state actors. If the initiative now being led by the UK for an Arms Trade Treaty goes ahead it will need a lot of conscientious support from business in all parts of the world, and more particularly, an improvement in the low (average) level of transparency surrounding defence industry contracts at present.\(^5\)

When it comes to activity in conflict zones, it is reasonable to deplore the use of private business employees as mercenaries or as prison guards and interrogators. This, fundamentally, reveals the failure of the states employing them to live up to their own ambitions and responsibilities for the use of force. But it is less easy to condemn the leasing of air and sea transport from private owners when urgently needed to take peacekeepers to a trouble spot, or the employment of private experts to help retrain local forces to a higher democratic and professional standard after conflict. The best way ahead could be to seek a growing consensus that certain core defence functions simply should not be privatised, while strengthening the framework of specific regulation for companies that provide legitimate services, both in the countries where they are based and in the field of operation. Despite obvious sensitivities, the EU itself seems one of the international fora best placed to study this issue and to offer its own models of best practice.\(^7\)

Business in conflict areas is also a double-edged issue: no one wants entrepreneurs to aggravate the violence, but they are regularly urged to come in after a conflict to help with reconstruction and the re-launch of economic life. Conflict experts now emphasise that the better creation and distribution of wealth (including higher rates of employment) can be the key to a lasting peace and, indeed, to preventing some conflicts before they start. But governmental aid can only go so far, because it creates its own distortions and dependencies. Here, too, the answer may lie in clearer, more universal codes of conduct for business that are designed to maximise its good impact, e.g. through the disciplines of Corporate Social Responsibility, and to deter it from intervening improperly in conflict either directly or through corrupt and collaborative relationships with local players. The line can be genuinely difficult to draw in real situations, but international authorities like the International Committee of the Red Cross have already done good work in providing suitable codes of conduct,\(^2\) and there is a more recent initiative to attach such a code to the UN-backed Global Compact for business, which originally limited itself to non-security-related desiderata.\(^8\)

Examples of business’ role in meeting newer and more indirect threats are easier to identify and on the whole less controversial. Here are a few to illustrate the range:

- blocking the flow of financing to terrorism and breaking its connections with the drugs trade and organised crime;
- stopping the illegal leakage of WMD-related technologies, which now include a very wide range of chemical industry and biotech techniques capable of being put to destructive use, both by terrorists and irresponsible states;
- maximising the security of transport by rail, air and sea;
- maintaining the regularity and quality of energy, food and water supplies and keeping essential transport infrastructures working;
- restoring normal service as fast as possible after emergencies;
- protecting the integrity of cyberspace against viruses and spam;
- developing technologies for environmental protection and for more efficient and sustainable energy use; and
- producing rapid and adequate stocks of new drugs against animal and human epidemics.

What is striking about many of these cases is that the main resources that need to be deployed and properly directed for human protection now belong to business rather than government because of privatisation, and are often controlled by businesses based outside the given community because of multinationalisation and globalisation. No single government could get the right effects just by...
issuing orders to business – let alone by trying to re-nationalise all the functions involved – even if it could be sure itself what the right answers were. There is not space here to discuss the possible governance solutions in any detail, but in general the logic seems to point to a more open and equal dialogue between business and government across the whole security spectrum. Government has a right to ask that business takes its fair share of the security burden, but should also be ready to listen to business’ own experience and advice on how best to calculate the balance of risks and to find the most effective and economical solutions. It is an interesting point for reflection how far these considerations can also be applied at EU level and what more the EU collectively might do to optimise the public-private sector interaction on security across its territories.  

“Civil Society”: and the role of individuals

Ordinary people at the third point of the governance triangle come into the picture in two main ways. First, they have a right and duty to exercise democratic control over the activities both of the governments they elect and, though perhaps by different means, over the companies whose products they buy. Consumer power has in fact proved remarkably effective in restraining a number of business abuses – ethical, social and ecological – up to now and it is worth considering how it might be better applied to tackle companies’ security-related behaviour as well. However, the people cannot play their part in revealing, debating and punishing bad actions across the whole, wide contemporary spectrum of security unless they have access to good and timely information on all the relevant governmental and corporate actions. Even in the EU’s advanced democracies this is still true only to a limited and patchy degree, and it is not always clear whether society itself has the will and the mechanisms to take up its existing opportunities for supervision in the defence and security field.

Second, today’s wide range of risks as well as human beings’ increased mingling and mobility mean that all citizens are in principle liable to get directly involved in security processes of all kinds, including not just “hot” emergencies but also the work of planning before and clearing up afterwards. It is vital to stress that ordinary people should not come into this picture only as victims and should not let themselves be forced into that role. They will suffer doubly if they let their governments treat them like incompetents and take away valuable parts of their rights and freedoms in the name of combating terrorism or any other security menace. But that danger cannot not be avoided by taking the attitude of “a plague on all your houses”, as at least some Europeans seem tempted to do, and refusing to pay any price at all for one’s own and others’ survival. There is no basic human right to live a “desecuritised” life. Europe as an entity has reached a stage of integration where no part of it can count on safety unless its different parts are willing to empathise with, and address the varying threat-pictures and risk exposures of, other European nations and sub-regions. It has reached a stage in the evolution of governance where traditional governments can neither be blindly trusted to do their security jobs without popular scrutiny, nor reasonably relied upon to succeed without support and active participation from their populations down to the individual level.

Conclusion

If two triangles are placed on top of each other in one particular way, they produce the symbol of a star – a figure associated with positive values in many civilisations, including the European. The mobilisation of all three levels of governance to tackle all three dimensions of modern security is not in principle beyond the EU’s reach, and it should be the measure of EU ambition. The goal cannot, of course, be absolute safety and the elimination of threats, which is as unattainable now as at any time in history and probably more so. The last few years have shown yet again how policies seeking immunity for one human group are likely to damage other humans from the outset and to undermine their own protégés’ quality of life before long. What the three-cornered alliance of governments, business and people can best hope to guarantee is the resilience needed for repeated recovery after setbacks, and for the continued positive enjoyment of freedom. If, in Europe’s case, it can also generate a surplus of security to export to the needier governments, private sectors and peoples of other nations and continents, tant mieux.

9 For further discussion of governance solutions, and of EU policies, see the introduction and relevant sections in the SIPRI book written by Burgess, N. and Spence, D. respectively, which can be found in Bailes, A.J.K. and Frommelt, I., (eds.), (2004), Business and security: public-private sector relationships in a new security environment, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
CHAPTER 3: THE GLOBAL CONFLICT BAROMETER

Summary

The Global Conflict Barometer monitors political conflicts across the world, analysing their levels of intensity and the overall levels of conflict, and presents an annual review of changes in the state of conflict from previous years. In 2005, it found that the number of conflicts at the most intense levels decreased slightly, whereas there was an increase in crises involving violence. Violent action was almost exclusively confined to internal conflicts, rather than conflict between states.

Conflict in 2005

During 2005, there were 249 political conflicts (see Table). Two of these were wars and 22 were severe crises, making a total of 24 conflicts being carried out with a massive amount of violence. A further 74 conflicts were classified as crises, meaning violence is used only occasionally. In contrast, there were 151 non-violent conflicts, which can be differentiated in 86 manifest and 65 latent conflicts.

Compared to 2004, the number of conflicts carried out at the highest level of intensity decreased slightly from three to two wars. These two – the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region and the war between the Iraqi Interim Government and predominantly Sunni insurgents – were already at the same level of intensity in the previous year. The third war in 2004, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, de-escalated to a severe crisis. The number of severe crises decreased significantly from 35 to 22, reflecting a significant reduction of conflicts on the two highest intensity levels.

In 2005, 24 high-intensity conflicts were counted, compared to 38 in 2004. The number of crises, representing conflicts of medium intensity, increased strikingly from 35 to 74. On the one hand, this increase signifies the trend of de-escalation since the majority of the past year’s severe crises de-escalated by one level. On the other hand, this development is due to the escalation of some formerly non-violent conflicts to a violent level and eleven new conflicts turning violent in their very first year. The number of conflicts at non-violent intensity levels decreased by three, from 154 to 151.

While manifest conflicts rose from 71 to 86, latent conflicts reduced from 83 to 65. The total number of conflicts has risen from 242 to 249, as six conflicts ended in 2004 and 13 new conflicts emerged in 2005. These are as follows: in Europe, two conflicts ended in 2004 and one new conflict emerged in 2005. In Africa, no conflict ended in 2004, but one is consider-

Conflict Intensities as defined in the Global Conflict Barometer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State of Violence</th>
<th>Intensity Group</th>
<th>Level of Intensity</th>
<th>Name of Conflict</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>non-violent</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Latent Conflict</td>
<td>A positional difference on definable values of national meaning is considered to be a latent conflict if respective demands are articulated by one of the parties and perceived by the other as such.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Manifest Conflict</td>
<td>A manifest conflict includes the use of measures that are located in the preliminary stage to violent force. This includes for example verbal pressure, threatening explicitly with violence, or the imposition of economic sanctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medium</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>A crisis is a tense situation in which at least one of the parties uses violent force in sporadic incidents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violent</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Severe Crisis</td>
<td>A conflict is considered to be a severe crisis if violent force is repeatedly used in an organised way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>high</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>A war is a type of violent conflict in which violent force is used with a certain continuity in an organized and systematic way. The conflict parties exercise extensive measures, depending on the situation. The extent of destruction is massive and of long duration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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When looking at high-intensity conflicts, a continuous and for the most part regular increase is obvious, from seven in 1945 to 38 in 2004. So the latest development of a decrease to 24 high-intensity conflicts in 2005 is quite remarkable.

Three phases of high escalations can be distinguished: 1945 to 1949 from seven to 20, 1976 to 1979 from 22 to 37 and 1989 to 1991, the period that saw the collapse of the Soviet Union, from 31 to 47 marking the overall peak of high-intensity conflicts. Comparing the graphs of high- and medium-intensity conflicts, a diametrical trend is notable in the rise and fall of the curves. When the number of high-intensity conflicts increases, there is a decline in medium-intensity conflicts or crises respectively. This signifies that de-escalating of high-intensity conflicts often remain on a violent level, while crises often escalated to high-intensity conflicts. In many cases, individual conflicts oscillate between the level of a crisis and a severe crises or war.

Conflict by region

The Americas were the region with the lowest total number of conflicts, 24. With a total of 86 out of 249, almost a third of all conflicts in 2005 were located in Asia and Oceania. With 79, this region also had the highest number of low- and medium-intensity conflicts. In terms of crises, Asia and Oceania with 28 was followed by Africa with six fewer, third was Europe with half the number of crises as Africa.

Remarkably, Europe was the third in terms of total number of conflicts, but has – with only one severe crisis, Russia (Chechnya) – the lowest number of high-intensity conflicts. Unlike previous years, Asia and Oceania ranked second in terms of high-intensity conflicts with seven, behind the Middle East and Maghreb where eight high-intensity conflicts were being fought, while Africa was third with five. This is the reverse of recent years, due to the fact that...
the number of high-intensity conflicts remained the same in the Middle East and Maghreb whilst a significant decrease took place in Asia and Oceania and an even greater one in Africa. It is also remarkable that there were no wars in Asia and Oceania for the second year running, and only one war in Africa: Sudan (Darfur), while last year’s other African war de-escalated by one level, Democratic Republic of Congo (various rebel groups).

In the Middle East and Maghreb, as in the previous year, only one war was counted, the same as last year: Iraq (insurgents). Europe was the region with the smallest number of high-intensity conflicts, both in absolute terms (one) and in proportion to the number of states in the region. The Middle East and Maghreb has both the highest proportion of conflicts in total per state and high-intensity conflicts per state. Asia and Oceania may have nearly a third of the world’s conflicts, but fewer conflicts per state than the Middle East and Maghreb, and is also home to more than a third of the world’s population. A comparison of high-intensity conflicts in the regions in 2004 and 2005 shows a significant decrease in Africa (13 to five) and Asia and Oceania (twelve to seven), a slight decrease in the Americas (four to three), while the numbers in Europe (one) and the Middle East and Maghreb (eight) remain the same.

Reasons for conflict

Most conflicts in 2005 concerned ideological differences or were conducted in order to change the political system (67), the second most frequent reason for conflict was the aspiration for national power (53). More than half of the conflicts on national power, but less than half of ideological conflicts were carried out with the use of violence, albeit often only occasionally. None of the disputes on international power – inter-state conflicts – were violent in 2005. Territorial claims, another reason for interstate conflict, are only rarely carried out violently – yet, all violent interstate conflicts in this year concerned territory – whereas the intrastate conflict aims of secession and regional predominance are fought out violently in more than half of the cases. Autonomy, another reason for intrastate conflict, is pursued violently in more than one third of the conflicts, whereas disputes about resources were violent in less than a third of the observed cases. One has to keep in mind that conflicts often have more than one reason, resources being one very frequently mixed with national and international power as well as with regional predominance, autonomy and secession.

Coups d’états

After the 2004 peak of ten attempted coups, there were three successful and no failed coups in 2005. In Mauritania, which for these purposes is considered part of the Middle East and Maghreb region, a group of Republican Guards overthrew the regime of President Maamoa Ould Taya two years after an unsuccessful attempt to oust him. The other two putsches took place in Asia. In Nepal, King Gyanendra sacked the government and imposed a state of emergency on 1 February. In Kyrgyzstan, a coup by the people after fraudulent elections ousted authoritarian President Askar Akayev who fled to Russia in April. 

Terrorism

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Europe has been confronted with this kind of violence for decades, with ETA in Spain or the IRA in Northern Ireland. But with the events of 11 September 2001, terrorism seems to have reached a new quality. Motivated by fundamentalist religious faith, the transnational al-Qaeda network plots attacks – usually suicide attacks – long in advance in order to produce spectacular effects, with massive levels of destruction or many victims, to receive the greatest possible public attention.

This aim was certainly achieved with the 2004 attack on the public transport system in Madrid, Spain, and 2003’s events in Great Britain and Jordan. On 7 July, a series of bomb attacks on London’s public transport system killed 56 people, including the four suicide assassins of British nationality. About 700 people were injured. After the police searched houses in the cities of Leeds, Luton, and Birmingham, the mastermind of the attacks was identified on 14 July: a Pakistani with connections to Osama Bin Laden, head of the Islamist terrorist organisation al-Qeda. On 21 July, four attempted bombings took place in the British capital. Seven suspects were arrested and formally charged.

On 9 November, three hotels in the Jordanian capital Amman were attacked by suicide bombers. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by the Jordanian citizen Abu Mussah al-Zarqawi, claimed responsibility for the terrorist attacks killing 56 people. Despite the fact that such events have an impact on international relations that are challenged by the terrorist threat, they are not taken into account as separate conflicts here. In the cases described, the terrorists’ claims do not refer to conflicts directly carried out between the attacker and the addressee, but are often related to other conflicts, e.g. in Iraq or the Middle East conflict, and aimed at changing the (foreign) policies of the target countries. We do assess terrorist attacks, but only as a measure of conflict conduct and not as separate conflicts. Therefore, conflicts like Iraq (al-Zarqawi group), Israel (Palestinians), Philippines (Abu Sayyah), Spain (Basque provinces), or
the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) are taken into account here. In these cases, terrorist means are used by a conflict party as a measure to pursue its interests that, by our definition, are related to national values.

Changes in individual conflicts

From 2004 to 2005, 171 conflicts remained at the same intensity level. A total of 34 conflicts escalated; nine out of these by two levels, 25 by one. And 31 conflicts de-escalated; seven of these by two levels, 24 by one. Of the nine conflicts that escalated by two levels, all turned from a latent conflict to a crisis. Out of the seven conflicts that de-escalated by two levels, all turned from violent to non-violent: Two former crises transformed to latent conflicts and five severe crises to manifest conflicts. Of 31 de-escalated conflicts, 15 were carried out without violence in 2005.

Measures of conflict resolution

Negotiations

In at least 24 of the 249 current conflicts, talks, negotiations and conferences were conducted at least once during 2005. Conflict parties were most likely to talk to each other in conflicts that were carried out at the two highest intensity levels. The most talks took place in the North Korea vs. USA, South Korea, Japan, conflict, followed by North Korea vs. South Korea, and then Côte d’Ivoire (rebels).

Treaties

A total of 22 treaties or agreements were signed on the regulation of conflicts in 2005; five of these in highly violent conflicts, e.g. in Sudan (Darfur) and Burundi (Hutu). Amongst the total number, three peace treaties were reached – Sudan (SPLM/A), Senegal (MFDC), Indonesia (Aceh) – and three ceasefires concluded – Burundi (Hutu), Côte d’Ivoire (rebels), India (Bodos - Santhals). Nevertheless, these agreements did not result in final resolution of the conflicts concerned. The other deals reached referred to the regulation of procedures or disputed issues, or were of a more general nature such as memorandums of understanding and declarations on principles.

International organisations

At the end of 2005, the United Nations had 18 peacekeeping missions ongoing, including two political missions. Two new peacekeeping operations were established and two ended during the year. On 20 May, the political mission of the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNO-TIL) commenced in order to support the capacity development of critical institutions to strengthen democratic governance, and to help further build peace.

On 24 March, the UN decided to deploy the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) in order to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 9 January, signed by the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). At the end of the year, 3,519 troops were present in Sudan. This mission underlined the growing efforts the UN has been making in Africa in recent years.

In 2004, the UN for the first time provided six missions simultaneously in this conflict- ridden region (ONUB in Burundi, UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire, UNMIL in Liberia, MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone). In 2005, this number, with the Sudan mission, increased to seven concurrent operations.

Therefore, Africa was the region with most UN missions, followed by the Middle East and Maghreb with five ongoing peacekeeping activities (political mission UNAMA in Afghanistan, UNDOF in the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria, MINURSO in Western Sahara, Morocco, UNIFIL in Lebanon, and UNTSO in Israel). As in previous year, the UN maintained three missions in Europe (UNFICYP in Cyprus, UNOMIG in Abkhazia, Georgia and UNMIK in Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro).

Despite the fact that Asia and Oceania was the region with the second highest total number of highly violent conflicts, there were only three active missions (UNMSET then UNOTIL in Eastern Timor, and UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan). UNMSET ended on 20 May, but was succeeded by UNOTIL. A general observation concerning UN peacekeeping missions is that the international community is giving Blue Helmets more robust mandates and is increasing its efforts in violent conflicts. In four cases, UN troops have been assigned to high-intensity conflicts, namely in the war in Sudan (Darfur) as well as in the severe crises in Burundi (Hutu), the Democratic Republic of Congo (Hema - Lendu) and (various rebel groups), and Israel (Palest-

[46]
nians). By October, a total of 61,106 troops from 107 different countries had been assigned to peacekeeping missions. These numbers contrast with 62,790 troops from 103 different countries in 2004. Pakistan contributed most troops (8,183 to 9,914 troops in action during the year) in 2005, followed by Bangladesh (7,932 to 9,457) and India (5,154 to 6,878). 248 to 297 Germans were deployed in five missions.

Apart from peacekeeping missions, the UN can also apply measures which do not involve the use of armed force in order to maintain or restore peace and security. Sanctions represent such measures.

In 2005, the UN maintained sanctions against nine states: Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan. Besides the UN, several regional organisations maintained peacekeeping missions in 2005, e.g. the African Union (AU) in Sudan (Darfur), the Economic and Monetary Council of Central Africa (CEMAC) in the Central African Republic and the Organisation of American States (OAS) in Haiti and Suriname.

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) maintained a total of seven missions, most of them in the Balkans. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is leading peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Authoritative decisions by the ICJ

On 29 September, Costa Rica instituted proceedings against Nicaragua. The case, which added to the eleven cases already pending in 2004, was brought to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague in a dispute concerning navigational and related rights of Costa Rica on the San Juan River.

The ICJ issued three judgments during the past year. On 15 December 2004, the ICJ found that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claims on the “Legality of Use of Force” made by Serbia and Montenegro against Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. On 10 February 2004, the court found that it had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute between Liechtenstein and Germany over “certain property”. On 1 June 2001, Liechtenstein had filed the application for the compensation of its citizens who were expropriated after World War II on former Czechoslovakian territory. On 12 July 2005, the court issued a judgment in the border dispute between Benin and Niger. It determined that the island of Lété Goungou in the River Niger belongs to Niger. There was no advisory case pending in 2005.1

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1 The latest version of the Conflict Barometer was completed at the time we were printing this book; please follow this link to download it: [http://www.hki.de/koalitibarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2006.pdf](http://www.hki.de/koalitibarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2006.pdf)
CHAPTER 4: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT –
THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY DIMENSION OF ESDP

Summary

The EU has increasingly developed a strategic dimension, and has become a global actor. It is recognised that the EU’s profile will to a large extent remain that of a “civilian power”, as diplomacy, trade and development and humanitarian assistance continue to play an essential role to promote security and stability in the world. At the same time, the EU has developed its capabilities necessary to underpin its strategic interests and responsibilities, both in the military and civilian domains, and has achieved a remarkable level of progress within a short period of time. However, in order to meet the increasingly complex challenges of today’s and tomorrow’s contemporary strategic environment, and in order to truly realise its ESDP vision of a coherent and comprehensive approach to crisis management, the utilisation of the civil and military instruments that the EU has at its disposal needs to be further improved, not least in terms of coordination and timely response.

The EU Security Strategy

The European Union has become a global actor sharing in the responsibility for regional and global security. The EU is the most extensive and developed model of political integration of states based on law and freedom. It is also the world’s largest aid donor, and is a top trading power. The European Member States, who share similar strategic and economic interests, must be prepared and able to support, protect or even defend these interests, must be prepared and able to support, protect or even defend these interests, in both a regional and a global scale.

Addressing the strategic challenges and key threats (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destructions, regional conflicts, failed states, and organised crime) the EU believes that none of them can be dealt with by purely military means and that each crisis or crisis region requires an individual, tailored and comprehensive response. Three strategic objectives have been set:

First, given the nature of the new threats, the EU must engage in a timely manner; the ambition being to act, whenever possible, before a crisis occurs or escalates.

Second, the EU puts particular emphasis on creating stability in its strategic neighbourhood; the aim is to promote an arc of well-governed states from the East to the Mediterranean region and Africa.

Finally, the Strategy underlines the importance of international law and the role of the UN, for which the term “effective multilateralism” has been coined.

As a consequence, the ESS has set clear imperatives for ESDP. The EU is determined to become more active, more capable, and more coherent, and is willing to work with partners, on whom it also relies.

European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

Looking at the ESDP in particular, and with a view to establishing the ability to respond to crisis effectively, the challenge has been mainly threefold: first, to set up the necessary planning and decision-making structures and procedures in Brussels; second, to develop the required capabilities, and third, to establish and apply a comprehensive approach to strategy, planning and conduct of missions, which is crucial for mission success.

The Nice European Summit, in 2000, decided to establish the ESDP planning and decision-making structures within the overall EU institutional framework. The ESDP ‘machinery’, which has existed for some six years, consists of the Policy and Security Committee (PSC) providing political control over and strategic guidance on all ESDP activities; the EU Military Committee (EUMC) providing military advice to the PSC and exercises military direction of all military activities within the EU framework; and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) providing civilian advice to the PSC. These Committees are supported by the General
Secretariat of the Council, i.e. the Joint Situation Centre providing the necessary information on the strategic developments and crisis regions, the General Directorate External Affairs (DGE) supporting the PSC and CIVCOM, and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) working for the EUMC whilst at the same time providing in-house military expertise for the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) at the political-strategic level.

**The military dimension**

The **EUMS** is the only fully integrated multinational structure within the European Union. It comprises some 200 staff, both officers seconded from the Member States and civil servants seconded from the General Secretariat (and just recently from the Commission). It is divided into six Divisions each headed by a one star General: Policy and Plans; Intelligence; Operations and Exercise; Logistic and Resources; Communications and Information Systems; and the Civilian/Military Cell.

The **EUMS** contributes to early warning and situation awareness and undertakes strategic planning within the framework of crisis management external to the EU territory (Petersberg Tasks) in accordance with Art 17-2 TEU), as well as additional tasks identified in the European Security Strategy. Its mission also includes doctrine and concept development and force and capabilities development as well as implementing policies and decisions as directed by the EUMC. With respect to Crisis Management Operations, it contributes to the (political-military) Crisis Management Concepts (CMC), it develops Military-Strategic Options (MSO) for military ESDP operations; it monitors ongoing military operations and contributes to the mission reviews. In addition, its responsibilities encompass, in cooperation with the General Directorate for External Affairs (DGE), preparing and conducting crisis management exercises, which are designed to train the planning and decision-making ‘machinery’ both in Brussels and the capitals as well as to train the EU Headquarters at the military-strategic and operational level of command.

EU Command and Control is undertaken on the basis of two options: with or without recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities. The first one is founded in the so-called Berlin-plus arrangements agreed upon by the EU and NATO in 2003. In this case, DSACEUR is appointed the EU Operations Commander acting on the military-strategic level with SHAPE providing the EU Operations Headquarters (OHQ). For the latter case, the so-called autonomous EU operations, without recourse to NATO but using national assets provided by a Framework Nation, a number of EU Member States have offered their national HQ facilities to potentially provide an EU HQ (OHQ and Force HQ (FHQ) respectively, after multinational augmentation (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom).

**ESDP achievements**

Within the six-year timeframe since the year 2000, the European and Defence Policy has seen an astounding tempo of development: ESDP is performing in the field and it is not unrealistic to acknowledge its reality. Moreover, the operational tempo of the EU has increased significantly in recent years and months, as it progressively strives to realise its ambitions.

**Operations / Missions.** The command and control of EU military operations, both under Berlin-plus arrangements and autonomously utilising one of the national parent HQ mentioned above, has been tried and tested, and the arrangements have already proved their effectiveness. In 2003 the EU conducted two operations: Operation CONCORDIA, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with some 400 soldiers (under Berlin Plus), and the autonomous Operation ARTEMIS with some 2 100 soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (with France as Framework Nation).

Since December 2004, the EU has been conducting Operation ALTHEA with about 6 300 soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Berlin Plus); and from 30 July 2006 the autonomous Operation EUFOR RD Congo, with some 2 000 soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to provide assistance to the UN mission MONUC during the DRC electoral process, which envisages a duration of four months.

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1 The Petersberg tasks were established in June 1992 at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (WEU) held at the Petersberg Hotel close to Bonn. On this occasion, the WEU Member States declared their readiness to make available military assets from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of the WEU. The different types of military tasks were defined as humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. These tasks are today expressly included in Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union and form an integral part of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

2 Berlin Plus is a short title for a comprehensive package of agreements between NATO and the EU for their cooperation in terms of crisis management, based on conclusions of the NATO Washington Summit in 1999 and decisions originally taken by NATO in Berlin 1996. It is focusing on provisions and procedures for making available NATO common assets and capabilities to the EU for EU-led military crisis management operations. Berlin Plus is part of a wider Framework of EU-NATO relations that was concluded on 17 March 2003 through an exchange of letters between the SG/HR and SG NATO.
Within the civilian ESDP instrument, an impressive number of missions have been launched since 2003. In Europe, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina is complementing the military Operation ALTHEA, whilst the Police Mission EUPOL PROXIMA, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, followed the EU Operation CONCORDIA and was successfully concluded at the end of 2005. Furthermore, a planning team has been deployed to KOSOVO to start the preparation of a possible police and rule of law mission following an agreement on the future status of the province. In the Caucasus, the Rule of Law Mission EUSTACE DR Congo is also providing assistance to the police, the judiciary and the penitentiary. The Border Assistance Mission EUBAM Rafah in Gaza started in November 2005, and the Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support EUPOL COPPS in Palestine was launched in January 2006. In Africa, EUPOL KINSHASA in the Democratic Republic of Congo is providing assistance to the police reform in the DRC and has been complemented by the advisory and assistance mission EUSEC DR Congo which is advising the government in reconstructing the DRC Armed Forces and, thus, contributing to Security Sector Reform.

Additionally, the EU has been involved in the preparation and conduct of missions combining civilian and military competences. Since the summer of 2004, the EU along with other international partners has provided assistance to the African Union observer mission in Sudan/Darfur, AMIS, in terms of strategic airlift for the African units; military experts dispatched to the AMIS chain of command; military observers in the framework of the Cease-Fire Agreement; and assistance provided by European civilian police officers. Since September 2005 the EU, together with five Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) States is conducting a the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) in Aceh/Indonesia to monitor and verify the implementation of a Memorandum of Understanding agreed between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). Both missions utilise civilian and military expertise and personnel. In this context, it should be pointed out that the EU advisory and assistance mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo EUSEC is also being conducted utilising military expertise.

As a result, the key aspirations of the ESS have been and are being advanced by practice. The EU’s experience in the field has shown that there is no simple sequencing of crisis management instruments, military first and civilian later; and stabilisation and reconstruction efforts are never as civilian as one would wish. Today, almost all military operations need a complementary civilian effort - Bosnia, Afghanistan and DR Congo are cases in point. On the other hand, many of the EU’s civilian crisis management missions do rely on utilising military expertise and personnel (EUSEC DR Congo, Aceh Monitoring Mission), and can benefit from military support. Further, many civilian missions take place in an environment which requires military assistance in the provision of security guarantees (Darfur, Congo, Kosovo).

Capabilities. The strategic imperatives for the ESDP have also been reflected in the EU capabilities development, both in the civilian and the military domain. In 1999 the EU set itself the (military) Headline Goal 2003 aiming to develop the capabilities required to deploy a joint/combinied contingent of up to corps size within 60 days. Based on the forces assigned by Member States to the Force Catalogue 2003, the EU’s assessment is that it now has the operational capability across the full range of the Petersberg Tasks, from humanitarian operations through peacekeeping to peace enforcement - although limited and constrained by a number of significant shortfalls. These deficiencies are comparable with those suffered by the European NATO Allies and pertain mainly to those strategic capabilities that are essential for rapid deployment and sustainment of operations far abroad: strategic deployability, strategic reconnaissance, sustainment, and command, control and communications.

The evolving strategic environment and its new challenges have given cause for the EU to move capability-building to a new dimension. In 2003 the EU decided that it needed to look beyond the immediate future and set new goals for the further development of ESDP capabilities with a horizon of 2010, reflecting the European Security Strategy and drawing on lessons learned from EU-led operations. Experience to date clearly indicates that to achieve the enhanced ESDP goals five factors are essential for effective crisis response, namely:

- Timely reaction; this suggests anticipatory, rather than reactionary, action and should not only aim to respond to crises but rather to better to detect and identify potential instability before it deteriorates and so manage potential crisis situations;
- Establishing and following a clear political-strategic objective and end-state;
- Tailoring to specific requirements of an individual crisis or region;
Making optimal use of all the civilian and military crisis management instruments at the EU’s disposal provided by both Member States and the European Commission and enhancing effectiveness through better coordination.

Providing cooperation with all relevant international actors and organisations.

Thus, new tasks were added to the ESDP portfolio of possible operations, reflecting the EU’s comprehensive approach to crises management and focusing on Security Sector Reform including Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, which required a revised Headline Goal - Headline Goal 2010. It clearly focuses on rapid response and brings qualitative criteria to bear on EU capability development. In support of the Headline Goal Force Planning Process and the determination of the required capabilities to enable an effective response to crises, the EUMS has developed new, illustrative scenarios, which translate the European Security Strategy and Headline Goal 2010 into possible situations for ESDP operations, including the potential for separation of parties by force, embargoes, disarmament, military advisory roles, post conflict stabilisation or consequence management following a natural or man-made disaster, including a terrorist attack. The aim is to determine the capabilities required and to identify Illustrative Force Packages to the support an effective response to crises.

The EU Battlegroups Concept is a salient model and specific form of the EU’s rapid response elements providing a minimum militarily effective, coherent joint force package capable of stand-alone operations or for the initial phase of larger operations. The ambition is to be capable of sustaining two concurrent BG operations on a permanent basis, each sustainable for 30 days, extendable to 120 days, out of a set of BG the Member States have committed themselves to provide by 2007. Since the beginning of this year the EU has had an interim operational capability able to launch one BG operation, it envisages a full capability able to launch two BG operations at a time.

Regarding the development of the civilian instruments, in furtherance to its coherent and comprehensive approach the EU, in the framework of the ESDP, has established five priority areas to support the civilian dimension of crisis management: police, rule of law, civil administration, civil protection, and monitoring; these priority areas are complemented by specific capabilities required to support EU Special Representatives in the various regions. At the end of 2004 the EU Member States committed themselves to assign an impressive number of civilian experts to the various priority areas (i.e. police officers: 5,700; rule of law experts: 630; civil administration experts: 560), of whom five agreed to create a multi-national European Gendarmerie Force (EFG) capable of filling a specific gap between police and military capabilities in the field. However, currently the EU is unable to deploy larger scale “hard” civilian missions into crisis areas at short notice. Member States’ civilian capabilities are drawn from scarce resources committed to domestic affairs. At present there is no standby capacity (mirroring that of military forces) available for deployment with coherent, structured, trained and equipped forces and, thus, no coherent civilian rapid response capability.

In an effort to rectify this shortfall, the EU decided to adopt the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. It defines the strategic parameters for civilian crisis management with a systematic development of civilian capabilities. Generally, the approach is modelled on what has been done previously in the field of military capability planning and will lead to the creation of generic, multifunctional Civilian Capabilities Packages, such as the Crisis Response Teams consisting of experts from Member States that are available for deployment at short notice, and the Integrated Police Units.

In sum, notwithstanding the specific capability shortfalls identified above, the EU is particularly well-equipped to meet the challenges of the contemporary strategic environment using a wide range of complementary instruments - from trade, aid and diplomacy to civilian and military means. The EU is ready, and able, to take its place within the necessary international community toolkit of instruments and capabilities, and, as advocated by the European Security Strategy, the EU is willing to play its part in multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors in order to generate the required elements necessary to address a specific situation. These elements should be able to complement each other in a coherent way, throughout the entire crisis management process, from conflict prevention and crisis resolution to cessation of conflicts and post-conflict stabilisation. Consequently, there is a need for consistency in handling the suitable means across the various levels of authority/command, in terms of both planning and implementation.

Civilian-Military coordination and cooperation

As a consequence, there is one concept which is crucial for success of coherent civil-military crisis management, which everybody in Brussels is soughing like a mantra and which at the same time is our biggest challenge: coordination. Given the multitude of
The Strategic Planning Branch is made up of the Operations Centre Permanent Staff.

To better meet these challenges, the Civilian/Military Cell is made up of two entities, the Strategic Planning Branch and the EU Operations Centre Permanent Staff.

The Civilian-Military Cell

In order to take civilian-military coordination a step further, both within the ESDP structures and between the Council Secretariat and the Commission, a standing, fully integrated civilian-military body has been created within the Secretariat/EU%M: the Civilian-Military Cell (CCM). It is the place for early integration of civilian and military expertise, including the Commission, when planning for crisis management requiring a joint civilian-military response. In order to realise a proactive approach of identifying opportunities to pursue EU strategic objectives and to act in anticipation of crises, there is a requirement to create the necessary time to take advantage of such an initiative. Unlocking this necessary time and engaging all EU actors with a role in crisis management from the earliest phases of crisis management planning is key. Such an approach will enable the EU to be more active in the pursuit of its strategic objectives: distinguishing identification and action allows more time to study, plan, decide and act. The more time is used for contingency planning, the easier it becomes to decide what EU action is appropriate. It also allows greater flexibility to either increase our decision time or reduce the length of time before action - which is of particular importance for rapid response. The better the EU can coordinate - or even integrate - its civilian and military means, both during the planning and implementation phase, the more its response will be effective and tailored to the complexity of a particular crisis.

To better meet these challenges, the Civilian/Military Cell is made up of two entities, the Strategic Planning Branch and the EU Operations Centre Permanent Staff.

• The Strategic Planning Branch is made up of a number of military and civilian planners, including two Commission colleagues. It undertakes Strategic Contingency Planning that is prudent, comprehensive advance planning at the political-strategic level. Such planning will be developed for possible ESDP engagements, taking account of the EU's strategic objectives, including strategic options for the various instruments and outline resource requirements. The aim of this planning is to enhance the EU's capacity for rapid action although it will not prejudice the ultimate political decision taken by the Council of the European Union, to proceed with an option. Once the EU has decided to respond to a specific crisis and to launch a mission to a crisis region, the Cell provides assistance to Crisis Response Strategic Planning for single strand operations, civilian or military, carried out under the responsibility of the appropriate Secretariat service, building upon the previously undertaken Strategic Contingency Planning. In terms of future joint civil/military operations, the Cell develops strategic options - the ultimate goal being to develop joint options in a comprehensive manner, including both civilian and military aspects. Taking account of the inter-pillar dimension the Commission is able to contribute during all planning steps.

• The Operations Centre Permanent Staff (PermStaff) is responsible for maintaining the capability plan and running an autonomous EU operation - in particular where a joint civilian/military response is required and where no national HQ is identified. The PermStaff forms the Key Nucleus of the EU Operations Centre that will be activated upon Council decision. An Initial Operating Capability, that is the ability to plan, has to be achieved within five days by using the Key Nucleus reinforced by essentially “double-hatted” staff from the EU Military Staff. Full Operational Capability, the ability to plan and operate, must be reached within 20 days of activation with further reinforcement of pre-identified personnel from civilian counterparts within the Secretariat and additional personnel from Member States.

Additionally, the Civilian/Military Cell is to support the planning, coordination and conduct of civilian operations; it has already assisted in the planning of the civilian mission in Aceh/Indonesia as well as for the Rafah mission in the Palestinian Territories, thus illustrating the possibilities of close civil-military cooperation. Moreover, it contributes to the development of concepts, doctrine and procedures for civilian/military operations and the EU Operations Centre, which will

3 Following the decision of the Heads of State and Government, the Civilian/Military Cell was decided by the European Council in December 2003. It is part of a “package” that was tied up to enhance, on the one hand, the relationship between NATO and the EU and, on the other hand, the EU's capacity for planning and running autonomous ESDP operations. As a consequence, this package comprises - alongside the Cell - three additional elements: the EU Operations Centre, the Permanent EU Cell at Shape, and the Permanent NATO Liaison with the EU Military Staff.
allow the EU to conduct an operation in the event that neither NATO nor one of the Member States Operational HQs is available.

Notwithstanding its civilian and military set-up, including representation from the Commission, the Civilian/Military Cell cannot be considered as the only solution for all identified requirements in the field of civil-military coordination. Rather, its role is very much a “system integrator”, a facilitating entity to link the inputs from across the EU and, whilst avoiding unnecessary duplication, to pull the individual expert strands of work together in order to produce a more coherent and comprehensive product. It is here, in facilitating comprehensive contingency planning in focussed anticipation of potential crisis situations and identified opportunities to pursue EU strategic objectives, that the Civilian/Military Cell can bring the most added value to comprehensive crisis management and timely response. And it is anticipated that its work will lead to a greater coherence between the civilian and military structures.

**A coherent approach is the only approach**

With a coherent joint approach, the identification of the most appropriate assets to generate the necessary effect in the field should enable a more systematic use of assets and so reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium term, contribute to increased capability. Ergo, a more capable Europe will be enabled by more and better coherence. Just as it is the political will of Member States to act or not, it is the institutional will of the various EU bodies to act together that will enable the EU to achieve what we are ultimately striving for – a comprehensive approach to crisis management.

Whilst the Civilian/Military Cell can be considered as a standing body for civil-military coordination within the Council Secretariat, this is still not enough. Europe has achieved a European telephone number Henry Kissinger was asking for long ago to discuss international issues; it is the number of the SG/HR. However, in terms of external policy the EU needs to speak with one voice, and in this respect, the Council and the Commission need to be further interlocked. It remains to be seen whether the ongoing discussions on the future of the constitution treaty will lead to further progress in this regard.
What is civilian crisis response?

The term “civilian crisis response” is peculiar to the EU. No other international security organisation uses it, and few know precisely what is meant by it. Nor is it defined precisely within the EU context, where the scope of activities it encompasses remains unclear. There are two readings of the term in common use. In the first narrow interpretation, crisis response refers principally to humanitarian action performed by civilians to provide relief and protection to those affected by a crisis, be it the result of a natural disaster or a man-made conflict. In this case, the European Commission and the European Commission’s Humanitarian Office (ECHO) are the main institutional actors responsible for managing the response. In line with this interpretation, EU civilian crisis response is distinct from “EU civilian crisis management”, a term commonly used in connection with the deployment of Member States civilian personnel to assist with efforts to strengthen or rebuild state structures that uphold the rule of law. These operations are conducted through the inter-governmental framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), supported by the Council Secretariat. The European Security Strategy, agreed in late 2003, appears to confirm the distinction in describing the appropriate mix of EU instruments required to respond to failed states where “humanitarian means [are needed] to tackle the immediate crisis…and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government.”

The second broader reading of what is meant by civilian crisis response can be defined negatively, in terms of what it is not, i.e. a military policy or intervention using military instruments. In this interpretation the EU’s civilian crisis response capability includes all non-military instruments and activities that are employed to prevent or respond to a crisis. This includes all diplomatic and assistance activities deployed within the context of ESDP, as well as the range of activities linked to the provision of emergency relief, protection, mediation, post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction supported and managed by the European Commission. This book uses the broader definition. It explores the short-term crisis response instruments managed by the Commission, including: the Rapid Reaction Mechanism that provided support for political mediation in Aceh; the Civil Protection Mechanism that coordinates the EU’s combined civil protection assistance; and ECHO’s role in delivering EU humanitarian relief in crisis situations. It also explores the civilian capabilities that have been developed in the framework of the ESDP and examines how these have been deployed in practice in the Balkans and Aceh, Indonesia. Similarly, this introductory overview of the EU’s emerging capacities in this field is broad in scope. It describes the main trends and issues in the development of both EC and ESDP instruments and concludes with a brief analysis of the overarching challenge of how best to optimise the overall EU crisis response effort through better coordination of EU instruments and activities.

Summary

This Chapter provides an introductory overview of the EU’s emerging capacities in civilian crisis response. It adopts a broad definition of these capacities, whereby civilian crisis response encompasses diplomatic and assistance activities deployed within the inter-governmental context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), as well as the range of activities linked to the provision of emergency relief, protection, mediation, post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction managed by the European Commission. It describes a range of relevant European Commission (EC) and ESDP instruments; notes the principal trends and issues in their development; and concludes with a brief analysis of the overarching challenge of how best to optimise the overall EU crisis response through better coordination of EU instruments and activities.
with the overarching objectives set out in the Treaty establishing the Economic Commission (TEC), notably the “promotion of stable conditions for human and economic development and the promotion of human rights, democracy and fundamental freedoms” and the “political commitment to pursue conflict prevention as one of the main objectives of the EU’s external relations” agreed in the 2001 Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. A range of instruments has been established to deliver Commission assistance in pre-, active, and post-crisis situations. These include instruments to relieve suffering in line with humanitarian principles, as well as mechanisms designed to support political stabilisation processes, where the EC can fund efforts to: defuse a crisis; foster stability during periods of transition; safeguard human rights and strengthen democratic processes; and restart the process of economic and social development. In order to deliver this assistance in a strategic, timely and accountable way, the Commission has developed a number of geographic and specialised sectoral financial instruments. Figure 1 provides a list of the main relevant funding instruments that are used to disburse EC assistance.

![Figure 1: European Commission instruments for civilian crisis response](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Possible actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Aid</td>
<td>Short term - emergency relief; humanitarian demining; emergency rehabilitation; reconstruction; and civil protection. Longer term - disaster preparedness, services to refugee populations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Protection</td>
<td>Supports and facilitates European civil protection assistance in the event of major disasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)</td>
<td>Short term – technical assessment and fact finding missions. Six month projects in field such as: mediation, arbitration, reconciliation; rule of law and civilian administration; rehabilitation and reconstruction; civil society development; high level policy advice; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Longer term – can finance the first phase of longer term relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)</td>
<td>Short term – human rights monitoring and observer missions; support for elections; conciliation; support to international criminal tribunals; rehabilitation of victims of torture; promotion of the rule of law; independent media. Longer term – promotion of human rights, support for minorities, ethnic groups and indigenous peoples, promotion of international humanitarian law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and Reconstruction</td>
<td>Short term – rehabilitation of basic infrastructure; mine clearance; social reintegration of refugees, displaced persons; demobilisation and reintegration. Longer term – relaunch of production, restoration of institutional capacities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food aid and Food security</td>
<td>Short term – provision of foodstuffs, supply of seeds, fertiliser, tools etc., drinking water. Longer term – creation of food reserves, rural credit, early warning systems etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Development Fund (EDF)</td>
<td>Provides an integrated framework for funding development and security activities in the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) region, including inter alia: support for mediation; negotiation and reconciliation efforts; management of scarce resources; Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration; Security Sector Reform; actions to control small arms and light weapons; support to elections; and support to justice sector reform. Support to African Peace Facility, which supports African Union peacekeeping operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Article 177(2) of the Treaty establishing the Economic Commission (TEC).
Of these instruments, it is the EC’s short-term instruments that are designed to be mobilised rapidly in the event of an emergency or conflict that are typically considered “crisis response” instruments. Some of the principal ongoing capacity developments in relation to these instruments are highlighted below.

**Humanitarian action – providing rapid relief on the basis of need**

Humanitarian aid is an important element of the EC’s assistance delivered in response to a crisis. However, it is not a crisis management tool in the sense that it is delivered solely on the basis of need, and cannot be subsumed to the political logic of crisis management. EC humanitarian assistance is channelled from the European Commission’s Humanitarian Office (ECHO), which in 2005 made funding decisions of over €652 million, mostly channelled through European NGOs (51%), the specialised agencies of the UN (33%), the Red Cross family (12%). ECHO is present in some 70 countries and its focus on vulnerable countries and rapid funding procedures ensure that the EC is a frontline donor in sudden disasters. Rapid relief on the basis of need, and cannot be subsumed to the political logic of crisis management. EC humanitarian assistance is channelled from the European Commission’s Humanitarian Office (ECHO), which in 2005 made funding decisions of over €652 million, mostly channelled through European NGOs (51%), the specialised agencies of the UN (33%), the Red Cross family (12%). ECHO is present in some 70 countries and its focus on vulnerable countries and rapid funding procedures ensure that the EC is a frontline donor in sudden disasters.

One example of how this capability is being developed is the decision to strengthen the political logic of crisis management. EC humanitarian assistance is channelled from the European Commission’s Humanitarian Office (ECHO), which in 2005 made funding decisions of over €652 million, mostly channelled through European NGOs (51%), the specialised agencies of the UN (33%), the Red Cross family (12%). ECHO is present in some 70 countries and its focus on vulnerable countries and rapid funding procedures ensure that the EC is a frontline donor in sudden disasters. Rapid relief on the basis of need, and cannot be subsumed to the political logic of crisis management. EC humanitarian assistance is channelled from the European Commission’s Humanitarian Office (ECHO), which in 2005 made funding decisions of over €652 million, mostly channelled through European NGOs (51%), the specialised agencies of the UN (33%), the Red Cross family (12%). ECHO is present in some 70 countries and its focus on vulnerable countries and rapid funding procedures ensure that the EC is a frontline donor in sudden disasters. Rapid relief on the basis of need, and cannot be subsumed to the political logic of crisis management. EC humanitarian assistance is channelled from the European Commission’s Humanitarian Office (ECHO), which in 2005 made funding decisions of over €652 million, mostly channelled through European NGOs (51%), the specialised agencies of the UN (33%), the Red Cross family (12%). ECHO is present in some 70 countries and its focus on vulnerable countries and rapid funding procedures ensure that the EC is a frontline donor in sudden disasters. Rapid relief on the basis of need, and cannot be subsumed to the political logic of crisis management. EC humanitarian assistance is channelled from the European Commission’s Humanitarian Office (ECHO), which in 2005 made funding decisions of over €652 million, mostly channelled through European NGOs (51%), the specialised agencies of the UN (33%), the Red Cross family (12%).

In the event of a natural or man-made emergency, the EC is responsible for coordinating Member State’s assistance to protect affected civilians through the EC Civil Protection Mechanism. The heart of this system is the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), which transmits requests for assistance and coordinates the delivery of material and specialist teams made available by Member States. While the majority of the costs of civil protection are borne directly by participating Member States, the EC Civil Protection Mechanism has a budget of some €7 million that funds common activities such as training, exchange of experts and the mobilisation of assessment and coordination teams. In the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami, the EC engaged in a number of efforts to enhance the situation assessment and operational planning capacity of the Civil Protection Mechanism. These include: increasing the planning and analytical capacity of the MIC; increasing EU-level training and exercises, identifying and committing national teams and key equipment for European disaster response, and increasing financial resources for hiring equipment that Member States are not in a position to supply, e.g. aircraft. Moreover, in recognition that short-term crisis response needs to be informed of and coordinated with long-term reconstruction and development efforts, the Commission is pioneering a new cross-sectoral planning tool to better coordinate the total EC crisis response effort. This is the establishment of “Assessment and Planning Teams (APTs)” comprised of EC officials from Brussels and the Commission’s 134 country delegations, representations, and technical offices with relevant regional or sectoral expertise. The teams will be deployed at short notice for up to one month. Working in cooperation with the UN and the World Bank, these teams will kickstart the process of planning for rehabilitation and reconstruction, including by identifying projects that might require emergency assistance. This should foster a more integrated approach to the delivery of EC assistance in the aftermath of a crisis and is designed to ensure that emergency assistance is conflict-sensitive and lays the foundations for long-term sustainable development.

**The Rapid Reaction Mechanism – rapid funding for actions to promote political stability**

The Rapid Reaction Mechanism is a funding mechanism that was established in 2001 to allow the Commission to rapidly disperse funds with the explicit purpose of promoting political stability. With an annual budget of €30 million it can be used to finance civilian activities aimed at countering or resolving emerging crisis and serious threats or outbreaks of conflict. It has been used to support one-off short-term actions such as support to peace negotiations or to start-up projects that will subsequently be funded by long-term EC development assistance or other donors. Examples of activities supported are provided in Figure 2.

One of the reasons that the RRM is not used more widely is that it can only fund actions

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4 In the next financial perspective (2007-2013), these funds will be channelled through the new Instrument for Stability.


6 This is based on Council Regulation (EC) 381/2001.
for up to six months. Given the long lead-times of regular financing of development projects, this is not sufficient to secure follow-on funding through the EC’s long-term instruments. However, the radical restructuring of funding instruments in the new financial perspective 2007-2013 should address this, with the creation of a new Stability Instrument to fund actions to promote political stability, including in countries affected by crisis, for up to two years.

Geographic instruments – long-term development assistance to prevent conflict and build peace.

The principal funding instrument for development in the Africa, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) region is the European Development Fund. This totalled 13.5 billion from 2000 to 2007. The EDF budget funds activities in line with the Cotonou Agreement, which sets out the objectives and rules for funding development and security-related activities in the region. These explicitly include support for mediation, negotiation and reconciliation and demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants into society.7

Development and economic assistance cooperation in other regions is funded from other geographic instruments or individual country budgets within the EU external relations budget heading. In total, these regional programmes total some €5 billion per annum. All can be used for activities relating to post-conflict reconstruction and institutional capacity-building. While it is difficult to establish what proportion of funding is directed to activities related to post-crisis reconstruction and peacebuilding due to the lack of appropriate classification codes, a recent review of country and regional strategy papers conducted by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Development suggested that €2 billion out of a global programmable envelope of €10 billion was allocated to “governance-related” activities.8 For illustrative purposes (the list is by no means exhaustive), a selection of peacebuilding activities supported by EDF and EC development funds is provided in Figure 3.9

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7 See Article 11, paragraph 3 of the Cotonou Agreement, signed on 23 June 2000.
Challenges for EC crisis response

Whereas the EU’s relatively new ambition to play a more effective role in the prevention and management of conflict is principally pursued through the intergovernmental channels of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the ESDP, the EC’s heritage in crisis response is firmly rooted in traditional humanitarian and developmental approaches to the delivery of assistance. While there is broad policy consensus that optimising the EU crisis response effort requires a more integrated response to the overall EU effort, there are nevertheless real differences in practice that are generated by these different traditions, structures and instruments. Some of the principal challenges facing the EC in connection with increasing its crisis response capacity are related to how best to reconcile these differences and strengthen the links between the EC’s efforts to provide short-term relief and long-term assistance aimed at promoting human security and development.

Linking relief, rehabilitation and development

The recognition of “gaps” between humanitarian assistance and long-term development cooperation has resulted in proposals within the EC on how best to improve the link between relief, rehabilitation and development. These have built on the understanding that, at least in response to conflict-related crises, all three types of activity may be undertaken simultaneously and will need to be responsive to the unfolding political situation. In the case of short-term instruments, a common charge is that EC emergency assistance is not sufficiently informed by local political knowledge and analysis and relief efforts can exacerbate underlying local political tensions. EC reflections on how to address the associated challenges, notably the 2001 EC Communication on this issue, have stressed the need for better strategic planning and disaster preparedness, improved inter-
nal and external coordination measures as well as efforts to make EC development funding more agile and able to respond to changing needs and political opportunities. Many of the reforms proposed are far-reaching in so far as they require adjustments to the funding decision-making procedures (through addenda to Country Strategy Papers), a rationalisation and simplification of financial instruments, and a re-evaluation of implementing partners. These reforms are ongoing and the relatively slow pace of their implementation demonstrates the inherent difficulty of efforts to sensitise different communities of aid workers to a broader range of humanitarian, development and security imperatives.

**Balancing sustainability with flexibility and political reform**

To ensure sustainability of development through local ownership, EC development assistance typically works with partner countries in the formulation of long-term funding programmes and in many cases, including all African countries, partner governments have codecision rights over EC funding plans. The decision-making requirements of co-ownership have led to lengthy development programming and project management cycles. EC development funding strategies are therefore ill-adapted to crisis response and prohibit rapid adjustments to EC funding priorities in light of political crises and/or decisions to launch ESDP actions. Moreover, despite an elaborate policy framework to justify the mainstreaming of human rights, democratisation, governance and an increasing emphasis on human security throughout the EC’s long-term assistance, this is often difficult to reconcile with the practice of developing multi-year National Indicative Programmes to guide the provision of assistance in collaboration of the recipient states. Partner countries generally favour “concrete” assistance in traditional areas such as infrastructure to more politically sensitive governance-related assistance. As a result, projects designed to promote political stability and manage reform processes present a small proportion of EC assistance even in countries affected by conflict. Over and above these decision-making obstacles to linking security and development activities, the Commission still lacks the capacity at headquarters and in delegations to maximise its potential in promoting reform agendas in conflict or post-conflict situations. While efforts are being made to promote more political agendas in Country Strategy Papers and the process of decentralisation of Commission staff and decision-making authority to the EC’s 134 delegations should provide for more locally attuned funding decisions, the capacity of the EC to implement conflict-sensitive project design and assessment still needs to be developed.

Thus, despite a growing recognition that short-term actions should be informed by long-term development and peacebuilding considerations and long-term development plans more flexible and capable of reacting to short-term threats or opportunities, current practices and capabilities still hamper EC ambitions to achieve a more joined-up approach to crisis response.

**The emerging ESDP civilian crisis response capacity**

The EU’s experience in the Balkans in the 1990s was an unhappy one and it is widely recognised that the EU’s failure to have a more constructive and active role during the Kosovo war prompted the development of the ESDP, and with it the EU’s ability to use military instruments for crisis response. Likewise the development of the civilian aspects of the ESDP has its origins in the crisis of Kosovo, and in particular the EU’s attempt to bring peace to Kosovo after the NATO led intervention in March 1999. One key flashpoint was Mitrovica and the lack of an international policing capacity or strategy to address public order challenges was keenly felt to be a security gap that the EU should be in a position to fill. The EU therefore first focused on how civilian forces could help complement the military in providing public order in the immediate post-conflict phase, albeit also recognising that this also required a law to enforce. This explains the initially narrow approach to developing civilian capabilities in the framework of the ESDP, agreed at the Helsinki European Council in 1999.

The method that the EU adopted to raise capacity modeled the approach used to generate military capacity. This involved establishing concrete quantitative targets (Headline Goals) in each of four identified priority areas, followed by pledging conferences in which Member States voluntarily committed a specific quantity of resources. The first Headline Goals were agreed at the Feira European Council in 2000 and, before the first EU civilian crisis management mission (EU Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina) was launched in 2003 they had been formally met (see Figure 4).

This goal-oriented process is suited to the EU context in which peer pressure is crucial and has also been adopted in other areas, notably the defence capabilities (hardware) generation efforts that are overseen by the European Defence Agency. Nevertheless, the methodology initially placed little emphasis on quality or form, a shortcoming that was subsequently addressed in the second phase of capability
development – Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008). This was endorsed at the December 2004 European Council when new qualitative targets to conduct concurrent missions at different levels of engagement were set. It also introduced greater flexibility into the form of potential deployments (opening the way for integrated police and rule of law missions). Finally, it broadened the range of activities to include monitoring missions and a range of generic support functions for missions and EU Special Representatives, including experts in human rights, gender and security sector reform. In short, it signalled that EU capabilities would be developed to respond to the broader needs of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding after the initial post-conflict phase in which the principal focus was on violence control. Most recently in June 2005, it was agreed that rapidly deployable multifunctional Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) should be created to further improve mission planning of ESDP operations and provide a potential surge capacity. These should be able to be mobilised and deployed within five days of a request from the Council and will be drawn from a pool of experts from Member States, with their functional composition designed on the basis of need.

Despite the successful generation of sufficient numbers of experts “on paper”, Member States nevertheless struggle to find sufficient numbers of experts in response to actual calls for contributions to specific missions. Extracting civilian experts from their national duties is a new and complex task and Member States are at the early stages of exploring what legislative, financial and procedural mechanisms might be put in place to help identify, mobilise and train available talent for such international missions.

Figure 4: ESDP civilian personnel capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority area</th>
<th>Activities supported</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Numbers pledged (Nov 2004)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>The 2000 Feira targets included a range of policing tasks including substitution policing missions (executive tasks) as well as supportive “monitoring, mentoring and advising” functions.</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>The Gothenburg Council of June 2001 set the target for experts in rule of law, where this includes judges, lawyers, public prosecutors and penitentiary personnel.</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Administration</td>
<td>The ambition established at Feira in 2000 was to be able to set up or ensure functional administrative frameworks while promoting transition to local ownership as soon as possible.</td>
<td>No concrete target set</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Protection</td>
<td>Although precise targets were set at Feira no progress has been made within an ESDP context because civil protection is being dealt with through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism managed by the Commission (see above).</td>
<td>23 assessment teams of 10 experts with a total rapid deployment capacity of 2 000.</td>
<td>4 445 including all teams pledged by Member States and 579 individual experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>Functional monitoring tasks might include monitoring: cease fire agreements; Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR); border monitoring; refugee return; human rights; political and security developments; and confidence building measures.</td>
<td>No concrete target set</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generic support functions</td>
<td>Expertise is sought in the following areas: Security Sector Reform, DDR, mediation, border control, human rights and media policy. These experts are to be incorporated into ESDP missions or would support the EU Special Representatives.</td>
<td>No concrete target set</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Civilian ESDP structures and operations

Although the 1999 Helsinki European Council laid the groundwork for both the military and civilian aspects of the ESDP, there was initially no parity in the design of decision-making structures for the civilian aspects of crisis management. While Member States were quick to recognise the need for a specialised Military Committee to prepare the decisions of the ultimate ESDP decision-making body – the Political and Security Committee (PSC), there was little support for parallel decision-making procedures to be set up in the civilian sphere. This was only agreed after the 2001 Swedish Presidency insisted on establishing a “Committee on the non-military aspects of crisis management” – now commonly referred to as CIVCOM.

Civilian crisis management nevertheless remains the poor brother of its military sibling in Council structures. The Council Secretariat has not been reinforced to conduct civilian tasks with anything like the same level of resources as have been dedicated to build-up of EU military capacity. Thus while there are over 130 military staff in the EU Military Staff, conducting strategic planning, there are around 45 working on civilian aspects (in DG E IX of the Council Secretariat). Moreover, these are responsible for strategic and operational planning as well as mission support. Given the increasing number and scope of civilian missions as well as the inherent challenges in building up a civilian intervention capacity from scratch, the capacity of the Council Secretariat is overstretched. The EU is currently discussing how mission support capacity, in particular, should be strengthened.

Given that the civilian aspects of crisis management appear to be ranked lower in the EU crisis management hierarchy in terms of structures and resources, it is perhaps paradoxical that the civilian aspects of the ESDP have made the fastest operational progress. This is reflected in the increasing scope and number (now totaling 12) of missions since 2003 (see Figure 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type and size</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUPM</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Police 500 officers</td>
<td>Launched after expiry of the UN led International Police Task Force’s (IPTF) mandate. Wide mandate - addressed whole range of rule of law aspects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL PROXIMA</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Police 200 personnel</td>
<td>At the invitation of President Trajkovisiki. EU police experts are monitoring, mentoring and advising the country’s police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU JUST THEMIS</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Rule of Law 10 international experts</td>
<td>Assisted in guiding the reform of the criminal justice sector. 10 international experts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL Kinshasa</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>Police 30 personnel</td>
<td>Response to an invitation of the DRC government. The objective of the mission is to provide monitoring, mentoring and advice to the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) under the Congolese line of command and to ensure that the actions of the IPU are in line with international police best practices. <strong>EUPOL Kinshasa is one component of an EU inter-pillar operation</strong> to establish the IPU. The European Commission is providing support to the IPU in the form of training and provision of equipment and refurbishment of a training centre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC-R.D. Congo</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>Security Reform 8 seconded experts</td>
<td>On request of the DRC Government. Provides advice and assistance for security sector reform in the DRC with the aim of contributing to a successful integration of the Congolese army.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EUSEC-R.D. Congo and EUPOL Kinshasa are part of a broader EU response to the crisis in DRC financed through different instruments and include the appointment of an EU special Representative for the Great Lakes, the military operation Artemis, support to the electoral process, justice sector reform, rehabilitation and DDR.

**EUJUST LEX**  
July 2005 ongoing  
Iraq  
Rule of Law  
On the invitation of the interim Iraqi Government, EUJUST LEX will provide training for high and middle level Iraqi officials from the police, judiciary and penitentiary sectors.

**AMIS II E CIVPOL**  
August 2005 ongoing  
Darfur, Sudan  
Police 16 EU police officers  
On request of the AU and part of an EU "consolidated package" in support of the CIVPOL (civilian police) component AMIS II, the AU’s proactive ceasefire monitoring mission in Darfur. Involves: support for the AMIS CIVPOL chain of command; support for the training of CIVPOL personnel; support for the development of a police planning unit within the AU secretariat. The consolidated package is part of a broader EU response to the crisis in Darfur financed through different instruments, including the Africa Peace Facility. Actions have included support for humanitarian assistance, support of the political process, diplomatic involvement (appointment of an EU special representative), as well as contributions to AMIS.

**AMM**  
September 2005  
ongoing (six months)  
Aceh, Indonesia  
Conducted with countries from Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as with Norway and Switzerland. Designed to monitor the implementation of aspects of the peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) including: the demobilisation of GAM, decommissioning of weapons and explosives, legislation change, the reintegration of GAM and human rights. The mission follows and is flanked by EC actions, including support for the negotiations that led to the peace agreement and development assistance.

**EU BAM Rafah**  
November 2005 ongoing  
Palestine  
Border Assistance 70 personnel  
On invitation of the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel on the basis of their "Agreement of Movement and Access". Operates at the Rafah Crossing Point (Gaza-Egypt border). Provides a Third Party presence and contributes to the opening of the Rafah Crossing Point.

**EU BAM**  
November 2005 ongoing (2-year mandate)  
Moldova – Ukraine  
Border assistance 69 experts from Member States 50 local staff  
Provides capacity-building assistance in the area of custom and border controls and border surveillance. Strengthens cross-border cooperation and build confidence.

**EUPAT**  
December 2005 ongoing  
Macedonia  
Police 30 police advisors  
Follows the termination of the mandate of PROXIMA.

**EUPOL COPPS**  
January 2006  
Palestine  
Police 33 personnel  
Contributes to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership.

*Bold indicates elements of cooperation or integration with other activities.*

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**Figure 5: ESDP civilian operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type and size</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS II E CIVPOL</td>
<td>Darfur, Sudan</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>On request of the AU and part of an EU “consolidated package” in support of the CIVPOL (civilian police) component AMIS II, the AU’s proactive ceasefire monitoring mission in Darfur. Involves: support for the AMIS CIVPOL chain of command; support for the training of CIVPOL personnel; support for the development of a police planning unit within the AU secretariat. The consolidated package is part of a broader EU response to the crisis in Darfur financed through different instruments, including the Africa Peace Facility. Actions have included support for humanitarian assistance, support of the political process, diplomatic involvement (appointment of an EU special representative), as well as contributions to AMIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Follows the termination of the mandate of PROXIMA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Contributes to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to the challenge of ensuring sufficient structural capacity for the planning and support of civilian missions, is the issue of financial resources. Unlike military missions, where the vast majority of the costs are borne directly by the contributing countries, civilian missions are largely paid out of the limited CFSP budget of the EU. Given the rise of ESDP missions in the past few years this has consistently been insufficient when compared with Member State operations ambitions. In recognition of this limitation the CFSP budget was increased from €62 million in 2005 to €102 million for 2006. Nevertheless, the combination of the challenges associated with recruiting suitable civilian experts for ESDP missions, the still-limited capacity of the Council Secretariat to plan and manage missions, the still-limited capacity of the state to deploy national civilian experts, thereby lending political weight to efforts to promote transitional reform and build state capacity. While initially conceived as a capability that would perform executive functions to help contain violence and uphold the rule of law, the actions of the ESDP have tended towards supportive functions that help drive reform and state-building process in the police and rule of law sectors in post-conflict settings. Recently the EU has also taken on monitoring missions that have important confidence-building functions in areas where the EU is best placed to do so. This is the case in the EU’s Moldova/Ukrainian border monitoring intervention in the context of the Transnistrian frozen conflict and in the border crossing monitoring mission in Gaza. The development of the ESDP civilian crisis response capabilities thereby adds an important practical and overtly political instrument to the EU’s toolbox for crisis management.

The challenge of coordination in the absence of integration

Unlike ESDP actions conducted directly by Member States, EC assistance measures (with the exception of civil protection) are generally implemented through other partner organizations, notably the UN family of agencies, the World Bank, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or the state itself. They are therefore relatively invisible. Much is made of the “visibility” or relative lack thereof of EC assistance. Mostly it is seen as a weakness, reducing the EU’s political clout and operational influence and causing it to “punch below its weight” in world affairs. Others, however, stress the long-term political benefits of strengthening multilateral institutions by channelling aid through them and see the relative political neutrality of EC implementing partners as a strength. Certainly maintaining political neutrality is key to maintaining access to affected populations for humanitarian actions, but it is also important in other contexts, for example when operating in former EU Member State colonies that are sensitive to direct interventions by Member States, even under an EU umbrella. Similarly, in the context of weak or fragile states, it is often important for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state, that it not be perceived as reliant on visible outside interventions. Achieving the appropriate balance between indirect, relatively “neutral” assistance and high-profile foreign policy-driven actions in response to a crisis is a new challenge for the EU.

The challenge of coordination of EU instruments is particularly acute in the context of crisis response. The European Security Strategy explicitly recognises this, noting that:

“The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition of development. Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command.”

However, an obvious feature of EU crisis response is precisely that there is no “unity of command”. In the absence of proposed and subsequently abandoned Constitutional reforms to create the position of EU Foreign Minister to be supported by a Joint External Action Service, the ESDP and EC chains of command remain distinct and institutionally separated. There is thus no common authority or forum within the EU where strategic decisions over when best to deploy which instrument can be reached. The fragmented EU structure is therefore an impediment to coherence and efficiency and militates against coordinated cross-pillar approaches to crisis response.

While structural fragmentation is not unique to the EU and many national and international organisations grapple with parallel challenges of coordination between ministries and departments, the politics of EU integration adds a further complicating dimension to the challenge of coherence. This is particularly true in the area of civilian crisis management, which has long been viewed as a “grey area” in which both the Commission and the Council claimed competence and where the dividing line between development policy and CFSP was never clearly drawn. This is in line with policy and doctrinal developments in both development and security spheres, characterised by a merging of agendas. Good development practice is increasingly seen as being conflict sensitive and informed by the need to promote human security, while post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation are increasingly seen as being central to crisis management operations rather than part of their exit strategy. Despite this policy convergence, the politics of EU integration have ensured that the issue of institutional competencies in this area is highly politicised and contested. The matter has been referred to the European Court of Justice\(^1\) and has dominated negotiations over the range of activities that the new EC Stability and Development funding instruments can cover. This has led to intense scrutiny and interpretative interpretations of what kinds of activities the EC can undertake in support of conflict prevention, security sector reform, demobilisation, and tackling the spread of conventional arms.

The EU can, however, be made to work despite its structure and there is an increasing body of evidence demonstrating that different EC and ESDP instruments can be employed in a coordinated fashion to promote common security and development objectives. This book explores some of the cases in point in the Balkans and Aceh, Indonesia. There are also other positive examples where a number of EU instruments are currently being deployed in a concerted fashion, for example in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Georgia. These cases show that informal channels of cooperation can still be effective under propitious circumstances. More significantly perhaps they also demonstrate the importance of developing a shared understanding of the needs on the ground and how best to address them. Thus coherence can be achieved from the bottom up, through working-level mechanisms such as joint fact-finding missions and needs assessments as well as institutional planning innovations such as the Civil-Military planning cell. The next important step is for the EU to develop common approaches or doctrines that can build on and help to institutionalise best practice. This remains a tall order given that the development of civilian capabilities and doctrines relating to post-crisis institutions and peacebuilding are still at an early stage within and beyond the EU. Nevertheless, efforts to define and institutionalise best practice, including in terms of inter-institutional cooperation, are essential if field-based lessons are to be redeemed. While perhaps no substitute for political leadership and integrated structures, such efforts would go a long way to developing practical inter-institutional partnerships based on shared understandings of the common challenges posed by the complex business of crisis response and post-crisis recovery.

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\(^1\) In this case (C-91/05), the Commission alleges that the Council overstepped its competence when deciding to implement a Joint Action that provided support to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Secretariat in the framework of its work to combat the destabilising accumulation of small arms and light weapons.
DEVELOPING THE EU’S CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES

Interview with Pedro Serrano

When was the ESDP launched in its crisis management dimension?

Our involvement in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) began around six years ago: we have carried out so far 12 major operations involving both civilian and military crisis management measures, and we are planning a couple more. We have achieved some important results but there are still a lot of concepts and structures which need further development. We are working on it.

What specific types of operations are there on the ground in Europe?

In the Balkans, we have a police mission in Bosnia Herzegovina, the European Union Police Mission (EUPM), which substituted the United Nations international police mission, the IPTF. The initial force strength was 500: we have since re-focused the mission in order to concentrate on the fight against organised crime and the reform of the Bosnian police force. The mission has been reduced to around 170 international police officers.

Still in the Balkans we launched another police mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), which drew to a close on 14 December 2005. Following the end of the ESDP operation, the European Commission is now taking the lead in this country in initiating FYROM’s path towards accession through cooperation programmes in the field of police.

Since May 2006, we have also had a planning team in Kosovo that is preparing a possible ESDP mission in the field of police and rule of law in preparation of a post status negotiation settlement and the foreseen departure of UNMIK.

What are the specific operations outside Europe?

In the Caucasus, we have a support action in Georgia that is assisting border-monitoring activities in the northern part of the country. We are also supporting the implementation of an action plan for the reform of the criminal justice system, developed with the assistance of the ESDP rule of law mission, EUJUST THEMIS, which concluded in July 2005.

In the Middle East, we have a police mission, EUPOL COPPS which was launched on 1 January 2006 and which works on supporting the reform of the Palestinian civilian police.

In response to requests from the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel, the EU is also fulfilling the role of a third party in accordance with the Agreement between the parties on the Rafah border crossing. Our mission is preparing to close down its activities on 15 December 2006, once the local elections on the basis of the new Law of Governing Aceh have taken place.

What is the political framework behind these operations?

The European Security Strategy (ESS) – in the new strategic context characterised by globalisation and the end of the cold war – provides our political framework for action. World geopolitics have changed substantially since before the 1990s, and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been a part of the EU’s response to meeting the new strategic situation. Other contributions come for example from the European Commission, which has at its disposal other important cooperation and trade instruments.

Pedro Serrano

Director of DGE IX, Civilian Crisis Management, of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, taking up this post in April 2005. Before that he spent two years as Deputy Head of the Private Office of the Secretary General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana. Prior to joining the Council Secretariat, Mr Serrano accumulated 18 years of experience as a Spanish diplomat, serving both abroad and in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Apart from military aspects, what does EU security policy consider?

From the outset the EU has acknowledged that the security challenges it faces cannot be met exclusively with a military response. We now have a broader understanding of the concept of security. In the past, thinking on security focused primarily on the question of protecting our territorial borders. Now, in order to ensure the security of our citizens we have to go even further. We have to move beyond thinking about our own borders and have to address issues that require the deployment of other measures than the military instrument. We have, for example, to contribute to state building. This change was acknowledged when ESDP was launched and it was then decided to couple the military dimension with a civilian one.

Our security requires a multidisciplinary approach. This multidisciplinarity is actually clearly acknowledged in the European security strategy I mentioned above.

What is the challenge of generating civilian capability for crisis management?

The EU’s civilian capability for crisis management depends on being able to utilise the resources and capabilities available within our member states. Unlike the military, these personnel have been trained and recruited to fulfill roles within the domestic administrations of EU member states. It is a challenge to all our member states to be able to make such human resources available for deployment in crisis situations. This is a problem common not only to the European Union, but also to other international organisations, like the UN.

Initially, to encourage EU Member States to develop capabilities, numerical targets were set up. Although these political targets have now been met, they are not considered sufficient. Member state commitments are generic, but these generic commitments do not generate a legal obligation. They have to be reconfirmed on an ad hoc, operation-by-operation basis. Inevitably, this can lead to problems since we cannot be certain in advance whether we have the necessary resources to carry out an operation or at least not until a specific request is sent to Member States.

How can we increase the availability of civilian resources for crisis management operations?

For instance, if we indicate that we want to be capable of deploying up to 5 000 police officers, we need to ask, what kind of officers should they be? What kind of missions do we want to cover? What is our goal? Finding answers to these questions has led to the introduction of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 process. In this process, together with member states, we have worked on identifying the kinds of scenarios to which the EU should be able to respond. This in turn has lead to the identification of the required EU capabilities. Much work is being put into this assessment, which will highlight the shortcomings in our crisis management capabilities to be addressed in the coming years. One way of tackling the problem is to ensure that when Member States develop their capabilities, they bear in mind that they will need to have some availability for deployment in crisis management operations.

What is the role of training?

Training should play a significant role in improving EU crisis management capabilities in the future. If we suddenly deploy personnel to Rafah or Bosnia, for example, it is important that the context in which they are working, the structures that exist in Brussels, and the chain of command is explained to them. Considerable effort has already been put into training, with the European Commission being particularly helpful in this respect. Furthermore, the European Police College, CEPOL, and the European Security and Defence College have developed training too. We will have to assess how these instruments are performing and how many people are being trained by them and are ready to go on operations.

Crisis management operations are subject to the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), under the authority of the Council of Ministers. The Council takes the key decisions on the launching, the re-focusing and the closing of operations. The PSC also has an important role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy and can therefore match the identified foreign policy and security needs to an ESDP mission. In support of the PSC, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) completes all the necessary groundwork to ensure that missions are launched.

All of our Heads of Mission report regularly to the PSC and CIVCOM. As for ourselves, we currently have a Directorate within the Council Secretariat which is responsible for both the development of concepts that encourage the development of capabilities and the planning and monitoring of operations. It is an ambitious remit. Are we doing it correctly? Do we have all the resources? We are proceeding as best we can with the resources we have, but the results achieved in the last three years are extremely encouraging.
Where does the money come from?

Article 28.3 of the Treaty on European Union states that our operations are to be financed through the EU budget. There is a special Chapter of this budget – Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – that is dedicated to financing CFSP actions and civilian ESDP operations. The budget for 2005 set aside €62 million, which proved to be insufficient. For 2006, the budget has been increased and such a trend should continue. The lengthy procedures involved in accessing the CFSP budget can contribute to preventing the rapid launch of an operation. We have seen this clearly in the Aceh mission where most of the initial deployment was done thanks to the direct support of Member States, which provided personnel, equipment and even financing of the mission directly. This is an issue that needs to be addressed urgently.

We are working together with our Commission colleagues to speed up procurement procedures through framework contracts so that we can pre-identify assets, or providers for assets, in order to avoid the individual lengthy process of tendering for contracts each time we launch a new mission.

Is the ESDP only carried out by the EU and its Member States?

No, civilian crisis management operations carried out to date demonstrate that the ESDP is an open project. For most of our missions, we have been open to the participation of third countries. In order to enable them to follow the missions, we have established so-called “Committees of Contributors” through which the life of missions can be monitored and documents shared with them in accordance with agreements reached with the sending country. At the same time the EU has also established framework agreements with a number of third countries which set out in advance the terms and conditions of those countries’ participation in future missions. The ESDP is also open in that we have strong cooperation with international organisations, such as the UN, the OSCE and NATO. We not only share information with these bodies, we cooperate on the ground and on a number of occasions have intervened at the request of the UN.

What about internal EU coordination?

Internal EU coordination is a major issue in most of our missions, as the European Commission is active in all the places where we are deployed. When launching our operations, we need to be aware of, and take into account, EC programmes. We have to coordinate with them and they have to coordinate with us as well. Our interaction has improved considerably in recent years and in most fields of operation the cooperation is good even if work should be continued to improve it. In reality, the ESDP is only one of the EU’s instruments. What is particularly important for the EU now and in the future is to give as coherent an image as possible on the ground. In a security crisis, the public does not need to know if an operation is a Commission action or a Council action, it only needs to know that an action is run by the EU.
This first outline of my work is not a reflection of a political decision but a labour of love. I fell in love in Egypt, with Egypt. Up until then I had never done much travelling. I have a crystal-clear picture of my arrival at Cairo airport in 1992, when I discovered the city. I was absolutely fascinated by the porter, a Nubian dressed in a white *galabeya*, in front of the building where I lived. The most striking thing was this servant stretched out under a piece of furniture with nothing to cover him. I was appalled. The next day I went up to the roof where the domestic staff live. I wanted to see them and find out how they lived.

I, too, come from a very modest background. In the tiny village in the Anjou region where I was raised, my grandmother used to work at the castle as a servant. I was struck by the social stratification; by the way she was indebted, beholden to the lady of the castle. Seeing these Egyptians conjured up vivid images of my childhood. My first stay was a bit ambiguous. On the one hand I was inducted into the Oriental pleasure of luxury, evenings on the edge of the River Nile, music and the scent of pink laurels. On the other hand, I felt as though I was suffocating.

I started to focus on the *souk*, on the working class district of Gamaleya around the El Hazar mosque, the largest Sunni religious centre that exists. This is the nerve centre of Cairo, next to El Hussein Square, where all of the city’s social classes gather together, a stone’s throw from the Fishawy café. This is the spot where you meet all kinds of people: tourists, women, men, people who have come to drink a cup of coffee, have a chat or a smoke. Moving from one tiny street to another, my journey resembled a kind of spider’s web of the district.

I discovered the people, their homes and working conditions. It was suggestive of Emile Zola’s *Germinal* at the end of the 20th century. The workshops had horrifying working conditions, metal foundries where 15 or so workers would be crushed into a tiny space: dreadful places. But at the same time, there was a sense of comradeship that I had rarely seen before. If I had been in their place, I would have shouted my rage from the rooftops, but their faces were lit up with smiles.

The people I encountered were wise men, angels and damaged souls. These workers were the inspiration of the greatest Egyptian writers, such as Naguib Mahfouz, who was born in Gamaleya. Albert Cossery talks and writes about nothing else but these people. I was anxious to show their faces. The faces of those who are mocked, who are looked down on, who have nothing but sometimes fare much better than I do, alone in my anger at their utter misery. I noted their dignified airs and proud bearing, while often being captivated by their impudence and arrogant attitudes. “Beggars and proud”, as Cossery put it. Mindful of their nobleness, they are able to laugh at themselves.

As I returned there several times a year, I started to recognise the codes of conduct that prevailed in these workshops, where social ties and religions are regarded as a kind of skeleton to hold the people up. I watch, sit and pass the time. I see everything, the humiliation, disgrace, power games and spiteful remarks made by the supervisors. There is always a whipping boy. That is what happened to a tiny boy as beautiful as an Italian painting. He was the “greenhorn”, the tiny newcomer. He arrived in the wrought iron workshop where I was sitting that morning, and as always in these circumstances I could not help identifying with these children. They remind me of my own suffering when I was their age, my own wounds. I am outraged by injustice. I asked his employer for permission to take him outside. I photographed him in the sunlight.

In 2004, keen to visit areas outside Egypt, I visited Sudan then Yemen. I realised straight away that these two countries made my Egyptian story complete in a way. In my five days in Yemen, I mostly photographed Aden. I went to the places where Rimbaud had been in this unusual town that was so calm,
slow and poetic. I do not know if I really understood the soul of the town during my brief stay, but there was contact between us, a connection if I can say so, and I had a strong desire to take pictures of this port town. In a rush, it is fair to say. But also with a certain excitement, to figure out things in this town and this world that I hope one day will become fully clear to me. Rimbaud has not left Aden. It is not that the port has not changed since the 19th century, it is just that I understood with the poet’s eyes, through his words, what seduced him at that time and what could seduce him in this town today. When I left Aden, I knew I would return.

With my momentum, I could not stop myself following Rimbaud as far as Harrar in Ethiopia. A little town, in another time, with another climate, closed in on itself in a protective way. Hostile, it is not a place that opens up easily. I saw Harrar certainly, but did I understand it ? I still ask myself that question today. I took photos in any case. Working with – or in – doubt is sometimes necessary. Not knowing where you are going. It is the going that is everything.

One year later, I stayed a week in a house of artists in Azzemour, south of Casablanca. I was drawn to its wonderful medina, completely neglected by the authorities. I find Morocco a difficult country to photograph because I have never understood what drives Moroccans in their daily life. But something happened in Azzemour. Was it the striking beauty of the people ? The Middle Age flavour of the town ? Its incredibly beautiful situation ? Knowing that a major touristic development will completely change it, turn it upside down, take away its nature ? I do not know. Before my eyes was a world free of clichés that will soon disappear. It called to me. I answered. In its softness, a little like Egypt, Azzemour is different to the rest of Morocco. Captivating, it does not reflect the country.

Material used:
Mamiya C330, films Fuji Pro 400 H

[ Denis Dailleux ]
The Red Sea at El Qusier

© Denis Dailleux / Agence VU
Egypt, 2003
Central Alexandria
Salesman in front of his shop
© Denis Dailleux / Agence VU
Egypt, June 2002
Alexandria
On Gizeret El Dubah island
(the golden island)

© Denis Daillieux / Agence VU
Egypt, 2003
Young apprentice at Helwan (suburb of Cairo)

© Denis Dailleux / Agence VU
Egypt, 2004
Cairo
Luxor
Emad, painter

© Denis Dailleux / Agence VU
Egypt, 2004
Aden
Fishermen resting in the fish market

© Denis Dailleux / Agence VU
"Sur les traces de Rimbaud"
(In the steps of Rimbaud)
Yemen, Spring 2004
On the banks of the Nile at Dongola

© Denis Dailleux / Agence Vu
Sudan, December 2003
Harar
In a café

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“Sur les traces de Rimbaud”
(In the steps of Rimbaud)
Ethiopia, Spring 2004
Morocco - People from Azmoune (small town south of Rabat)

In a café in Azmoune

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Morocco - People from Azmmour (a small town south of Rabat)
In a café in Azmmour

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Morocco - People from Azmmour
(a small town south of Rabat)
A farmer from Azmmour

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Morocco - People from Azmous (a small town south of Rabat)
A cemetery attendant
© Denis Dailleux / Agence VU
Morocco - People from Azmoum (a small town south of Rabat)
Young Moroccan in the streets of Azmoum
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Morocco - People from Azmoum
(a small town south of Rabat)
A man from Azmoum

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Morocco – People from Azemmour
(a small town south of Rabat)
Woman from a village close to Azemmour

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BUILDING STRUCTURES FOR EU DEFENCE MISSIONS

Interview with Claude-France Arnould

How is the General Secretariat of the Council responding to EU defence needs and how has your approach changed over the past four years?

When I arrived at the Council in September 2001 I was appointed as Director for Operations and Exercises. Today, this job title has changed to Director for Defence Issues – and I think this reveals a lot. Until recently, EU security and defence policy only implied operations and exercises. The issue of capacities is key (take the Battle Groups as an example) but also missions wider than “military operations”.

The Council Secretariat including the EU Member States whose evolution went in the same direction prepared all the elements to support the launching and supervision of four military operations, such as the Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Artemis operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. At the end of July a force will be in place to support the UN in DRC during the elections. It is also involved in activities that go beyond the notion of military operations, such as support for regional organisations – for example, in Sudan, to the African Union – and assistance in reforming the defence sector. All of which demonstrates that what started out as a relatively limited concept – operations and exercises – has now moved forward to a much more general definition linked to defence issues including responses to natural disasters, together with the Commission, and to terrorism.

What specific needs have you been faced with and how have you responded?

The first need identified was to complete the panoply of instruments that the EU and individual Member States had as regards crisis prevention and stabilisation. In order to prevent and manage crises and be able to intervene in the reconstruction phase, we wanted to increase the EU’s military capacity in responding to crises. This was the missing link in the chain, and why the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was created.

Another crucial need also came to light: the need for Europeans to take their responsibilities in the Balkans. We needed to show that we were able to shoulder our responsibilities in the region and relieve our American partners of the burden they had been assuming in Europe. The Balkan situation demonstrated to us that the EU’s defence capacity had to be developed. In fact, the Balkan issue gave rise to the St Malo agreements between the United Kingdom and France in 1998.

Since then, defence issues have diversified considerably. We now, for example, need to respond to the proposals put forward in the European Security Strategy by Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union. We also need to develop EU capacities to the point that the Union is in a position to be a global player, and can fully take on board its responsibilities in the area of security, as well as crisis and conflict situations throughout the world. This has led to a far greater focus on issues such as rule of law, support for regional organisations; and early intervention.

At the same time structures were created to support the decision-making process. The Political and Security Committee (COPs) that brings together permanent representatives of EU Member States. The Military Committee, and within the Secretariat a EU military staff with around 200 officers and our directorate. The European Defence Agency (EDA) is also, of course, a major step toward enhancing capacities.

What about the Council’s overall approach to crisis situations? How is this being developed?

From the very beginning we intended to develop a global - now called “comprehensive” - approach to crisis situations. Indeed, this was the very reason for creating the ESDP. When a crisis situation arises, it is important to start with a global concept, (called “crisis management concept”) as this allows the Council to have an overall view of all the instruments that may be used to carry out a specific mission with specific political objectives. We consequently meet regularly with the European Commission via the Crisis Response Coordinating Team (CRCT) or any ad hoc meeting.

These structures can be improved. Four years ago the people who set in place the ESDP were very familiar with the NATO systems and therefore imported its systems into the EU. What we need, within the EU is to be able to work more closely together and have a greater degree of flexibility. There are still certain rigid elements, in particular with regard to funding mechanisms; coordination on the ground; the
Special Representatives should play a major role on the ground.

That is why there is still room for improvement in order to ensure a high level of professionalism and symbioses in these structure particularly for the planning and conduct of operations. Establishing this crucial link between the structures responsible for implementing an operational mission and its political oversight is of the utmost importance to us. That is the objective of what Javier Solana described as internal measures within the Secretariat Structure at the occasion of the last European Council.
CHAPTER 6: THE EU’S TOOLKIT TO ADDRESS CONFLICT PREVENTION

Summary
Conflict prevention and crisis management activity undertaken by the EU has evolved significantly in recent years. There is now a huge range of instruments available, depending on the specific action to be taken in a given situation. The different tools available range from long-term action to short-term measures to resolve current crisis situations. The EU’s ability to take short-term action has increased considerably with the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and associated military attributes, but it would be wrong to consider that the EU favours short-term over long-term or vice versa. Rather, most situations will require a well-coordinated strategy involving a mixture of tools and actions over a period of time. It should be noted that the fact that different tools fall under different pillars of the Union (i.e. whether European Community or European Union competences) means that the EU’s institutions have varying powers and influence over the different tools. Part of this contribution has been adapted from an earlier article by the author: see J. Niño Pérez, ‘EU instruments for conflict prevention’ in The European Union and Conflict Prevention: Policy and Legal aspects, edited by V. Kroneberg and J. Wouters, TMC Asser Press, 2004.

EU and Community instruments for conflict prevention and crisis response and their relationship

In the context of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Maastricht Treaty (signed in February 1992 and entered into force in November 1993) significantly altered the nature and institutional framework of the European integration process by: (i) creating the European Union; and (ii) introducing new and more tangible and effective forms of cooperation in the fields of foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs. The principles and structures defined by the new Maastricht Treaty were to be further refined by the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, signed in June 1997 and May 1999 respectively.

As a result, the new institutional setting of the Union is fragmented across three pillars, or systems, of cooperation:

• Pillar I: The European Community, including trade and development cooperation;
• Pillar II: Common Foreign and Security Policy; and
• Pillar III: Justice and Home Affairs.

Each pillar has its own decision-making procedures and assigns different roles and responsibilities to the three main EU institutions – the Council of Ministers, the European Commission and the European Parliament. Decisions regarding Pillar I are normally adopted on a qualified majority basis whereas those concerning Pillars II and III are taken on a unanimous basis. As far as the role of the institutions is concerned, the Commission has more power in Pillar I than in Pillars II and III, the latter two covering areas where Member States have been traditionally less willing to surrender sovereignty to the EU than in others:

The instruments of Pillar I – The European Community – are referred to as EC or Community instruments as opposed to those used in the areas covered by Pillars II and III.

The different instruments used by the EU to address policy-making/implementation of issues on external relations/foreign policy are scattered across the three pillars. Hence the same applies to conflict-prevention-related activities

Pillar I: EC instruments
The European Community pillar covers the vast majority of the measures available in the field of EU external action. Therefore, the so-called Community instruments relate to areas including trade, social, economic and environmental measures, humanitarian aid and development assistance.

The greater part of Community instruments have three distinct features:

• They have a predominantly economic nature, bringing into play substantial material resources;
• They are primarily aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict and are to be placed in a long-term/structural perspective;
• They have an exclusively civilian nature as opposed to some of the new instruments being developed in the framework of the...
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – Pillar II.

But EC instruments can also have a more political nature and/or short-term impact. Electoral observation and assistance activities, implemented by the European Commission, are a good example of Community actions with a predominantly political dimension. This is an interesting example of a conflict-prevention instrument that previously fell under Pillars I and II (the political decision was often taken in the CFSP framework and the financing decision in the Community and/or CFSP context) and has become exclusively a Pillar I action. Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) actions are on the other hand a relevant case of short-term interventions also implemented under Pillar I.

Community instruments confer a privileged role on the European Commission as it has the exclusive right to formally initiate proposals in this area, and is primarily responsible for the definition and implementation of the corresponding actions. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the Commission’s proposals have generally to be submitted to the Council of Ministers – which takes the ultimate decision – and the European Parliament – which shares the power of co-decision in most areas and has to be consulted in others.

**Pillars II and III: EU instruments**

Although the tools to implement actions falling under both Pillars II and III are commonly referred to as EU instruments, each one of these frameworks has its own specifics linked to the corresponding areas of intervention. Pillar II instruments cover the implementation of all CFSP, and the majority of ESDP activities. In other words, these are the instruments relating to political dialogue – (declarations, demarches, high-level visits and Special Envoys) and some of the new crisis management activities developed under the ESDP.

As opposed to Pillar I instruments, they:

- Have a predominantly political component which aims at giving expression and substance to the increasingly important and active EU role in international relations.
- Focus primarily on short-term activities relating to ongoing or imminent crises.
- Can incorporate both a civilian and a military dimension.

Nevertheless, as was the case with Pillar I actions, there are a number of exceptions to the general rule. Thus Pillar I economic instruments, like development cooperation programmes, could be used in order to re-prioritise or suspend activities and mobilise funds relatively quickly if a political need arises. Pillar II instruments such as Special Envoys can have an equally long-term structural approach when their work is framed in a comprehensive common strategy.

The use of measures that fall under the CFSP pillar remains contingent on agreement between Member States in the Council. This reflects the reluctance of the Member States to surrender national sovereignty in a field as critical as foreign policy. The Commission’s role within the CFSP pillar is more limited than in the European Community pillar as it does not have the sole right to submit proposals. The European Parliament’s role is also limited, as the Council Presidency merely consults it on the main aspects of CFSP.

**Pillar III instruments**

The Justice and Home Affairs instruments (JHA) pillar is also relevant to the field of EU external relations and is increasingly incorporated into the formulation of EU policies with third countries. Matters of relevance in this pillar include:

1. judicial cooperation in criminal matters;
2. customs and police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drugs, people and arms trafficking and other serious forms of international crime;
3. asylum policy;
4. crossing of external frontiers and border controls; and
5. immigration policy.

In the "post-September 11 world", where conflict prevention is often being replaced on the agenda by the narrower prevention of terrorism, this area is becoming increasingly important to a peacebuilding perspective.

So far, activities in this pillar have been dominated by the strengthening of law enforcement responses, together with significant efforts to enhance cooperation with other relevant international organisations and institutions. Within this pillar, the Council takes the lead and it is the Member State holding the Presidency that takes the initiatives. The Commission’s involvement with the JHA pillar was initially limited but has progressively increased in scope. The European Parliament plays no role in the JHA

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2 The RRM and certain civilian crisis-management activities relating to the Petersberg Tasks, are implemented by the European Commission and hence fall under Pillar I’s decision-making rules in spite of being placed in the broader context of the ESDP – Pillar II.
decision-making process and is simply informed after the adoption of initiatives by the Council.

Notwithstanding the above, it is worth noting that the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a new title headed “Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons” into the Treaty establishing the European Community. Areas such as controls on external borders, asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation on civil matters all now come under the first pillar and are governed by the Community method. Cooperation in criminal matters remains under the third pillar, to which the Amsterdam Treaty adds “preventing and combating racism and xenophobia”.

EC and EU instruments and their relationship

A number of elements pertaining to the EU’s current institutional framework hinder the consistency and coherence of existing instruments and activities in the field of external relations, where conflict-prevention-related activities are designed and carried out. Among these elements, we could cite:

1. Confusing terminology. In both official and public discussions, concepts like crisis and conflict tend to be used almost interchangeably, as do prevention, management and response.

2. There are different perceptions as to the exact nature of the different instruments. Whilst the proposal to negotiate a free trade agreement with a country like Iran is a Pillar I Community instrument (trade policy), it would be difficult to challenge the notion that the foreign policy implications of such a proposal are extremely significant and probably outweigh many of the CFSP instruments that might be mobilised by the EU in its dealings with that country.

3. Member States’ bilateral policies still play a very significant role in the areas corresponding to Pillars II and III. The recent Iraq crisis has regrettably proved how the decision-making process and Member States’ diverging interests and priorities in the field of CFSP sometimes makes it difficult to achieve common approaches to crisis situations.

4. Some of the conflict prevention/crisis management activities to be implemented under the emerging ESDP have a military dimension, often necessitating ad hoc arrangements with other existing international bodies dealing with security affairs (i.e. UN, NATO) and impeding the smooth inter-pillar flow of information due to the confidential nature of many of these issues.

5. Finally, the regular (six-monthly) rotation of the EU Presidency can be detrimental to coherence and continuity. Each Presidency’s priorities on conflict prevention rarely coincide, thereby hindering follow-up to previous initiatives.

These challenges have been recognised and the EU has made a number of formal commitments to address these issues. Three documents ought to be mentioned:

1. The resolution on Coherence (section Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and Resolution), adopted by the Development Council on 5 June 1997. This text highlights the need to ensure:
   a. Horizontal consistency (i.e. between pillars): the Union’s external activities must be consistent in the sense that measures taken must be compatible and, ideally, mutually reinforcing.
   b. Vertical consistency (i.e. between the EU and national levels): this refers to the need for conformity between the actions and positions of the Member States and those of the EU, and explains why formulating an effective common EU foreign policy can be challenging.

2. The Guidelines for strengthening operational coordination between the Community represented by the Commission and the Member States in the field of external assistance, adopted by the Council on 22 January 2001. In this document, the Commission points to the need to enhance coordination and better ensure the flow of information between the Commission and the Member States in the area of development cooperation.

3. Finally, the Göteborg Programme for the prevention of violent conflict calls upon the Council to “pursue coherent and comprehensive preventive strategies, using appropriate existing instruments and taking into account ongoing actions, in order to identify challenges, set clear objectives, allocate adequate resources and ensure cooperation with external partners”. More importantly, it indicates that “Coreper (Committee of Permanent Representatives in the EU) will continue to ensure coherence between different policy areas of the Union, paying specific attention to the question of coherent preventive activities”. Thus, notwithstanding the role to be played in this area by the Political and Security Committee, which has the mandate to develop and monitor conflict prevention policies within the Common
Foreign and Security Policy, Coreper is mandated to ensure the consistency of EU policy and activities in the field of conflict prevention across all three pillars. Although these initiatives have undoubtedly contributed to better coordination of existing conflict prevention instruments across the three pillars, much remains to be done to develop all possible synergies among all existing instruments, thereby ensuring the coherence and consistency of all the EU’s external actions in this area.

Some of the proposals of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (e.g., the merging of the posts of High Representative for CFSP and Commissioner for External Relations, or the proposal for permanent European Council President that would do away with the current six-monthly Presidency rotation) could potentially help achieve these objectives. Nevertheless, there is still no final agreement on the institutional setting in the area of external relations.

Beyond possible changes in the decision-making process, ultimately only the political will to ensure enhanced consistency will allow more effective conflict-prevention policies.
CIVIL PROTECTION 

CHAPTER 7: ENHANCING THE CIVIL PROTECTION CAPACITY OF THE EU

Summary

The European Union’s Civil Protection Mechanism, coordinated by the Commission, enables the various civil protection resources of the Member States to be mobilised rapidly in the event of a disaster within or outside the EU. In the immediate aftermath of the Asian tsunami in December 2004, the Mechanism proved its worth, ensuring that effective, appropriate assistance was provided quickly by the Member States when it was needed. That said, experiences after the tsunami allowed the EU to identify some critical weaknesses which are now being addressed, not least in improving communication systems between the field and headquarters.

Civil protection and crisis response

With the creation of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism, the EU has added a new string to its bow in its civilian response to emergencies. The Mechanism was set up in 2001 because of growing demand for coordinated European assistance after disasters which threaten human lives and the wider environment. It is a simple yet effective system, which can be activated to address natural or man-made emergencies around the globe, ranging from earthquakes to oil spills or terrorist attacks.

In the event of a catastrophe overwhelming the national capabilities of the affected state(s), the Mechanism enables the pooling of civil protection resources of the 30 participating countries, to facilitate the sending and coordination of European aid to the stricken country and ensure it has maximum impact and effectiveness.

Interventions under the Mechanism can take place both in and outside Europe. Past operations include those mounted after forest fires in France and Portugal and floods in central Europe in 2003 and 2005, the Prestige oil tanker accident off Galicia in 2002, or the major earthquakes in Algeria and in Bam, Iran, in 2003. While the Mechanism was originally designed with the primary purpose of facilitating European solidarity within the Community, it is taking on an increasingly important role in the EU’s response to disasters outside Europe and around the globe. Most recently, European civil protection has played an important part in the response to cataclysmic disasters affecting third countries around the globe: the south-east Asian tsunami of December 2004, and Hurricane Katrina, the October earthquake in northern Pakistan in 2005, Java earthquake in May 2006 and Lebanon crisis in July 2006.

Civil protection is about providing immediate, life-saving relief in the first hours and days after a disaster. Aid is provided in kind and typically includes search and rescue teams, emergency medical assistance, shelter and food and water for the victims. Depending on the nature of the emergency, it may also involve technical assistance such as fire-fighting aircraft, high-capacity pumps for floods or decontamination facilities (in the event of chemical, biological or nuclear incidents). Civil protection therefore shares the aim of saving lives and alleviating the effects of a disaster for the victims with humanitarian aid, and works in tandem with it.

However, while ECHO, the European Commission’s humanitarian office, seeks to do so by financing the work of humanitarian organisations (United Nations specialised agencies, Red Cross organisations and NGOs), civil protection aid is provided by the Member States themselves. The Mechanism is thus a unique tool for pooling the human and material resources of the participating countries, ensuring these are coordinated, and avoiding duplication. Furthermore, civil protection is targeted only at the immediate aftermath of a disaster and withdraws once the first life-saving needs have been met, handing over to humanitarian teams, whose reconstruction projects can last years. While both civil protection and humanitarian actors are usually present on the ground very fast after a disaster, civil protection teams are in and out of the country within a time period ranging from a few days to a few weeks, depending on the magnitude of the disaster.

The creation of the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection has thus endowed the EU with an effective and adaptable tool for facilitating its response to major disasters around

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2 EU-25 plus Bulgaria, Romania, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
the globe, in developed as well as developing countries, and in almost any foreseeable scenario where civil protection is required. Flexibility is one of the main advantages: requests for help can be tailored to match the specific needs of the situation – whatever is necessary to protect people, their homes and property and the wider environment.

When the Civil Protection Mechanism is activated in the case of a major disaster in a third country, the Commission consults with the Presidency before activating the Civil Protection Mechanism. If the disaster concerns a volatile region where security concerns exist, CFSP crisis management provisions may apply, in which case the Council takes the lead in directing the European response. If necessary, the Mechanism may be used to support the operation, to help muster rapid assistance from Member States. When crisis management provisions do not apply, however, the Commission activates the Mechanism and passes on details of the help required to the Member States. The one important requirement is a formal request for assistance from the disaster-stricken country, which is responsible for directing international teams and the overall relief effort. Finally, European civil protection interventions in third countries are usually conducted in close cooperation with international actors such as the UN, when these are present on the ground.

The Mechanism in action: responding to the December 2004 tsunami

The relief operation after the tsunami constituted one of the biggest European civil protection interventions mounted to date under the Mechanism.

The Commission’s Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), the operational hub of the Mechanism based in the Directorate-General for the Environment in Brussels, was immediately alerted by an automatic earthquake alert. At 00:58 UTC (01:58 CET in Brussels) on 26 December 2004 an undersea earthquake, initially estimated at 8.2 on the Richter scale, struck off the northern coast of Sumatra. The powerful tidal waves caused devastated coastal areas throughout south-east Asia and comparatively smaller sections of the east African coast.

By 08:30 CET, first contacts were made between the MIC and UN OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), the Netherlands Presidency of the EU and other Commission services to assess the situation and the appropriate response. Despite the prevailing confusion, the MIC activated the Mechanism at 10:30 CET following an international request for assistance from Sri Lanka, broadcasting details of the aid required to its network of 24-hour contact points in the 30 Mechanism states. In the following days, three more affected countries called for help through the Mechanism, adding to the complexity of the operation.

The Mechanism played an important part in facilitating the inflow of European emergency aid to the region in the first critical phase. All 30 participating Mechanism states offered civil protection assistance in some form or another, while 18 of these chose to dispatch aid in kind through the MIC. This included “traditional” civil protection assistance such as search and rescue teams, pumping and water purification equipment, medical teams, shelter and food, as well as specialised help needed in the unusual circumstances. For example, as local and consular authorities in Thailand were struggling to cope with the numerous European tourists affected by the disaster, the MIC launched a call for forensic experts to help deal with the difficult task of identifying bodies. A number of teams and specialist equipment (body bags, refrigerated containers…) were dispatched from Europe to support the Thai authorities as a result.

To help coordinate the operation on the ground, the MIC appointed and dispatched six EU assessment and coordination experts to the four countries concerned. Their role proved crucial in increasing the efficiency of the operation. The EU experts stayed in close contact with local and UN authorities, reported back to the MIC on priorities and logistical bottlenecks and helped coordinate the tasking of European teams, equipment and supplies. Their presence on site enabled the integration of European assistance into the overall relief effort and ensured offers were matched to real needs. In Sri Lanka, the EU expert participated in the three-day UN assessment mission to the Tamil area, while in Indonesia teams of experts were dispatched to Jakarta and to Banda Aceh, where organising relief was proving most difficult. The EU experts also worked closely with Commission delegations in the region.

The flow of accurate, constantly updated information between EU and national headquarters and the disaster zone was an essential part of the operation. Throughout the emergency, the MIC broadcast a series of messages and information sheets to national civil protection authorities, containing updates on the situation and on the latest aid requirements. This ensured all Member States had access to the same information at the same time and provided an effective medium for urgent messages. In return,
After the tsunami: lessons learnt

Overall the Mechanism performed speedily and well in responding to the tsunami, particularly given the cataclysmic scale of the disaster, the number of countries affected, the distance from Europe and the timing in the middle of the holiday period. The MIC was quick to react and played an active and valuable role in matching requests for aid to the available resources. The system also proved flexible enough to meet the particular needs dictated by the situation, namely support to Thai and consular authorities.

However, the intervention unearthed a number of gaps, which have since been confirmed following other major disasters in third countries (Hurricane Katrina, Pakistan earthquake):

• As for most civilian actors, working effectively with the military was a challenge for the MIC. During the tsunami relief efforts, the MIC could not access a database of European military assets, as this was only available in case of terrorist attack. This meant there was no comprehensive picture of the resources available and prevented effective coordination between civilian and military assets.
• The lack of transport means was a problem. Many Member States did not have sufficient aircraft capacity at their disposal to dispatch aid to Southeast Asia, or the cost of procuring an airlift outweighed the value of the aid to be sent.
• More EU assessment and coordination experts were needed on site, and communications with headquarters sometimes proved problematic.
• Member States had differing conceptions of the role of European coordination. The degree to which Member States cooperated with each other and the MIC during the tsunami relief operation differed significantly, with some choosing to send most aid bilaterally, and others using the MIC as the principal channel.

In the wake of the tsunami, European civil society sent out a clear message that it wished to see a strengthening of the EU’s disaster response capability. In an extraordinary meeting on 7 January 2005, the General Affairs and External Relations Council decided to examine improvements to the Mechanism and the MIC, and to investigate the possibility of developing an EU rapid response capability for natural disasters. This was followed by calls from the European Parliament for “the creation of a pool of specialised civilian civil protection units, with appropriate material, which should undertake joint training and be available in the event of natural, humanitarian or environmental disasters, or those associated with industrial risks, within the Union or in the rest of the world”.

The future of European civil protection

The Commission has responded to the lessons learnt from the tsunami and from other major operations in third countries with a number of initiatives. These aim to strengthen the Community Civil Protection Mechanism and contribute to better EU preparedness and responses to natural or man-made disasters in Europe and beyond.

• The analytical ability of the MIC, and most particularly its role in early warning of disasters, has been stepped up. One of the products developed includes the “MIC Daily”, a daily alert service developed in conjunction with the EU Joint Research Centre (JRC), which integrates early warning systems and news from hundreds of sources and is circulated every day to...
national contact points and other interested partners.

- Strong support has been won for extending access to the military database to cover a wider range of scenarios, and the Commission has begun work with the EU military staff on taking this forward. An evaluation of the capabilities available to Member States in case of major terrorist attacks has also been conducted.
- The Commission is exploring the idea of developing civil protection modules, on standby in case of disaster, in partnership with Member States.

In April 2005, the Commission issued a Communication setting out ideas for improving the Mechanism. This has translated into two new legislative proposals on civil protection: the creation of a Rapid Response and Preparedness Instrument for Major Emergencies\(^5\) to fund projects and initiatives contributing to these goals; and a proposal to amend and strengthen the original Council Decision on the Mechanism.\(^6\)

If adopted, the amended Decision would allow for the creation of a safety net, to allow the Commission to finance the hiring of transport or even specialised equipment (e.g. firefighting aircraft, pumping equipment) if the existing resources of Member States prove inadequate in the event of a major disaster. The proposal also provides for a greater Commission role in developing and upgrading early-warning systems and making them accessible to European decision-makers. Finally, the new Decision would strengthen the mandate for European coordination during third-country disasters, whether an autonomous operation or one led by the UN.

### NOTE

**EU response to the tsunami: assistance sent through the Mechanism**

**Types of aid sent:**
- Search and rescue teams
- Pumping and water purification equipment
- Medical teams and medicine
- Mobile field hospitals
- Tents, blankets and food
- Assessment and coordination experts
- Forensic teams

**Mechanism interventions by country:**
- Sri Lanka: call for assistance on 26 December 2004, expert arrives on site on 27 December, emergency relief speedily dispatched
- Thailand: MIC participates in inter-consular conference calls and issues call for help with forensic identification to Member States after local authorities are overwhelmed, resulting in the dispatch of specialist teams and equipment from the Community
  - Indonesia: call for assistance launched on 28 December 2004 following UN advice that situation had been under-estimated and was extremely serious. MIC appoints assessment expert, who plays valuable role in coordinating aid to Banda Aceh in Sumatra
  - Maldives: early reports of only limited damage prove over-optimistic; MIC dispatches expert on site and emergency relief is sent by Member States.

**The work of the MIC:**
- Nearly 1 000 emails and telephone calls handled during the initial phase of the emergency
- 23 messages and 13 situation reports broadcast to all Member States
- Selection and appointment of six EU assessment and coordination experts
- MIC staffed almost around the clock for two weeks

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Conclusion

The Community Civil Protection Mechanism is only one facet of the EU’s civilian crisis response capability. Nevertheless, its role in mobilising and facilitating European civil protection aid after the tsunami and other third-country disasters testifies to its usefulness. A strengthened Mechanism also has the potential to improve coordination and contribute still further to a more effective European response to major disasters. Its limitations, too, are emblematic of the underlying challenges facing the EU in this task. Current initiatives to improve the system should go a long way towards addressing some of the gaps. Whether a fully coordinated and effective European civil protection capability emerges, however, depends to a large extent on the political will of Member States and civil society to make this a reality.
**CHAPTER 8: ECHO: DELIVERING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN COMPLEX CRISIS**

**Summary**

In humanitarian terms, 2005 will forever be synonymous with two massive disasters: the aftermath of the tsunami on 26 December 2004 and the earthquake in Pakistan in October 2005. In both, the devastation was significant. The tsunami affected 12 countries and resulted in the death or disappearance of more than 200,000 people (three times the average annual number of deaths caused by natural disasters in the world in the previous decade). In October the earthquake in Pakistan/Kashmir, measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale, killed more than 74,000 people and left a further three million homeless. But such large-scale events that capture media attention should not divert attention from the often forgotten, but still ongoing, crises such as Chechnya, Colombia, Congo, Darfur or Nepal.

**A world of complex crises**

Whether natural disasters or man-made conflicts, today’s crises are ever more complex requiring well-planned and coordinated solutions. But what do we mean exactly by “complex crises”?

Complex crises are those in which two or more negative circumstances combine to create large-scale humanitarian needs. For example: conflict (usually inside a country) caused by cultural, ethnic or religious differences occurring alongside drought in a region with already limited food and water resources; famine in a country badly hit by HIV/AIDS. Factors contributing to a complex crisis may of course be interrelated. The underlying reason for an internal conflict that pits one ethnic or religious group against another may in fact be resource-related – a battle for scarce water or fertile land.

The distinction between “man-made” and “natural” disasters is also increasingly blurred now that the activities of humankind are generally acknowledged to be a contributory factor to climate change. It has been known for some time that serious flooding in river deltas is often directly linked to deforestation in the mountainous regions where the rivers are formed.

The European Commission has a longstanding commitment to help crisis victims irrespective of their causes. This article considers the role, strategy and contribution of the Commission’s humanitarian intervention through its humanitarian aid department – ECHO.

**What does ECHO do?**

ECHO, as a service of the European Commission, comes under the direction and responsibility of Commissioner Louis Michel.

Since 1992, the Commission has, through ECHO, funded relief to millions of victims of natural and man-made disasters in more than 100 countries outside the European Union. Aid is channelled impartially to the affected populations regardless of their race, ethnic group, religion, gender, age nationality or political affiliation.

In 2005, the Commission provided more than €652 million for humanitarian programmes. This does not include the aid given separately by the EU’s 25 Member States. Support went to projects in more than 60 countries. The funds were spent on goods and services such as food, clothing, shelter, medical provisions, water supplies, sanitation, emergency repairs and mine clearing. The Commission also supports disaster preparedness and mitigation projects in regions prone to natural catastrophes.

Part of ECHO’s mission is to raise public awareness of humanitarian issues, other objectives include the following:

- Save and preserve life during emergencies and their immediate aftermaths in man-made or natural disasters.
- Provide assistance and relief to people affected by longer-lasting crises such as civil wars.
- Finance the delivery of aid, working to ensure that it is accessible to those for whom it is intended.
- Assist refugees or displaced people wherever they find sanctuary and to help them resettle if they return home.
- Support short-term rehabilitation and reconstruction work in order to help victims regain a minimum level of self-sufficiency, taking long-term objectives into account where possible.
- Ensure preparedness for natural disasters, in particular by setting up early-warning...
systems and financing disaster prevention projects in high-risk regions.

In the humanitarian field, the Commission does more than just fund relief activities. It also:

- Regularly monitors humanitarian projects and promotes coordination arrangements between partners.
- Promotes and coordinates disaster preparedness measures by trained specialists, strengthens local institutions and supports pilot micro-projects.
- Raises public awareness about humanitarian issues in Europe and elsewhere.
- Constantly evaluates the impact and the effectiveness of its operations to make the best possible use of European taxpayer’s money.

Lessons learnt from recent disasters, particularly the tsunami, suggest that better coordination with and between the major international actors in humanitarian aid should be a high priority.

To this end the Commission continues to play an important role in strengthening coordination between Member States. It also strongly supports the internal coordination role of the UN.

Another area that deserves greater recognition is disaster preparedness. This has always been a component of ECHO’s work but added emphasis has been given recently to risk reduction and disaster preparedness - aimed at boosting the response capacity of communities in vulnerable areas. No matter how effective the international relief response, many communities are on their own in the first hours and days after a catastrophe and proper advance planning and training can save many lives.

ECHO works with around 200 operational partners including specialised United Nations relief agencies, members of the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement and around 200 non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Having a diverse range of partners with very different specialisations is important for the Commission, enabling it to meet the growing needs of people facing increasingly complex crises in different parts of the world. Working with partners in the field enables ECHO to act swiftly to supply aid when disaster strikes and to continue helping stricken regions after the media spotlight has long disappeared. The Commission continues to develop close working relationships with its partners, both for specific humanitarian operations and at the policy level.

### Financial decisions

Financial decisions for humanitarian aid are adopted by the Commission throughout the year on the basis of needs assessments and specific proposals made by partners. The Commission has a wide range of instruments that allow for a flexible approach to different types of humanitarian crisis.

In the case of a significant, unforeseen emergency, the Commission can request extra funding from the budgetary reserve.

Fast-track primary emergency decisions for up to €3 million are taken to respond within 72 hours to sudden crises. In the event of a hurricane or an earthquake, it is vital that assistance such as food, shelter materials, blankets, warm clothes and medicines be provided within hours. Emergency decisions can also be taken speedily – within a few days – allowing larger sums to be allocated following more detailed needs assessments from the disaster location. Even bigger amounts can be allocated through ad hoc decisions, used most often in areas where there are long-term humanitarian needs often linked to ongoing conflicts.

The major crisis zones, a key type of major ad hoc decision is known as a “global plan” covering a variety of sectors.

### The Commission’s strategic objectives in humanitarian aid

The implementation of European humanitarian aid is carried out in accordance with international humanitarian law and is based on the fundamental principles of humanity and impartiality. In the practical application of these principles, decisions to grant humanitarian aid are based solely on an assessment of the beneficiary population’s needs.

Each year, the Commission draws up strategic objectives for the delivery of humanitarian aid. These are based on a thorough assessment of existing and foreseeable future needs, using information provided by Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid’s field experts and other humanitarian operators. Populations requiring support are identified through a parallel exercise of “bottom-up” assessments undertaken by ECHO’s geographical units and field experts and a “top-down” classification of developing countries’ vulnerability as reflected by the GNA index (Forgotten Crisis Assessment). Particular attention is paid to “forgotten crises”, so-called because they receive little attention in terms of financial or media coverage. The latter is reflected by the FCA index (Forgotten Crisis Assessment).

The GNA index works on the assumption that humanitarian needs in a crisis will be greatest in the least developed countries, or in those that are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters or violent conflicts. Some 140 countries have been classified using this index.

The identification of “forgotten” crises is based on a combination of the following elements:
• Major humanitarian needs as reflected by the GNA index;
• Little or no media coverage; and/or
• Little interest on the part of donors reflected by the level of official aid received and an assessment by ECHO’s geographical units and field experts.

Forgotten crises are generally long-running ones, which explains the lack of interest on the part of the media. For 2006, ECHO has classified as forgotten crises the following areas: Chechnya, Myanmar, the Sahrawi refugees in Algeria, Nepal and to a lesser degree Kashmir (linked to the ongoing conflict – the earthquake in October was, of course, highly publicised).

**Key programmes for 2006**

Overall, the Commission’s system for funding humanitarian aid is a judicious mix of effective forward planning and readiness for the unexpected. For 2006, it once again is implementing a major programme of support in more than 60 developing countries with pressing humanitarian needs – spanning five continents. For major crisis zones, a series of new “global plans” has been drawn up to provide relief assistance across a range of sectors.

The ECHO budget also includes an internal reserve of unearmarked funds – around €75 million – to enable it to respond to new needs and events during the course of the year. Should large-scale new needs arise, the emergency reserve of the European Community budget can also be drawn upon, following approval of the budgetary authority (European Parliament and Council).

The European Union (Commission plus Member States) is the world’s largest provider of “official” humanitarian aid, reflecting its adherence to the principle of solidarity with those who are suffering. Under the new budget perspectives, adopted by the European Union for the period 2007-2013, this is set to continue with the Commission continuing to play a central role in providing humanitarian resources for crisis-hit populations across the globe.
The brief case studies below highlight some of the most significant ECHO funded programmes during 2005. The Commission remains active in providing relief assistance to all of these areas in 2006.

**Sudan (€45 million)**

In January 2005, a comprehensive peace agreement brought an end to the 21-year long civil war in southern Sudan. In the Darfur region by contrast, the situation deteriorated as fighting between the government and two regional opposition groups escalated.

Both situations gave rise to humanitarian needs. Significant “post-conflict” support is often needed when displaced people and former refugees head home after a conflict and this proved to be the case in southern Sudan. At best, people needed help to re-establish their livelihoods. In the worst cases, they returned to find homes, health centres and water systems all destroyed.

In funding terms, however, the Commission’s main focus was on Darfur where more than 2.5 million people were affected by the conflict, including 1.8 million displaced internally or as refugees in neighbouring Chad. Frequent human rights violations were reported and humanitarian access was adversely affected by poor security. A series of abductions and attacks on convoys were reported.

The Commission was the largest contributor of funds to Sudan in 2005, its support focusing on food security, nutrition, health, water/sanitation and emergency preparedness. Particular emphasis was placed on providing ante-natal support and protection for women, as well as healthcare and nutrition for children.

**Burundi (€17 million)**

A Presidential election in Burundi marked the conclusion of the country’s political transition following a ten-year civil war. Again, the good news of improved stability in recent years created a challenge for humanitarian agencies in the shape of large numbers of people going home (many from refugee camps in Tanzania). They have been returning to one of Africa’s most densely populated countries where a great deal of reconstruction is needed in areas such as basic infrastructure, healthcare and education. In some parts of the country, insecurity was still a problem.

The Commission’s humanitarian global plan for Burundi focused on the needs of the most vulnerable, including people who were still displaced, their host communities, and returnees. Support continued for multisectoral operations to provide healthcare, food security, nutrition, emergency relief items and protection.

**Democratic Republic of Congo (€38 million)**

Displaced people returned to their homes in the DRC in greater numbers during 2005, reflecting an improved security situation in many areas. The DRC is a huge country however, and in some regions – notably in the east – serious security problems were still encountered, with the continued active presence of armed militias.

The Democratic Republic of Congo’s complex conflict in recent years had displaced around four million people, brought devastation to the health system and led to pockets of severe malnutrition. In 2005, many people continued to succumb to infectious diseases.

The Commission has been DRC’s largest humanitarian donor for the past six years. In 2005, its main focus was on conflict-torn eastern areas where the needs were greatest. Under-fives were targeted through nutrition programmes and women through special health-care (including aid for victims of sexual violence in conflict areas). Basic relief assistance was provided for around 1.7 million returnees and displaced people.
CHAPTER 9: THE CAUSES AND DYNAMICS OF POVERTY-RELATED CONFLICT

Poverty and conflict are commonly understood to be closely related. Both recall images of destitution, destruction and human suffering. Violent conflicts have led to high numbers of deaths and displaced people, material destruction and even state collapse. In this way, years of development efforts and investments are destroyed. Poverty, however, is also thought of as being a cause of conflict. When grievances are not met, it is argued, poor people will riot, question government altogether and join rebel groups. Economic decline and extreme poverty may then reinforce tendencies to resort to violent means.

At the root of conflict, however, lies a complex of factors: the imbalance of political, socioeconomic and cultural opportunities among different identity groups; the lack of democratic legitimacy and effective governance; the absence of a vibrant civil society; and the absence of effective mechanisms for non-violent conflict management of group interests. This complexity is commonly recognised by the major EU conflict and development cooperation policies. Yet, how to move from these general, abstract statements toward viable, timely and context specific preventive measures is less understood. At the basis of policy design must lie an appropriate conflict assessment of the interacting factors and actors. In this Chapter we will therefore look in greater detail at the ways in which current thinking and analysis of the interacting factors and actors is less understood. At the basis of policy design must lie an appropriate conflict assessment of the interacting factors and actors.

The poverty-development-conflict nexus

It used to be common knowledge that development automatically enhanced peace and stability. Reality, however, has demonstrated that this is not the case. Events in many countries have shown that economic development is no guarantee for peace and security, and that fostering socio-economic development means fostering change and challenges to the status quo, i.e. social and political tensions in the societies concerned. In fact, political and economic development is a permanent process of moderating conflicts and of managing contradictions in society at large. Hence, intense political conflict and, for that matter, grievances, are not in themselves dangerous. Research on the poverty-development-conflict nexus has proven unable to provide any conclusive answers on the relationship between poverty and conflict, and the relationship is often understood to be indirect at best. Case studies provide a diverse picture of factors that explain why groups resort to violence. This often is a gradual process of escalating and de-escalating activities. State failure, ineffective and illegitimate governance, imbalance of power and opportunities, the theft of national wealth by a small, self-declared elite, the repression of opposition, rights and freedoms all figure prominently in this setting.

The life cycle of conflict: unstable peace

Conflict is therefore embedded in society. Legitimate differences and clashes between needs, interests, perceptions and activities of actors are part of social life. For this reason conflict cannot be separated from wider and ongoing political and social processes. As long as these tensions are managed in a non-violent manner, they frequently induce change for the better. Conflict emerges from multiple causes and runs through various stages of escalation and de-escalation: from stable peace and unstable peace/latent conflict to high tension and open conflict. There exists, however, no linear development along these stages. Post-conflict settings, for example, may be equally unstable with a high potential for a renewed resort to violence. On the basis of such a process approach to conflict, the intensity and nature of conflict can be monitored over time and negative trends identified. In light of our concern with conflict prevention, we focus on avoiding violent escalation of conflict and increasing the capacity for peaceful conflict mediation. A renewed identification of a dangerous trend and appropriate action could avoid increasingly hostile, polarising group identities and positions.

Poverty-related conflict

A more in-depth study in poverty-related conflicts appears hampered by "superficial" assumptions about poverty that focus on the appearances of poverty, rather than its causes. Moreover, violent conflict is often treated as an exogenous factor, one that impacts strongly on poverty but that is not part of the problem of poverty. Hence, when we talk about "poverty-related conflict" in this Chapter, we aim for a qualification and differentiation of the concepts. Poverty is as much a cause of conflict as it is a consequence of conflict, in terms of socio-economic and material costs, the damages inflicted on livelihoods, and the fracture of social structures, of formal and informal institutions. The causes and consequences of conflict, moreover, are not shared society-wide. Conflict has winners and losers, and for some armed groups with vested interests warfare becomes a livelihood. There is also an uneven geographical and social impact of conflict. Conflicts themselves transform political, economic and social realities and the factors that sustain present conflicts thus are not necessarily those which originally caused them. Before introducing an alternative perspective for approaching the dynamics underlying poverty and conflict, we will shortly focus on the various dimensions of poverty and their relevance for understanding poverty-related conflict.

Understanding poverty: absolute and relative deprivation

Poverty cannot be understood as a phenomenon of an absolute nature, in which there is a poor figure of a needy, destitute and passive victim who should be helped. A focus on the material dimensions of poverty fails to take into account the prevailing social and cultural characteristics of local society that accompany certain material levels of development. Informal redistribution, such as through patron-client relations or social networks and extended families, diversified livelihoods and coping strategies have hitherto created relatively stable social environments. Poverty assessments as currently applied do not capture all dimensions of poverty, nor do they reflect the ways in which poverty is experienced on the ground. This implies that these assessments are an insufficient basis for policy planning.

Inequality perspectives on poverty: the political dimension of poverty

There are varying kinds of inequality that should be taken into account. Not just asset and income or stock and flow inequality matter, but also gender inequality, asymmetry in constitutional inclusion between ethnic, religious or language groups, regional inequalities, class inequalities, the forms in which power relations are institutionalised and so on. An alternative perspective therefore is to view poverty as social injustice, a consequence of socio-economic exploitation and exclusion and the end result of deliberate actions or a lack of distributive mechanisms of central authority. Exclusion and downward mobility are here seen as the processes of relative and absolute impoverishment, which is in many cases the reverse image of the enrichment of another group. Poverty, then, is the result of unequal patterns of distribution of power. It is, moreover, a question of perceptions and relative deprivation. Socially determined power as well as state power need close scrutiny in this regard.

Entitlement perspectives on poverty

The significance of inequality thus lies beyond merely its presence or its degree of intensity. When the concept of poverty is assessed in the light of politics and power relations, the inherent dynamic and multidimensional nature of poverty and the feeling of wellbeing comes to the fore. In particular, the economic aspects (income, consumption capabilities) are particularly dynamic. This has consequences for the identification of the poor: they are not a static group of people, and persistent poverty is not as much linked to lack of assets, but mainly to innate disadvantages, deep-rooted characteristics that cannot be easily changed in the short or medium term. It also affects the view on how poverty is experienced and therefore requires an increased understanding in groups’ vulnerabilities and coping strategies. This more encompassing picture of how the poor cope with a variety of risks and shocks in meeting

their basic needs is reflected in contemporary (sustainable) livelihood approaches. Access to resources then is not only based on one’s productive activities and endowments, but also on one’s legal, political and social position within society. This brings together relevant concepts to allow poverty to be understood more holistically. Consequently, different types of poverty demand different types of antipoverty responses. And antipoverty responses have a differential impact on the “poor”.

Important and path-breaking insights in this light have come from the seminal work of Amartya Sen and what has commonly become known as an “entitlement perspective”. As a reaction to the then-prominent view on famine as a natural disaster, a production failure and a depoliticised event, Sen focused on famine and starvation due to a breakdown in food entitlement and distribution. This account of famine outlines two crucial points: in any population it is only certain vulnerable groups that are affected by starvation, and secondly, famines are man-made events. Rather than focusing on broad categories and statistics of quantities of food per capita, the entitlement perspective argues that attention needs to shift to the specific position of particular groups in society and their claim-making capacities toward government or the legal system. Groups’ access to resources is therefore based on many factors that go beyond economic ones. The vulnerabilities of groups may differ accordingly.

In short, entitlement analysis argues that there are many ways of gaining access to and control over resources, such as the market and kin networks. There are, furthermore, many ways of legitimating such access and control not only through the formal legal system, but also through customary law, social conventions and norms. The nature and “rules” of each political and economic system produces a set of entitlement relations, governing who can have what in that system. The nature of the entitlement of a person would thus depend on the legal, political, economic and social conditions in society and the person’s position in it. Entitlement therefore is a matter of both rights and power, and is concerned with the actual process of how people gain access to resources. Resources, however, are limited and the distribution of these resources can be understood as the outcome of a process of negotiation and/or contestation between social actors with different priorities and interests.

“Entitlements” and the dynamics of poverty-related conflict

Although the entitlement perspective pays due attention to the complexity of the political, social, economic and cultural dimensions, we focus on principally political expressions of poverty-related violence, i.e. situations in which conflict and violence takes on forms that become a threat to peaceful dealing with state business and governance. The crucial task then is to capture the political significance of changes in inequality and in the social relations behind inequality.

Entitlement analysis has particular value for understanding these dynamics behind poverty-related conflict as it focuses on the politics of resource access and control among diverse social actors. In terms of the entitlement concept, this implies that the perspective focuses on situations in which entitlement claims, perceptions and priorities of various groups are contradictory, i.e. on situations in which the command that people have over resources and services that they value fails. The aim is to identify the conditions under which this failure is approached by violent means. In short, the challenge lies in, firstly, the identification of problem areas and, secondly, the identification of patterns of escalation.

Identification of problem areas: access to resources

Many studies in the causes of conflict argue that societies vulnerable to violent conflict are fre-
quently characterised by a serious imbalance of opportunities among its main identity groups in areas such as employment, education and basic physical security. Others are at least marginalised by not enjoying the same rights as ordinary citizens and being condemned not to voice their grievances publicly. This imbalance of opportunities may become institutionalised even under formally democratic procedures. Lack of access to government services may also be a deliberate policy to perpetuate this imbalance. Certain groups may be routinely kept outside the formal economy, social services and the political process. Most systems of exclusion are meant to maintain the uneven distribution of power, income and wealth. Clientelist and particularistic practices then lead to a highly skewed access and distribution of resources.

If this, indeed, reflects the common pattern that indicates a society’s vulnerability to violent conflict, it would be crucial to understand the different roles that resources can play in conflicts and different ways in which access to resources is restricted. The Conflict Prevention Network Practical Guide identifies four important problem areas that, in line with the above-mentioned entitlement perspective, offer an insight to dimensions that hinder a group’s access to resources.

- Socio-economic inequalities
  People have very different standards of living, especially regarding basic needs such as food, housing, jobs, health services and education. Some identity groups may be routinely denied access to goods and services, while others enjoy them or are perceived as privileged. Specific shortages and sudden declines of opportunities affect these parts of the population differently.

- Exclusive government elite
  Government can be exclusive for the members of a specific identity group. Representatives of other major identity groups are not included in key decision-making positions. Also government and civil service jobs can be reserved for the members of restricted groups. In case of denial of more inclusive government, only radical solutions of overthrowing the regime remain.

- Violation of group rights
  Specific groups can be denied the right to voice their grievances, through the denial of their civil and political liberties, such as the right to vote and to assemble peacefully. Awareness of restricted group rights might gain momentum.

- Lack of economic interests in peace
  In cases of lacking conditions for development in the formal economy and the lack of legal protection for property, the position of local, private entrepreneurs is weakened considerably. When no positive changes are expected from the public sphere, and in the absence of sufficient licit alternatives, a number of illegal economic activities can become more interesting for the state and non-state actors. In particular, this may apply to newcomers in the labour force who are not able to find jobs in the formal economy.

Patterns of escalation:
horizontal (group) inequality and state legitimacy deficit

In practice we find little evidence of situations where socio-economic inequalities or cultural distinctions alone bring about violent conflict. Nor do a lack of civil and political rights provide sufficient ground for resistance. We therefore have to look into patterns of escalation.

A key pattern of escalation is reflected in the process of group identification and mobilisation. Real or perceived economic and political differentiation among groups is of fundamental importance to group mobilisation for civil war. Since access to political power might be quickly translated into influence over the distribution of resources, one of the most intense areas of rivalry and competition is over control of political power, embodied by the state. Scarc resources, in this respect, contribute to social insecurity in ways that reinforce vertical solidarity on the basis of region, clan and ethnicity for example. This is captured in the concept of horizontal inequality: situations in which groups are excluded from parallel political, economic and/or social dimensions.

A second key pattern that crosses the four problem areas is the level of legitimacy of state institutions and their role in brokering processes of change. Patronage and clientelistic practices may fulfil an important redistribution role in this regard. Yet, when the result-
ing pattern of economic differentiation is seen as a conscious effect of discriminatory actions by the government and lead to feelings of relative deprivation, political entrepreneurs can galvanise these grievances in political action and violence. Thus, where legitimacy is in question, or the state does not provide an adequate legal and security infrastructure, competition can degenerate into social exclusion, the evolution of new political economies based on the criminalisation of economic activity, increased recourse to radical ethnic and religious communalism as a basis for social and political mobilisation, political violence and ultimately internal conflict.

Conclusion and implications

In this Chapter we have concluded that inequality may be associated with social conflict and with violence but not necessarily with civil war. In other words, the social and political consequences of sharp economic inequality are likely to vary across countries. Why inequality appears to be (at least indirectly) linked to war in some countries and why it appears to be associated more with pervasive (non-political) violence in others needs further exploration in a conflict-specific setting. A more comprehensive approach such as entitlement analysis allows for greater explanatory depth. At the same time however, this requires a concession in the predictive power and generalisation across contexts. Entitlement analysis would argue that the main pattern of escalation is grouped around two phenomena: persistent and widening horizontal inequality and decreasing state legitimacy. The process of group mobilisation deserves due attention and can be explored in greater detail through "entitlement lenses".

Entitlement analysis is a way of getting insight into disputes. It focuses on the process of, and motives for, group identification rather than a priori assuming this to be based on ethnicity, religion, or regional identity. By including entitlement analysis within a conflict assessment framework we obtain a comprehensive and differentiated picture of the struggle of different groups (among each other and with government) for access to and control over resources. Access to resources is highly influenced by people’s bargaining position within this system. When some groups no longer accept positions of inequality, legitimacy of the state crumbles. Rules are increasingly questioned, and if the government is incapable or unwilling to respond to or mediate these demands for changing the rules or influencing the outcomes (e.g. through its redistribution policies), violence might become an option. Power in its different forms, rather than legitimacy, then becomes the determining factor in access to resources.
[Part II: Field experience]
The first series of pictures was taken in the Balkans in the aftermath of the war, ten years later. I was a "war" reporter in Kosovo in 1999, but this time I wanted to see the effects of war. A conflict can also be interpreted outside its most volatile periods. A war makes its mark on the territory and the people, leaving scars.

I have the curious impression that the war in the Balkans is still going on, and has just been put on hold. A ceasefire is not synonymous with peace. The representatives of the international community know this only too well. They are struggling to hold together the divided territories which are sometimes still under strain, while the killers walk free and are protected by the states for which they are nothing but pawns. The Balkans raises the question of whether a war can be stopped before it reaches its conclusion, with a conqueror and a loser.

Neither Europe nor the United States were really anxious to fight for Bosnia, where the situation was ambiguous. The Serbs and Croats were unable to complete the "ethnic cleansing". The Bosnians, who suffered the highest number of deaths, have not yet been able to take their revenge, so what now? The country is still not working. It is an international protectorate under supervision, but for how long? No immediate solution appears to be available.

I have taken several photos of the Mostar Bridge, which I regard as an extremely symbolic object. This old Ottoman Bridge was destroyed by Croat shellfire and the international community rebuilt it, aware of its symbolic value. The city is still divided by the "Bulevar", the former front line that people still do not cross, and they refuse to see each other or speak to each other, even ten years after the end of the conflict. How can you pardon the siege of the city, massacres and concentration camps? And yet this is now the biggest challenge for the "international community", which is still young compared to the scale of history: to hold the world "together", at a time when ancient barbaric rites are being resuscitated.

In the summer of 2006, I was in Lebanon. I was not there in an official capacity as a war reporter because the Hezbollah wouldn’t let us anywhere near – "secrecy, faith and martyrdom" is their motto. From the front, it was impossible to see anything, and we would have wasted our time while taking absurd risks, trapped under exchanges of artillery fire for no reason, looking for invisible soldiers. So I told the story of Lebanon: a country ravaged by a brief and violent assault, devastated by bombs that made craters the size of an Olympic swimming pool, civilians murdered by missiles made by Lockheed Martin in the "land of liberty".

What kind of image of freedom and democracy are we giving the world with two-tonne bombs?

One missile, a building, and ten storeys go up in smoke regardless of who may be inside. The threat is invisible: the aircraft is too high to be noticed, only a low buzzing is heard, and then death suddenly strikes. Sometimes in Beirut, we could feel the blast of the cruise missiles a kilometre away. It is harrowing enough to witness the devastation brought about by conflict but when you see the bodies of dead children, huddled together with their hands on their chests, having died of asphyxiation, you have a duty to show such horrors to the rest of the world, lest we forget.
You may find some of the photographs depicted here shocking particularly those of corpses. But that is what war is about. As war reporters we risk our lives, not to show picturesque photos of ruins and beautiful pictures of refugees, but to capture the harsh reality of what it is to be at war.

If I don’t tell you about death, I’m not telling you the truth about war.

[David Sauveur]
Chess players, Sarajevo, August 2003. Similar games of chess are played in various public places throughout Bosnian. People from all walks of life take part in these impromptu gatherings.

© David Sauveur / Agence VU
The Balkans
Vukovar, September 2003. Even though the town is being slowly rebuilt, the water tower remains in the same state as in 1991; a symbol of a town under siege. Every morning a Croat soldier would climb to the top of the tower, which bore the bullets from Serb fire, to replace the flag.

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The Balkans
Srebrenica, September 2003. The ravages of war are still very much in view in this enclave, where Serbs killed between 8,000 and 12,000 men in 1995.

© David Sauveur / Agence VU
The Balkans
Sarajevo, August 2003. At the market. During the war, Sarajevo became home to many people from the countryside who had been evicted from their homes and villages.

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The Balkans
Vukovar, September 2003. Building work in the centre of town, which was completely destroyed during the violent spate of bombing in 1991, is taking a long time. The region was only returned to Croatia in 1998 so rebuilding started very recently.

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The Balkans
Empty shells that were once homes line the roads in the region of Tuzla. Looters have taken everything they could find, even building materials.

September 2003.

© David Sauveur / Agence VU
The Balkans
On the bridge at Mostar, which was being rebuilt. August 2003.

© David Sauveur / Agence VU
The Balkans
Mostar at the end of the day, on the footbridge that was built next to the construction site of the old bridge. August 2003.

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The Balkans
In Tuzla, at the centre for missing people, a forensic team tries to identify the victims retrieved from mass graves. In this image, clothes have been unfolded so that they can be measured and analysed.

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The Balkans
Lebanon, Tyre, 27 July 2006. In the city centre, on the ruins of a building just bombed by the Israeli air force. People are looking for survivors while trying to put out the fire. Liban.

© David Sauvêtre / Agence VU
The southern suburbs, heavily bombed by the Israelis, the day after the ceasefire. The ruins of the Roueiss quarter, crushed together with its inhabitants by a violent Israeli bombardment the previous day. Conversation between Shiite religious dignitaries.

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Beirut, 15/08/06.
The southern suburbs, heavily bombed by the Israelis, the day after the ceasefire. In the Roueiss quarter, several buildings were destroyed by Israeli bombing. The exact number of victims is not known but the buildings were occupied at the time of the bombing.

© David Sauveur/ Agence Vu
Beirut, 16/08/06
The southern suburbs, heavily bombed by the Israelis, the day after the ceasefire.

© David Sauvage/Agence Vu
Beirut, 16/08/06
The southern suburbs, flattened by Israeli bombing, the day after the ceasefire.

© David Sauveur/ Agence Vu
Beirut, 15/08/06
BEIRUT, 15 August 2006.
The southern suburbs, heavily bombed by the Israelis, the day after the ceasefire. The ruins of the Roueiss quarter, crushed together with its inhabitants by a violent Israeli bombardment the previous day. Conversation between Shiite religious dignitaries.

© David Sauvage/Agence Vu
Lebanon, Beirut, 2 August 2006
On the seafront, one of the biggest beaches in Beirut, polluted by the oil slick triggered by the bombing of the Jiyé plant.

© David Sauveur / Agence VU

Summary

Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is the third and, so far, largest EU military operation. At its outset, the Secretary General and High Representative for the EU CFSP Dr. Javier Solana insisted that EUFOR should be “new and distinct” and should “make a difference” when it took over the peacekeeping role from NATO’s SFOR in BiH. By undertaking orthodox peacekeeping military operations, EUFOR has been the essential security reassurance in BiH maintaining the stable conditions to allow BiH’s political, social and economic development. The new and distinct part of EUFOR’s mandate came in its novel “key military task” to support the High Representative’s Mission Implementation Plan and in its “key supporting task” to support the fight against organised crime. Both of these tasks were to be undertaken in close coordination with the EU family of instruments in BiH.

The question for the Commander of EUFOR was how to give effect to these new mandated tasks using EUFOR’s military capability to undertake essentially civil responsibilities. There were difficulties but by adopting pragmatic principles and setting some guiding objectives, these were largely overcome and EUFOR achieved a significant impact in supporting the ambitions of the High Representative’s Mission Implementation Plan and in supporting the fight against organised crime. Overall, EUFOR and its civil/military cooperation were a success story in 2005. Above all, EUFOR established itself as the military force in charge and has continued to guarantee stability in BiH.

EUFOR – Making a difference

Shortly after I was appointed to be COMEUFOR in 2004, Dr. Javier Solana, the Secretary General and High Representative for the EU CFSP, summoned me to receive his guidance on the third and, so far, largest EU military operation. He gave me two particularly strong messages. The first was that EUFOR was to be “new and distinct”; the second, that EUFOR was to “make a difference”. This seemed at first to be somewhat unusual and rather vague guidance. In fact it was highly pertinent.

NATO had run a very successful mission with IFOR and SFOR implementing the military Annexes of the Dayton Agreement and stabilising BiH over nine years. Why change a winning formula? Why did the EU volunteer to take over this mission which NATO described as “mission accomplished”? The reasons were neatly described by Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative of the international community and the EU Special Representative in BiH: Bosnia was reaching the end of the road from Dayton and was now at the beginning of the road to Brussels. Put another way, BiH was out of “emergency surgery” following the end of its war, with a major emphasis on NATO’s military stabilisation to create the conditions for civilian reconstruction; BiH was now in “rehabilitation”, with the main emphasis on civil institution building supported by a military and security reassurance. A robust international military presence was still necessary to guarantee Bosnia’s stability.

So, what was EUFOR’s role to be? How was it to be new and distinct? How was it to make a difference?

In 2005 there were some remaining potential instabilities in BiH: the divisive nature and dominance of the mono-ethnic politics, unsettling regional influences from Kosovo and Montenegro, a depressed economy, plentiful holdings of illegal weapons amongst the communities, and the debilitating influences of organised crime, corruption and failings in the rule of law. Therefore, EUFOR’s primary

1. European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2. Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3. Commander of EUFOR.
4. Implementation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
ration d’être was to provide a security reassurance: to continue to maintain the safe and secure environment, to deter the possibility of a resumption of violence; in short, to continue the stabilisation established by NATO. In order to do this, EUFOR continued many of SFOR’s military operations such as confidence patrolling in remote or unsettled areas, harvesting weapons from the community, supervising the BiH Armed Forces’ and the Defence Industry’s compliance with the Dayton Agreement, and assisting the BiH police security operations in the community. EUFOR continued vigorously to undertake these tasks, and established its military credibility early on thanks to high operational tempo and widespread visibility.

But one of EUFOR’s tasks, and very different to NATO’s mandated tasks, was to “support the High Representative’s Mission Implementation Plan” in close cooperation with other International Community actors, especially with the EU family of instruments under the coordination of the EU Special Representative, Lord Ashdown. Most surprising to me as military commander was that this task was not a Key Supporting Task but rather one of the Key Military Tasks. As is normal in military operations, my mission was broken down by the authorities in Brussels into “key military tasks” and “key supporting tasks”. Key military tasks are those to which the commander has to give priority.

Eager to satisfy this Key Military Task, I looked in the High Representative’s Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) for areas in which EUFOR’s military capability could “support”, as ordered. The MIP was in four sections dealing respectively with the economy, the rule of law, the police, and defence reform. The first two seemed unlikely areas for military engagement. The police section seemed to be more properly a concern of the EU Police Mission. Finally, assisting the Defence Reform process was the main role reserved for the small residual NATO presence in BiH. So how could EUFOR appropriately give its military “support” to the MIP? In other words, how could EUFOR be “new and distinct” and “make a difference”?

Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative, was talking about the obstructionism which was preventing BiH’s progress and process towards membership of the Euro Atlantic structures of the EU and NATO. This obstructionism manifested itself and was reflected in the organised crime and in the vested interests and corruption of many of the political leaders which pervaded the political and administrative establishments – at all levels. The organised crime, corruption and failings in the rule of law were undermining the integrity of good governance in BiH and hampering the development of its economy. These constituted much of the “obstructionism” hindering BiH’s progress and also delaying the conditions or end-state for EUFOR’s exit from BiH.

Among its Key Supporting Tasks, EUFOR was also mandated “to support the fight against organised crime”, another new and rather different task for the military in BiH. These two tasks “supporting the fight against organised crime” and “supporting the MIP” were two sides of the same coin in the context of BiH. Although not routinely orthodox military tasks, such operations would contribute to fostering the security and stability of BiH, EUFOR’s main role. Additionally they would also contribute to the whole “EU effort” to promote BiH’s progress towards the EU. Finally, combating organised crime would also have an impact on the networks supporting the fugitive Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs) – another of EUFOR’s key supporting tasks.

Still there remained the questions of how EUFOR could use its military capability to contribute in this area and how to coordinate with the other EU instruments and international community actors.

First I should clarify EUFOR’s role. EUFOR was not mandated to fight crime but to support the fight against organised crime. This means that EUFOR would not substitute itself for the local authorities. EUFOR would only support, for three reasons: political (the common objective of all the EU actors in BiH is to develop the local capacities), legal (EUFOR does not operate under local law) and practical (soldiers cannot generally be transformed into law enforcement agents).

EUFOR’s supporting role being clearly established, let me address EUFOR’s military capability and the principles for its use in supporting the fight against organised crime. EUFOR possessed a gendarmerie style unit of battalion strength. The police-trained soldiers were ideal for undertaking police-style operations just as they had been as part of NATO’s SFOR. But a battalion is not enough to make an impact on the resolve and the capacities of the numerous Bosnian law enforcement agencies to tackle organised crime and corruption in a country of the size and population of BiH. It seemed

5. Such as the EU Presidency, the EU Police Mission, the EU Monitoring Mission, the EC’s CAFAO (Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office, a project funded by the European Commission), and the European Commission Delegation.

6. Known as the Integrated Police Unit or IPU.

[144]
It is true that some contingent commanders were reluctant, under instructions from capitals, to undertake operations to give effect to these tasks. They complained that these were police activities and not appropriate for soldiers. However, during 2005, most contributing nations released many of their written and unwritten national caveats and restraints against such operational tasks. Much credit for this goes to the Operation Commander in Mons, Belgium, who energetically lobbied CHODS’ and ministers. This has been a major step forward for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and marks a distinction between the SFOR mandate (mainly military) and the “new and distinct” mandate of EUFOR which combines a robust military posture and extensive EU supporting tasks.

It was, however, important to make a distinction between what was an appropriate military activity for EUFOR soldiers and what was a police task. I laid down one clear principle to guide EUFOR: soldiers would create the conditions in which the BiH law enforcement agencies not only “could” but “would have to” do their duty. In other words, EUFOR would help discover a crime or illegality (e.g. fuel smuggling or illegal timber cutting), but would “freeze the scene” and hand it over to the BiH authorities to deal with the legal and law enforcement technicalities. This avoided EUFOR soldiers being involved in the specialised police work of handling evidence or appearing as witnesses in subsequent legal proceedings. This is not to suggest that EUFOR was acting on its own. On the contrary, the emphasis was to act together with the Bosnian Law Enforcement Agencies. To give added meaning and guidance to this principle that EUFOR should not cross the line into police work, I set out three objectives.

**EUFOR’s objectives in supporting the BiH Law Enforcement Agencies**

First and foremost, in undertaking these operations EUFOR was to support, strengthen and embolden the BiH law enforcement agencies, and to help them tackle some of the “untouchables”. The idea was to create the conditions so that, although EUFOR might be in the lead at the outset, the BiH authorities would gradually take over, lead and initiate operations which they had not previously undertaken. The local law enforcement agencies had respect for EUFOR and were eager to cooperate with EUFOR and learn from the way EUFOR planned, conducted and reviewed operations. Over the year 2005, the BiH authorities have indeed gradually taken over, led and initiated operations. Space in this article allows no more than a comment that EUFOR’s effect was significant.

Second objective: EUFOR was to have an impact on the networks of organised crime and corruption. This was important since our soldiers needed to have some results from their efforts in order to motivate them. But also, EUFOR needed to be adding tangible and visible value to the fight against organised crime. Results were modest given that the problem of organised crime and corruption is not to be solved in the course of a year or so! But some significant and visible results were achieved.

Third objective: EUFOR was to change attitudes – within the BiH Law Enforcement Agencies, within the media, and amongst the general public. Once again, changing the Balkan culture and attitude to endemic crime and corruption was not going to take place overnight, but some measurable changes were achieved both through the highly professional example of EUFOR’s soldiers on the ground and through EUFOR’s public information activities.

I do not wish to give the impression of total success. There are some EU Member States which remain sceptical about the use of soldiers in the sort of operations to support the fight against organised crime which EUFOR undertook in 2005. Moreover, there are officers and soldiers whose military culture and training also make them reluctant to engage in these non-warrior and police-like tasks. The military role and engagement in “reconstruction and stabilisation” in post-conflict situations, such as in BiH, is an issue under debate and development on both sides of the Atlantic. The key is that ministers need to be clear on what they expect the military to undertake; and the military need to be flexible and to adapt their conventional military skills and capabilities to new...
and unorthodox tasks, just as they have so often done in the past for humanitarian relief operations or natural disaster situations. A military force cannot stand apart and aloof from the main challenges to the rule of law facing the society to which it is deployed. Otherwise it risks irrelevance and erosion of its credibility.

There was strong support for EUFOR and its new role within BiH from the EU Special Representative, the EU Presidency and the EU Ambassadors. This unity of EU family support was also helpful in encouraging the BiH authorities to engage constructively with EUFOR in its new tasks.

Initially, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) was not unanimously in favour of EUFOR’s approach. Thankfully there were many individual police officers who threw themselves wholeheartedly behind EUFOR and assisted in EUFOR’s operations with the BiH law enforcement agencies. But there was a tendency from the leadership downwards of antipathy to military engagement in operations which targeted crime and law enforcement so closely. Partly this was because the military routinely plays no such role in developed states, and to do so in BiH was seen by some as setting a poor example to an aspiring member of the EU. Perhaps this was an issue on which the EU Police Mission could have received unequivocal direction from Brussels. Indeed, by the end of 2005 this antipathy to EUFOR’s operations was largely reversed, a very positive development.

Of course, EUFOR was working to support the fight against organised crime not only in the EUPM’s “police arena”. Organised crime together with corruption and failings in the rule of law spanned many other non-police agencies such as the customs and tax authorities, the trading standards authority, the many state and cantonal forestry authorities, as well as the BiH intelligence service and the prosecutors. EUFOR was working with all these agencies too, often coordinating activity between them. This argued for a strong civil body, not EUFOR, to coordinate amongst the EU Family and other international actors and also to encourage a coherent pan-agency approach to organised crime and corruption by the BiH government; this role was for the European Union Special Representative in BiH (EUSR).

What was particularly “new and distinct” in EUFOR was our close relationship with other international organisations, particularly European ones. For example, EUFOR worked in very close collaboration with CAFAO which was invariably supportive. But CAFAO’s law enforcement capacity and expertise was limited to a small staff of just a few individuals. Their purpose was to combat fiscal fraud and corruption with a special concern about the smuggling of fuel and other commodities, a massive fraud in BiH and a major source of income for organised crime and war criminal support networks. Larger numbers of CAFAO to combine with EUFOR in the arena of revenue fraud would have paid handsome dividends.

The EU Monitoring Mission shared their reporting with EUFOR, and vice versa, and contributed hugely to EUFOR’s political and local situational awareness. Relations between EUFOR and the EC Delegation on a personal and institutional level were good. EUFOR cooperated with the EC Delegation on a number of high value CARDS projects (e.g. infrastructure and engineering projects, funded by the EC and using EUFOR engineers to implement them). These were of major local benefit and could not have been realised without EUFOR’s engineers and CIMIC experts. However, I felt that the EC Delegation was bound by their particular role and EU treaty position, and kept itself at arms length from a closer synergy and engagement with EUFOR and even with other EU actors in BiH.

No one could have asked Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative and EUSR, to have given a greater personal commitment to his work in BiH. For four years he worked 24/7, as the military say, and enabled huge developments in BiH, not least in its progress towards EU candidature. As regards his interface with EUFOR, there was no activity or operation undertaken by EUFOR which was not first coordinated or synchronised politically with the EUSR. However, it was only in the last months of 2005 that there was an exponential and successful increase in energising the cohesive impact of the EU instruments, at least in the crucial area of the fight against organised crime. In retrospect it is easy to say that this could and should have come earlier, but there were other priorities.

It is, however, also true that the instruments of the EU family acting relatively independently in BiH is a reflection of their supervising “compartments” within the EU institutions in Brussels. But perhaps the main reason why it took a while to work up a high level of coherence and synergy was that EUFOR was doing something “new and distinct” in Dr Solana’s words. Multinational institutions are conservative, and constrained and limited by mandates written in
isolation of each other. It takes time for them to adapt to new and unorthodox approaches, even though the logic and the benefits are clear.

The first year of EUFOR was a multi-dimensional success story. It is beyond doubt that EUFOR established itself as the military force in charge in BiH and continued to be at least as militarily effective as its predecessor NATO forces. There was no loss of military credibility or drop in local confidence, as some feared, in the transition from NATO to EUFOR. EUFOR also successfully took up the challenge of its mandate to be new and distinct and to make a difference. The EU, through combining its military and civil operations, achieved a collective and politically significant impact in BiH during 2005, especially through promotion of the EU “brand” in the public perception. Civil-Military cooperation and coordination within the EU family was a success from which some helpful signals for its development in the future can be drawn.
The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) was the first civilian crisis management mission launched as part of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The mission was established following an invitation from the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). We started our three-year mandate in January 2003 and have received an invitation from the BiH government for another two-year mandate until the end of 2007.

Today, the mission is operating in a rather benign security environment. The political environment and the state structure, however, are characterised by multiple disfunctions which also have a negative impact on the police. The 1992-1995 war left the country with a highly fragmented structure, including the police. We have to deal with almost 20 different police services at cantonal, entity and state levels. Our particular focus is to strengthen police services at the state level.

Programmatic approach

The mission was conceptualised as a strengthening of local police and the mandate is strictly confined to monitoring, mentoring and inspecting. EUPM’s objective is to support BiH police to uphold law enforcement at a level comparable to best European and international practices.

Four strategic priorities have been set to meet our objective:
• Institution and capacity-building.
• The fight against organised crime and corruption.
• Financial viability and sustainability of local police.
• The developing of police independence and accountability.

In these priority areas EUPM assists BiH in achieving viable, sustainable and effective law enforcement agencies by increasing local capacity. With this in mind, EUPM has developed a strategy of working with local counterparts, based on the principle of local ownership.

As pointed out before, the mission is non-executive. This means we cannot force change. Therefore our focus is to assist local police managers to initiate change and development themselves – though guided and assisted by international police professionals.

EUPM is the first mission of its kind. We had the challenging task of breaking down the strategic priorities into manageable packages of work that could produce tangible results. Our work also needed to be measured and assessed – also in light of handing the responsibility for them over to our local counterparts.

It was left to the mission to choose areas for programming and intervention. Seven programmes were designed, covering the development of new law enforcement agencies (the State Border Service and a State Investigation and Protection Agency) as well as cross-cutting ones in the fields of criminal police and criminal justice; training and education; internal affairs; administration and public order.

Within these programmes, a range of projects was devised to achieve sustainable results. From the outset, both programmes and projects were developed in partnership with local police and other international stakeholders. Over 100 projects were launched at the various levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina: cantons, entities, and state.
Ensuring participation and ownership

How have we put local ownership in action at police management and the political level? We advocated the set-up of a Police Steering Board, consisting of representatives from all elements of the local police services. This Steering Board enjoys the full support of EUPM and acts as the final arbiter on the design and introduction of projects within our programmes. EUPM has furthermore supported a hierarchy of local decision-making, from the political level down to local police units. At political level we have organised support for our work through a Ministerial Consultative Meeting on Police Matters.

How have we created ownership at local level? EUPM advised on the creation of Project Implementation Boards (PIBOs). PIBOs are responsible for developing projects and involve local police and EUPM advisors. The responsibility for implementation is handed over to the level where police services are delivered, which in turn maximises the principle of local ownership.

The aim of our projects is to develop local capacity, to build institutions and to create a lasting police infrastructure. As part of a “permanent” hand-over process, we are involving local police in decision-making regarding these projects. In this way, we want to ensure that our programming work is inclusive from the start. And that it is driven by the ultimate practitioners. We found that this is the best way to ensure motivation and real ownership.

Measuring progress and sustainability

Ensuring quality and consistency in such a participatory process is key. Due to BiH’s structure we are running projects in more than 20 different locations within almost as many different police services. EUPM developed a specific computerised benchmarking and reporting system which allowed the mission management to measure progress. Not always, but most times, we could identify problems early on, and we were able to address them quickly.

In addition, a rigorous process of audit and inspection was created, in which locations were periodically scrutinised to ensure progress against project implementation plans and remedial measures recommended where appropriate.

We are currently leading an evaluation process, inspecting all projects at all locations. We are checking that all requisite tasks are completed both from the side of the mission, and most importantly, by our local counterparts. The evaluation will allow our local police colleagues to buy into the results achieved so far. They will also commit themselves to continue or finalise projects that have not yet been concluded.

We have also made considerable achievements in handing over to local authorities in the key area of the fight against organised crime. The critical element was to build capacity and institutions to deal with organised criminality at state level. This was particularly relevant in the fragmented policing structures, which in themselves are an obstacle to success in the fight against organised crime. Together with our international community partners and local authorities, we supported the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) and the State Border Service (SBS). It was paramount to anchor those key services within an appropriate state-level institution, the Ministry of Security. After a difficult start, the Ministry – a key element of local responsibility – has started to play an increasingly important role in coordinating police matters, including the important areas of regional and international cooperation. However, the process is still at an early stage; final success is likely but not yet secured.

The creation of new state institutions was, however, also marred by tiresome quarrels about appointments to key positions and other controversial questions. Regrettably, the High Representative had to intervene on several occasions and impose a decision as otherwise there would have been no progress. These situations were an unsuccessful test of the principle of local ownership – political blockage between the main groups has unfortunately remained a feature of BiH, blocking even decisions which should be taken on purely professional and technical grounds.

On a more positive note, in June BiH was officially appointed a member of the Egmont Group of states a worldwide network that connects law enforcement agencies with the aim of combating money laundering, as a result of the efforts of the SIPA. This is viewed as a significant step in the fight against organised crime, which has come out of home-grown efforts.

Lessons learned

Methodology: the lack of standardised programme development and management tools was a serious challenge for the mission. EUPM’s mandate was quite innovative and standardised programme methodology for ESDP missions will need to be developed to support local capacity and – even more importantly – to manage orderly “hand-over” processes. Our methodology will need to be dovetailed with the development and technical assistance
approach to ensure continuity from crisis management to long-term development cooperation – or in the case of South-Eastern Europe to association and accession instruments.

Training and education of police are key for the development of a stable Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore we decided to bring all aspects of police education under a specific mission programme. This was important to secure continuous local capacity-building. The agreement on a BIH-wide training system was an important success of EUPM. The International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP) and EC CARDS have agreed to provide instruction for local police trainers, to enable them to teach both specialists and senior managers. These developments represent a significant step towards ensuring sustainability and harmonisation of a previously fragmented police education. To secure a long-term educational and training approach, coordination of the EU family and other donors was essential.

Coordination: EUPM has also created a Donor Funds and Training Projects Coordination Cell. This Cell is vital for management and coordination assistance related to mission activities. The lack of a more central coordination of donor efforts, however, has proved – as so often – problematic! A coordinated, central function relating to donations will need to be established to better assist the development of local police agencies. EUPM should no longer make requests for assistance on behalf of the local police. Supporting local capacity here means that the EU and others need to step up their coordination capacity.

Personnel: ESDP missions rely on seconded officers from Member States. We have experienced both the strengths and limitations of secondment of personnel. EUPM’s advisory role and programmatic approach require that officers are suitably experienced themselves. In not a few cases, officers seconded to the mission lacked the requisite managerial experience. If we are to build local capacity in order to hand over to local authorities, experience in managing such change processes is indispensable. We know that the enthusiasm for and commitment to the EUPM approach and methodology among local counterparts directly depends on the quality of international officers. Where we had inadequately skilled or inexperienced staff, we found it much harder to reach our programme aims.

Outlook

In November 2005, we commemorated the 10th anniversary of the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords which ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. International civilian police have supported the peace process from the beginning. We have moved from an executive role in the time of the United Nations International Police Task Force (UNIPTF) up to 2002 to the first civilian crisis management mission of the EU from 2003 to 2006. Over these three years, EUPM has developed a new, approach in the field of international peace assistance missions. We have focused our efforts on strengthening local ownership and responsibility for tackling the difficult problems of BiH. Our approach has not spared us from criticism but is showing results.

Over recent weeks, I have met with many senior police officers in BiH. At first, all of them had difficulties in fully grasping our programmatic and participatory approach – as they were used to receiving orders and not asking questions. Now as the first EUPM is drawing to a close, our methodology has been fully accepted and many local colleagues have assured me that they will continue working in this manner. I am therefore confident that EUPM has played a role. In supporting local capacity in the difficult policing environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that my successors in EUPM II will be able to hand over full responsibility for policing matters by the end of 2007 to the authorities and people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
CHAPTER 12: OPERATION ARTEMIS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Summary

In June 2003, the EU sent Operation Artemis, its first military mission outside Europe and independent of NATO, to the Democratic Republic of Congo. While it ultimately received an EU badge, its origin, command and control were French. The objective of Operation Artemis was to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions in Bunia, capital of Ituri, to improve the humanitarian situation, and to ensure the protection of displaced persons in the refugee camps in Bunia. Its mandate was to provide a short-term interim force for three months until the transition to the reinforced United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (UNMOC). Although the EU can be said to have passed the first “test” of its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mechanisms for the conduct of an autonomous operation, this test was a limited one. Operational constraints were caused by inadequate strategic lift capabilities, inadequate communications systems between headquarters and staff, and the lack of a strategic reserve.

Operation Artemis

This chapter focuses on the EU-led International Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF), codenamed Artemis, in the Democratic Republic of Congo in summer 2003.

In Ituri, an unstable region in the north-east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), some 50 000 people were killed in factional fighting between 1999 and early 2003, and a further 500 000 fled the district to other regions of Congo or to neighbouring states. Ituri has a long history of ethnic conflicts over access to land, mineral resources and control of local positions of power. The conflict shaped up as a proxy war, with sponsors from Kinshasa, Goma, Rwanda and Uganda backing rival factions, and shipping in weapons.

Under the Luanda agreement signed in September 2002 between the governments of Uganda and the DRC, the withdrawal of the Ugandan army was scheduled to take place after the holding of an Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC), setting-up a peacebuilding strategy for the troubled district of Ituri. The IPC was held from 1-14 April 2003 with an all-inclusive involvement of the Iturians, the participation of the DRC and Ugandan governments, and the support of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and the broader international community. It provided a peace-building and reconciliation roadmap for Ituri, which was to be led by a newly created Ituri interim administration (IIA). MONUC committed itself to providing security for the IIA. Unfortunately, the grave crisis that took place in Bunia and Ituri following the withdrawal of the Ugandan Peoples’ Defence Force (UPDF) units in early May 2003, made it impossible for the IIA to function normally.

As the last Ugandan troops left Bunia on 6 May 2003, Lendu-based militias and the predominantly Herma Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) attempted to take control of the town. In an attempt to escape the ensuing violence, thousands of civilians either abandoned the town or gathered around MONUC Sector 2 headquarters and the airport, where the Uruguayan battalion had established its base.

Tensions in Ituri mounted again and the local militias were fighting at a growing cost in civilian lives. The militias fought for the control of the town, committing large-scale atrocities on the civilian population. Two weeks of total chaos unfolded in Bunia and led to an international outcry about UN irresponsibility and the risk of a new genocide in the Great Lakes region.

Under its Chapter VI mandate, MONUC was already obliged to protect civilians under imminent threat. Yet its 700 strong Uruguayan battalion completely abdicated its responsibilities to protect civilians, and just a handful of peacekeepers and humanitarian workers succeeded in keeping alive 5 000-8 000 civilians who had sought refuge at a market located next to the UN compound near Bunia airport.

Proposed French deployment

During the weekend of 10 and 11 May, the Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, spoke with President Jacques Chirac, who indicated that France would be willing to deploy a force to Bunia.

In his letter of 15 May 2003, the Secretary-General called for “the rapid deployment to Bunia of a highly trained and well-equipped...
multinational force, under the lead of a Member State, to provide security at the airport as well as to other vital installations in the town and to protect the civilian population.\(^3\)

The force would temporarily relieve the UN peacekeepers from Uruguay until 1 September, when a larger UN force led by Bangladesh could be in place.

France agreed to intervene, provided (a) it was granted a UN Chapter VII mandate, (b) countries in the region involved in the fighting (DRC, Uganda and Rwanda) officially supported its intervention, and (c) the operation was limited in time and scope. On 28 May, France officially announced its intention to lead such an operation, with the contribution of other nations, and serve as Framework Nation.\(^2\)

Operation Mamba as it was initially called by the French, was already being prepared, when the French President Chirac realised this intervention would be the ideal case to prove the French, was already being prepared, when the French President Chirac realised this intervention would be the ideal case to prove the French readiness to act autonomously from the French, was already being prepared, when the French President Chirac realised this intervention would be the ideal case to prove the French readiness to act autonomously from the French, was already being prepared, when the French President Chirac realised this intervention would be the ideal case to prove the French readiness to act autonomously from other nations, and serve as Framework Nation.\(^3\)

On 30 May 2003, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment, of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in Bunia until 1 September 2003, when a reinforced UN mission in the Congo (MONUC) could be deployed. The mission of the IEMF was “to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town”.\(^4\)

**EU launches ESDP operation**

On 12 June 2003, the Council of the European Union adopted a decision to launch its first fully autonomous (outside the “Berlin-plus” framework agreed with NATO) crisis management operation outside Europe.\(^1\) It was the first ESDP operation in Africa, which took place within the framework of UNSC Resolution 1484 adopted on 30 May 2003, and the Council’s Joint Action adopted on 5 June 2003.

While the French forces represented a large majority of the military personnel involved in the operation it is important to note that the planning of the operation and the rules of engagement were decided by the EU-15. In a very brief space of time, EU Member States committed staff officers and troops to work with Paris. Apart from the French troops on the ground (90% of the force) a special operations unit from the United Kingdom and a medical team from Belgium were involved on the ground. The operational headquarters, where the operation was planned and conducted, was based in Paris and included 80 officers drawn from all European countries.

The political and security committee, under the responsibility of the Council to which the PSC reports regularly, exercised the political control and strategic direction of the operation, including the power to amend the operational plan, the chain of command and the rules of engagement.

The first French forward elements had been deployed to Bunia on 6 June 2003, closely followed by engineers to help maintain the very poor airfield for the numerous strategic and tactical airlifts of personnel and equipment. As Bunia was plagued by rival militiamen openly carrying small arms, an initial measure of the IEMF was to declare the town a 10 km area around it a “weapons-invisible” zone.

Starting with some initial skirmishes with Lendu militia on 14 June, through to more serious clashes with the UPC in early July that reportedly left 20 militiamen dead, the IEMF left no doubt as to its willingness to use force, not against one party in particular but against any challenges to its authority or threats to the security of the population.

By early July, all elements of the operation were in place. The operation was managed by French Major-General Neveux (Operation Commander) and French Brigadier-General Thonier (Force Commander).
Commander). It should be noted that MONUC had been present in the region since November 1999, which facilitated the deployment and some operations of the IEMF.

Ultimately, the IEMF re-established security in Bunia and weakened the military capabilities of the rival Lendu and Hema militias, including by cutting off military supplies from abroad, through monitoring of airfields. As a result, the political process in Ituri was allowed to resume some activity as political offices reopened in Bunia and 60,000 refugees returned. To a certain extent, economic and social activities were resumed.

Beyond its immediate military tasks, Operation Artemis delivered more than 3,000 tonnes of humanitarian aid to Bunia. After the demilitarisation of the city, more than 50,000 refugees were able to return.

The transition in September to the Bangladeshi-led MONUC forces, nicknamed the Ituri brigade, took a further two weeks, during which time the EU-led multinational force continued to take part in common patrols, provided logistical support and participated in the MONUC planning programme.

MONUC has subsequently had mixed success in continuing the pacification of Ituri. Arms smuggling continued and on 6 October 2003, 65 people, primarily women and children, were massacred in an attack in Katshele, about 60 km northeast of Bunia. Given its numerical constraints, however, it is doubtful that an extended EU mission would have had very different results.7

Lessons learned

Although limited in time, scope, geographical area of action and the number of forces involved, Operation Artemis was nevertheless significant in many different ways.

The operation was, for several reasons, not typical of an autonomous EU operation with future reference. Both operational and force planning were already well underway at a national (French) level, even before the EU actually became involved. As a consequence, important aspects of the EU rapid response planning process were not tested.7

In fact, Artemis was more a French operation with an EU cover, than an EU operation led by the French. Without French leadership, the EU operation would not have happened. Artemis became an EU operation because of the political weight it could provide in proving the value of an EU military capability for peace-keeping. According to a Nairobi-based analyst of Africa’s Great Lakes region, the political motivation behind Operation Artemis was to show unity after the European foreign policy debacle of Iraq.8

In the military field, some military shortcomings were already known prior to the start of the operation, in particular a shortage of strategic transport. This problem was solved by leasing an aircraft from Ukraine.9 The availability of strategic airlift puts a premium on any rapid response capability.

Other shortcomings were the need for better and secure means for long-distance communications, better information technology, intelligence sharing and the need to improve the interoperability of European armed forces. From the strategic level downwards, effective and secure communications and liaison for planning, as well as Command and Control (C2) and the passing of intelligence with the designated operational Headquarters (HQs) should be guaranteed. Identifying a shortfall in operation Artemis, the EU has taken the necessary action to solve this issue, guaranteeing the availability of secure data links with potential operational HQs in future operations.

The bulk of the forces on the ground in Bunia were French. The ability of the forces to communicate with the local population was widely considered an asset for facilitated cooperation and improved intelligence.

However, the strict insistence on a very limited area of operations – Bunia – merely pushed the problem of violent aggression against civilians beyond the environs of the town, where atrocities continued.

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9. Of note, French military officials reportedly informally asked US officials if US transports would be available to airlift European troops to Bunia. The US advised that such requests should come under Berlin Plus. The French soon dropped the matter and opted to lease Ukrainian transports. The incident reinforced perceptions in Washington and elsewhere that Paris was determined, for political reasons, to conduct an autonomous mission (Michel, L., (Winter 2004) “NATO and the EU, Stop the Minuet, it’s Time to Tango?”, EuroFuture, p. 90).
Another factor to note is that none of the participants in the IEMF were willing to re-hat with MONUC. This placed the mission’s credibility at risk since MONUC lacked the special forces, intelligence and overflight capabilities that were crucial to the IEMF’s success. The very strict insistence on the three-month period of deployment signalled clearly to all, including the armed belligerents, the transitory nature of the force.

The arrangements for political-military direction in Operation Artemis provided maximum flexibility for the Operations Commander on scene. Although this was highly appreciated by him, there is a valid question as to whether the EU should be satisfied with similar arrangements in future operations.

UN-EU links

Operation Artemis has been a remarkably positive experiment in cooperation between the UN and a regional organisation, in the domain of peace and security. It has provided a stopgap to the UN, limited in time and space, which has allowed it to prepare the transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcing better, in a situation where there was not much peace to keep, but rather a war in progress (which had to be stopped) and a peace to build.

At the highest level, direct reporting from Javier Solana to the UN Security Council was also seen as an improvement over the mechanism used to report on UN-mandated operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, which involves the submission of a three-page written report to the Security Council every three months.

One of the aims of the operation was to allow humanitarian assistance to resume and extend further, and therefore help and facilitate the humanitarian community in its work. Relations between military and humanitarian organisations can often be difficult, as they do not always share the same perspective and above all use very different means. According to ECHO, there was an almost immediate understanding that each could be valuable to the other. The advantage of the humanitarian agencies from the point of view of the military was undoubtedly their deep knowledge on the ground.

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Chapter 13: EU monitoring mission in Aceh

The AMM – facilitating dialogue

The AMM was successfully launched on 15 September 2005. It replaced the Initial Monitoring Presence (IMP), which had been established on 15 August to bridge the one-month gap between the signature, on this same date, of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and AMM deployment on 15 September. The IMP was entirely financed from participating states’ voluntary contributions. It was set up by a team of mostly General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (GSC) staff, supported by experts from Member States/third states. Mr Pieter Feith had the leadership as Head of Mission designate for AMM.

AMM is a civilian mission in the framework of the ESDP. The European Union runs the mission in partnership with five Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries – Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – as well as with Norway and Switzerland. Total AMM international staff now stands at some 240, of whom 92 are from ASEAN countries.

AMM covers the whole Aceh province through 11 District Offices and 4 Mobile Decommissioning Teams. Since its establishment, the AMM has:

- facilitated continued dialogue between the two parties through a difficult initial period when trust was very low;
- verified the decommissioning of more than half (476) of GAM weapons;
- monitored the redeployment of more than half (15,116) of non-organic troops (TNI – or Indonesian Army – and Police);
- monitored the reintegration of amnestied GAM former fighters and supporters; and
- contributed to public awareness of and support for the MoU and the AMM’s role in it.

The AMM has always kept strict neutrality and even-handedness. It has been instrumental in ensuring that the parties have begun to deliver on the commitments they made in the MoU. The AMM has also created a positive impression – in Asia, the UN and the US – of the EU’s ability to manage a crisis.

Recommendations for the future

Given the mixed nature of the team and the poor infrastructure in Aceh, it is impressive that the mission has got up and running this fast. But it could – and should – have been set up with less improvisation. The European Union should now consider how to reinforce and reconfigure its crisis management procedures to allow a consistently timely, effective, safe and flexible ESDP response that is not dependent on the unpredictable generosity of individual Member States.

The EU draws in a structured way and systematically lessons from all its crisis management operations. This has not yet happened for AMM. Nonetheless, some areas for improvement are clear:

- Finances: in the case of IMP/AMM, individual Member States provided the money to start the mission and EU monies did not arrive until some time after the start of the mission. A rapidly deployable planning team and mission must be able to draw on finance in the set-up phase. The establishment of a “start-up fund” for crisis management should be considered.

Bruno Hanses: Head of Section “Planning and Operations” in the Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management (DGE IX) of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. He has been a Council Secretariat official since 1991, and has held various positions in the field of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, including in the Cabinet of the Secretary General, as adviser to the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, and on geographical desks for EU relations with Africa and South Asia.
• Logistics: procurement times need to be radically shortened. We need to exploit all possibilities for doing this under existing rules. The alternative would be to create specific mechanisms for civilian crisis management, for instance a permanent stock of start-up equipment. The stockpile could draw on assets from closing missions.

• Procedures: existing crisis management procedures are too long and cumbersome to allow a genuinely rapid response. Current working practices – including Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Operation Plans (OPlans) and Joint Actions – require working group input at every level on the path to the Council. We need to streamline the tasking and command path, while maintaining overall Council control.

• Personnel: our AMM experience showed that a mission of this complexity requires trained operational leadership, crisis management generalists and experts. Some specific expertise, for instance, for logistics, procurement and finance, is needed at a very early stage, ideally even before the adoption of a Joint Action by the Council. We therefore need a rapidly deployable cadre of civilian crisis management personnel.

One of the factors that made the Aceh mission a success was that the team in charge of setting up the mission was already fully familiar with Brussels in general and firmly embedded in our institutional structure. We must be able to rapidly put together effective teams for each operation. To do so, we must look beyond our scarce personnel resources in the Council Secretariat.

The General Affairs and External Relations Council in July approved the concept for so-called Crisis Response Teams (CRTs) that can be mobilised within 5 days from a decision by the Secretary-General/High Representative, Council or Political and Security Committee (PSC). CRTs would notably be used for early assessment of a crisis situation and fact-finding, and the crucial phase of mission build-up. Our ambition is to have a pool comprising initially up to 100 named experts, nominated by Member States and who have gone through a tailor-made induction training. Work is currently ongoing to make this tool available as soon as possible.

Outlook

The end of the decommissioning and relocation process is scheduled for the end of December. Ideally, this work should be completed by 26 December 2005, the anniversary of the Tsunami.

AMM will then focus on the political and legislative process, but also continue to monitor the situation on the ground, including as regards human rights. When AMM’s mandate expires as foreseen on 15 March 2006 it will be important for the EU to ensure a smooth transition between AMM, an activity under the ESDP, and the more long-term reconstruction and institution-building under Community competence.
CHAPTER 14: THE EU IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE GAZA DISENGAGEMENT

Interview with Christian Berger

What is the European Union’s overall policy in the Middle East?

For years the EU has been working towards the “two-State solution leading to a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on implementation of the Road Map, with Israel and a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign Palestinian State living side-by-side within secure and recognised borders…”

The EU has formulated this policy in a number of milestone declarations on the Middle East Peace Process, such as the Venice Declaration of 13 June 1980, which reconfirmed the right of existence of all states in the region including Israel, and confirmed the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people. This was followed some years later with the Berlin Declaration of 24 March 1999, which introduced the notion of the two-State solution but also through the European Neighbourhood Policy. The EU is also working with both partners in support of the peace process; here just to mention the Commission’s Partnership for Peace Programme, which was set up to support civil society organisations on both sides in their search for peace. EU Member States are running two important European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions on the ground: EUPOL COPPS and EU BAM. Through EUPOL COPPS the EU supports the reform of the Palestinian civilian police force. EU BAM is the Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point between Gaza and Egypt; the latter is a direct result of the Wolfensohn mission in the wake of the Gaza Disengagement. The EU’s more specific support of the Disengagement Plan, and its cooperation with other Quartet members, (US, Russia, and the UN), was significant as we shall see later.

The EU’s political goals are underpinned by its developmental approach in support of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and other specific instruments, for example, financial support to the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine refugees. The EU is the largest donor to the Palestinian Authority. In 2005, as in previous years, the EU (not including individual support from Member States) provided €250 million in financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority and international organisations. Together with Member States contributions this is about 50% of what the world is giving to the Palestinians.

The EU has been involved in bilateral relations with Israel and the PA for some time now – both in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership but also through the European Neighbourhood Policy. The EU is also working with both partners in support of the peace process; here just to mention the Commission’s Partnership for Peace Programme, which was set up to support civil society organisations on both sides in their search for peace. EU Member States are running two important European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions on the ground: EUPOL COPPS and EU BAM. Through EUPOL COPPS the EU supports the reform of the Palestinian civilian police force. EU BAM is the Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point between Gaza and Egypt; the latter is a direct result of the Wolfensohn mission in the wake of the Gaza Disengagement. The EU’s more specific support of the Disengagement Plan, and its cooperation with other Quartet members, (US, Russia, and the UN), was significant as we shall see later.

What was the lead up to the Gaza Disengagement Plan?

In 2004 – almost four years into the second Intifada – it was clear that something needed to happen if the Israelis and Palestinians were to have a hope of moving towards resolving the conflict. Another important point to mention, which had a bearing on the need for something to be done, was mounting domestic and international pressure on the then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and his calculation that at a certain point in the near future there would be more Arabs living to the West of Jordan River than there were Jews. From that perspective withdrawal was a logical step.

How did the EU react when Ariel Sharon announced the Disengagement Plan from the Gaza Strip in December 2003? The Irish Foreign Affairs Minister was quoted as saying that the EU disapproved of the plan because it did not address the complete withdrawal from the West Bank.

The EU welcomed the Disengagement Plan, albeit rather cautiously, and only on the grounds that the following five points were deemed crucial for the success of the plan:

1. That it was linked to the Road Map (the Quartet’s peace plan).
2. That it paved the way for a two-State solution.
3. That there was adequate coordination between Israelis and Palestinians.
4. That there would be no transfer of settlers from Gaza to the West Bank.
5. That Israel would facilitate the economic recovery of the Palestinian Territory.

The international community wanted disengagement to happen and so did the Israelis. The EU could hardly be against the plan to withdraw the settlers whose presence in the occu-
Pied territory was illegal according to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, which states: “The occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own population into the territories it occupies.”

What was the specific role of the EU in the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the northern West Bank?

As mentioned, the EU supported the disengagement plan, particularly the withdrawal of settlers and the Israeli military from Gaza and the Northern West Bank. But also as part of the international Quartet the EU contributed in terms of political, financial and human resources to the Quartet Special Envoy for Disengagement, James Wolfensohn. In April 2005, the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, planned to appoint a US economic envoy overseeing the implementation of the Disengagement Plan. James Wolfensohn, who at the time was about to leave his post of President of the World Bank, was chosen for this role. The other Quartet members felt that rather than act solely as US representative he should represent the Quartet as a whole given the economic and political involvement of the other Quartet members in the region. So Wolfensohn became the Special Envoy for the Quartet. This was the first time an envoy was appointed by and reported to the Quartet itself. A team of advisers and Quartet representatives was set up in May 2005, and became operational in June 2005, in time for the last phases of preparation for disengagement.

Our role was to facilitate the Israeli disengagement from Gaza and the Northern West Bank, oversee and coordinate the international community’s efforts in support of the Israeli disengagement and revitalisation of the Palestinian economy. In particular, we had to:

1. Show the Palestinians the benefits of disengagement. Over US$ 700 million was donated in ongoing and planned programmes to support reconstruction of the region’s infrastructure and boost job creation.
2. Provide long-term support. James Wolfensohn pushed for the international community to support a three-year development plan that was introduced, and accepted, at the G8 Summit at Gleneagles in June 2005. The plan is worth a total of US$ 9 billion over the three years. The World Bank together with the UK Department for International Development (DFID) helped the Palestinian Authority work on a three-year integrated budget and development plan. Given the current situation the plan is now on hold.
3. Support the Palestinian President in addressing their US$ 400 million budget deficit. The idea was that Palestine could start with a balanced budget in 2006 and that this would be achieved through fundraising activities carried out by the Palestinians and supported by the Wolfensohn mission.

How did you come to be involved and what was your specific role?

I was seconded from the EU as part of the team of Quartet representatives. Together we developed a work programme that had several components, of which the major part was to bring the Israelis and the Palestinians to the negotiating table and ensure that disengagement proceeded as smoothly and seamlessly as possible. To that end James Wolfensohn launched negotiations with the Israeli armed forces and the Palestinian Authority, and brought both sides together in order to coordinate the Israeli departure from Gaza.

In parallel we developed the Rapid Action Programme, with 27 points falling within five categories:

1. Access, Movement Passages and Trade;
2. Settlement Assets;
3. Disengagement;
4. Palestinian Governance; and
5. Relieving Suffering and Restoring Growth.

However, it became clear that the focus would have to be narrowed and that, in addition to increased donor support, access and trade issues needed to be tackled as a first priority if there was to be any improvement in the Palestinian economy. As discussions proceeded we soon realised that the 27 point programme was too broad a remit and had to be scaled back and limited to six issues, of which four were important for the future development of the Gaza Strip, and two were particularly urgent issues that needed immediate attention. Together with the three points mentioned earlier it became known as the “Six plus Three Programme”.

The four access and movement issues included the following:

- Internal crossing points between Israel and Palestine.
- Links between the West Bank and Gaza.
- Movement within the West Bank.
- Access to the outside world via port and airport, and the international crossing point to Egypt.

The two urgent issues were:

- What to do with the settlement houses.
- How to maximise the potential of the settlers’ green houses.

The first four issues were captured in the Access and Movement Agreement. That agreement was the result of face-to-face negotiations by both sides under the chairmanship of James Wolfen-
sohn. By November we had a text outlining the major principles. On 15 November we requested the help of Condoleezza Rice and Javier Solana to get the final agreement to the text from both the Israelis and Palestinians. Israel agreed in principle but wanted the US to be responsible for the implementation phase of the agreement. That meant that the Quartet Envoy was no longer responsible for implementation.

What were your specific achievements?

In general terms, it was the first time in a long period time that the Palestinians and Israelis had returned to the negotiating table and that an independent neutral third party had been involved in such discussions. This in itself serves as a model for the future.

In more specific terms, some progress was made in both of the two urgent issues just mentioned – the settlement houses and the greenhouses. For example, Israel agreed to demolish all settlement houses, remove all hazardous materials, such as asbestos, and pay for the removal of the debris. In December 2005, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) was selected as the implementing agency and received US$ 25 million from the Israeli Government to carry out the removal and shredding of the non-hazardous debris that was left behind following the demolition of the houses. This would then be recycled into building materials that could be reused by the Palestinians in the region. This left the non-recyclable but non-hazardous materials, for example plastic material, hoses and pipes, an issue for which we have, as yet, been unable to find an answer.

The greenhouses were particularly important as it was felt they could have a far-reaching impact on the local Palestinian economy. It was hoped that the greenhouses left by the Israeli settlers could be made available to the Palestinian farming community. Generating approximately US$ 100 million, they had been a significant source of income for the Israeli settlers and provided an opportunity to aid the local Palestinian economy. Mr Wolfensohn was able to raise US$ 14 million in private donations to offer the settlers enough incentive to leave their greenhouses behind when they left the Gaza Strip. On another positive note, a point we tried to highlight as a benefit was the fact that the greenhouse programme alone was responsible for creating jobs for 3 000 people - not only in terms of farming, but also jobs for security guards to ward off the threat from looting. The question of how to exploit this source of income became the next issue for us. In order to make the greenhouses work financially the Palestinians would need to be able to export their produce, particularly to the European market and the Gulf States. This in turn meant that crossing points would need to be left open. For a while the main crossing point for goods, Karmi, remained open. However, in January 2006, at the peak of the harvesting season, the crossing point was closed. The result was that farmers had to destroy 75% of the produce they had hoped to export. This was a major setback. However, the programme could still work. Since it was set up, the Palestinian Authority took control and invested some US$ 20 million in maintenance and upkeep. Now they are planning to privatise the greenhouses, giving neighbouring farmers the opportunity to buy them.

The Rafah Crossing Agreement was also a significant step. Between September and October 2005 we negotiated security details, customs procedures and the role of a potential third party at the Crossing Point. And we drew up the principles for an agreement to govern the Rafah crossing point, which included:

- Palestinian ID card holders could cross.
- Other non-ID card holders would have to cross at the Israeli Karem-Shalom crossing.
- Exports could go through to Egypt. Egyptian imports had to go through the Karem-Shalom crossing point, where they would be cleared by Palestinian customs officials under Israeli supervision.
- Israelis would receive real-time video and data transmission from the Palestinian crossing point.

Both parties wanted a third party to monitor the implementation of the agreement. James Wolfensohn invited the EU to be that third party. Subsequently, the EU set up the monitoring mission on 25 November and on the following day the crossing point was opened. Since then about 250 000 people have crossed the border, approximately 1 400 per day.

We also put forward a proposal to rebuild the airport, build a seaport, and make both fully operational and therefore economically feasible. There has been no progress. However, the parties have conceded to continue discussions and are considering third party involvement as a model. There could be an ongoing role for the Quartet if this does eventually get the go ahead. There was no progress on the Gaza-West Bank link, nor was there progress on improving movement in the West Bank.

As with all of the steps taken, the political situation will need to stabilise before we can move forward. The important outcome of the Wolfensohn mission, however, is that the principles have been established.
In a speech about the Disengagement Plan in August 2005, Benita Ferrero-Waldner spoke of the “immense challenges that lie ahead”. What were the major challenges to the Wolfensohn mission?

As mentioned previously, the crossing points were a major bottleneck preventing full movement and access. The World Bank wanted to improve the crossing points for people and for goods. The Bank recognised that this could have a major impact on the economic recovery which until then had been slow for various reasons: the fact that trucks could not leave Gaza meant that there is a lengthy and slow onload/offload process whereby goods arrive at the crossing points and are offloaded on one side, undergo a security check and are loaded onto other trucks on the other side. We suggested that the process could be speeded up if there was a door-to-door service where the goods were delivered from the sender to the addressee, doing away with the need for changing trucks, or at least keep using the same container because heavy scanners could be used to scan the goods loaded on a container. Delivering goods this way would improve efficiency, flow and management of the goods, not to mention increase the amount passing through on a daily basis. We suggested that the number of trucks cleared should increase 150 per day. Other ideas that were put forward for improving movement and access were connecting the Gaza Strip and the West Bank through rail and road links; as a start we suggested to run convoys between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. External access to Egypt was also a problem. It was agreed, as part of the acceptance of the Disengagement Plan, that the Palestinian people would have access to the rest of the world and especially to Egypt. The Gaza Strip which is 40km long and 8-12km wide has one access point to Egypt along the 12km long border: the Rafah crossing point. This crossing point had been controlled by Israeli forces via a corridor along the border and it was not clear until the end of August 2005 whether they would relinquish control or not. When they finally withdrew neither the Palestinians nor the Egyptians were prepared for the rush of people trying to get to the other side. They closed the border in September, which in itself was an incentive for us to finalise discussions with both sides on the crossing point.

The unilateral disengagement plan has been criticised from various angles both by the Israelis themselves who feel that Ariel Sharon betrayed them; and by anti-Israeli community who believe it is a method of stalling negotiations. What are your personal views of the plan? Was it useful, will it hold?

I think it is fair to say that the majority of the Israeli society never supported the settler movement but they still ended up paying a high price in terms of economic and military resources. The biggest obstacles PM Sharon faced came from within his party. In terms of whether or not he made the right decision in calling for the evacuation of the settlers, I believe it was the natural course of action to be taken. It made sense for economic and demographic reasons. Furthermore, Sharon knew he had to offer something to the international community. From his point of view, it could not be as far reaching as suggested by the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002, which called for the full withdrawal of Israel from the territories occupied in June 1967. The unilateral disengagement plan has been criticised from various angles both by the Israelis themselves who feel that Ariel Sharon betrayed them; and by anti-Israeli community who believe it is a method of stalling negotiations. What are your personal views of the plan? Was it useful, will it hold?

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The anger has died down and is now replaced with the worry about the next phase. Of course, the media will always jump on claims from settlers that they have not been adequately compensated, though I cannot comment on whether such claims are founded as I am not party to this information.

For the Israeli people, the greatest impact has been psychological in the sense that the vision of a “greater” Israel has vanished; this was then subsequently confirmed in the March 2006 elections.

What are your most memorable experiences of the Quartet, particularly with my US counterpart, was clearly a positive experience. Also the fact that the Quartet became functional at the operational level and that Israel fully engaged with us. From a European perspective this was also a sign of improved relationship between the EU and Israel. I had the clear impression that our Israeli interlocutors trusted a European as facilitator in talks between themselves and the Palestinians. On a more personal level, it was a real pleasure to have the opportunity to work alongside James Wolfensohn particularly because of the skilful way in which he handled those very difficult negotiations.

Ten months after the plan was implemented, what is the current situation for the Israelis who had to leave their homes? Has the anger and sorrow abated? Have they been able to build their lives elsewhere?

The anger has died down and is now replaced with the worry about the next phase. Of course, the media will always jump on claims from settlers that they have not been adequately compensated, though I cannot comment on whether such claims are founded as I am not party to this information.

For the Israeli people, the greatest impact has been psychological in the sense that the vision of a “greater” Israel has vanished; this was then subsequently confirmed in the March 2006 elections.

What about the situation of the Palestinians in the region?

From the Palestinian perspective very little has changed. Individual Palestinians have seen no concrete improvements following the evacuation of Israel from Gaza and the northern area of the West Bank. Sure, there are no checkpoints and there is no Israeli presence but there are very few improvements to the general situation.
From the Israeli perspective, they have shed the problem of the settlers in the Gaza Strip, but still have a military presence in the northern West Bank. Given the cross-border missile fire, security has not really improved for the Israelis living in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip.

What will be the ongoing role of development aid in the context of the peace process particularly in reference to Gaza?

There are three important issues affecting the provision of aid. Firstly, there is an increasing level of conflict fatigue in the international community. This is largely due to the fact that expectations have not been fulfilled; there has been little improvement in the economic situation; movement of access for the Palestinian people in the region has not improved either; and there is still restricted access for building materials (steel, concrete, and so on) that are much needed to aid the redevelopment plans. Another reason why the international community’s interest is waning is that international aid workers have increasingly become victims of kidnappings. The Palestinian Authority has also lost interest in investing in the development programme for reform. Finally, work on the three-year development plan came to a halt after the victory of Hamas in the elections of 25 January 2006. On 30 January the Quartet issued the new government with an ultimatum: either they adhered to three conditions or direct financial support to the PA would stop. The conditions were:

1. Accept Israel’s right of existence.
2. Fight terrorism and violence.
3. Honour the agreements established under the previous government.

No clear message came from the Hamas Government, therefore direct funding has stopped.

Why did Wolfensohn step down as the Quartet special envoy in April 2006?

James Wolfensohn, being an American citizen, is subject to US legislation, which prohibits any US citizen from interacting with a foreign terrorist organisation. Since Hamas is considered to be a terrorist organisation it was impossible for him to continue working beyond April 2006.

What in your view are the challenges that need to be addressed if the Disengagement Plan is to hold?

The Israelis need to uphold their commitment to stay out of Gaza. Aside from the continued shelling in response to Palestinian missile fire, Israelis had kept out of the area right up until two weeks ago. We have to see how that is going to develop (NB: this interview was recorded two weeks before operation “Summer Rain” which led to a widespread incursion of Israeli troops in Gaza following the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier). The West Bank is a different story. The other challenge will be the support that Israel provides to Palestine. For instance, will it facilitate the economic recovery in terms of access points allowing the adequate flow of commodities and fuel that are essential for the area? That still remains to be seen.
aza withdrawal 2005: 8 000 settlers in a territory inhabited by over 1 000 000 Palestinians, 40 000 troops sent to oversee their departure, 8 000 journalists and photographers who flocked here from all corners of the globe to immortalise “the event”. These figures were the first thing that struck me when I first heard about the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

Everything seemed so unreal, excessive, a huge communication exercise, a gigantic political grandstanding circus staged like a major Hollywood production. I was anxious to highlight the theatrical dimensions of this event where, for example, the almost hesitant young soldiers moved in the midst of the never-ending shouting and crying of the settlers carrying their children and yelling out angry comments, like, “Do you realise what they are doing to our people again!” I wanted to photograph emotions, stage-managed to the point of caricature.

The camera is a Rolleiflex Binocular, with Reala Fuji format 120 films.

[ Steeve Juncker ]
During the Hamas demonstration, the young boys wear military clothes.
Shiteit Hayam colony - Retreat from the Gaza strip, August 2005 - Israeli soldiers comforting each other

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Shirat Hayam colony - Retreat from the Gaza strip, August 2005- Demonstration against the retreat
© Steeve Iuncker / VU
Shirat Hayam colony - December 2003 -
Moment of prayer

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Shirat Hayam colony - Retreat from the Gaza strip, August 2005 - At the wall built to separate the Israeli and the Palestinian territories

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Jerusalem - Retreat from the Gaza strip, August 2005 -
A young boy in front of the wall which separates the
Israel and the Palestinian territories

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Shirat Hayam colony - Retreat from the Gaza strip, August 2005 - Young Israeli boy

© Steeve Larcher / Agence VU
Neveh Dekalim colony - Retreat from the Gaza strip, August 2005 - Two Israeli men observing a demonstration against the retreat

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Jerusalem - Retreat from the Gaza strip, August 2005 - A man with his child go through the official passage of the wall which separates the Israeli and the Palestinian territories.
Shurat Hayam colony - Retreat from the Gaza strip, August 2005 - During a demonstration against the retreat

© Steve Lungher / Agence VU
Shirat Hayam colony - Retreat from the Gaza strip, August 2005 - An Israeli soldier comforts a little girl

© Steeve Ioaneker / Agence VU
Shirat-Hayam colony, Gaza strip
Withdrawal from the colonies, August 2005

While photographers watch on, a doctor from Tsahal talks to children and a woman to convince them to leave their homes themselves, before they are forced to do so by the army.

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[Part III: The EU working in partnership]
CHAPTER 15: EU-UN COOPERATION IN CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT:
A PROMISING WORK IN PROGRESS

Summary

EU-UN cooperation in civilian crisis management has progressed significantly since the EU began to establish its civilian rapid reaction capacities in 2000. Cooperation has moved from the ceremonial to the operational and some of the mistrust characterising the early days of the relationship has disappeared. The potential for increased cooperation is huge, but capacity problems and the diverging interests and priorities of the two organisations may stall further progress. This Chapter provides an overview of the evolution of EU-UN cooperation to date, assesses its prospects for the future and ends with a set of recommendations that would strengthen the emerging EU-UN partnership in civilian crisis management.

From ceremonial to operational cooperation

With the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) the European Union (EU) signalled its intention to become a global player in the field of crisis management. The EU ambition was to “add value” by establishing a capability to deploy joint civil-military force packages at short notice. While this was a welcome initiative in the eyes of the United Nations (UN), which lacks reliable rapid reaction capacities, it was also a cause for concern as it might challenge the UN’s position as the world’s premier peacekeeper and increase the “commitment gap” resulting from the post-Srebrenica reluctance of West European states to provide military personnel for UN-commanded peace operations. While the commitment gap remains a sensitive issue in EU-UN relations, the recent launch of several new UN-commanded interventions in Africa has made overstretched, not marginalisation, the principal concern in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Thus, the ESDP capacity is no longer seen as unwelcome competition, but as a much-needed resource. The principal complaint from New York these days is not that the EU is encroaching on UN turf but that it is incapable of providing all the support that the UN would like.

In the early years of the ESDP, EU-UN cooperation was limited to declarations of support, information exchanges and high-level contacts. The EU High Representative addressed the UN Security Council in 2000 and the UN Secretary General met with the EU troika later that year. Another step forward was taken at the Göteborg European Council in 2001 which led to the adoption of a set of principles and practical options guiding EU-UN cooperation in the field of civilian crisis management as well as a set of practical arrangements aimed at intensifying EU-UN dialogue and cooperation. Cooperation intensified during 2002 as the EU prepared to take over responsibility for the police mission in Bosnia from the UN in January 2003. This experience was largely successful, but it also underlined the need for closer coordination and cooperation between the two organisations, both at the strategic level as well as in the field. Additional lessons were learned in 2003 from Operation Artemis, a three-month military operation deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) upon the request of the UN Secretary-General to give the UN time to send more troops to the DRC. These operational experiences set the stage for the signing of the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Coordination in Crisis Management on 24 September 2003, in which the two organisations agreed to establish a joint consultative mechanism to enhance coordination and cooperation in the areas of planning, training, communication and best practice.

The joint consultative mechanism, named the EU-UN Steering Committee, consists of

Peter Viggo Jakobsen: Head of the Department of Conflict and Security Studies at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). He has written extensively on civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), coercive diplomacy, Danish foreign and security policy, peace operations, and use of military force. His most recent work is Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making? (London and New York: Routledge 2006).
• An EU contribution following a request from the UN.6

Of these scenarios only the latter can be said to add real value to the UN. Although improved coordination of national contributions by EU Member States to UN-commanded operations would be welcome, coordinating Member State contributions to its operations is something that the UN can manage through its own procedures, and this would presumably not increase the willingness of individual EU member states to provide personnel to UN operations. The third scenario is therefore the most interesting from the UN perspective, and the EU Council has outlined five practical options for making such a contribution:

• Option i - An EU contribution through an evaluation, assessment and monitoring of a crisis in advance of an UN operation;
• Option ii - A component of a larger UN operation;
• Option iii - An autonomous operation within the UN framework;
• Option iv - An autonomous operation launched before or after an UN operation; and
• Option v - Simultaneous EU-UN operations.

Three of these options have already been employed. The EU provided personnel to a joint fact-finding mission to Burundi in February 2004 prior to the establishment of the ONUB operation (Option i); the EU police mission (EUPM) took over from the UN police mission in Bosnia in January 2003 and the EU has also taken over from NATO operations in Bosnia and Macedonia (Option iv). Finally, the EU has conducted civilian operations simultaneously with UN operations (Option v) on three occasions: the police mission (EUPOL Kinshasa) and the police mission (EUSEC DR Congo) both in the DRC are conducted alongside the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), and the EU supporting action to the African Union Mission to Darfur, Sudan (AMIS II) is conducted simultaneously with the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS).

From operational cooperation to strategic partnership?

In six years the EU-UN relationship has moved from a state of uneasiness and some distrust to real and growing cooperation at all levels from the political-strategic to the tactical in civilian crisis management. Progress has gone further and occurred at a greater pace than predicted by most. At the same time, it is still far from the strategic partnership that the UN is seeking in order to help it meet its growing obligations in the field of crisis management (both civilian and military). At the moment cooperation is taking place primarily on EU terms. The EU has more or less dictated the terms and place of the cooperation and has displayed little willingness to enhance its rapid reaction military support for UN-led peace operations, which is what the UN would prefer. It has thus reacted coldly to UN calls for using EU battle groups as strategic reserves for UN operations facing serious challenges or crises. The EU position may be changing, however, as France and Germany are considering a UN request for an EU battle group to act as a deterrent force during elections that are scheduled to take place in the DRC at the end of April 2006. Such a deployment eases

the tension generated by the Western reluctance to provide military personnel for UN-led operations and represents a major step on the road towards a more balanced EU-UN partnership.

In the civilian field the situation appears to be more balanced as the number of civilian police committed to UN operations by EU Member States remains higher (865 as of 31 January 2006) than the number committed to EU operations (some 600). These figures are deceptive, however. The picture will change if the UN operation in Kosovo is handed over, as expected, to the EU in 2007. As of 31 January 2005, EU Member States provided 656 police to the UN operation in Kosovo and their transfer to an EU-led operation would create an imbalance in favour of EU-led operations similar to the one currently existing in the military field. Moreover, the launch of 11 civilian ESDP operations in a period of just four years demonstrates a clear EU preference for conducting its own operations; a preference that is underlined by the principles of visibility and decision making autonomy that guide the EU’s cooperation with other international organisations in civilian crisis management.

This does not mean that future EU contributions to UN-commanded operations should be completely ruled out. Added value and interoperability, the two other principles guiding EU cooperation with other organisations, do favour such contributions, and the EU is considering the idea of making integrated police units (police with military status, i.e. carabinieri and gendarmes) available for UN-led operations at short notice. In addition, EU Member States are also more willing to make civilian than military contributions to UN-led operations.

The principal factor standing in the way of a more balanced strategic EU-UN partnership in civilian crisis management characterised by sizable EU contributions to UN-commanded operations is the lack of capacity. Although the EU civilian rapid reaction capacities look impressive on paper with Member State commitments of 5 761 police, 631 rule of law, 562 civilian administration, 4 988 civilian protection and 505 monitors, the EU has been struggling to rapidly deploy and sustain its civilian missions even though their combined personnel requirements only constitute a fraction of the personnel committed by Member States. Finding the 600 police required to sustain existing operations is thus proving difficult even though they only amount to about 10% of the total committed.

The problem of force generation is compounded by an inadequate capacity for mission planning and support in the Council Secretariat, the lack of an agreed funding mechanism for civilian missions even though their combined personnel requirements only constitute a fraction of the total committed. This has now begun to change. As part of the Civilian Headline Goal process launched in December 2004, a new needs-based approach has been adopted. The new approach, already

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11. UN mission contributions by country, 31 January 2006.
12. The other two are: added value and interoperability. See EU cooperation with international organisations on civilian aspects of crisis management, Annex V to the Presidency Report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy, Doc 9526/1/01, 11 June 2001.
employed in the military ESDP, identifies the capability shortfalls that prevent the EU from honouring its operational ambitions and asks Member States to address these shortfalls.\(^\text{16}\) While this new approach represents a step in the right direction, the Member State investments needed to address the capability shortfalls identified do not seem to be forthcoming, and significant initiatives aimed at expanding the force pool of qualified personnel have yet to be taken. It is quite telling that the ESDP Presidency Report from December 2004 suggests that the problem be addressed by lowering expectations instead of giving priority to capacity-building.\(^\text{17}\)

Recommendation one: A joint EU-UN effort is required to enhance the pool of qualified civilian rapid reaction personnel.

The single greatest obstacle to civilian rapid reaction and EU-UN cooperation is the desperate shortage of qualified personnel. It is therefore imperative that the EU and the UN give priority to enhancing the force pool. This will require structural reform in the Member States as they will have to build “excess” capacity in the relevant personnel categories. There is more to this than merely enhancing the number of, say, police officers and judges. While quantitative increases may be required in these areas, changes in the incentive structures and education systems may be sufficient in others. Individual states could make international service more attractive for rule of law personnel and civil administration personnel by making it count in their own personnel management. At the moment international service is generally not a trump in the promotion game for civilian personnel in the public sector. If that was changed and civilian crisis management operations were made part of the curricula in law schools, public administration schools etc., the pool of qualified personnel willing to serve on such operations would no doubt grow. The EU and the UN should encourage such changes in their Member States and in addition make a major effort to support the training and recruitment of qualified personnel outside of Europe. Africa should be a priority area in this respect since the majority of the crisis management operations conducted by the two organisations will take place on the African continent in the foreseeable future.

Recommendation two: The institutional capacity for civilian rapid reaction crisis management should be enhanced in both Brussels and New York.

Enlarging the personnel pool is only half the battle as it will not make much difference unless it is accompanied by a strengthening of the EU and UN Secretariats. Both secretariats are currently planning and supporting civilian operations with a minimum of staff and resources, and additional personnel and resources are therefore required - not just to enhance operational effectiveness, but also to create space and time for effective cooperation between the two bodies. EU Member States can play a crucial role here by strengthening the Council Secretariat in Brussels while at the same time providing strong support for the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to establish a standing civilian police capacity in the UN Secretariat.\(^\text{18}\)

Creating a strategic EU-UN partnership in civilian crisis management

The creation of a more balanced relationship is the single most important precondition for maintaining the momentum and strengthening the EU-UN cooperation that has emerged in civilian crisis management over the last six years. Without balance a real partnership cannot be created. It is consequently imperative to prevent an increase in the number of EU-led civilian operations from resulting in a significant decline in the number of civilian personnel that EU Member States commit to UN-commanded operations. The emergence of a civilian commitment gap similar to the one in the military field has to be avoided. The EU must therefore display a greater willingness to provide civilian personnel and other forms of assistance to UN-commanded operations. At the same time, it is equally clear that such a gap may be inevitable in the short term as a result of the expected transfer of responsibility from the UN to the EU in Kosovo. The longer term solution to this problem is to enlarge the pool of qualified civilian personnel that is available for deployment on crisis management operations at short notice. The first recommendation flowing from this analysis therefore emphasises the importance of doing so.

Creating a strategic EU-UN partnership in civilian crisis management

Recommendation three: Joint solutions and a pooling of resources should be pursued to the greatest extent possible to avoid wasteful duplication.

Given that both organisations are currently struggling to build up their civilian rapid reaction capacities, the EU and the UN should pool their limited resources and seek joint solutions to the problems they are facing. The criteria employed by both organisations for recruitment, vetting of personnel, training and personnel management, the establishment of law and order packages and joint civil-military force packages, security etc. should be the same. Moreover, since the organisations are establishing them at the same time, it would make most sense to let joint inter-organisational task forces do it. At the very least both organisations should be represented in the working groups and task forces set up to address such issues. This also applies to the establishment of databases for personnel management, lessons learned, the development of best practice etc. Joint training and exercise programmes are also logical given that both organisations are relying on the same force pool. Finally, joint mission analysis and planning would also seem logical for operations involving components from both the EU and the UN.

Recommendation four: Cooperation in areas of planning, training, communication and best practice should be stepped up.

Implementing this recommendation will require personnel exchanges between the two secretariats and use of liaison officers to create the personal networks usually required for effective inter-organisational cooperation. This would also be the simplest way to ensure timely information sharing between the situation centres in the two organisations. However, this can only happen if the bodies responsible for civilian rapid reaction crisis management in both organisations are provided with additional resources.

Recommendation five: A secure communications system should be established between Brussels and New York.

Joint cooperation along the lines suggested here would involve the handling and sharing of sensitive information related to personnel management, mission planning and support and lessons learned. To make this possible secure communications between the two secretariats is a must, and it should go beyond the mere establishment of a hot-line.19

CHAPTER 16: EU-OSCE COOPERATION

Summary

This paper assesses the state of the relationship between the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and discusses the limitation and challenges to that relation, as well as opportunities and forms of future cooperation in civilian crisis management. It concludes with supporting the proposal for an in-depth discussion between the OSCE and the EU on their respective roles and ways they can support each other in practical terms in civilian crisis management activities.

OSCE and the EU: natural-born partners?

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU) have been described as “natural-born partners” by High Representative Solana. Indeed they not only have similar aims, and their activities are largely complementary, they also put into place a multitude of forms and frameworks for consultation, cooperation and coordination.

Since the momentous decision of the European Union to embark upon civilian crisis management activities and the Feira meeting of the European Council in June 2000 where priority areas in civilian crisis management were identified, more and more attention has been paid by experts to the implications of this development for the OSCE. Some observers asked whether the evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is designed to support or to sideline the OSCE, because its operations can be undertaken either autonomously or in support of the UN or the OSCE.

Indeed, prior to those decisions, the role of the EU in relation to field operations was to provide significant political and financial support to the existing operations of other organisations, especially the OSCE.

However, as of today, a concerted and serious discussion about the way forward has not taken place even within the respective organisations. This may be due to some rather complex considerations of the EU’s and OSCE’s future roles and standing. The EU developing crisis management capabilities, especially of the civilian kind, which are deployed in the OSCE area, will bring with them opportunities but also risks to the relations between the EU and the OSCE.

State of relationship

In the 1990s, the increasing number of actors involved in stabilisation activities in the OSCE area and the large scope of international cooperation with this aim resulted in coordination difficulties. In an attempt to remedy this situation, the OSCE participating states engaged in discussions on the possibility of establishing a framework for cooperation with its partners. These discussions led to the adoption of the Platform for Co-operative Security at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, which constitutes a part of the OSCE Charter for European Security.

According to the Platform, its goal is: “to strengthen the mutually reinforcing nature of the relationship between those organisations and institutions concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area”. The main instruments and mechanisms for cooperation foreseen in the Platform include: regular information exchanges and meetings, joint needs assessment missions, secondment of experts by other organisations to the OSCE, appointment of liaison officers, development of common projects and field operations, and joint training efforts.

Consultations and the exchange of information take place at the field level with European Commission delegations and EU Special Representatives, at the headquarters level

1. The views expressed in this chapter are the personal opinions of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the organisation.
with staff meetings and visits, and at the political level with Ambassadors or Ministerial
EU-OSCE Troika meetings. Very often, both partners cooperate closely on various project
activities. This is the case, for instance, in the zone of Georgian-Ossetian conflict, where the
OSCE and the EU interact in developing ideas for future activities, and the European Community is supporting various OSCE ini-
tiatives such as a multi-million Euro Economic Rehabilitation Programme. The OSCE
Mission to Georgia also provided backing to EU rehabilitation initiatives.

The EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy, although not developed with the primary aim
of closer cooperation with the OSCE, may have the effect of bringing the EU and OSCE closer together in a number of regions. Simi-
larly, the growing involvement of the EU in Central Asia, as reflected in the recent appointment of the EU Special Repre-
sentative (SR) for the region, may have the effect of creating closer and more effective ties. The EU political contribution to negota-
tion processes, with the involvement of, or under the auspices of the OSCE, has recently
developed, pointing to synergies and the potential to contribute jointly to addressing
unresolved conflicts in the OSCE area. For instance, in Moldova, the OSCE supported the
division which some have referred to as the “values and commitment gap” emerging be-
median, and interest from a number of its participating states for the OSCE to become more
active in adjacent areas, the OSCE has assisted elections in Afghanistan twice on an ad hoc
basis – this, however, is bound to remain an exception.

While the general aims are similar, the specific priorities of the EU and the OSCE do not always coincide fully. Significantly, there is no
mechanism in place for the partners to coordinate during the EU’s planning stage for pro-
grame activities (apart from regular exchanges at various levels). Consequently, it
is sometimes felt in the OSCE that support from the EU could be better administered to
certain, specific programmes of the OSCE, such as police assistance efforts in Caucasus and Central Asia. Finally, with the increase of
the EU’s involvement in field activities, the competition for qualified staff is bound to increase.

Future cooperation
The OSCE is well-placed to tackle the threats and challenges to security identified in the
security strategies of the EU and the OSCE, and the EU and its Member States could be
instrumental in ensuring that the potential of the OSCE is fully realised.
Dynamic developments in the security situation in the OSCE area might soon require a much closer operational cooperation. In particular, if tangible results are achieved in the framework of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement process, the two partners will need to intensify their contacts on this issue to exchange information and to seek to coordinate their respective efforts. In particular, the extent of the reconstruction and security needs in the zone of conflict will require the involvement of various international actors who have made commitments to provide necessary human and financial resources. The OSCE could provide a flexible coordinating framework for various international activities in the region. Active participation of the EU in all stages of this process would be of particular importance, as it would be hardly imaginable that any serious international effort in the zone of conflict could be implemented without the EU.

Cooperation between the OSCE and the EU on Kosovo will also be crucial and might actually define the future character of the relationship. The OSCE and the EU are expected to take on an increased role following status discussions, in particular to assume some of the functions performed at present by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK. The first step in defining future responsibilities was the creation of an informal Steering Group on contingency planning for future arrangements. Initial discussions indicated that the envisaged roles of the OSCE and the EU might not be always fully compatible and/or complementary. Thus both partners engaged in a dialogue with a view to seeking synergies, avoiding duplication of efforts and ensuring that tasks and responsibilities are delegated according to comparative advantages and the practical experience of the relevant actors. As stated recently by Martti Ahtisaari in Vienna: “Managing the division of labour with other actors, such as the OSCE, and the coordination and the mobilisation of resources of the international community will not be solved easily. Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina should be carefully mirrored to the case of Kosovo.” As far as the status negotiations are concerned, the OSCE would have benefited from being better informed about developments and their repercussions for its presence in Kosovo.

Mechanisms for consultations and contacts

The existing forms of interaction on civilian crisis management should be further streamlined. A systematic exchange of regional and thematic expertise and lessons learnt at all levels should become a standard practice in relations between the two partners. OSCE representatives should also be able to participate regularly and more fully in relevant meetings in Brussels, including in the Political and Security Committee, Working Party on the OSCE and the Council of Europe, COSCE, and relevant working groups. Finally, as observed by Martti Ahtisaari, “a practical step to facilitate dialogue might be to strengthen the institutional representation of the organisations at headquarters level”. While the European Commission has its Delegation in Vienna, the OSCE lacks structures that could provide permanent liaison with the EU.

On a more technical side, interaction between the Situation Rooms of the OSCE and the EU should be strengthened, particularly through a more active exchange of information. Principles for such exchanges should be clearly defined by both partners to ensure an uninterrupted flow of vitally important information between the two headquarters.

Joint activities

In regions of common interest, joint fact-finding missions could be organised with the aim to prepare joint reports and/or contribute to the development of proposals on ways to achieve common goals. Depending on the case, such activities could involve representatives of other international organisations and NGOs. This would help to improve international interaction on topical issues, increasing the impact of the relevant findings, improving the prospects for the implementation of relevant proposals and contributing to a more efficient use of existing human and financial resources.

Thematic missions

Thinking is also developing on new types of OSCE operations which address more effectively the broad spectrum of new threats and challenges to security. For instance, according to the Final Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE issued on 27 June 2005, such thematic missions “could look at a specific issue in one country, or (…) ensure coherence in the work in a broader regional/sub-regional context”. If created, such missions might become yet another framework for OSCE-EU interaction in a particular geographical area or related to a horizontal issue, such as counter-terrorism; the fight against


5. Ibid.
organised crime; the prevention of trafficking in human beings, drugs and arms; the promotion of rule of law and good governance; and justice sector reform.

**Frameworks for co-ordination of field activities**

The introduction of an improved co-ordination mechanism regarding the present and future activities in the field, including training programmes, is necessary to ensure that efforts are not duplicated, and that such activities correspond to actual needs. Such a mechanism could, inter alia, foresee a system of cross-reference pools of experts and lecturers. Moreover, both partners could be organising joint training and induction programmes for future members of field operations. First initiatives on the latter issue have already been made.

**Activities of the OSCE funded through extra-budgetary contributions**

The EU is among the biggest donors to OSCE’s activities funded through extra-budgetary contributions. An agreement defining the modalities for the use of EU resources by the OSCE is being negotiated between the partners, and should have the effect of clarifying and simplifying for the OSCE aspects of technical and bureaucratic requirements for cooperation in this sphere.

**Administrative issues**

The OSCE has acquired vast experience on issues related to the staffing of field operations, as well as procurement and the integrated management of assets. This experience could be shared with the EU experts, who have expressed interest in learning from the OSCE.

**Concluding remarks**

Cooperation between the OSCE and the EU on civilian crises management issues has been developing steadily over the last few years and is a function of the good relationship between the two partners. In most cases, the interaction between the OSCE and the EU has been very successful. Some elements of competition are bound to remain, particularly due to the varying memberships. Yet, there are some areas where improvements are possible and necessary.

It becomes increasingly clear that the interaction between the OSCE and the EU would improve if full advantage were taken of all the various possibilities for practical cooperation described above. Therefore, while future cooperation between the OSCE and the EU should remain flexible and non-bureaucratic, it seems that the time has come for both partners to review their relationship and to look for ways of making it more operational.

Some argue that the best way to do this would be to develop a formal agreement on modalities for cooperation between the OSCE and the EU, while others think that a less formal, common catalogue of cooperation modalities, like the one between the OSCE and the Council of Europe, would be more appropriate. From our perspective, the format for future agreements does not seem to be of primary importance. What matters is that the OSCE and the EU manage to find a common understanding on their respective roles in civilian crisis management, their comparative advantages, as well as ways they can support each other on practical issues. The sooner a serious dialogue on these issues begins the better for both partners and for the entire system of international cooperation on civilian crisis management in the OSCE area.
Since 1992 the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe/ Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) has deployed some 30 field operations at the request of the host countries. Its first field deployment ever was the short-lived CSCE Missions of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, in the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. The longest continuously-serving field operation is the Spillover Monitoring Mission to Skopje, also established in 1992, now with a broader mandate from the original conflict prevention tasks (i.e. blocking any spillover of the Yugoslav war).

The second longest-serving OSCE field operation is the Mission to Georgia. It is worth noting that from 1999 until the end of 2004, the Mission also included a border monitoring operation (BMO). The BMO observed a 280-kilometre stretch of the mountainous border between Georgia and the Chechen, Ingush and Dagestani Republics of the Russian Federation.

The largest OSCE field operation ever was the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) deployed in Kosovo prior to the NATO campaign in 1999. Today, the largest field operation is the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK), some 900 mission members.

Currently, there are 19 field operations across the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the southern Caucasus and Central Asia. In total, about 3 000 OSCE staff are employed in field operations, the majority locally-contracted. The largest operations are in the Balkans, although a gradual shift of the Organisation’s financial and human resources towards the southern Caucasus and Central Asia began recently.

Although varying greatly, all mandates of OSCE field operations share the fact that they require the consensus of the 56 states that are part of the Organisation, including the host states. So far, the OSCE has only deployed field operations on the territory of its participating states. Mandates always cover one or more of the three dimensions of the OSCE’s work (political-military, economic/environmental, human) and often refer to activities related to one or more phases of the conflict cycle with which the OSCE – as a UN Chapter VIII regional arrangement – is available to assist: early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management or post-conflict rehabilitation.

All field operations cooperate in a political and practical sense at headquarters, field office and project levels with the OSCE’s main partners among international organisations (the United Nations, Council of Europe, European Union and NATO) as well as with subregional organisations and international and locally-based non-governmental organisations.

In their activities, field operations receive active support from the OSCE Secretariat, including from its specialised units, and from OSCE Institutions.
CHAPTER 17: NGO FACILITATION IN PEACE PROCESSES

Summary

The Aceh peace process is an interesting example of how a non-governmental, track two actor can contribute to the peace process through a close network and collaboration with other track two actors. Aceh also offers an example of the possibilities of strategic collaboration between track two actors, local actors and regional organisations. The paper demonstrates how Aceh can be viewed as a case of thinking peace through a process which can contribute to sustainable peace through transformative facilitation.

NGO facilitation in peace processes

The involvement of Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) in the Aceh conflict started in the spring of 2004. The contacts intensified in late 2004 and the first round of talks was held in January 2005. The Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement was signed in mid-August 2005 concluding the process for talks, which the Chairman of CMI, President Martti Ahtisaari, facilitated.

The general aim of the negotiations was to establish a process leading to a peaceful settlement of the Aceh conflict within the framework of autonomy. The CMI led the process. It was not the first time the parties had met. The previous negotiation process to end the conflict, facilitated by the Swiss NGO Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), started in 1999 and led to a ceasefire ("Humanitarian Pause") in 2000 and to the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in December 2002. The process broke down in May 2003, and the CMI-led talks of January 2005 were the first to be held since then. The previous efforts contributed to the efforts described in this Chapter.

Readiness of both the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement to negotiate was strengthened by the post-tsunami context. In the negotiations, where the parties committed themselves to seek a permanent and comprehensive solution with dignity for all, issues such as self-government, political participation, economic relations, amnesty, human rights and justice, security arrangements and outside monitoring were debated. The signed Memorandum of Understanding was followed by the Aceh Monitoring Mission, which supported the implementation of the MoU.

The Aceh peace process is an interesting example of how a non-governmental, track two actor can contribute through a close network and collaboration with other track two actors to the peace process. Aceh also offers an example of the possibilities of strategic collaboration between track two actors, local actors and regional organisations.

Role of third party in ending violent conflict

Many believe that a number of measures can be used to affect the course of a conflict and bring the parties to the conflict to some form of political accommodation that will end violence. This approach stresses the moral obligation to intervene in civil conflict, especially when human rights violations are taking place. There are good examples where the active intervention of international actors has helped to end military hostilities, defuse tensions or build grounds for peace. Examples include Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador and Cambodia.

Mediation is a form of intervention in a conflict. It differs from many other forms of interventions as it is not based on the direct use of force and it does not help any of the parties to win. Its purpose is to bring the conflict to a settlement that is acceptable to both sides and consistent with the third party’s interests. At its best, mediation can help the parties to find solutions, which they might not reach by themselves. Even when it...
is successful, mediation can only cut through some layers of dispute and provide means for the parties to live together in spite of disputes. Mediation can neither provide deep reconciliation nor cancel the causes of the conflict.

As numerous factors are at play and influence the course of any conflict, it is easy to argue against an intervention strategy that is directed at a single cause or at alleviating only one set of social or political pressures. Inter-communal conflict contains a large number of constituencies with different demands, interests and belief systems. Intervention should therefore be considered as a coordinated series of concurrent and consecutive strategies directed toward the long-term goal of resolving the conflict. Most conflicts have a life cycle of their own, characterised by various phases and stages, ranging from a period of rising tensions all the way to rapprochement and reconciliation.

From the Aceh talks, it was clear to us at all times that any lasting and comprehensive solution would only be possible through the clear commitment of the parties themselves. They would make the peace, not the mediators, whose task was to create conditions and manage the process.

Towards a multitrack intervention strategy

A successful intervention strategy has to be multi-leveled and needs to encompass the official process of mediation, the possible quasi-official processes promoted by unofficial groups, public peace processes aimed at sustained dialogue and the various activities of civil society. There are obvious challenges to managing multiparty mediation and the following lengthy process of peacebuilding in a multiparty manner. Management in these circumstances is not simply a matter of establishing a line of command and responsibility.

Organising diverse third-party peacemaking entities is much more challenging as all actors are independent beings. The challenge is how to make a coherent whole out of the initiatives by keeping simultaneous interventions and activities of various actors from cancelling each other out. The benefit of this approach can be fully utilised if there is shared analysis of the problem and its solutions among the actors. If there is not, the messages may end up being mixed, resources wasted and the ball dropped.

At its best, a multiparty approach gains entry at different stages, opens new avenues for dialogue, creates leverage, and shares costs and risks. At its best, a multiparty approach can bring about a catalytic and transformative process for peace.

For CMI, right from the start, it was vital to plan the Aceh peace process not only with multilevel, but also with multitrack lenses. We knew our own limits, and the vital importance of the political leverage regional organisations, such as the European Union, and governments could bring to the process, should it succeed. Additionally, for us, it was vital to work as part of a network of experts and brokers, ranging from the Henri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and Nordic Institute of Asian Studies to the Olof Palme Centre, WSP International and beyond. Local actors contributed with information and facilitation on the ground and provided help and support to the negotiations. Through this network the necessary expertise and engagement could be pulled together.

For us, limiting our own role consciously to the mediation phase during the Aceh peace talks was important. Informing the governmental and regional actors and other NGOs in the early stages of the process allowed them to engage in the process when it was necessary. By ensuring that our own role is limited, we wanted not only to ensure the quality, impartiality and transparency of our own actions, but also that various avenues of dialogue, leverage, which could be brought in by official actors, and the cost sharing would be there. Support by governments and in particular of the European Commission, both politically and financially, made our role possible. The collaborative approach was a must.

Thinking in processes – collaboration towards transformative facilitation

There is a lot of uncertainty about the actual added value and effectiveness of NGOs and civil society actors as such in peacebuilding and peace mediation. It seems that NGOs are able to provide a variety of conflict management roles by providing early warning of impending conflict; by acting as channels of communication; by serving as mediators or facilitators of official or unofficial negotiations; by contributing to the process of reconciliation through grassroots engagements; and by strengthening the civil society in the post-conflict environment to nurture the culture of peace.

NGOs can also, through their experience, contribute to innovative conflict management and resolution strategies. Local NGOs can be instrumental in addressing the escalation of violence and emergence of war. They can mobilise, at best, political will for peace, as well as develop options and strategies for response by strengthening constituencies for peace. They can not only engage in track two dialogues by using their unofficial and low-key
and legitimate power (where the parties’ relationship between the mediator and the parties) is referred to as the mediator’s referent power, based on the relationship between the mediator and the parties). According to Jeffrey Rubin, “referent power” (based on the relationship between the parties) is exercised in a “soft power” way. This is the technique of exercising “soft power.” The mediator can be perceived as a knowledgeable expert, as well as a skilled communicator between the parties and the external world, if so wished.

In the case of Aceh, CMI was in an interesting position, if we analyse our activities from the point of view of power usage. CMI is a civil society organisation, which could use expert and informational power. Our Chairman, President Ahtisaari, clearly through his eminent personality and vast experience, could add referent power to our layers of credibility. CMI could also engage easily with other civil society and research organisations, and has been assisted by President Ahtisaari’s ability to address political, governmental constituencies. This 1.5 track provided a successful solution to the Aceh talks.

A particular need for an NGO is the possibility and the ability to build strategic alliances to function, but also, if needed, to “borrow” power to reward and to coerce. Traditional NGOs have acted independently, with little coordination either within themselves or with the governments, military forces or international organisations. All of this is changing. Organisational cultures, differences in mandates, objectives and capabilities may bring barriers to collaboration, but by exercise and learning many of these issues can be worked on and if the political will exists, overcome.

The strength of many NGOs is their lack of an elaborate hierarchical structure, their decentralised and relatively flat authority structures and their flexible approach to management. NGOs are often willing to act in speed when needs arise and can therefore act when presented with a sudden challenge. The downside of this ability to change strategies, shift resources and quickly expand operations is the fact that sometimes NGOs’ actions can appear, or even be, chaotic. The Aceh experience was a learning possibility for CMI as well, when it comes to the planning of the activity and communicating the process to various actors in the network and to the external world. After this experience, I believe, we have better resources to be self-reflective in our work.

I guess that all facilitators in a peace process, in particular, in civil society, dream of being able to contribute transformative facilitation. Facilitation, which would not only bring about the cognitive and decision path which would lead to a conclusion, but to a process which would transform the society little by little over a period of time toward a culture of peace. My belief is that such a process of transformative facilitation, at least in its holistic and comprehensive meaning, cannot be achieved by one actor alone. I would therefore argue for a careful collaboration between various actors committed to engage themselves to the process all the way from identifying the goals for the process, to finding entry points, firm deadlines and building in learning mechanisms.

This would argue for a new way of working together for NGOs, governments, regional and international organisations, where we would think in processes and in building strategic alliances. For me this is the best way to use the triggers and catalyst that are there to ensure a sustainable process.
Aceh – a change for peace at last

Aceh is situated on the northern-most tip of Sumatra and is the western-most province of Indonesia. It has a population of around four million and was the site of the first Islamic Sultanate in what is now Indonesia. It has a long tradition of resistance to outside powers and for nearly three decades has been torn by a separatist conflict waged by the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka - GAM) against the Jakarta government rooted in issues over control of resources and cultural and religious issues.

On 15 August 2005, in Helsinki, Finland, representatives of the Indonesian government and the GAM signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) aiming to end the conflict in Aceh. The immediate background to the peace talks when they began in January 2005 did not seem propitious. There had already been two failed peace accords in recent years. In 2000, a “Humanitarian Pause” had generated only a temporary halt to the violence, while a December 2002 “Cessation of Hostilities Agreement” (COHA) ended when the Indonesian government declared a “military emergency” in Aceh in May 2003 and announced that it wanted to destroy GAM once and for all.

The next two years, however, saw important changes on both sides that paved the way for a return to talks. The government’s military offensive took a major toll on GAM and gave rise to battle fatigue among its supporters. Some GAM leaders began to feel that their existing strategy of armed struggle for independence had reached an impasse. Meanwhile, a presidential election in late 2004 handed control of the Indonesian government to two men, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla, who were personally committed to negotiations as a means of ending conflict. Early steps toward reopening talks occurred in late 2004 and were accelerated by the impact of the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, which caused great loss of life in Aceh and opened the province to a substantial international humanitarian presence.

After five rounds of bargaining in 2005, the two sides eventually agreed on the Helsinki MoU. This agreement has a much greater chance of success than the previous peace accords. Unlike the previous accords, the MoU includes the outline of a comprehensive peace settlement. It deals not only with security matters but also sets out in broad terms a new political relationship between Aceh and the Indonesian state to be embodied in a new Law on the Governing of Aceh. The MoU also includes provisions concerning political participation, human rights, the rule of law, and economic matters as well as measures for the disarmament of GAM and its members’ reintegration into society. Also distinguishing it from previous accords are much more robust monitoring provisions, with an Aceh Monitoring Mission sponsored by the European Union and participating countries from ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations).
Interview with Alain Délétroz

The role of advocacy in crisis management – the case of Crisis Group

The goal of this conference is to come up with ideas on how to improve the EU’s response to civilian crises. How do you think the work of Crisis Group contributes to this goal?

We’ve heard some excellent presentations over the last couple of days on tools and techniques to anticipate and respond to crises. But a key question for me is how to trigger the political action to prevent and resolve conflict situations. This is where Crisis Group has a crucial role to play. Some 30% of our budget [annual operating budget of US$12 million in 2004] goes towards our advocacy work. We have advocacy offices in Brussels, Moscow, Washington DC, London and New York. It means we have access, and influence, at the highest levels in the US and European governments, the UN, EU, NATO and in Moscow.

With field offices in 15 different countries, covering over 40 conflict areas, we have access to a sound and thorough analysis of the situation on the ground. We work with highly qualified, experienced field staff, who themselves rely on networks of personal contacts. The reports and briefing papers we produce are therefore based on very solid information. But producing the reports is not an academic exercise. Our interest is to get the issues on the political agenda, and our reports are always very pragmatic, with concrete political recommendations to the key actors. We want to be sure that the reports are read, and acted upon, in the major capitals.

Do you have a listening ear among policy-makers?

I’d say we’ve been quite successful at getting our voice heard at EU level. Here our advocacy work has certainly paid off. We can see several of our recommendations appearing in conclusions coming out of the European Council, on Darfur, Congo, the Great Lakes, Central Asia and the Balkans.

In Moscow, it’s much more difficult. We are certainly received at high level in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Duma and the Council of the Federation, and in most cases they agree with our analysis of the situation in crisis areas. If we agree on many issues when it comes to conflicts in Africa, Asia or even the Middle East, it has been unfortunately difficult to get the decision-makers to take on board our recommendations on conflicts closer to Russia proper, like the South Caucasus, or more recently, Uzbekistan after the Andijon massacre.

Our work in Washington DC is not always easy either. But sometimes our recommendations have clearly made a difference. Take, for example, our two reports on drugs production in the Andes. Thanks to these reports, we managed to get the issue of drugs consumption – and not just their production – firmly onto the US agenda. Up until then tackling drugs consumption had been somewhat of a taboo.

Do you have examples of how your advocacy work has actually helped to prevent conflict breaking out?

Well, it would be impossible to link political action directly to our work. There are always other factors at play as well, not least the political context. But if we take the example of the Artemis mission in 2003, Crisis Group was the first to alert the international community to the seriousness of the inter-ethnic tensions developing between the Hema and Lendu communities in the district of Ituri, in the north east of the Democratic Republic of Congo. On Kofi Annan’s demand, we sent field staff to New York to brief the UN Security Council and in parallel we started an in-depth conversation in the Elysée in Paris, as France was at that time, in our view, the only country able to react quickly and to lead an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in the area. What we know is that Kofi Annan contacted Chirac very quickly afterwards and an EU-led military operation codenamed “Artemis” was launched to stabilise the situation. I believe this rapid intervention was critical in neutralising a highly volatile situation, which risked evolving into mass genocide on the scale of Rwanda in the early 1990s.

Can we attribute Kofi Annan’s, Jacques Chirac’s and the EU’s decisive actions to the work of Crisis Group?

It would certainly be a lack of humility on our part to do so. But still I do believe that we did contribute to ring the alarm bells at the right time and at the right doors.

Why do you think “advocacy” is needed in conflict prevention?

Advocacy is necessary because it is the only way to get governments moving on so-called “forgotten wars”. Through its work with the press, advocacy can also raise public awareness about conflicts and influence public opinion. It’s an important way of triggering alarm bells over impending crises among governments and the public alike.
Generally, it has to be said that the wider public shows little interest in conflict issues and not much compassion is shown from politicians. However, the situation is changing. Today, paradoxically, the public believes that there are hundreds of conflicts going on all over the world and that the situation is getting worse, when in reality, since the Cold War, the number of war-related deaths has dropped significantly. More and more crises are being resolved around the negotiating table and there are many more actors, like Crisis Group, who are working on defusing them.

You’re responsible for the Latin American region at ICG. What are the main risks/emergencies in Latin America now?

The most serious conflict that is happening in Latin America today is the drug trafficking war in Colombia. In fact, it’s a war that has been waged for around 40 years now, but it receives little coverage from the press in Europe. 2006 will be a particularly important year for this country as elections are being held and people are waiting to see if the rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, as it’s better known, will use the opportunity to cause trouble. The drug war has implications for all countries on Colombia’s borders too, as trafficking armed groups are commonly thought to be spreading their network into neighbouring territories, such as Ecuador and Venezuela.

Besides Colombia, there are two other major question marks for stability in the region. The first is Bolivia. Its new president Evo Morales has won an unusually high percentage of the vote. No president since the second half of the twentieth century had ever been elected with 54% of the votes in Bolivia. So it will be interesting to see how things evolve there and if he will follow through on promises he has made to the electorate. He has already stated that he would like to see the liberalisation of coca leaf production – a stance that could get him into difficulties with the international community – and maximise the exploitation of hydrocarbons in the country. This could be difficult as Bolivia lacks the capacity to exploit its own reserves.

The second question mark – although not a danger spot like Colombia – is Venezuela. Its president Hugo Chavez currently faces no opposition in the country’s Congress. He is very popular in Latin America, particularly for his use of anti-US rhetoric. For the moment, it remains just rhetoric, but if his presidency should turn into a dictatorship then that could be serious.

How do Euro-Latin American relations presently stand?

I would say that the understanding between the EU and Latin America is much better than the understanding between the US and Latin America under the Bush administration. The EU funds many projects there and is the region’s biggest donor – bigger than the US. It’s true that Europe is not very interested in the region, but its individual Member States are. Spain is a major investor in Latin America and maintains cultural links with most of the Spanish speaking countries of the Americas. Other countries are quite active in quiet diplomacy: when the second largest Colombian rebel group the ELN went to peace talks with the Colombian government in Cuba, diplomats from Spain, Switzerland and Norway facilitated the meeting. Together with these countries, France joined in the efforts to negotiate an agreement with the FARC to help free the hostages held by the FARC. From a political viewpoint, the EU is more interested still in Africa than in Latin America. This, to be fair, is not surprising, given that Africa is far more explosive than Latin America and geographically closer.
THE EUROPEAN PEACEBUILDING LIAISON OFFICE – EPLO

Interview with Nicolas Beger

Can you explain what EPLO is?

EPLO is a platform of European NGOs, networks of NGOs, and think tanks active in the field of peacebuilding who share an interest in promoting sustainable peacebuilding policies among decision-makers in the European Union (EU). EPLO is a formally structured NGO platform, with clear decision-making rules that are based on a strict added value principle (i.e. we only join forces where it is more useful to work together, e.g. the technicalities of certain EU debates, and leave to member organisations what they better implement themselves). More precisely this means that EPLO’s members work on the implementation of measures that lead to sustainable peace, not only between and within states but particularly among citizens.

EPLO reflects this joint work vis-à-vis the EU and its Member States. From various approaches and in all conflict zones of the world, EPLO’s members implement, research, and evaluate peacebuilding measures and subsequently come together through EPLO to argue at a policy level for non-violent conflict transformation and resolution, insisting that their values, objectives, and their specific expertise are reflected in EU policies.

EPLO, broadly speaking, wants the EU to recognise the crucial connection between peacebuilding and the eradication of poverty, global sustainable development, and the fundamental role NGOs can play in EU efforts for peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and crisis management.

Who are the members of EPLO?

EPLO’s members include many large NGOs working in the field, and jointly our members are active in all conflict zones of the world. We currently have 20 member organisations, some of which are themselves larger networks that reach out to many locally based peace NGOs in Europe and our global network members branch out to a very large network of NGOs based in conflict zones. Our members are not only active in all conflict zones of the world, they also bring together a vast array of peacebuilding techniques, programmes, approaches, evaluation methods, expertise etc. that cover most of the existing tools and themes used by civil society to engage in peacebuilding. Our membership is growing at the moment, but currently EPLO brings together: the Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, the Crisis Management Initiative, the European Network for Civil Peace Services, the European Centre for Conflict Prevention, the Field Diplomacy Initiative, the German Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management, Groupe de Recherches et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité (GRIP), the International Alert, the International Centre for Transitional Justice, the International Security Information Service, Interpeace, KATU (Finnish Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network), Nonviolent Peaceforce, Pax Christi International, the Life and Peace Institute, Peace Team Forum Sweden, the Quaker Council for European Affairs, Saferworld, Search for Common Ground, Swisspeace and World Vision. Moreover, EPLO has close relationships with other NGO networks, particularly in the field of human rights and development.

Wherever possible we work together to create synergies and join forces.

What is the role that NGOs can play and in which type of activities is EPLO involved concretely?

The roles NGOs can usefully play are varied and we maintain that civil society organisations are a crucial part of any successful efforts towards sustainable peace. In fact, at EU and mission levels, civil dialogue on peace and security ought to be increased. However, we recognise the limits and remaining open questions vis-à-vis this dialogue, and we insist on the added value principle here as well. EPLO - together with CMI and KATU - has been engaged in a thorough research project with the support of the Finnish Presidency on the role of civil society in EU civilian crisis management. This project is now being followed by another initiative with the German Presidency. With the results of these projects we hope to be able to better support our argument of the necessary link between civil society and EU conflict prevention and crisis management activities. Broadly speaking, the first project identified the added value of NGOs at different levels: the strategic level in Brussels; the field level, including the cooperation with local civil society; mission evaluation and the development of lessons learned; training; and finally recruitment. In addition to this, there is obviously also a link to the

Nicolas Beger: Director of the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), an EU platform for peacebuilding and conflict prevention NGOs. Before working for EPLO he was the coordinator of the EU Civil Society Contact Group, bringing together seven rights and values-based NGO networks, and he has also worked for other European NGO networks in the past 10 years. He has previously been engaged as a trainer in gender and anti-racism and has held academic posts in New Zealand, Germany, and the Netherlands.

The opinions reflected in this interview are those of the author and do not echo policy decisions of all EPLO member organisations.

1. For further information on EPLO see www.eplo.org
peace movement and citizens’ interests in Europe. We have jointly produced a detailed report and are following the substance of the argument with some field based case studies under the German Presidency.

EPLO’s activities are in principle centred around a “hub function”: creating a link among the peacebuilding NGO sector and between the sector and the EU. This results in a considerable range of activities that fall broadly into three equally important areas. First, EPLO engages in advocacy. It does so through working groups, coordinated by the Secretariat. Currently, our members have chosen to focus on the following topics: civilian capabilities; budgetary structure of the EU; development/conflict sensitivity; gender; and we are currently developing work on thematic issues such as justice, security, governance and economics. EPLO makes its policy decisions and brings together its policy and implementation expertise through working groups and taskforces. The aim is to get involved in a range of EU policies and programmes adding a conflict prevention dimension to conflict related and apparently conflict unrelated EU external policies and assistance. The second leg of EPLO’s activities concerns information and services. This includes services for our Member Organisations and the public through diverse kinds of internal and external publications, linking member organisations, building trust within the sector and towards other NGO sectors, and advertising the principle of peacebuilding and conflict prevention as a successful strategy. In the same manner we also provide information and expertise to EU institutions through a wide range of activities. This might include, for example, quick responses to individual requests from officials, a data base on organisational expertise (a project we are currently developing), or bringing experts from the field. The EPLO secretariat also organises conferences and seminars together with EU institutions, and in particular with EU Presidencies, and it is also at times engaged in delivering training on peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity. Both the advocacy and the information/service activities form a part of raising awareness about the contribution the EU should make to peacebuilding and the need to hold the EU accountable to its own political commitments of helping secure peace within and outside its borders. EPLO’s third “working leg” is the implementation of civil dialogue. As I explained above, peacebuilding and conflict prevention NGOs can contribute essential elements to EU activities and they effectively deliver programmes with a degree of ownership and inclusion that state actors of their nature cannot deliver. EPLO acts as a linking point for the EU to those who can deliver, join efforts, or provide the necessary help and advice in this respect. This activity does not only include acting as a potential administrative hook for this dialogue, but also engaging in analysis, data collection, and most prominently trust building among the different decision-makers and NGO actors inside and outside the EU.

What do you mean by sustainable peace?

This should be an easy question to answer for EPLO, but it is unfortunately not all that simple. EPLO maintains that conflicts are, in principle, part and parcel of human relations and it is the violent expression of conflict that is problematic. If peace is sustainable, conflicts can be resolved in a non-violent fashion, without violating the fundamental rights of groups of people in society, and the governance structures can deliver conflict resolution. To achieve sustainable peace one needs certain pre-conditions, but these pre-conditions often require peace as a pre-condition themselves. I am thinking here of essentials such as democratic governance, rule of law, equitable distribution of natural resources, democratic oversight of the security sector, efficient justice systems, protection of the environment, non-discrimination etc. For example, delivering aid for democratic elections or disarmament might be a step towards peace in some situations, but it cannot deliver sustainable peace by itself. Once one has arrived at this point, it becomes evident how complex sustainable peace and the efforts towards it are. Peacebuilding is intrinsically connected to a range of fields as far apart as human security, business, and environmental protection. At EPLO we aim to further the understanding of how these apparently unrelated elements relate to peacebuilding and how direct peacebuilding efforts can be improved. For example, with our Civilian Intervention for Sustainable Peace (CISP) working group, EPLO aims to increase the awareness, scope and effectiveness (both in terms of lives and financial cost) of civilian contributions to conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding. CISP also tries to reduce the dependence on military forces for activities which are better carried out by civilians to assure sustainable forms of change. We propose, therefore, alternative solutions for strengthening EU capacity (human and financial) and particularly its institutional coherence. The latter seems like a technical point only relevant to Brussels, but it is indeed probably one of the most signifi-

2. Many EPLO member organisations would include structural and psychological forms of violence in this definition.
cant reasons why the EU cannot deliver effectively on its own goals. The trickle down effect of this incoherence can have disastrous impact on the ground since it hinders thorough conflict analysis for a country/region and a subsequently conflict sensitive delivery of all EU activities across the institutions, pillars, and programmes, particularly where they seem to be conflict unrelated (e.g. Economic Partnership Agreements).

What is EPLO’s view on the link between poverty and conflict?

Again, this is a question with considerable scope. Poverty definitely belongs to the potential structural causes of conflict. Yet poverty alone is not necessarily a pre-condition or a cause of violent conflict and this distinction is important. One can safely say that poverty belongs to the many root causes of conflict and EPLO’s values certainly include the eradication of poverty. Our work in this area is mainly focused on conflict sensitivity and the important link between conflict prevention/postconflict reconstruction and development. For example, our working group on Peacebuilding and Development (PBD) focuses on conflict sensitivity and aims at strengthening the EU’s capacity to prevent violent conflict and build peace through all of its external assistance programmes and policies including trade. Our belief is that sustainable development is a critical and essential aspect of peacebuilding, and the reverse is equally true.

But there is no development unless you tackle the issue of economic resources and the access to them.

This statement is correct and it is a large and important work area to which EPLO contributes in some smaller aspects. Besides EPLO’s strong emphasis on conflict sensitivity and conflict analysis for all EU engagement in conflict-prone zones, we also strongly believe the EU budget should be capable of fulfilling the EU’s external relations commitments to peacebuilding. With our working group on Funding for Peace (FfP), we advocate for a role of the EU as a serious player in safeguarding human security and we engage in EU budget discussions in relation to peacebuilding activities of the EU with a focus on financial planning, EU budget capabilities, programme funding, access of civil society, and Financial Perspectives. Thanks to our specific capacity in this field, EPLO can participate in the details of technical, financial, and programming debates that individual member organisations would not be able to on their own. Personally I think this work is a particularly clear example of how EPLO creates added value for the interests of its members.

What is your engagement on gender issues and peacebuilding? Why is this so important?

Gender issues are addressed in EPLO’s new working group on Gender, Peace, and Security (GPS) in which we will advocate for full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the related EP Resolution. Over the past few years, it has become apparent that the importance of gender analysis for successful peacebuilding programmes as well as the importance of women in conflict resolution is continuously undervalued. For example, there is evidence that the lack of gender focus in certain EU DDR processes has contributed to significant failures on those programmes. Equally, there has been little to no progress in increasing the number of women involved in EU peacebuilding programmes, missions, or peace diplomacy. Generally speaking, many decision-makers nowadays recognise the huge atrocities committed against women during violent conflict and some – but not many – have realised the essential contribution women make to peacebuilding. However, women as participants in conflict have received almost no attention and a successful gender analysis has to look precisely at both men and women as actors and how both are affected differently by conflict but also how each of them affect conflict differently. A large number of conflict prevention NGOs within and outside EPLO place a lot of emphasis on gender in their work and the interest generated within the EU institutions, most notably the European Parliament, has increased significantly over recent years. EPLO aims to both mainstream gender aspects in its work as well as dedicate considerable specific resources to that topic. We want to fill the analytical gap about EU policies on gender and violent conflict and create an improved advocacy capacity.
COMUNITÀ DI SANT’EGIDIO
Interview with François Delooz

Summary

The Community of Sant’Egidio began in Rome in 1968 following the Second Vatican Council. Today it is a movement of lay people and has more than 50 000 members, dedicated to evangelisation and charity in Rome, Italy and in more than 70 countries throughout the world. The Community of Sant’Egidio is a “church public lay association”. The Community has as its centre the Roman Church of Sant’Egidio, from which the Community takes its name. From its very beginnings, the Community has maintained, in the area of Trastevere and in Rome, a continuous presence of prayer and welcome for the poor and for pilgrims.

Interview with François Delooz

Can you briefly explain how Sant’Egidio became involved in conflict resolution and prevention work?

Sant’Egidio is first and foremost a Christian movement that works with the poor at a local level, including the homeless, children, the elderly and refugees. We are active around the world and have almost 50 000 voluntary members. But it is impossible to tackle poverty without looking at the wider picture – every refugee has his or her story to tell. So we began to get involved in conflict mediation in the early 1990s, starting with Mozambique.

In 1990, the Community of Sant’Egidio offered itself as mediator to bring the government - Frente de Liberação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) - and the guerilla movement - Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO) – to the negotiating table. Negotiations took place at the headquarters of Sant’Egidio in Rome and an agreement was signed in Rome on 4 October 1992. The success of this experience led us to become involved in resolving other conflicts. But it is important to stress that in most cases the governments or the opposition come to us for help. In this sense we are not a conflict resolution organisation like many others. We do not say, for example, that if there’s a conflict in Iraq we must go to Iraq. Our main experience is in Africa, although we are also dealing with conflicts in Latin America, such as Colombia, and in the Balkans – including Kosovo and Albania.

How did Sant’Egidio bring about successful negotiations in Mozambique?

The General Peace Agreement signed in 1992 in Rome was the result of a negotiating process which lasted 27 months and that dealt with all the outstanding issues between FRELIMO and RENAMO so as to establish a “lasting peace and a stable democracy in Mozambique”. The peace agreement contained a series of Protocols, which dealt with matters including the criteria for formation and recognition of political parties, organisation of elections at the various levels of power, military questions (cease-fire, demobilisation, integration into the army), the transitional period and the support of the international community. Nearly 15 years after the end of the war, Mozambique remains an example of a successful transition to peace and democracy in Africa.

Another important result of the negotiating process is the gradual transformation of RENAMO from an armed rebel movement to a political party, which accepts to take part in the democratic process. This “transformation” of a player in an armed conflict is part of the essential political work required to ensure that players in conflicts “buy into” the peace.

In Mozambique, Sant’Egidio acted as a non-institutional player - as part of the action taken by civil society. The peace achieved through the negotiations became an example of how a non-institutional set-up can successfully accomplish mediation thanks to a synergy of responsibilities between governmental and non-governmental entities. It was the Bishop of Beira, Mgr. Jaime Gonçalves, who called for Sant’Egidio to be involved in the mediation. After confidential preliminary contacts, the Italian State was then brought into the negotiations. The mediation team consisted of four people: Mario Raffaeli (Italian Foreign Affairs Ministry), Mgr. Jaime Gonçalves, Andrea Riccardi (Sant’Egidio) and Don Matteo Zuppi (Sant’Egidio).

The path for the negotiations was laid down by intermediate accords (e.g. Agreement on a Partial Ceasefire and the Declaration on the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance) that created an opportunity to involve African states from the region or with close ties to the players in the conflict, such as Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, South Africa, and Kenya. The presence of these observers reassured the fighters and gave them the essential guarantees while building the peace.

Besides Italy, which was involved from the start of the discussions, three other European states -
Portugal, France and the United Kingdom - were involved in the final phase of the negotiating process. They were also joined by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the UN.

In addition to the contribution made by Sant’Egidio, Italy and private foundations supported the negotiations financially. Following the substantial involvement of the Secretary General’s representative, Aldo Ajello, in the negotiations, the UN financed a large part of the implementation of the peace agreements.

*What is the particular role of Sant’Egidio in resolving or preventing conflict?*

Of course in conflict resolution everybody has a role to play. We do not, by any means, replace diplomacy. Our particular strength is that we have no interest other than achieving peace. We don’t have any political interests, we don’t have any particular agenda, and most importantly we have time. For example, the negotiations in Mozambique took almost two years – for some people this was too long, but we considered that it was important to take the necessary time to get a good agreement. The fact that this agreement is still valid today vindicates our approach.

Another strength of our organisation is confidentiality. We don’t publicise our work and so the different parties can meet without media attention. For example, in the cases of Sudan, Burundi and Congo, the different parties needed a place to meet without making a public statement. Such publicity would have been too early for public opinion in their countries. But it’s clear that at some point, the governments, the UN, the regional organisations, and the EU have to play their part. However good an agreement is, it will need political pressure and sometimes military pressure to implement it. That is clearly not our role.

*Can you give some examples of your interventions?*

Well, just this summer we were able to bring the President of Togo together with the opposition to find political solutions after the elections there. There is an agreement now in place and a strong momentum for peace, but other regional actors now need to step in to apply the necessary pressure to implement and carry through the agreements.

We may also intervene when negotiations are blocked for one reason or another. This was the case for Guatemala, for example. When the talks broke down, we organised two or three meetings in Rome and finally they agreed to go back to the negotiating table in 1996. Also in the case of Darfur in the Sudan we had several meetings with the two guerrilla movements to help them to go back to the official negotiations.

We have a team of peace negotiators working in different conflicts, with people specialised in different regions.

*What is Sant’Egidio’s relationship with the Catholic Church and the Vatican in particular?*

There is a perception that Sant’Egidio acts as a sort of “submarine” of the Vatican, but this is simply not true. Sant’Egidio is a Catholic movement of the Catholic Church. But we are completely independent of the Vatican. Of course based in Rome we can establish contacts quite easily, and we exchange information, but they have never asked us to do something on their behalf.

*According to Sant’Egidio, where are the greatest emergencies now located around the world?*

After 1989, with the end of Communism, the world hoped for a lasting and secure peace. The conditions were right for resolving many conflicts that could have laid the foundations for a long period of peace. But unfortunately, the 1990s were a period of wasted hope, energy and opportunities. There was a resurgence of many national and nationalist passions; feelings of hate were stirred up; foundations for new conflicts were laid. Over the years, the great horrors of the Second World War were forgotten. The world forgot just how horrific war is. War continues to poison the lives of a large number of peoples. There is also a widespread war of terrorism and violence, which nowadays can rely on some fearsome agreements.

The Middle East is the prime example of a victim of an escalation of violence – take a look at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iraq, the unstable situation in Lebanon and Syria, as well as the dangers of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons in Iran in particular. In Central Asia too, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the proliferation of weapons and the presence of armed opposition movements or terrorists can also constitute a danger for the stability of the region.

Moreover, the world seems to have quietly accepted the reality of entire regions sinking deeper into poverty. I am thinking of areas of Africa on the margins of the economic process of globalisation. In these lands of despair, the state often collapses. The absence of the state leads to an absence of law and order and security. In these regions, resignation combines with deep-rooted anger, leading to new violence. There are also parts of the world where one sector of the population, often including very young people, live in violence. This is the problem for regions like Darfur in Sudan, which is the greatest humanitarian crisis today, as well as regions in West Africa (Ivory Coast, Togo, Nigeria) and Central Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo, Northern Uganda). Sant’Egidio is involved with these countries through mediation or participation in peace
In the context of current international relations and “multi-track diplomacy”, Sant’Egidio is one of the players that can contribute to conflict resolution. Sant’Egidio is interested in developing collaboration with international and regional organisations in order to support work on prevention and conflict resolution carried out in support of peace negotiation processes. Support from international donors must be considered as a way of looking for synergies and complementarities in the search for peace.

The experience of mediations undertaken by Sant’Egidio in recent years has highlighted the importance of finding support from donors to carry out actions in favour of peace based on the following observation: a group of men, even a small number of them, provided that they are well-organised, can destabilise a whole region. Likewise, organisations from civil society can make a decisive contribution to restoring peace thanks to their local knowledge, combined with the fact of having experienced the ravages caused by war first hand. Contact with the war and the humanitarian experience can enhance understanding of armed conflicts. “Religious” or “identity” phenomena in many present-day conflicts act as a further reminder of the importance of inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue; mediation is an art where time is aconsiderable advantage. Time is also necessary to convince military players in a conflict of the necessity of becoming political players instead. Political imagination is required to respond to the logic of war in order to ensure that players in conflicts buy into the peace.

Does Sant’Egidio only intervene in regions where Christian communities are in danger? What is the relationship with other religious communities?

Sant’Egidio’s peace work is frequently based and sometimes originates in the network of links, relationships and friendships created by its engagement in Ecumenism and inter-religious dialogue since the 1980s, in particular with the three monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, but also with the world’s other religions.

The search for peace in present-day conflicts calls for consistent and prolonged efforts by a plurality of international players, whether governmental or non-governmental, in a synergy of resources and intentions. Today’s conflicts are rarely conventional wars between states, and they rarely result in military victory or defeat. Ethnic guerrilla wars and conflicts between groups within the same state are very different from the traditional power politics of states; they involve new elements like the co-existence of different cultures, religions and ethnic groups. Acknowledging these characteristics, the Community of Sant’Egidio is taking advantage of substantial experience and competences acquired in the field of inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue.

Since 1986, the Community of Sant’Egidio has been organising an international and inter-religious meeting each year in the spirit of Assisi, which brings together several hundred leaders of the major world religions, as well as thousands of participants. It has become one of the largest world events of its kind. The meeting takes the form of a spiritual pilgrimage of “peace-seekers”, and is organised in a different city each year, involving the political authorities and local religious communities – the latest meeting took place in Assisi, Italy, in September 2006.

Religious leaders were able to discuss difficult topics like fundamentalism, protection of the planet, the status of Jerusalem, the death penalty, terrorism and the “clash of civilisations”. While not all of these major problems were able to be resolved, the inter-religious meetings of Sant’Egidio contribute to improved communication between worlds that often know little about each other, do not communicate and distrust each other. The Community of Sant’Egidio insisted on not limiting its invitations to people who are naturally open to dialogue, but made sure that it invited religious leaders who are respectful and representative of their own community.

This worldwide network of friendship helps the Community of Sant’Egidio to play a role in the resolution and prevention of conflicts. To cite just one example: only three weeks after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and before the US response against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the Community of Sant’Egidio brought together the most senior leaders of the Christian world (Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox) and the Muslim world (Sunni and Shi’ite), in order to establish a vital channel of communication at a time when there was almost a complete breakdown in communications between “the West” and “Islam”. Sant’Egidio wanted to contribute in that way to preventing terrorism and “the war against terror” from degenerating into a “conflict of civilisations”, in which religious minorities would probably be the first casualties.
CHAPTER 18: THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS AND “BLOOD” DIAMONDS

Summary

The problem of “blood diamonds” no longer requires much of an introduction. With James Bond villains dabbling in conflict diamonds, and rap stars introducing their audiences to the diamond-fuelled civil war in Sierra Leone, the phenomenon has moved beyond the world of UN panels and NGO reports and entered the vocabulary of popular culture. In the late 1990s, the struggle to control the diamond fields of West Africa was a major factor in fuelling the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia, while Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA thrived on the income from the diamond production it controlled in Northern Angola. While such conflict diamonds only ever made up a small proportion of the global trade in rough diamonds, they were undoubtedly a contributing factor (if not the sole cause) of some of the most brutal civil wars the African continent has seen.

What is less well-known is that the problem of conflict diamonds has given rise to one of the most innovative (and arguably, one of the most successful) conflict prevention initiatives yet developed. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), in which Europe (through the European Community) has been one of the driving forces, has now been in operation for three years – and beyond its impact on the diamond trade, the KPCS carries useful lessons for efforts to tackle other types of "conflict resources".

The challenge: regulating the trade in a “conflict commodity”

The relative ease with which diamonds can be mined in parts of West and Central Africa presented rebel movements in Sierra Leone, Angola, Liberia and parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with a rich source of income – and an important stimulus for seeking control over diamond-producing areas. At the same time, diamonds offered themselves as a singularly convenient way of storing value and transferring funds across borders. Initially, the UN Security Council responded with sanctions on the diamond exports of affected countries; and in the cases of Sierra Leone and Angola, with a requirement that all official diamond exports be accompanied by certificates of origin. The limitations of using measures targeted at individual diamond producing countries quickly became apparent. However as certain points of export were closed off, illicit diamonds would simply transit through countries not affected by sanctions, and then be exported to the main international diamond markets.

The response: “certifying” the trade to drive out illicit diamonds

In order to find a more effective solution to the problem, interested governments, the international diamond industry and non-governmental organisations initiated the “Kimberley Process”, with the backing of the UN. The threat of a consumer boycott of diamonds undoubtedly contributed to the sense of urgency with which the KP approached the issue, and the informal series of meetings started in Kimberley (South Africa) in May 2000 quickly matured into a more formal arrangement. In November 2002, participating governments (including, through the European Community, all Member States of the EU) adopted the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which is now implemented by 45 participants, comprising all significant diamond producing countries and trading centres. The basic elements of the KPCS are straightforward: participants commit themselves to ensuring that all incoming or outgoing international shipments of rough diamonds are accompanied by Kimberley Process certificates, issued under the authority of a participant and guaranteeing that the diamonds in a given shipment were handled in accordance with the requirements of the KPCS. By the same token, non-certified trade, including trade with countries outside the KPCS, is prohibited – and this has to be enforced through legislation by every participant. Moreover, in order for participants to be able to certify diamonds on export, they are required to have in place adequate internal controls over their rough diamond “pipeline”, from import or production to export. Perhaps one of the most original features of the KPCS is that while...
participation as such is voluntary for any state, the requirements of the Scheme have to be implemented by binding legislation at the national level (or, in the case of the EU, at the Community level) – an unusual combination that has shown itself highly effective in practice.

Crucially, although some of the provisions of the KPCS as adopted in November 2002 were relatively vague – for example, the provisions on monitoring of implementation, or the procedure for admission to the Scheme – these have been strengthened by subsequent agreements adopted by consensus among the KP’s participants. By the end of 2004, the KP’s decision-making “plenary” had thus set up a “peer review” monitoring system, and established clear procedures for the screening and admission of new participants, as well as spelling out compulsory requirements for regular statistical reporting by participants. Taken together, these provisions now make up a system that is arguably more effective in promoting its minimum requirements than many long-established treaties or conventions. Applications for participation in the Scheme are subjected to a rigorous screening by the KP’s “Participation Committee”. In 2003, an initial screening by the Committee of all the participants who had initially signed up to the KPCS led to some 20 countries being dropped from participation in the Scheme (some of whom were subsequently re-admitted after adopting adequate implementing legislation). In 2004, the KPCS was confronted with its first major implementation issue when the Democratic Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) came into effect.

The impact of the KPCS after three years

In a short space of time, the KP has had a profound impact on the international diamond trade. Where previously diamonds of uncertain provenance could be imported, traded and re-exported in the world’s main trading centres with (almost) no questions asked, shipments not accompanied by a valid KP certificate now have to be investigated and will in many cases end up being seized. There is no doubt that some illicit trafficking of diamonds continues in spite of the KPCS. But by virtue of the KPCS, smuggling is now recognised as such and can be dealt with by law enforcement. In the EC, for example, there have been 27 cases since 2003 where the authorities of Member States have seized shipments of rough diamonds for infringing the provisions of the EC Regulation implementing the KPCS.

Crucially, the Scheme has allowed the governments of countries previously affected by conflict diamonds to extend their control over diamond trade and production. Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, have seen huge increases in the proportion of their diamonds exported through legitimate channels since the KPCS came into effect.

At the same time, much remains to be done to strengthen effective implementation of the KPCS by all its participants. Working with participants that have large-scale artisanal diamond mining to enhance the traceability of diamond production has emerged as a crucial challenge in that regard, and one that will increasingly need to be reflected in development assistance strategies in diamond-producing countries.

Conclusion: conflict diamonds – and beyond?

As a response to one of the main contributing factors fueling conflict in parts of West and Central Africa, the KPCS has without any doubt proved its usefulness. There is little doubt that the KPCS will need to remain in place for the foreseeable future as a preventive instrument; and this is underscored by the fact that even as the main diamond-fuelled conflicts in Sierra Leone and Angola have been settled,
the international community is once again faced with the production of conflict diamonds (albeit on a far smaller scale) in Côte d’Ivoire.

The bigger question is whether at least some elements of the KPCS could be replicated in other sectors to deal with other “conflict commodities” – of which gold, coltan and tin in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo are probably the best-known examples. It is unlikely that a comprehensive trade certification scheme like the KPCS could ever be implemented for a commodity other than diamonds: by their size, value and economic characteristics, diamonds are not comparable to any of the other minerals cited. Moreover, it is unlikely that the threat of a consumer boycott could ever have the impact in another sector that it has had in the diamond world. Nonetheless, a simpler form of trade certification could work in other sectors. In fact, the partnership agreements with timber producing countries being explored by the EC under the EU’s “Forestry Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade” initiative are partly inspired by the KPCS. At the very least, the first three years of the KPCS have demonstrated that using a trade instrument to tackle the sources from which some conflicts are funded can be fruitful. It remains to be seen whether the KPCS will remain a (successful) one-off – or whether it heralds a more comprehensive attempt to curb the abuse of “conflict commodities”.
In the 1990s, I did a number of photo-reportages during the fighting in Zaire (the present-day Democratic Republic of Congo), Sierra Leone and Angola, conflicts which were often dismissed as tribal wars, the final convulsions of the Cold War. By degrees, however, they increasingly became conflicts over raw materials.

The diamond deposits were, for the most part, controlled by the Angolan and Sierra Leonean rebels, who used the gems as a means to buy weapons. Governments got in on the act too and the terms “blood diamond” and “conflict diamond” were born. At the time I did a number of reportages on this subject, without however being able to picture the whole industry; both rebels and dealers were very suspicious.

But then various campaign groups began to sound the alarm and pressure was put on the industry as well as the producing and trading authorities to cooperate on a certification system which would guarantee that only conflict-free diamonds could come onto the market. Worried by any threat to their image, the industry bowed to public opinion and entered into negotiations with the relevant authorities and campaign groups such as Fatal Transactions. This led to the Kimberley Agreement being signed at the end of 2002 by a large number of the exporting and importing countries. The agreement reduced smuggling and made the industry more transparent. Nowadays these African countries are, on the whole, at peace, and rebel movements no longer officially play much of a role in diamond exploitation.

In 2004 I decided to try to go back to these countries to see the changes, if there were any. I worked closely with the Dutch Institute on Southern Africa, so I could use their expertise and could work with small local NGOs active in the field of mineral resources in the respective countries. In February I left for the first trip to Sierra Leone.

It was difficult to work, especially in Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo, where mines are often controlled by undefined armed groups. I basically had to win the trust of the (mainly foreign) diamond dealers to get access. This was very time consuming and often frustrating and occasionally dangerous. I was sticking my nose in a business where some people did not want me. But compared to previous trips, I did get access in the end and managed to show the whole process of mining and dealing.

Working conditions remain appalling. Profits are enormous but very little flows back to the people. The mining companies get big concessions, which improves their control of the trade, but robs the local populace of its bread. They are chased off their land and given little, if any, compensation. Besides this, the locals have always dug for diamonds and know little or nothing about farming. So in no way are they able to profit from the riches under their feet; worse, they are outlawed. Society is threatened with meltdown.

"Fair trade" in diamonds would be the ideal next step, with profits being shared by all in the industry and diamond workers’ rights being respected. The countries of Africa would not benefit from a collapse in the industry. Tens of thousands there earn a
living from diamonds – albeit a meagre one. The mineral resources of the disrupted countries give real hope for reconstruction and economic development, provided that it happens honestly, of course.

This photo reportage examines the financing, working conditions, dealers and those who really profit from the industry.

I used Nikon FM3 and FM2, Hasselblad Xpan panoramic camera and a Hasselblad 500c/m. And for film, Kodak Tri-x 400 and Fuji Neopan 1600.

[Kadir van Lohuizen]
Carrying gravel out of the mine at Bakwa Bowa, the Congo
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Diamond miners and gravel carrier

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Miners getting baptised, in Mbuji Mayi, the Congo

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Diamond matters - 2004
Funeral of a miner. Many miners die, because they drown or sand walls collapse.
Mbaj Mayi, the Congo

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Cangula (36 years), Angola
"I have been working here in the Bula mines for two years. I come from Cafunfo, but I live here in a tent next to the mine."

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Ishmael Nyaka (34 years)

“I was born in Koidu. When the war started, I fled to Bo. I came back in 2003. I am a miner; the work here is not okay; there are no social programmes. I don’t get any money, just food. If a diamond is found we share it, but the prices are low.”

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Diamond matters - 2004
Sierra Leone

Diamond found at the Sewa river, Sierra Leone

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Diamond matters - 2004
Washing the gravel at Bakwawa Bowa, the Congo

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PART IV: IMPROVING QUALITY IN CIVILIAN CRISIS RESPONSE
CHAPTER 19: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY: IMPROVING THE RESPONSE

Summary

In this increasingly uncertain world, it is imperative that we find better and more effective ways to respond to crisis more rapidly and coherently, and to identify concrete means to ensure that staff are safe wherever they implement a European Union (EU) security mission. To this end, much dialogue is needed and this paper contributes to the debate by discussing some of the global and regional challenges that require EU engagement, as well as use of its different crisis management instruments. It also outlines some of the key issues for the improvement of the EU’s capability to respond, examining the overall civilian crisis response from early warning to state-building.

EU crisis management: an asset to the UN

In the beginning of the twenty-first century, the major threats to world stability include failing states, global disease outbreaks, chronic poverty, natural disasters, climate change, terrorism, organised crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. How would the world deal with these threats if there were no multilateral system – no regional organisations active in peace and security cooperation, but also that organisations such as the African Union look for a more active role in peacekeeping and peace support operations, as well as increase their capacity to act.

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Improving the EU’s crisis management capacity is an asset to the UN - not competition with it. The EU has played an important, if often unnoticed, role in stabilising regions threatened with insecurity by using the economic, technical and political means available to the European Community. The development of the civilian and military capabilities under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has created the long-needed capacity for active crisis management. The work under the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 is vital in making sure that we match the capabilities both to realistic field requirements and planning scenarios.

However, there remains a lot of work to be done before the EU is as effective as it could be. Perhaps the most serious consequence of the division of the EU’s crisis response capacity between Pillar I and Pillar II is the possibility that the Union’s reaction to any crisis will be driven by institutional considerations rather than by a problem-solving approach. A key issue for the EU’s global role is that we have to be able to work together coherently and effectively. Postponement of the new Constitution cannot be an excuse for not finding means for inter-institutional cooperation in the current framework. The world community or our tax payers do not care about the internal mandates or division of labour but they will judge the EU’s overall performance.

Clarity about political objectives and the means to achieve them is a precondition for coherent EU security policy, including its crisis response capabilities. That is why the European Security Strategy of December 2003 represents a milestone in the development of the EU’s global role.

In addition to coherent policy, the capability to deploy and deliver response in the field is a key challenge. The EU is increasingly active in the most dangerous hot spots around the world and ensuring staff security at all times is of utmost importance. This point was brought home to me during my recent chairmanship of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of the UN Personnel in Iraq. It was the saddest job I have ever had. Confronting both the misery of wounded, traumatised staff
The EU success story in Aceh is an example of how the different civilian instruments can come together in a concrete case and of what the EU could do at its best when working together. European Commission and Member States responded with humanitarian and emergency aid to the tsunami that devastated the Aceh province. In parallel, the European Commission used its Rapid Reaction Mechanism to support the peace negotiations between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement that were facilitated by the Crisis Management Initiative. Already during the first round of negotiations, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and his staff were consulted about the possibility of an EU monitoring mission should there eventually be a peace agreement. In addition, CMI’s peace facilitation was supported by a network of NGOs, governments, UN and individuals. That helped CMI to concentrate on the facilitation of talks without compromising its impartiality.

In order to ensure timely preparations both the EU Council Secretariat and Commission representatives participated in the negotiations when monitoring arrangements were discussed between the warring parties. And indeed, the speed of deployment of the EU monitoring mission on the ground was probably a world record.

The implementation of the peace agreement has gone well, and Peter Feith and his colleagues on the ground are to be congratulated. The process has helped to build confidence between the parties, but it takes time. Therefore it is vital that despite of AMM leaving Aceh, EU continues to support the peace process. For instance it is important that EU continues monitoring that there are adequate resources available for the reintegration of combatants of the Free Aceh Movement.

The key lesson learned from Aceh is that Europe needs to work together across institutions, governments and non-governmental actors. That is the best strategy for the EU to be a credible global actor in peace and security issues.

At the same time the Aceh experience also highlighted some areas for further development in civilian crisis management. It is vital that an adequate civilian planning capacity is in place. The EU also has to streamline its administration and management so that the internal systems are geared towards delivering in the field rapidly. Third, it is important to start mainstreaming human rights to all civilian crisis management operations.

Developing a long-term strategy for Africa

The EU is also increasingly active in Africa. There is a growing trend of argument that the EU should take a primary role in supporting not only the African continent’s economic development but also its security efforts. Developing a long-term strategy for Africa has been one of the priorities of the UK EU Presidency between July-December 2005. The African Union’s (AU) intervention in Sudan’s Darfur region tests the effectiveness of its own peace and security structures and those of the European Union. The AU has taken the lead both in the political negotiations between the government and the rebels and in deploying a peace-monitoring mission, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). It has had to rely on outside support for AMIS, with nearly two thirds of its funding coming from the EU’s African Peace Facility.
If the EU could play a role in building the capacity of African organisations in civilian and military crisis response, drawing from its own experience that would be a major contribution in global terms. It requires a well-thought-out strategy in addition to financial resources to have sustainability in the long run.

### Taking a lead in post-conflict resolution

The roots of the new security dangers lie in unresolved political conflicts on the periphery of Europe and in more remote regions. The erosion of state structures, the dissolution of entire states and civil wars create opportunities for armed groups and non-state actors, and encourage terrorism, organised crime, corruption, and trafficking in humans and drugs. In our globalised world, these factors not only have a destabilising effect on their immediate environment, they also, in many ways, threaten the security of the international community as a whole.

Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated to us that turning fragile and failed states into strong and stable ones is perhaps the most difficult security challenge of our time. How can the conditions be created to enable people to live in dignity, freedom, democracy and security?

The EU is a Union of 25 democratic states. Some of them have recently gone through a democratic transition process of their own. This blend is a formidable asset to support democratisation processes elsewhere in the world. Europe must take the lead in improving the effectiveness of post-conflict reconstruction to maximise its international influence and to carve out a distinctive world role.

There is broad support for the UN Peacebuilding Commission aimed at improving the UN’s post-conflict peacebuilding capabilities. Europe should work together with its partners to make this new capacity a centrepiece of the UN’s mission. There is a need for these kinds of reconstruction and stabilisation capabilities, which complement the EU’s own efforts.

### Developing transatlantic cooperation

Besides the European capacity to respond crisis, there is also the issue of transatlantic cooperation to be considered. It has been fashionable on both sides of the Atlantic to argue that differences over the Iraq war, or the Kyoto Treaty, or the International Criminal Court will end the longstanding trans-atlantic partnership. Frankly, this seems improbable. We share too much history, too many common values, too many core economic, political and security interests to go our separate ways.

Only on the basis of a joint international agenda and joint action can an increasingly stronger Europe, and the global power represented by the US, effectively exploit their potentials as zones of stability on the domestic front and as exporters of stability abroad. The US and Europe can tackle the complex security challenges of the 21st century. But they will only be able to do so together. In order to form an effective framework for this transatlantic partnership, Europe and the US need to embark together on the following: to begin a strategic dialogue; to undertake joint action within the context of effective multilateralism; and to use a set of instruments linking civilian and military means, oriented towards sustainable stabilisation.

Furthermore, NATO and the EU complement each other. Their collaboration is a core element of an Atlanticism based on effective multilateralism. The danger to NATO is not a strong Europe but a weak Europe. Only a strong Europe can guarantee Europe’s partnership within the transatlantic alliance.

### Improving the EU’s crisis response – a seven point agenda

The challenges are numerous and this article only highlights a few of them but they already give guidance for the EU on how to take the crisis response agenda forward. Below a seven point agenda for the EU on how to improve the quality and professionalism of its crisis response capability is outlined.

#### Conflict resolution

First, many European governments, institutions and NGOs are well-placed to act as outside facilitators in different conflict situations. The normal work of European Council and European Commission top civil servants is often, in fact, peace diplomacy in action. However, the EU could implement a more strategic approach to investment in conflict resolution. This author proposes that the Commission establish a start-up fund for peace, which will fund small, rather high-risk, track two diplomacy efforts in conflict resolution, thereby engaging directly in building peace processes.

#### Rapid deployment

Second, in conflicts, rapid and timely action is essential. Both the concept for Civilian Response Teams (CRT) and Commission Rapid Reaction Mechanism are important steps in this direction. However, the EU should ensure synergies and eliminate unnecessary
overlap between Council and Commission rapid reaction instruments, particularly between CRT and planning assessment teams. Furthermore, both the Council and Commission should ensure that their internal administrative systems enable flexible and rapid action and deployment.

Training
Third, training is a key component in developing the quality and professionalism of civilians working in the field, and much work is already underway to this effect. This author would propose the following priorities:

- include more extensive security and safety training in the civilian crisis management training courses and organise/outsource special training courses for security management professionals to be deployed to field operations;
- extend existing security training programmes within Directorate-General for External Relations to other Commission Directorates-General and training for people going to EU delegations in conflict areas;
- ensure the coherence in training between pillars by conducting training on an inter-pillar basis wherever possible; and
- increase the role and participation of European NGOs in civilian crisis management training activities, using the expertise, for example, of civil peace services.

Coherence and conflict sensitivity
Fourth, it is often said that the EU’s advantage lies in the wide array of instruments that it can use in crisis situations. That is certainly true. However, it can also become a weakness if the instruments are not complementary, coherent and conflict sensitive. If aid, trade, crisis management and diplomatic means are not implemented in a coherent framework they can have unintended consequences in the field and undermine each other’s impact.

Therefore, it is important to fund research and evaluation on the impact and coherence of different civilian instruments (aid, trade, diplomatic means and crisis management) on the ground to get new information for policy planning purposes.

Civil-military cooperation
Fifth, the experience in the Balkans and in Afghanistan shows that a combination of civilian and military instruments is needed in order to be successful. Indeed, it is this approach that is one of the key characteristics of ESDP and which renders it distinct from other concepts. The process of developing comprehensive planning needs to continue. A key challenge is to increase the civilian planning capacity for operations to match, at least partly, that of the military.

Work with NGOs
Sixth, NGOs participate in enhancing the quality of EU crisis response in multiple ways. By working with NGOs the EU can draw on local experience and expertise, and build solidarity and partnership with local partners in conflict countries. NGOs also help in identifying emerging public issues and articulating this in debates at the European level. In so doing, they also contribute to bringing European Union development, humanitarian aid and crisis management policies closer to EU citizens.

There is an identified need to achieve greater conceptual coherence about the overall strategy and goals of crisis management missions between the European Union and non-governmental organisations. It is time to take a new qualitative step from the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP that was adopted by the European Council on 17-18 June 2004, acknowledging the importance of including the views of civil society in its civilian crisis management policy orientations. CMI, the Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network from Finland and the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, EPLO, CMI, The Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network from Finland and European Peacebuilding Liaison Office have established, as part of the EU Finnish Presidency, a project which developed a concrete action plan with recommendations on how to benefit from NGO expertise and comparative advantages in the EU civilian crisis management. The project presented possibilities for better cooperation at a field and strategic level in terms of mission planning, recruitment, training and evaluation.

Staff security and mission support capabilities
Finally, when mission support works it is almost invisible, but when it doesn’t, it can seriously inhibit political and operational work. Logistics, administration and communications are crucial not only in enabling efficient daily work but also in providing security to the staff in the field. The EU needs a professional security management system that is tailored to the current security and political reality.
Particularly on the civilian side there is a need to develop a scalable and interoperable communications concept based on user requirements. Often procurement is the biggest stumbling block for rapid deployment. It is important to develop agreement on procurement that guarantees transparency but effectively supports the missions.

**Conclusion: Towards strong and effective multilateralism**

In recent years the world has become less secure and international relations everywhere are going through a period of profound uncertainty. The EU must promote strong and effective multilateralism, toward respect for human rights and prevention of conflict. It should develop its civilian crisis response capacity in close cooperation with the United Nations and try to find more common ground with all those relevant players who can contribute to finding peaceful solutions.
The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) is an independent, non-governmental organisation responding to challenges in sustainable security.

The aim of CMI is to enhance the conflict prevention, active crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation capacity of the international community. Additionally, CMI seeks solutions to global problems through strengthening democratic practices and through a firm commitment to equitable development. In preventing conflicts CMI seeks to get acquainted with their causes and to act for their mitigation through various initiatives and projects. Through these initiatives CMI seeks practical and easily implemented solutions.

Through focused networks of political decision-makers, international organisations, civil society organisations, business actors and research institutes, CMI acts as a bridge builder within the international community. The aim of the bridge building activities is to come up with new tools or working practices which help the international community to respond better to the challenges of human security. CMI seeks partnerships and facilitates dialogue.

CMI’s action-orientated approach is based on extensive experience and consistent communication with international actors as well as topical, unbiased and well-analysed information and advice.
CHAPTER 20: BUILDING CIVILIAN CAPACITY FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE

Summary

This paper was originally prepared for the Government of Denmark’s meeting on Strengthening the UN’s Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management, held in Copenhagen, 8-9 June, 2004. Its purpose was to inform the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, appointed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to develop reform recommendations for collective security in the changed 21st century security environment. The paper precedes the Panel’s and subsequent recommendations leading up to the September 2005 Summit and the reform package that has now been partially implemented. The paper has been updated to reference advances made by the UN and the European Union in the 18 months since the Copenhagen meeting.1

Background and Rationale

Since the early 1990s, the UN System, the World Bank Group, the EU and bilateral donors have been involved in a broad array of peace-building functions in the aftermath of conflicts that have either severely weakened or largely decimated the institutions of governance. Designated variously as post-conflict reconstruction or peace-building, these activities have included a wide variety of administrative and public management tasks, ranging from political observation and negotiation in El Salvador, to the full-fledged governing authority assumed by UNTAET in East Timor and UNMIK in Kosovo.

These political and civilian administration tasks take place alongside vital security and humanitarian operations, but have not received the same recognition of their importance, that is until recently with the High Level Panel’s recommendations for the creation of a Peace—building Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office and EU efforts such as the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 process.2 This paper focuses primarily on the need for civilian capacity-building at the UN, although reference is made to other multilateral and bilateral initiatives and the need for greater co-ordination between and among these initiatives.

Increasingly over the last decade, the UN System, including the Bretton Woods Institutions, has developed its capacity to deal with a range of crises from conflict prevention to peace-building. Efforts have focused on responding to acute human suffering and violent conflict, resulting in significantly improved capacity for peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief in complex emergencies. These improvements reflect the need for international actors to accord primacy to peace implementation and to deal with security challenges to local authorities until the latter are able to establish their own defence and public order capabilities. Failure to perform this vital transition function creates a high risk of relapse into conflict.

It is also the case, however, that failure to build adequate state capacity can also doom post-conflict peace-building efforts. In response, peacekeeping mandates have become ever more multi-dimensional, and a broader array of UN entities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has become engaged in post-conflict operations and assistance programmes, including drafting and implementing peace accords; training local police; managing local and national economies; reconstructing public utilities; and supervising the reconstruction of education and health systems. In the most developed of these missions, the UN has had a full array of civil responsibilities.

Far from being mere technical tasks, these undertakings require strong leadership, political and inter-personal skills, as well as knowledge of local languages, culture and norms.

1. Special credit is due to James Boyce, William Durch, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, and Susan Woodward for the contributions on the civilian capacity of, respectively, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the UN Secretariat, the European Union, and the United Nations Development Fund.

2. The Utstein report defines peace-building as “… the development of the conditions, attitude and behavior that foster and sustain social and economic development that is peaceful, stable and prosperous.” (p.5).

Success depends on the skills of civilian actors in these missions, and on the legitimacy derived from close consultation with local actors. Unfortunately, while there is general acceptance of the broad guidelines governing international action in peacebuilding (e.g., the DAC guidelines), relatively little has been done to create the institutional and human resource capacities necessary to effectively plan and implement the civilian components of multidimensional peace operations. Each peacebuilding mission scrambles anew to design and organise the appropriate administrative structure, assess needs, recruit staff, match skills to tasks, mobilise resources and coordinate effectively. Differing capacities (and cultures) in the civilian peacebuilding, military, humanitarian, and developmental components of multidimensional peace operations also impede integrated planning and mission execution. Moreover, although the UN System has paid increasing attention to the need for conflict assessment, early alert, strategic planning, and mission design, the civilian components of its crisis management continue to be impeded by lack of shared strategic objectives, authoritative coordination mechanisms, effective human resource strategy and implementation, and adequate financing arrangements.

These institutional and financial shortcomings are compounded by the fact that within the UN System there has been no place for intergovernmental decision-making relating to post-conflict peacebuilding, a matter that will now hopefully be addressed through the Peacebuilding Commission. In the absence of such a mechanism, the Security Council continually extended its writ, in terms of duration of mandates and the range of economic and developmental issues tackled within multidimensional peace operations. While this has focused greater attention on mission integration, it nevertheless characterised a Security Council attempting to shape policy for UN agencies and programmes that do not report to it, and to provide guidance on political and economic development issues outside its range of competence. It also vests responsibility with Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for coordinating UN actors over which they have no authority.

The UN’s institutional mechanisms to support conflict prevention and good offices are even more constrained. The Department for Political Affairs is widely recognised to be inadequately staffed to provide effective strategic analysis for conflict prevention and political support for good offices, a problem that can conceivably be addressed by the proposed addition of an effective mediation capacity. For their part, the inter-agency mechanisms formally tasked with developing conflict prevention strategy are neither appropriately staffed nor do they have the authority to ensure programme coherence in the field.

It is important to note that the UN System does not suffer these shortcomings alone. The European Union is struggling to build its own rapid-deployment civilian capacity to provide more timely and effective peacebuilding assistance. A number of Member States are seeking either to ensure greater coordination among their own government agencies, or to adjust their funding procedures to provide more flexibility in addressing early recovery and reconstruction. And, while there is considerable discussion of potential regional contributions to peace-building, especially in Africa, there is in fact no capacity in the regional and sub-regional organisations at present to respond in any effective way.

Considering the ad hoc and improvisational means by which the international community has undertaken conflict prevention and peace-building missions, the rate of success, however relative, is nothing short of remarkable. It is, however, also tenuous to assume that the end result will be viable, effective and legitimate states able to govern. To be more certain of these outcomes, it is critical that the UN system’s civilian components of multidimensional peacebuilding be accorded the same attention as has military and humanitarian capacity-building. Given the number of current and looming crises and their risks to international peace and security, there is a pressing need to reassess the policies, programmes, and institutional and financing mechanisms that underpin the civilian components of peace operations.

Reform efforts at the United Nations

A substantial number of reform proposals for improving the UN’s response capabilities have followed from the initial promulgation of the Agenda for Peace (1992). These have been undertaken by the UN Secretariat and Specialised Agencies, UN Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, and the Member States. As a result, a number of internal reforms have been instituted, principally in the areas of military planning and in improving standards of conduct, delivery and coordination in humanitarian relief. Furthermore, the UN has achieved some incremental

4. For more detail on the EU efforts, see the background paper prepared by Jakobsen, P.V., for the Copenhagen meeting on the website of the Danish Foreign Ministry or at www.cic.nyu.edu/publications. See also Corbish, P. and Edwards, G. (2005), The Strategic Culture of the European Union: a Progress Report, International Affairs No. 81 Vol. 4 pp. 801-820.
successes in integrated planning and oversight; in management of field operations; in recruitment and training; and in recent coordination between the UN and the World Bank. Advances have also been made in Demobilisation, Disarmament and Rehabilitation (DDR) and de-mining, in harmonising administrative and budget procedures, and, to a degree, in attention to gender issues.

Yet much remains to be done to ensure that the international system is better prepared to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflict, as well as lay the basis for sustainable peace and development. Building on a set of reviews of existing capacities in the principal intergovernmental bodies, this paper outlines a number of alternative approaches to strengthening governing mechanisms, policy approaches, institutional capacity, and coordination and financial arrangements for the civilian dimensions of conflict management, especially post-conflict peace-building.

**Recommendations and options**

**Policy goals**

In order to both prevent state failure and ensure a lasting peace after conflict, donor governments and international agencies need to:

- Make “state-building” a central goal of conflict management and peacebuilding, agreeing that effective and legitimate public and civil society institutions, with adequate accountability safeguards, are essential to meet the on-going public safety and social/economic welfare needs necessary to ensure public confidence in any system of local and national governance.  

- Align political and macro-economic stabilisation goals to minimise the tensions between budget deficit reduction strategies and “state-building” and public confidence-building requirements; resolve the trade-offs between fiscal austerity and trade liberalisation and a range of tax, tariff and other options necessary for state revenue generation; and harmonise World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) grant and lending policies, including debt reduction or clearance, with the need for aid conditionality in support of peace accords and the consolidation of peace.

- Ensure that political and economic development strategies are integral parts of a well-focused approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

- Peace operations mandates should be sufficiently encompassing to include the full range of civilian activities essential to effective peacebuilding, albeit appropriately prioritised and sequenced, in order to provide ample scope for mission planning, design and financing.

- Shift the operational focus from “doing” to “enabling.” External capacity-building must provide the support and advisory services needed to transfer responsibility to local actors for their own political and economic well-being at the earliest possible moment.

- Develop the professional public information capabilities needed to explain missions to local populations and counteract hate radio and TV and other destabilising media activities while supporting the development of a locally-controlled, open and free media in transitional situations.

**Institutional arrangements**

A concerted effort must be made to strengthen the specific competencies of individual departments, agencies and bureaus at the United Nations. This would require:

- Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) – Establishing a multidisciplinary, civilian post-conflict planning division to develop field strategies with other departments and specialised agencies, to support the interdepartmental task forces that elaborate mission plans and staffing tables, and to interface with the Office of Mission Support and of the Military Advisor.

- Department of Political Affairs (DPA) – Developing adequate personnel and management capacity for strategic analysis in support of conflict prevention and the conduct of good offices; strengthen regional desk-officer capacity to provide sound advice on political transition issues.

- Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) – Reviewing and strengthening current capacities for early recovery and reconstruction activities in areas such as DDR, rule of law and governance; identify and support areas of comparative advantage in relation to longer-term development strategies of the World Bank.

- Department of Public Information (DPI) - Investing in the DPI’s capacity to address the current planning, training and support gaps in public information for peace operations.

A standing mechanism should be created to develop and maintain the UN’s institutional
capacity for planning, operational design and backstopping, and evaluation. Its small core staff should be comprised of individuals with substantial headquarters and field experience in a range of peace operations related issues, and it should maintain close liaison with the Bretton Woods institutions and leading NGOs. Options to be considered include:

- Merging relevant and competent elements of DPKO, DPA, BCPR and Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) into a new crisis management office based on the Executive Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) model recommended in the Brahimi report.

- Creating an Executive Steering Committee comprised of the chairs of Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) and UN Development Group (UNDG) and serviced by the ECPS Secretariat to coordinate interdepartmental cooperation in planning and implementing peacebuilding operations.

- Establishing a strategic coordination capacity in the Office of the Secretary-General or the Deputy Secretary-General to provide authoritative oversight in the planning and implementation of peacebuilding operations.

Each of these options should include an evaluation and audit unit to undertake both real-time and overall mission assessments for purposes of measuring progress and outcomes as well as institutional and individual performance.

Field operations design and planning

Planning for field operations needs to be based on a targeted intervention strategy that relies on knowledge of local politics and culture, a multidisciplinary approach to conflict management and peacebuilding, clear objectives, and measurable goals. To meet these objectives:

- A Deputy to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), should be appointed as soon as a new field operation is mandated to coordinate diverse operating agencies, including chairing the planning activities of Integrated Mission Task Forces.

- Joint needs assessments should be routinely undertaken with local participation and integrated into a comprehensive plan of action that is consistent with locally-determined strategic goals.

- A multidisciplinary expert task force should be established to assess agency data gathering methodologies and data bases and make recommendations for standardising baseline data needed for improved planning, tracking and monitoring of progress.

- The World Bank should further its efforts to develop its conflict assessment tools in designing policies and projects that help reduce conflict-generating social inequities; to monitor and measure the effects of macro-economic policies on political stabilisation; and to evaluate the quality of outcomes as opposed to the quantity of lending.

International recruitment

- A special task force should examine the pros and cons of using outside recruiters or creating a personnel unit for field missions outside the UN System in order to overcome the lengthy personnel procedures that now impede rapid deployment of civilian staff.

- Rosters and online postings need to be substantially upgraded to ensure the rapid recruitment of qualified civilian personnel for upcoming operations.

- The allocation and retention of department posts should be reassessed to facilitate inter-agency and inter-departmental secondments and transfers to ensure the availability of experienced staff for field assignments.

- Standby arrangements of experienced personnel with competencies in public administration and management and language skills, preferably regionally-based, need to be established for early deployment.

Training

- Urgent attention is needed to special skill areas such as police supervision and training, community policing, law enforcement, judicial administration, public administration and finance, public information, and evaluation that are sorely lacking within the System.

- Regional training institutes, especially in crisis prone areas, should be created and strengthened in public management and administration and other civilian skills both for crisis response and to create a “next generation” cadre of qualified civil servants. This could be done in collaboration with the EU’s on-going efforts to develop civilian capacity and effective training.
Local staffing

• Devise standardised methods to vet, train, and employ local staff at all levels of mission administration and management, in order to avoid displacement and a two-tiered system of international and local staff, and to ensure that local capacity is in place for the earliest possible handover; correct the salary distortions that attract staff away from local government to service jobs in the international agencies.

Financing arrangements

To help meet the financing requirements of conflict prevention and multidimensional peacekeeping, the donor community should consider the following options:

• Make available to DPA the resources required to build its staff capacity for strategic analysis for conflict prevention and the conduct of good offices.

• Redefine the boundaries between assessed budgets for peacekeeping and voluntary contributions to finance civilian activities that are folded into peace operations mandated by the Security Council but are routinely carried out by UNDP and the Specialised Agencies as integral components of peacebuilding.

• Expand the use of "pooled" funding for a more flexible response to multidimensional peacebuilding.

• Establish a "standby" fund to ensure adequate and timely funding in the 12-18 month early recovery and reconstruction phase of operations.

• Direct programme funding to public sector institutions in host countries while helping to devise self-sustaining local revenue streams and responsible fiscal policies for them.

• The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) should encourage the development of local revenue streams and fiscal capacity, including early generation of public resources through taxes and tariffs.

• The IFIs should establish a body to assess the scope and implications of efforts to erase "odious debts" inherited by post-conflict governments.

• The IFIs should explore how their lending and grant programmes can more effectively support efforts to consolidate peace, by imposing "peace conditionality" or by incorporating peace-accord commitments into Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.

• Develop a clear and transparent accounting system for reconstruction aid and a shared method for measuring and evaluating impact.

Governing arrangements

While peacekeeping operations are characterised by common objectives and unity of command, peacebuilding to date has been largely an amalgam of projects devoid of a mutually agreed strategy and coherent plan of action. Multiple agencies, both intergovernmental and bilateral, are subject to diverse decision-making bodies, and they plan and implement programmes based on their discrete and sometimes contradictory political objectives and operational doctrines.

The assets and capacities of all of these actors are critical to the successful outcome of multidimensional peacebuilding; yet, there is no systematic way to optimise their roles as part of a holistic, coherent strategy to meet peacebuilding objectives. While there are various efforts underway to improve coordination among UN departments and agencies and between them and the international financial institutions, a truly integrated System-wide response might well require deeper institutional reforms, which could include the following options:

• Expanding the writ of the Security Council to include broader state-building and development concerns related to conflict situations.

• Establishing an oversight body for peace-building within the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), perhaps through a subcommittee structure with a manageably small subset of ECOSOC members that could take over operations from the Security Council. This body in turn could consult with the wider set of economic actors, including the World Bank, the regional development banks, and the IMF.

• Creating a free-standing UN-World Bank facility governed by Member States to jointly review conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies and agree on an interlocking response to ensure that the right agencies undertake and initiate appropriate policies and programmes and that financing is at hand to do so.

Joining-up the UN System, donor country, and regional efforts

Multiple efforts are simultaneously underway within the UN System, the European Union, and individual Member States to strengthen their own capacities for planning and
implementing the civilian components of multidimensional peacebuilding. The risk to the UN System operations lies in the potential for a growing preference for autonomous EU and Member State operations. On the assumption that collective action is likely to produce an enhanced resource base for peacebuilding, special efforts should be made to structure these initiatives so that they contribute to a whole that is greater and more effective than the sum of the parts. This is especially the case with regard to EU-UN collaboration in the context of the Joint Declaration on EU/UN Cooperation in Crisis Management (2003) and with respect to the UN and regional organisations based on the principle of subsidiarity. To these ends, the EU and UN should:

• Increase cooperation in the areas of planning, training and communication through personnel exchanges and the use of liaison officers.

• Develop their respective institutional capacities for planning and implementing operations to complement each other.

• Establish joint inter-organisational task forces to address common issues regarding recruitment, personnel management, and the development of service packages in critical areas of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.

• Create a secure communication system to manage sensitive information related to personnel management, mission planning and support, and mission evaluation.

• Develop crisis management curricula in schools of public administration and law in both donor countries and crisis prone regions, and provide incentives, in the form of advanced training and career advancement, to increase the pool of experienced civil service personnel with appropriate language skills available for crisis management.

• Jointly work with regional and sub-regional organisations, especially in Africa, to help design and build their institutional capacity for crisis management in order to increase their potential to make positive contributions in their own neighbourhoods.

Conclusions

The recommendations contained in this report are intended to enhance the capacity of the United Nations System, including the Bretton Woods institutions, to plan and implement the civilian components of conflict management and peacebuilding. While calling for a substantial reorientation of the way in which business is now done, the recommendations are consistent with initiatives currently underway in the EU and at the national level in a number of the major donor countries, suggesting that consensus on a way forward is possible. The starting point is to accord the civilian components of peacebuilding corollary status to peacekeeping as integral to multidimensional missions, to stipulate the importance of effective and legitimate state institutions as the basis for sustainable peace and development, to address the urgent need for governing arrangements that are inclusive of the multiple agencies involved in field operation, and to pay serious attention to issues of institutional capacity, coordination and the modalities of financing. This is no easy task but the urgency of need should propel us toward a determined effort at reform.

Postscript

The recommendations emanating from the Copenhagen meeting fed directly into the deliberative process of the High Level Panel, and were followed by meetings co-sponsored by the Governments of Denmark and Tanzania, in New York, and by the Governments of Denmark and Ghana, in Accra, in which the recommendations for a Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Support Office, and Peacebuilding Support Fund were further honed and elaborated. Simultaneous efforts to improve civilian response capacity have occurred in the European Union and in a number of national settings, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom, where multi-agency coordination has become a rallying cry. The African Union and a number of African sub-regional organisations have also become involved in this question, particularly in light of the Secretary-General’s and EU’s calls for greater collaboration between these bodies across the range of peace support operations.

It is clear that peacekeeping and peacebuilding require multiple entry points, both military and civilian, and that the tasks are of sufficient enormity and consequence as to require full cooperation and greater coherence between the UN System, including the Bretton Woods institutions, regional organisations, the EU, bilateral donors and NGOs. By pulling together in a planned and structured way, we can and must maximise the individual response capacities of the various national and inter-governmental agencies. The EU is in a commanding position to help make this happen and thereby vastly enhance our chances for sustaining peace in the years ahead.
FINNISH DEVELOPMENT OF CAPABILITIES IN CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Interview with Antti Häikiö

What sort of challenges does European government face today in the field of crisis response?

Well, in my view, crisis response today is not really lacking good strategy and policy papers, there is no shortage of new initiatives. What is lacking is quality-controlled implementation. Quality in crisis management is the result of a long sequence of actions and reactions, causes and effects. If, for example, threat assessment or situational analysis fail, if a fact-finding mission does not really scrutinise a given situation, images what happens to political decision-making. Political decisions depend on a good information picture: no quality control in the preparatory phase, no quality in the decision-making.

Let me give you another example. Good planning (which is by the way the other facet of assessment and analysis) is the starting point for a successful crisis management operation. Preparations for an operation should begin before the specific mission requirements that an organisation sets for its members. Preparations should start with the basic setup that the Member State should provide for its own national readiness and participation. Quality assurance (or Total Quality Management, as some call it) is a standard doctrine of the profit-making private sector, but it is harder to apply in the fields of human security, democratic state-building and sustainable peace. This process is further complicated when a country needs to integrate and develop its civilian capabilities in a common framework with the other Member States of the European Union.

European Crisis Response doctrine has emphasised the importance of numbers, quantities, because all the attention is going to the shortfalls, missing links, and missing resources for a common crisis response apparatus. But figures tell very little about quality or about the competence of the experts and professionals.

If quality is essentially generated by the human resources we deploy on the ground, can you tell us how the European Member States are coping with this issue?

One of the most important current initiatives in the field of capacity building in the EU Member States is the European Community Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. It’s a pan-European project run by an open network of national contact points and training institutes; the project constitutes the European Group on Training (EGT). Its training programme only trains civilians and only at an operational, tactical and technical level. In addition to this, I should mention the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), established by a Joint Action in 2005, which is a network admitting an equal number of military and civilian participants in its courses. Its specificity is that it aims to develop strategic level knowledge only. The ESDC institutes are also mainly military institutes, such as Defence Colleges.

Simultaneously and alongside the EGT and ESDC, the EU Council General Secretariat publishes an annual paper called the European Security and Defence Policy Training Programme, which is a list of training-related events reported by the Member States and their actors. So as you can see there is already a certain amount of initiatives going on, but regrettably I reckon that there is not enough crisis or conflict-based field research bringing the latest results back to training and the production of material.

What should be the articulation between the national and the European level in the field of crisis response?

I am convinced that a truly comprehensive approach to EU crisis management starts from Member State level and specifically from inter-ministerial cooperation and coordination. Finland succeeded between 2003-2004 in creating national legislation for civilian crisis management, which was drafted in a joint project by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior (which chaired the process), the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice. This process led to the national Act on the Participation of Civilian Personnel in Crisis Management. The Act entered into force on 1 January 20051, just a few days after the tsunami disaster.

In addition to the legislation, the next step for successful participation by a Member State is to create the financial resources for the participation. Budgetary resources in the Finnish case are governed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which retains the political decision-making role in accordance with the Act. A budget line of €14 million maintains approximately

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110 experts in all EU, UN, OSCE and other operations in which Finland participates. In early 2006, the government decision guaran-
teed €1 million for the management of com-
petences of civilian personnel, administered
by the Ministry of the Interior in accordance
with the Act.

To complete these overviews I should also
mention that the Finnish Ministry of the Inter-
ior took on the responsibility to establish a
new cell for the Civilian Crisis Management
within the International Security Affairs Unit,
which falls directly under the responsibility of
the Permanent Secretary and is located in the
Headquarters of the Ministry. All staff recruited
to the new unit have recent personal expe-
rience in field missions – varying from military
and civilian backgrounds in the UN DPKO,
OSCE field missions in the Western Balkans
or the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission SLMM.

**Which criteria were used to assemble this type of
organisation in your country?**

Our initial approach for the establishment of
our organisation was based on pragmatism.
With our personnel we were not aiming at
creating an entity whose cohesion was to be
based in political, formal or theoretic criteria.
We wanted people who could understand the
legislation governing crisis management,
grasp basic notions of budgetary management
and also have a thorough understanding and
personal experience of crisis management.
Experience was the most important bond to
keep the community together.

Since then, the political discourse has focused
on proposing ambitious goals for an integrated
approach to crisis management, but few
concrete actions between the players have been
created yet. The legal framework clarifies the
roles and responsibilities of the players, from the
ministries at home to the pillars in EU. Indepen-
dent finances create conditions to fulfill the res-
sponsibilities for each actor, both at home and
within the EU. What is still not satisfactory is
the status of human resources, which are the
most valuable of all. Competence in crisis mana-
gement cannot simply be bought.

Military personnel often have better field
experience than civilian personnel; every mili-
tary officer starts personal career development
from the field. The technical-tactical aspects
are developed through the ranks from the ope-
rational to the strategic level. In the civilian
system, an academic degree opens the doors
(even for relatively young persons) to roundta-
bles and meeting rooms where crucial deci-
sions are taken concerning missions and ope-
ration set-up. Civilians can take important
decisions even without having ever been in the
field. This could have serious consequences in
policy and decision-making. While a military
general knows when to keep some distance from
the map of operations, the civilian counter-
part makes no distinction between strategic,
operational and tactical issues – or issues
belonging to the capital or to the field.

**What would you propose to improve the way trai-
ning is implemented in the field of crisis response?**

Organising courses and seminars – whether pre-
mission, in-mission, non-mission specific or
mission-specific – allows to have at least a basic
understanding of the problem of capacity-buil-
ding in crisis management. Just as quality assu-
rance is yet to come to the field of crisis mana-
gement, so to is the understanding of compe-
tence management and capacity building, as a
system of quality. This will happen when trai-
ning and education will be really related to
ongoing mission evaluation, analysis and
assessment; when relevant research will be
made as close as possible to the practices. With
this type of change we will be able to provide a
feedback loop from the ground into the head-
quarters training.

At the end of 2004, three ministries in Finland
(Foreign Affairs, Interior and Defence) came to
the joint conclusion that current research on cri-
ses is more headquarters than field-based, and
more centred on theories, concepts, and termi-
nology than on the real impact of international
presence on the ground. For these reasons, a
pilot field research was launched on a small scale,
with three field researchers from three ministries
and thereby three different focuses on the effects
of crisis management. The Kosovo case was
selected for several reasons, many of which are
still relevant today: its operational and situation-
al security problem, a multi-ethnic population
spread in local communities, a significant inter-
national and national presence of both govern-
mental and non-governmental stakeholders,
almost all multilateral actors in inter-pillar coo-
eration, and finally its proximity for logistical and
security considerations.

As the result of the pilot field research, during
the Finnish presidency of the EU in 2006, the
Ministry of the Interior, responsible for
domestic readiness, will propose and invite all
interested stakeholders to participate in the
opening of a field research centre. This struc-
ture will facilitate the research needs in the
Member States through a laboratory of prac-
tice (stemming from the Kosovo experience).

In addition to the failures in analysis and prepara-
tion, or the lack of adequate human resources, what
other big mistakes can be made to reduce quality in
crisis management?

Well, the issue of ownership comes to my
mind as another important quality-related
issue. Wherever we go, the local community
was there before us and will be there after us:
its role should never be undermined in the sustainable progress of peace and development. Most of the international actors need to develop clear exit strategies in accordance to the situation of the beneficiaries locally.

We need to better understand who withdraws, why and when. The exit strategy has an important impact on the work of each actor – and is also an indicator of the understanding of our own role and the role of the others in crisis management.

Military representatives in the crisis management community often state that they are the first in and first out. Surely when a political situation evolves negatively the military is the last resource to be used, when all other means of prevention - diplomatic, political, development cooperation and civilian crisis management have failed. But it could be said that they are still the first to go, when civilian security, e.g. an international or local police service, becomes responsible for the safety and security of the population. Against these remarks, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we could question the success of the international community, since the military is still present 11 years after the Dayton peace agreement.

International civilian crisis management is phased out through transitional projects (of advisory and mentoring, monitoring and reporting), which leave the local community with institutions and capacity. The local community can then run its own society, having learned real lessons and transformed them into local practice. The role of international development cooperation ends after sustainable development has been achieved in fair and equal welfare, prosperity and local economic development.

However the non-governmental sector remains after this phase, since the NGOs, both international and national, are parts of the mechanics of a democratic society; and make this society work again is the aim of the whole exercise. The earlier the NGOs are involved in crisis management activities, the better the chance the international community has to make a sustainable difference empowering true democracy among the good, silent majority of the population.

How would you explain to non-specialists, the notion of “comprehensive approach in crisis management”?

In their tri-presidency non-paper, the United Kingdom, Austria and Finland identified five core parameters as crucial elements of a comprehensive approach in crisis management:

- Comprehensive analysis.
- Comprehensive planning.
- Management of operations.
- Methodology for measuring progress.
- Management of capabilities.

Each element represents, alone, a challenge. The critical success factor at EU level lies in the joint implementation of all these elements. The elements have to be connected nationally and transnationally. This is the biggest challenge. We need to have a good understanding of the terms of the equation before we can implement them quickly. For instance, comprehensive analysis does not only depend on intelligence gathering or on the sharing of pre-existent intelligence information (intelligence may be simply missing or intelligence methodologies could not be applicable to the particular context). This is an important conceptual problem. Some may still think that the underlying causes of a conflict can be better understood in the locked rooms of an intelligence section than in close interaction with society around.

I personally think that we need to focus on interoperability issues, especially in civil-military coordination (below strategic level): in this domain many concrete steps forward are needed; we need to promote the sharing of best practices urgently. In addition to the many similarities in the civilian and military aspects of crisis management, there are also many differences that have to be openly recognized. Before the management of operations works in joint operations and interoperability functions in an equal, effective and efficient way, a new philosophy of command and control should emerge.

Quality begins with openness and honesty by all parties; these virtues are essential in peacebuilding – we owe that to the people outside Europe’s borders.
CHAPTER 21: INCREASING POLICY COHERENCE IN CRISIS RESPONSE

Summary

Five years after the EU adopted its programme on conflict prevention at the Göteborg European Council, it is apparent that the commitments made then have not been implemented in full. A critical factor in this has been the shift in focus towards crisis response, with the EU’s foreign policy developing much more in that responsive area, following the raising of the terrorist threat, than in the longer-term efforts of conflict prevention. EU actions in conflict-prone regions of the world need to therefore be reviewed, taking greater account of the potential role of the EU, and given actions, in preventing conflict. This article was written in May 2006.

Introduction

C
risis response and conflict prevention address, and are supposed to influence in a complementary fashion, two different phases in the conflict continuum from latent tensions to open violence. Since the adoption of the Göteborg programme in June 2001, conflict prevention has been a key priority for the EU’s external action. However, the focus on terrorism after 11 September 2001 as well as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, have demonstrated that preventing conflict, while ensuring one’s own security and pursuing strategic interests, are not always easily compatible and may harm political coherence.

This article looks at current trends at work in the EU in the field of conflict prevention and crisis response. It first argues that the implementation of the 2001 programme for prevention of violent conflicts has fallen short because of an increasing focus on crisis response. It then states that EU policies should be more systematically conflict-sensitive in order to achieve coherence when responding to or preventing conflicts. It concludes on future challenges for crisis response.

Long-term conflict prevention is essential

Since 2001 crisis response has tended to replace conflict prevention at the top of the EU security agenda. The EU has launched several short-term ESDP operations to react to crises. It has developed new crisis management capacities such as the Rapid Reaction Mechanism. It has created the African Peace Facility to support African responses to local conflicts. This attention paid to crisis response was more than necessary. Yet it has hidden the importance of long-term, pro-active and sustainable commitments to conflict prevention and peacebuilding policies.

Contemporary conflicts are recurrent, may be cross-border as well as internal and involve sub-state stakeholders. Military forces organised for the Cold War alone are unable to prevent such conflicts today. Enhancing the EU’s capabilities with battle groups to respond to conflicts does not tackle their root causes nor solve deep political disagreements. Without a coherent foreign policy led by strong political will and vision, the EU will only have the force to respond and manage but not necessarily the power to solve conflicts. Responding to crises may help to cure symptoms in the short term but is in itself a failure of prevention.

Five years after Göteborg: commitments need to be better implemented

Key 2001 commitments of the Göteborg conflict prevention programme have hardly been implemented, illustrating the EU’s lack of coherence. However, it would be unfair to state that the EU has not tried to achieve results and progress in this area. Member States have committed themselves to work on joint preventive strategies in the Council. Saferworld and International Alert have repeatedly offered to successive EU presidencies to work jointly on the drafting of pilot preventive strategies, but in vain. It seems that Member States prefer not to commit themselves to costly engagements that are politically too risky and not always unanimously backed up by its 25 members or national constituencies.

Member States were also encouraged to develop national action plans to increase their capabilities for conflict prevention. Some countries (among which the UK, Germany and Sweden) have started to create cross-institutional structures with specific budget lines to address conflict prevention but these remain isolated cases. More dialogue and exchange between Member States about their efforts to comply
with their initial decisions in 2001 remains a challenge. According to the 2001 conflict prevention programme, it is the responsibility of the Council’s general secretariat, presidencies and Member States (through COREPER and PSC) to make sure that it is implemented. This should be done through regular reports, reviews and examination, before each presidency, of potential conflict areas.

Despite guidelines for coordination between the Commission and Member States, which were quoted in the new Stability Instrument, struggle for legal competences over security activities continues between Member States and the European Commission.

The Commission has started to focus on root causes of conflict in development policies and has published a checklist of key indicators of conflict. This list has been used by Commission staff in the framework of a three-year exercise on conflict assessment and country conflict analyses and this is planned to be continued. If done well such an initiative will boost the EC’s capacities to act as a more conflict-sensitive donor. Our experience in Uganda, where EC staff are already very supportive of conflict-sensitive approaches, shows that further work on how to apply the checklist and how to use it to provide informative conflict analysis that can be linked to programming is still needed.

Member States have committed themselves to support the UN Programme of Action (UNPoA) on Small Arms. Some progress was made in 2005 and 2006 to mobilise non-EU countries around key principles and to review and improve the full implementation of the UNPoA. This has come despite the failure to adopt an outcome document at the June 2006 Review Conference. However, the EU as whole has not yet become a champion of the idea of an international agreement on small arms. Progress was made in 2005 on the idea of an international treaty on arms trade (ATT) but this does not really replace substantive political commitments to fully implement and review the UNPoA. In the same year, an important step was also made when the EU adopted its strategy to combat illicit trafficking and accumulation of SALW and their ammunitions. The implementation of the strategy is monitored regularly and the Council receives progress reports every six months.

The Göteborg programme emphasised the need to use crisis management tools for preventive purposes. This has been more and more the case, but because crisis management operations are meant to remain short in time, the key challenge is to link them with longer-term peacebuilding community actions in development, reconstruction or reintegration. The recently created UN Peacebuilding Commission offers the EU a historic opportunity to strengthen EU-UN relations in the field of conflict prevention. It would be beneficial to see the EU specifically supporting the UNPBC preventive and consultative work with relevant civil society organisations in conflict-affected countries.

The role of non-state actors (NSAs) in partner countries, mentioned in the Göteborg programme, is still marginal and deserves particular attention from the EU. Ongoing initiatives aiming at linking track I and II diplomacies are without doubt extremely promising. The creation of a new thematic instrument on NSAs for 2007–2013 offers new opportunities to channel conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities through the work of non-state actors in the field of governance, democracy and human rights. Finally, recent support to the African Union and African sub-regional organisations is to be welcomed, but Göteborg commitments to strengthen their preventive capacities are sometimes either not taken up as a priority in budget allocations or not seen as primary by beneficiaries themselves.

Despite all efforts to ensure conflict prevention is taken into account in EU’s external action, a lot still remains to be done at the political level.

First of all, Member States would benefit from a reassessment of the 2001 programme by looking at what they have not managed to implement and at how they could improve their action in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Second, the tension between conflict prevention/peacebuilding and crisis response must become an incentive for coherent action rather than an obstacle for action. Competition between first and second pillars should similarly enhance political dedication to prevent deadly conflicts rather than slowing down political initiatives. Third, more awareness raising through large-scale training programmes teaching the benefits of conflict prevention is needed in the Member States and in EU institutions. NGOs are under the (maybe unfounded) impression that many diplomats or development experts are still not aware of, or convinced by, conflict prevention’s added-value, while studies have already demonstrated that it offers long-term econo-
mic, political and development benefits. This lack of awareness about preventive approaches and their contribution to strategic planning and impact evaluation has too often resulted in the continuation of incoherent external trade, development and security policies.

**Added value of conflict-sensitive approaches**

Being "conflict-sensitive" means bearing in mind peace and conflict factors at every stage of the assistance (needs assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation) in conflict-affected areas. This means having a thorough and up-to-date understanding of conflict dynamics and stakeholders and being aware of what to do, or what not to do, to maximise positive impact on peacebuilding and minimise spoiling actions. "A good effort at conflict sensitivity will involve impartiality, inclusion, participatory processes, transparency, respect, partnership and an acceptance of uncertainty and limitations".

As a major donor and a new security actor, the EU has a strong impact on conflicts. To remain credible worldwide and in conflict-affected areas it is key that the EU keeps being seen as a constructive actor and fair peacebuilder. This is possible if its development assistance and crisis response remain conflict sensitive.

Conflict sensitivity is a well-known, deeply discussed and constantly reviewed approach by peace-building NGOs, peacekeeping international organisations and many donors, including the EC. Unfortunately it seems EU policy-makers and practitioners in Brussels and in the Commission’s delegations have not yet really appropriated it. The challenge therefore is to put it into practice more systematically.

More generally, despite the existence of the European Security strategy and the 2001 programme for conflict prevention, NGOs are convinced that the EU still needs to use more country-based knowledge to better inform its own conflict-sensitive approaches of crisis response. Because of chronic instability in many areas, Country Strategy Papers sometimes need to be complemented by more detailed and frequent monitoring at national, and local levels. This work should also include, in volatile contexts, contingency planning exercises in order to adjust EU assistance to changing circumstances.

Coherence of EU external instruments and policies, identified as one of the main challenges for a common external action, has been further blurred and complicated by the emergence of ESDP as a new set of instruments, procedures and actors like Ministries of Defence, PSC, EUMC and EUMS.

Mainstreaming conflict prevention in the political, development, trade and humanitarian DGs was that local people should be employed. Not only would they benefit directly from the project but potential rivalry from other communities could be avoided. On a shea nut exporting project supported by SIDA, recommendations consisted of taking measures to improve the safety of the women employed to gather the nuts. Following the first report, further conflict monitoring and consultation workshops were organised with local communities to ensure aid projects continued to match volatile local conflict dynamics.

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5 Zainab Hawa Bangura, “Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development (the case of Sierra Leone)”, Keynote address for the CMI 2005 Annual Autumn Seminar, 22 November 2005.


7 Saferworld, (February 2005), Study to Explore the Impact of a Rural Electrification Project on the Peace and Conflict Dynamics in Uganda. (December 2005), Conflict and peace analysis report for the Northern Uganda Shea Nut Project in Otuke country of Lira district.

or structures has never been easy. The task has become even more difficult after the birth of a European defence policy focussing on crisis response and management. The development of rapid reaction capacities and operations has had an ambiguous impact on the image, role and identity of the EU as a central conflict prevention advocate. By taking more risks, the EU has started to intervene on complex contexts (like, for instance, in Iraq, in Moldova/Transnistria or in the Democratic Republic of Congo) where its firm policy lines may have disappointed peace spoilers and their constituencies. Indeed, more direct engagement in conflicts has resulted in more partiality thus making it increasingly difficult for EU non-military conflict prevention tools (humanitarian, development, trade, political and even civilian crisis management) to be perceived as conflict sensitive and politically neutral. The actual purpose of the Conflict Prevention Network funded by the European Commission is to support more early warning but also more consultation and dialogue on conflict prevention-related issues relying on participatory approaches. Such approaches would involve local communities and governments, non-state actors in beneficiary countries as well as international NGOs and think tanks.

Conclusions: challenges for crisis response

The EU’s ambitions to prevent and respond to conflicts are still constrained by four main challenges.

The first one is to agree on a human security doctrine\(^9\), which will include a review and update of the 2001 conflict prevention programme. The Commission has repeatedly emphasised the need for a human security approach in numerous speeches and spends considerable amounts in this field\(^10\). In-depth discussions on a human security approach and operational implications for the EU are currently on going. It is to be hoped that they will lead to the adoption of an EU human security strategy or doctrine that would gather the substance of existing constructive EU commitments to conflict prevention and peacebuilding mentioned in various documents.

Such a strategy would help the EU to strike a balance between short-term crisis response and longer-term conflict prevention\(^11\) by adopting key guidelines for applying conflict sensitivity more systematically and by legitimising a large-scale role for civilian experts working in the field of conflict prevention, crisis response, humanitarian aid, reconstruction, peace-building and reconciliation. Strengthening the professionalism of peace-building functions at the level of the EU would also help Brussels institutions to mirror the recently created UN Peace-building Commission. The EC has already started to work on its contribution to the UNPBC. In the near future Member States and Brussels institutions will need to broaden and strengthen the existing network of actors working on crisis prevention by including more and more conflict prevention and peacebuilding government and non-government experts on conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

A second challenge is to raise awareness about conflict sensitivity to ensure coherence, credibility and legitimacy. There is a need to mainstream conflict sensitivity in all instruments and policies for external action. This will have to be reflected in the adoption of conflict-sensitive approaches in trade, development, external relations and humanitarian policies as well as in programme and project management. More staff need to be trained and hired to work on conflict sensitivity in the Commission and in its delegations although this is subject to budgetary constraints imposed by Member States. In the current zero growth scenario, one way forward is definitely to mobilise external expertise in order to strengthen EC delegations’ staff capacities to adopt more conflict-sensitive working methods. Regular coordination with other donors on conflict-sensitive approaches to development needs to become a habit in all EC Delegations to raise awareness and build capacities to appropriate and reproduce conflict-sensitive practices in the EU institutions\(^12\).

Thirdly, the EU’s global reach must be balanced by democratic oversight. Peace, conflict prevention and conflict response are too important to be monopolised by track I decision makers. By taking more risks, the EU has created a habit in all EC Delegations to raise awareness and build capacities to appropriate and reproduce conflict-sensitive practices in the EU institutions.


\(^12\) More staff need to be trained and hired to work on conflict sensitivity in the Commission and in its delegations although this is subject to budgetary constraints imposed by Member States. In the current zero growth scenario, one way forward is definitely to mobilise external expertise in order to strengthen EC delegations’ staff capacities to adopt more conflict-sensitive working methods. Regular coordination with other donors on conflict-sensitive approaches to development needs to become a habit in all EC Delegations to raise awareness and build capacities to appropriate and reproduce conflict-sensitive practices in the EU institutions.

diplomacy. Initiatives such as the Conflict Prevention Network/Partnership are promising measures to include NGOs and think tanks in the debates. Participation and consultation with local communities, as a part of EU agreements with third countries are to feed into EU policies and programmes comprising conflict prevention and crisis response dimensions. The European Parliament and national parliaments have a role to play here because of their competences over budget allocations. NGOs consider that, as long as this does not affect their rapidity and efficiency, crisis response bodies should remain under the scrutiny of the European Parliament and (indirectly) national parliaments to ensure proper accountability with regard to European citizens. Parliamentary structures are usually backed by a broad range of skilled and professional security, peacebuilding as well as conflict prevention civil society organisations and networks.

In the short term, the first test for progress on mainstreaming conflict sensitive approaches to development has been to define the scope of the Commission’s external financial instruments and to set conflict sensitivity as a priority. This has been achieved in part with the Stability Instrument that will mainly focus on crisis response. Other instruments will also need to incorporate explicit language on conflict prevention especially to back up large programmes that have peacebuilding components and that need to be adopted in the Council’s working groups. Appropriate allocation of resources will then be required to fit political ambitions. With the 2005 stalemate on the European Constitution, Brussels institutions are still very much embedded in bureaucratic and legal infighting over competences in the conflict and (human) security field. Conflict prevention NGOs fear that this situation will remain until a strong presidency, in the appropriate political context, dares to re-launch fundamental constitutional debates and re-open the possibility to create a Common European External Service.

Five years after the adoption of the Göteborg programme on conflict prevention, efforts led at that time by late Ana Lindh should not be forgotten and left aside. To keep it alive it would be good that future presidencies review it to fit new realities such as the linkage between conflict prevention, crisis response and conflict-sensitivity, the increasing importance of Security Sector Reform approaches and the role of civilian actors in the EU and in beneficiary countries to apply appropriate democratic control.
CHAPTER 22: PROMISES AND CHALLENGES OF THE AFRICAN PEACE FACILITY

Summary

This article explains briefly the African Peace Facility and the Stability Instrument, and raises the challenges inherent in both from a pacifist perspective. It welcomes the acceptance of a link between peace and development. It questions, however, the implicit suggestion that peace equals security and security requires military intervention. Peace is much more than security and it can only be developed and sustained, in the end, through non-military approaches. It reminds us that developing peace is a long-term process, which may be started at the point of crisis intervention but can never be achieved in such short-term timeframes. Finally, it raises the question about the role of NGOs in peacebuilding processes and the need to integrate this role into the overall process. This article was written in December 2005 and reflects the state of development of the Stability Instrument and the other External Action Instruments at that time. Whilst that debate and decision-making around those instruments had moved on by the time this Chapter was published, the underlying thrust of the argument has not.

The African Peace Facility?

First and foremost, the African Peace Facility is money. Money provided by the European Union from the European Development Fund to the African Union to pay for costs arising from broad military peacekeeping missions in Africa which are staffed by African military personnel.

How much money is involved? In 2004, some €250 million were allocated to this fund. That does not sound like a lot. This is a very small proportion of the total expenditure of the EU.

The promises

Let’s take a look at the positive features of this initiative. It was asked for by the African Union. That means it is an African initiative and it is “owned” by the AU. That in itself is one very positive aspect. Secondly, the facility will finance activities which are to be undertaken by Africans. It will not fund Europeans to go to Africa to assist in peacekeeping. That must be welcomed.

And some of the money (some 14%) is allocated to capacity-building. That, too, is a good sign.

The challenges

First, there is the underlying concept of peacekeeping inherent in the Facility. It is a primarily, if not exclusively, military concept. There is little or no room in the Facility for the deployment or training of civilians to undertake either peacekeeping or peacebuilding work.

Second, there is the question of where the money comes from. And that question opens other issues which go much further than the African Peace Facility. They are the more serious, if the African Peace Facility is to be seen as a precedent.

The money comes from the European Development Fund (EDF). By allowing development funds to be used for peace and security operations, and especially if such operations are essentially to be carried out by military forces, of the following potential consequences arise:

• If the overall allocation to development funds does not increase, even less is spent on actual development; and
• In either case, development funding may be re-targeted at countries which are seen as a “security risk” from the point of view of the donor countries’ political perspective and away from countries which may need development assistance just as much but which do not pose a security risk.

Both challenges are important and are worth further reflection.

The Stability Instrument

At the time of writing the Stability Instrument has yet to be decided upon in a final form. It is still far from clear what will be in it and what will not, nor is it clear as to the amount

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of resources that will be available and which previous budget lines or instruments will be subsumed into it. So much of what follows must be speculation.

First, some background. The European Commission published its Communication on the Financial Perspectives 2007 to 2013 in February 2004. In this document, in the section on “The EU as a global partner”, the Commission sets out how the European Union “should wield considerable influence over the long-term political and economic choices determining prosperity and stability in Europe and the wider world, which in their turn influence the well-being and security of Europeans”.

This also sets out the intention to develop a number of policy instruments which will provide the context for European External Action in the future, at least insofar as they relate to Pillar I policies.

In July 2004, the Commission published a further Communication which set out that in order to streamline the instruments available for external action it will develop six specific instruments. These are to replace the many different current instruments and budget lines in order to bring more coherence into the available instruments and to make them more policy-driven.

The six instruments proposed are:

- Three geographically focused instruments:
  - Pre-Accession Instrument (PAI)
  - European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)
  - Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument (DCECI)

- Three thematically focused instruments:
  - Instrument for Stability
  - Humanitarian Aid Instrument
  - Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA)

What is of interest here is the Instrument for Stability. This is intended, in the words of the Communication, “before the intervention of other instruments…(to) allow the Community to (inter alia)”: 

- Deliver an effective, immediate and integrated response to crisis and instability;
- Address global and regional trans-border challenges such as trafficking, organised crime and terrorism, where such actions need to be delivered in response to crisis; and
- Develop international peace-keeping capacity in partnership with regional organisations, in line with the established policy agreed for the African Peace Facility.

**Some obstacles the Stability Instrument has encountered**

In September 2004, the Commission published a Proposal for a Regulation of the Council establishing an Instrument for Stability. This was the subject for discussion of the Council on the one hand and the European Parliament on the other. Both Institutions expressed concern about the proposed Regulation, but for different reasons.

The European Parliament was concerned that, because of the inclusion of nuclear safety issues, the Instrument would not be subject to co-decision and would thus remove a degree of control from the European Parliament over expenditures which had been under its control before.

The Council saw some elements of the Proposal as moving competence from Member States to the Commission and thus also wanted to see major changes. Indeed, at the time of writing, these issues are not fully resolved.

**What are the promises?**

The establishment of the Stability Instrument reflects the recognition that peace and development are linked. There cannot be peace without development and without the eradication of poverty. Indeed, development is one of the ways in which the European Union and other donors can address the root causes of conflict and therefore the security challenges set out in the European Security Strategy. There cannot, however, be development without peace in areas where conflict is rife and where it stems from poverty, from lack of access to resources or from unequal access to resources. Insofar as the proposal for a Stability Instrument “operationalises” this understanding, it is to be welcome.

The establishment of the Stability Instrument also reflects the need to intervene quickly and effectively in situations which are so unstable that ordinary development projects are not appropriate.

The establishment of the Stability Instrument indicates clearly that there could be situations of instability in a wide range of countries or...
regions and it is therefore non-specific in terms of the geographical application of the Instrument.

What are the challenges?

First, there is the question of where the money comes from. Arguably, and because this is an instrument which is intended to guide the external action spending of the European Union (Pillar 1), the money comes from resources allocated in principle to development. The same issues apply to this as to the African Peace Facility. Where money is spent on essentially military peace-keeping missions (and that is an express possibility within the terms of the Commission proposal) then such money should not come from the funds allocated for development. At this point, however, it is still not clear whether the Stability Instrument will include peacekeeping or not.

Second, there is a twin-track approach written into the proposed Stability Instrument. This is intended to deliver an effective and immediate response to crises and to address issues of trafficking, organised crime and terrorism. This could potentially undermine its effectiveness in terms of assisting in areas of crises to get back to a situation where normal development activity can progress. The reason for this concern is that the twin track approach may move the primary focus of the Instrument from countries and regions with serious development needs to those which present a “threat of terrorism”. In other words, funding would move from the poorest parts of the world to those parts of the world which are perceived to present the greatest threat to the security of the EU, its Member States and their citizens.

Focus on Peace and Development

Conceptual issues

This leads on to a discussion about the conceptual problems with both the African Peace Facility and the Stability Instrument.

Does peace require military intervention?

First, there is an inbuilt assumption that peace and security in conflict areas require military intervention. The African Peace Facility is completely transparent in this assumption as it is virtually wholly focused on supporting military peacekeeping missions of the African Union.

Whilst the European Commission is very clear that it will fund only certain aspects of such missions and that the funding is therefore not going toward military expenditure, this is still a very thin argument.

In particular, the difference between soldiers’ salaries and soldiers’ per diems may be a fine distinction in terms of military accounting, but in the end, it still pays for soldiers to do soldiering.

What is maybe most worrying is the fact that at the time the African Peace Facility was agreed it was not intended to be a model for the future. However, the Stability Instrument can be seen as a clear attempt to make the African Peace Facility into such a model and to enshrine that model into Community Policy at least for the next seven years.

This means that there is then a clear tendency towards more military approaches (here funded by the Community but carried out by personnel of third countries) in the Community conflict prevention policies and strategies which mirrors the increasing militarisation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

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<tr>
<th>The African Peace Facility will fund:</th>
<th>The African Peace Facility will not fund:</th>
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<td>Soldier’s per diem allowances</td>
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<td>Communication equipment</td>
<td>Arms and specific military equipment</td>
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<td>Medical facilities</td>
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<td>Wear and tear of civilian equipment</td>
<td>Salaries for soldiers</td>
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<td>Wear and tear of civilian equipment</td>
<td>Military training for soldiers</td>
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Crisis intervention as the approach of choice

There has been an assumption that the European Union focuses its longer-term approaches to conflict in its Pillar 1 activities and its shorter-term crisis management approaches in its Pillar 2 CFSP missions.

In essence, it is important to note that conflict is a natural part of all societies. The real question is not, is there a conflict in a given region or country, but rather, how is the conflict conducted and at what level of intensity is it played out? The whole idea of conflict prevention, crisis intervention and post-conflict reconstruction activities as separate and distinct activities which apply to different situations, fails to register the fact that in most violent conflicts all elements of the different levels of intensity of conflict coexist. The conflict process or continuum needs to be addressed on this basis.

But most importantly in this context is the fact that the development of the Stability Instruments reveals that the Commission response to conflicts is also shifting towards a short-term perspective. The Stability Instrument is clearly intended to be short term (though the definition of short term is by no means clear). It is intended to intervene where normal development activity cannot take place because of the intensity of the conflict.

However, the other External Action Instruments are short on any conflict perspective. Indeed, there is only marginal recognition in the proposed thematic instrument which may form part of the Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument (DCCECI) that conflict must be a necessary consideration when funding work relating to Human Rights and Democratisation. There is no clear reference to conflict work (be it prevention, capacity building or post-conflict reconstruction) in either the Pre-Accession Instrument (PAI) or the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). This despite the fact that many of the countries in the immediate neighbourhood (whether pre-accession or not) have recent histories of violent conflict.

So if the primary focus of the European Commission approach to conflicts in the world is to be governed by the Stability Instrument, then this shows a tendency toward short-term fixes rather than the more cost-effective preventative approach of conflict transformation work using civilian, non-military, and non-violent approaches.

Security: whose security?

Having said before that there is a real need to understand the link between security/peace and development, there is also a need to discuss what is meant by security and peace in this context.

It is important to look at two aspects of this question.

First: are we talking about state security or human security? In other words, is work to deal with conflicts intended to re-establish states or to provide real security for the people living in those states, countries or regions? And how are those people to be involved in the process of decision-making about what such security should look like? The concept of “state security” does not necessarily benefit enough people to ensure that eruptions of violent conflict can be prevented in the long term.

Second: are we talking about the security of people in the conflict area or are we talking about the security interests of the European Union and its Member States? These are two very different ways of looking at the question of what should be funded and how it should be funded. Not least, this will have a major impact on the question of where the funding will go.

Inter-institutional coherence

The European Union’s role as a global player suffers from an institutional disconnection between conflict prevention and crisis management. This ignores the fact that conflict prevention and crisis management cannot be divorced from one another. It presents a very limited view of the nature of conflict.

The distinction between the Commission’s remit and the CFSP remit in this context is also problematic because on the ground both types of interventions are seen as being European Union interventions. If they are not coherent, it reflects adversely on the European Union as a whole.

The proposal of a European Union Foreign Minister and an External Action Service as anticipated in the Treaty Establishing a European Constitution was an attempt to overcome this. The Stability Instrument, as originally designed by the Commission, was written at a time when there still seemed a reasonable chance that this Treaty would be ratified in the foreseeable future and that this structure would become reality. In that context, and seen as part of a more integrated approach to external relations conducted through an External Action Service, the approach of the Stability Instrument may look promising. It would, in some ways, form a bridge between CFSP missions and Pillar 1 conflict prevention activity in the context of a broad development policy approach.
However, after the French and Dutch referenda of the summer of 2005, it is now far from clear that the Treaty in its current form will come into force. Nor is it clear what will happen to the idea of a more coherent foreign/external policy of the European Union as a whole. The inter-institutional disagreements precisely on the content and legal basis of the Stability Instrument are evidence of this.

Nonetheless, if the European Union wants to establish itself as a credible player in a world which is in serious need of tackling the many conflicts (and in particular the many violent conflicts) in it, then inter-institutional coherence is critically important. This is so for a number of reasons.

First, there is the question of the effectiveness. Real effectiveness does not simply mean quelling a crisis. It means to work with local people (at all levels of society) to establish a situation in which conflicts can be resolved peacefully. It means to help build a conflict-resilient society. This is not best done within a short-term time frame. It is also not best done through “military peacekeeping” which can only ever – and at best – keep warring parties apart.

Second, there is the question of being clear about the different elements of peacebuilding and being clear about which of the whole range of actions and interventions is necessary at any one time and over the long term.

For example, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programmes can only work if:

- They cover all those affected by the violent conflict and do not treat certain parts of a population more favourably than others.
- They come with development programmes which facilitate reintegration. If there is no viable community and no viable economic infrastructure, the reintegration cannot work and this undermines the whole process.
- They come with a properly resourced and locally owned reform of the security sector. Such a programme must be geared to enhance security for all parts of the local populations, including all communities and groups, and including ex-combatants and their victims.
- They work on the basis of developing local capacity-building which will allow local populations to take on the role of a civil society able to hold politicians to account in the future.

All this must involve non-state actors both at local level and as partners in the implementation of work funded by the European Union. NGOs specialising in conflict-related work (prevention, mediation, trauma healing, capacity-building, security sector reform, to name but a few areas where NGOs can make a contribution) can bring their expertise to such situations and assist local civil society in facing the challenges that a conflict-resilient society demands.

If the Stability Instrument were to deliver all this for all of its interventions, then it would contain real promise.

Conclusions

The African Peace Facility and the proposed Stability Instrument carry within their conceptual framework the recognition of the link between development and security. This is to be welcomed.

Both have built into them the assumption that funding for security-related aspects of this link should come from the same pot as funding for the development-related aspects – this without any indication that this pot should grow to meet that requirement. Far from it. The external action allocation in the Financial Perspectives agreed at the December 2005 summit is far lower than those proposed by the European Commission.

Neither addresses the question of how such a redirecting of development funds should be dealt with in terms of measuring the European Union’s achievement against the 0.7% target of official development aid.

Neither addresses the question of how security is defined in this context.

But the Stability Instrument is a European policy instrument which will, once agreed, govern the expenditure of considerable sums of money in potentially many different parts of the world on conflict prevention, crisis management and anti-terrorism measures. A policy context is essential.

Such a policy context could answer these questions:

- How is security and/or stability defined?
- Whose security is the priority consideration?
• What is the balance between peacebuilding and anti-terrorism measures in funding terms?
• Are funds for these two strands to be ring-fenced?
• How broad will the approach be in terms of linking the longer-term approaches to the short-term fixes?
• To what extent will military intervention (even if carried out by the military forces of third countries and not those of the EU Member States) be favoured over civilian intervention?
• What is the role of both local and European civil society in this area and how can their contribution be ensured?
• What practical steps can the European Commission and the Council of the European Union take to ensure inter-institutional coherence in its external action?

It may be too late to ask these questions in the hope of affecting the final outcome of the discussions about the Stability Instrument. But it is not too late for the European Union to develop a policy context within which the Stability Instrument, in whatever form it may eventually be agreed, could be implemented with maximum coherence.
EU relations with Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific
Interview with Ranieri Sabatucci

There is the widely-held impression that nothing ever changes in Africa when it comes to violence. Is this true?

No, I do not believe this is true. There is a very strong wind of optimism blowing in Africa these days and several positive developments are taking place. Let’s use the example of the Great Lakes region (Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda), which for a very long time has been considered a politically highly sensitive area. A few years ago it was considered almost inevitable that the whole region sooner or later would descend into a downward spiral of violent conflict. Today, while the situation in this region is remains very precarious from a political, security and humanitarian perspective, there are also some very promising developments. Elections have recently been held in Rwanda (2003), Burundi (2005), and in 2006, presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled in both Uganda in February and in the DRC in April and May. The long-lasting Cold War era civil wars in Mozambique and Angola have not restarted, one of the longest running conflicts in Africa, the North-South conflict in Sudan, is gradually inching towards a comprehensive solution, and some of the key countries on the continent, including South Africa, continue to provide examples of what can be achieved in a climate of political and economic stability. Finally, it is also important to remember that Western news media tend to be far more interested in Africa’s wars and conflicts rather than its successful international companies, its rich cultural scene, or its universities and research centres.

What has been the contribution of the African Union (AU) to this change?

The African Union (AU) has played a major part in this positive change. First of all it has, in a very short time since its creation less than four years ago, managed to rally the continent around its programme for continental political and economic cooperation and has rapidly gained respect as a legitimate political voice for Africa. This is arguably something that the EU has not yet achieved, despite a much longer history and much greater resources. But the AU has also made an important difference on the ground. Its first peacekeeping operation, when it deployed troops in Burundi towards the end of the country’s 12-year civil war, was as close to a complete success you will ever get in this field. The successful Burundi operation enhanced the credibility of the AU and gave it confidence to gradually assume leadership for the African peace and security agenda. As you know, the AU has since been very active in the efforts to create security and stability in Sudan’s Darfur region and while still more needs to be done there, it is clear that the AU’s presence has prevented a complete humanitarian catastrophe. If it was not for the AU, we could possibly have had another Rwanda on our hands, and our consciences. The AU’s Sudan operation, AMIS, reflects well the risks at hand, but also the difference African states and organisations can make when acting collectively.

Even in Somalia, which was for long considered one of the most intractable situations in Africa, positive signs are emerging, much thanks to the AU’s mediation and negotiation efforts, such as the formation of a transitional government. All this indicates that the AU can help to bring about long-term positive change and stability in Africa.

From an international perspective it is also good to see that the AU is increasingly taking leadership on African security issues. It has a strong mandate and it has a leadership, including the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Issues, Mr Said Djinnit, who really understands the central issues at stake and the importance of a proactive AU role. Whereas its predecessor, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), was limited by the principle of non-interference, the AU is mandated to intervene where human rights and democracy are at risk. And they use this right. For example, in the case of the elections in Togo in 2005, the AU rapidly suspended Togo from its activities to exert pressure on the country’s then President, Faure Gnassingbe, to step down and allow democratic elections to take place – which he did. This is a "quiet" success that the AU has not received much international credit for.

But the AU remains a very young and inexperienced organisation. At present it only employs 700 staff, which is very small when compared for instance with the European Commission, and has 53 member states – more than twice as many as the EU. Just like the EU, one of its most important objectives is to promote and facilitate regional political and economic integration and cooperation. Our purposes and ideals are in many ways rather similar – we have a similar "genetic code" – and as a result, the AU looks to us for

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support and for our fifty years of experience in regional integration. The EU has also made its relationship with the AU a top priority and over the last years we have managed to build a strong partnership between our Unions and our respective institutions. The AU is, moreover, the EU’s key institutional counterpart in the implementation and monitoring of the new EU Strategy for Africa, adopted at the European Council in December 2005.

**Do we risk seeing further “forgotten wars” in Africa?**

It cannot be denied that the so-called “media wars”, like Darfur, attract much more NGO support and funding than the “forgotten wars” in, say, Northern Uganda and Somalia. But that does not in any way mean that the EU or the AU have forgotten about these conflicts. The European Commission, and many EU Member States, remain present on the ground in these countries and work proactively with local stakeholders to rebuild the foundations of a peaceful society. A much harder question is why these conflicts are forgotten by international mass media? Here, civil society organisations – both African and international – have an important role to play in making the rest of the world aware of potential and ongoing conflicts.

**Are EU initiatives in Africa working?**

You only have to look at the amount of positive news coming out of Africa recently to see that we are doing some good. One example in the area of peace and security is the African Peace Facility (APF), an EU development instrument (worth €250 million) created in 2004 to strengthen African capacities to carry out peacekeeping and peace support operations. This instrument has already been used to fund the efforts of the AU troops in Darfur (AMIS) and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa’s (CEMAC) peace support mission in the Central African Republic (FOMUC), as well as to provide capacity building support for the AU. It is also worth pointing out that when a team of independent consultants last year was called in to assess the Peace Facility, they produced a very positive evaluation. In fact, it was one of the most positive evaluations of any development programme that I have ever come across during my professional life.

The EU’s new Strategy for Africa should further contribute to reinforce our efforts in this field. Under this Strategy, the EU will continue its efforts to promote peace and sustainable development in Africa, but will increasingly also seek to integrate and find coherence between our approaches to security, governance, economic, social and environmental issues to ensure that we reinforce our efforts in one area, through our work in another.

**How is the notion of “ownership” being implemented in conflict prevention action? And does it help?**

In the past, peace negotiations in Africa tended to be imposed, external solutions, based upon certain economic or political conditions being fulfilled by the country or countries concerned. Now we accept that Africans themselves must take ownership of their own conflicts and define their own path to achieving stability. Take Darfur, for instance, where there have been calls from international commentators to deploy a much greater number of troops and to get NATO on board. From our experience in Somalia, where 40,000 US and European troops were kicked out of the country by rogue rebels, we would say that this would not be a very good strategy. The fact is that you simply cannot impose peace from the outside. We have therefore instead from the very beginning supported the AU decision to get involved in Darfur and develop an African solution to this very African conflict, and we intend to continue to support the AU until they can bring this crisis to an end. What the European Commission and other international partners should do is encourage African states and organisations to assume leadership in Darfur and elsewhere, and to provide the political and financial support they need to carry out their mandate effectively.

**There are increasing efforts on the part of certain African countries to act as peace mediators on African issues. Is it a good strategy to support these countries in their peace efforts?**

Absolutely. The best way to ensure a long-term positive development is to support regionally driven peace mediation initiatives. South Africa is a key player in this area and has already assisted in many areas of conflict, including Liberia, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Other countries, including Rwanda, Senegal and Nigeria, contribute to the same objectives by providing troops for African peace support operations. It is important to recognise the crucial role these countries play and to support their peacekeeping initiatives both financially and politically.

**How do you see the relationship between development and security? What is the added value of a development perspective?**

It is today widely recognised that there can be no sustainable development without peace and stability: this is true in Africa as well as in the rest of the world. There are some who argue that development funds should not be invested in security but should be reserved exclusively for more traditional development concerns, such as basic health and primary
education. But without peace and stability there would possibly be no hospitals or schools to administer. This is why it is important to understand the necessity of using development funds to promote security and stability, for example by investing in African-led peace-keeping initiatives and operations.

Regarding your second question on the added value of a development perspective, I would say that one important contribution could be to provide a long-term and contextualized dimension to security debates, which often tend to be very short-term, ignorant of the local context in Africa, and constructed from a European foreign policy perspective. It is clear that conflicts start for a number of interrelated reasons, so our policies must be comprehensive and address the underlying root causes of conflicts, often endemic poverty and social and political exclusion. This is why any suggestions to “solve” conflicts as complex as those in Darfur or the Democratic Republic of Congo by sending in Western troops are fundamentally flawed. In fact, I would go as far as to say that any military solution that is not a part of a long-term comprehensive political strategy is doomed to fail. That is also why I believe that a development perspective and a development approach is a very useful way to address conflicts and develop long-term strategies to build stable and peaceful societies. Military peace support operations are often useful, and sometimes necessary, but it is also clear that our responses to a crisis or security issue must address the long-term causes of insecurity, not only its symptoms. This, of course, is a much more difficult challenge, but if the challenges are large, our responses must be ambitious too.
Brigitte Grignet
It is summertime in the mountains and the trees do not have any leaves. Clothes can be seen here and there drying on the branches. The damage caused by deforestation and drought is apparent everywhere. Plastic wrappers are strewn along the ground. There is no waste management policy here. In the “best case” scenario they will be burnt, polluting the surrounding areas. A cow is grazing amongst the refuse. Women and children are bent under the weight of many water cans. The nearest spring is sometimes more than two hours away on foot.

When the jeep starts to skid, Manuel says: "¡Brigitte, toma tu última foto!" My smile is a bit tense. We have been driving in the mountains for two days, on roads that are sometimes hard to navigate. This is part of the weekly routine, a visit to beneficiary communities, families who live in such remote districts they find it a struggle to gain access to healthcare facilities, education, water and food supplies. Lots of the men have travelled to the towns and cities with the unlikely prospect of finding a job. On the way there we encounter families, men riding donkeys, women and children on foot. The women have often been bought when they were very young, for no more than $70. They suffer discrimination and domestic violence in many cases. More girls suffer from malnutrition than boys. Seen from the back, many of the adults could be mistaken for young adolescents. Their growth has been stunted by their basic diet of maize, beans and rice, malnutrition and a lack of food hygiene.

Propaganda for the recent elections can be seen everywhere, painted on the walls of houses and on the hillsides. The last government is said to have been one of the most corrupt.

In the communities, we are always welcomed with smiles. A relationship has built up. The team of volunteers holds information sessions. Action Contre la Faim (action against hunger) was set up to help these villages establish a water distribution system. The inhabitants will be carrying out the work and learning to manage the system, thanks to the organisation’s expert knowledge. The women are encouraged to get involved. Emphasis is placed on teaching children about food and personal hygiene.

We have to walk for two hours in the blazing hot sun to reach Oregano. The children are gathering in front of the one-classroom school. The teacher has to travel from the neighbouring village every day. Lessons are taught only in the morning. The families live in one-room huts and a mat is used by the whole family as a bed.

Everyone is willing to be photographed, and only a turkey seems a bit suspicious of my motives. These families regard the photos as evidence of their existence and circumstances. People living in these regions feel far away from everything, ignored by the rest of the world. I wander about with my Nikon hanging from a shoulder strap, to look credible, but I work with my plastic camera.

My mind is plagued with questions. How can I portray poverty without resorting to clichés or dwelling on the sordid side of things? How can I show the humanity, dignity and beauty of these families and convey their emotions? How can I control my own feelings in the face of so much sadness? How can I break through the indifference of a world inundated with images?

A Japanese tourist was killed by an indigenous community a few years ago. He wanted to take a photograph.

With a past fraught with dictatorships, civil wars, genocides and discrimination against the Maya communities, the United States’ takeover and land distribution inequality, Guatemala is much more than a tourist destination or a brightly coloured market. Despite its exotic setting, Guatemala is the third poorest American country.

Material used: Camera Holga - Film Kodak Portra 120

[ Brigitte Grignet ]
Ixmujil, Region of San Marcos

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Sélection livre ACF:
“Regards sur le monde, les visages de la faim”
(Views of the world, the faces of hunger)
Guatemala, February 2004
Commune of Jocotán (Region of Chiquimula)
A scene from one of the many villages where flooding during the monsoon season damages houses.
In this picture "Action Against Hunger" has funded a programme to rebuild a wall protecting a school and the children who attend.

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Sélection from ACF
"Regards sur le monde, les visages de la faim" (Views of the world, the faces of hunger)
Guatemala, February 2004
Finca, Buenos Aires, Costa (Region of San Marcos)
The government of Guatemala offers families that have worked on coffee plantations (Finca) the possibility to take out a loan to buy the Finca. But the process is long and drawn out and in the meantime the men have to leave their wives and children to look for work in nearby towns.

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Finca Buenos Aires, Costa (Region of San Marcos)

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Guatemala, February 2004
Jocotán (Region of Chiquimula)
Guatemala has a terrible problem in managing the accumulation of rubbish. In Jocotán, you see the charred remains of the rubbish that is covering whole roads. People who live there suffer from constant pollution.

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Laguna Chikabal (Region of San Marcos)

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Oregano, Commune of Jocotán (Region of Chiquimula)

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[PART V: TAKING EU DECISION SUPPORT TO THE 21ST CENTURY]
CHAPTER 23: TAKING EU INTELLIGENCE INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

Summary

This paper assesses the general conceptual framework for EU intelligence in the 21st century and the analytical support structure that is being established by the EU Joint Situation Centre in gathering intelligence at the present moment to respond to crisis management. In particular, it places intelligence under the broader heading of “information” and identifies the needs and nature of information, as well as the method of acquiring it, which is required to achieve a successful crisis response.

The conceptual framework

There are three general EU-related conceptual points that ought to be borne in mind when examining EU intelligence in the 21st century.

First of all, the Amsterdam Treaty, which established Javier Solana’s position, stated that Committed Member States must make confidential information available in order to assist in the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The second is the European Security Strategy which highlights the fact that in order to have a good appreciation of CFSP challenges and a thorough understanding of the threats, it is necessary to have an analytical assessment mechanism in place that supports policy developers. And thirdly, there are papers, which the European Council looked at in 2004, that extended the principle of establishing analytical support to CFSP to the field of terrorism and the threat to the Union, it is imperative to set up an analytical support structure which draws on, amongst other things, the expertise of the special services of the Member States.

So where does intelligence fit in? In the view of this author it fits in under a much broader heading entitled “Information”. The information task in the field of crisis management can in turn be categorised under the three headings of Needs, Nature and Method.

Information needs

Under the first heading, the question arises: what is the information need? The European Security Strategy identifies five principal threats to the European Union: security, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, state failure and organised crime. Each of these could lead towards a crisis management situation. So what kind of information do we need in crisis management terms or, put another way, what are the phases of the Centre’s activity where well-analysed information is relevant? Overall, there are five phases of activity where such information is needed, which are: early warning, policy development, decision support, conduct of operations and mission evaluation.

With regard to early warning, it is vital to have good information to secure a comprehensive “over-the-horizon view” of threats. In terms of analysing threats as identified in the European Security Strategy, it is possible to look at terrorism in relatively concrete terms, to look at where the threat is and where it is likely to emerge. The same applies to proliferation of weapons and in identifying developing regional conflicts or potential for state failure. And, although the EU is not structured well at the moment to do this, it is also possible to look at the threat organised crime poses and how it is developing. For all of these areas, the earlier the threat is identified, the earlier action can be stimulated in the conflict prevention track and a situation of crisis management avoided. Similarly, the earlier policy-makers can be oriented towards the security question, the earlier contingency thinking and contingency planning can be started.

The next phase concerns policy development. Once a potential threat to the European Union has been identified, the policy-makers need to be served and given a clear analysis of the problem so they can identify those discrete parts where activity may make a difference. Some of it may be out of control, for instance. Some of it may be amenable to preventative or management work. Therefore, close consultation with the policy-makers is crucial at all times. Many people in the early warning business are frustrated with the way early warning does not always turn into early action. Take the EU Political and Security Committee, for example, which likes to receive not only warnings, but recommendations for action as well. Part of our job at the European Joint Situation Centre, therefore, is to ensure that during the move from the first to the second phase of activity, policy-makers are informed and are developing parallel papers which can give decision-makers a first idea of the sorts of actions that might be necessary.
As a crisis develops, the need for decision support becomes every more pressing. Potential decisions need to be prepared, planning papers developed and a continual assessment provided to help observers refine their understanding of the situation. In the case of Rafah in the Gaza Strip, for example, we are currently producing parallel assessments of the risk, in tandem with the concept of operations that is presently being prepared, so that decision-makers can obtain a clear idea of whether the risk is properly understood and whether precise decisions match the risk in order that all the potential risks are properly covered.

Conduct of operations involves, as the term suggests, assisting those who are conducting an operation by providing them with information so they form an integrated picture of the situation. Lastly, there is mission evaluation, which cannot be considered as secret intelligence attributed to him, but its sense can still be included in an overall analysis. Sensitive intelligence is often covered by diplomatic activities. The European Union has its own tools which are not in the open source field but that are not in the intelligence field either, such as the EU monitoring mission in the Balkans, or the Aceh Monitoring Mission, which is providing some very good analysis in the field of reporting. This reporting covers a highly important middle ground.

Then we go further across the spectrum and we have open source intelligence. This is either information that people are choosing to put out – a website, for example – or information they cannot avoid making public, for instance, a person making an application for a visa. All this information can be mined, amassed and analysed. In both forms, the provider knows the information is potentially available to other people. As with secret intelligence information, open source intelligence, once processed, needs to be classified. Much open source material is good, “all-source” information which is well integrated and easy to digest. At the hard end of the spectrum is secret intelligence, or information extracted covertly from somewhere else without someone’s knowledge. Then there is sensitive information that may be derived from an overt contact but which might be still quite sensitive, such as contact between Javier Solana and the Head of States. The Head of State may not want certain information, which cannot be considered as secret intelligence attributed to him, but its sense can still be included in an overall analysis. Sensitive intelligence is often covered by diplomatic activities. The European Union has its own tools which are not in the open source field but that are not in the intelligence field either, such as the EU monitoring mission in the Balkans, or the Aceh Monitoring Mission, which is providing some very good analysis in the field of reporting. This reporting covers a highly important middle ground.

Method of acquiring information

Finally, the question arises: what can you do with the information acquired? At our Centre, we spend much of our time persuading Member States’ diplomatic and intelligence services to share information with us rather than keeping it squirreled away. Obviously, this creates tensions as the services consider that information, which is squirreled away, is safe. We have to persuade them that, while it is all very well it being safe, it also needs to be useful as well. This argument has provoked debate across the Member States in recent years, especially since 9/11. And the debate is far from over.

In the meantime, we continue to try to obtain and use assessed information from Member States in the intelligence and diplomatic fields. We are limited, in theory, to looking at assessed information and to take no interest in operational information. During the first phases of activity, such as early warning, policy development and the first stages of decision support, such limitations are acceptable. However, it becomes more complicated when real operational foreign policy starts to take place – the Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, for instance – when operations are being put together or are underway. Then information needs shift somewhat and veer towards information that is of a slightly more operational character. To give a concrete example, we have been thinking a lot about the risks to Rafah, and then there are bombs in Amman. Are there implications? Is there a crossover? Such questions cannot be answered from a distant strategic point of view. To reach the right conclusions, a reasonable amount of detail is required.

Conclusion

To conclude, I would like to make three final observations. Firstly, five years ago no conceptual background or requirements existed. Nevertheless, they are essential. The European Union is putting many people in harm’s way now on its missions and the trend is only going to be upwards. It is therefore imperative that they are supported with good analytical
work. Secondly, it’s imperfect: we do not have a blank sheet of paper to work with; we have to work with what’s available. And thirdly, as a consequence of these two points, the situation is developing and evolving all the time, thus requiring us to take a very pragmatic approach. Overall, EU intelligence is a very dynamic area that is being firmly supported by the Member States, which have clearly recognised that there is room for improvement when it comes to information acquisition and sharing.
Chapter 24: Early Warning for Early Action

Policy commitment to early warning

Conflict prevention is one of the main objectives of the EU’s external relations. Early warning lies at the heart of this policy: it is implicit in the very notion of conflict prevention that potential conflicts will be identified before they become acute and that, on the basis of this early warning, there should be a preparedness to take action before a situation deteriorates into violence.

Early warning has been defined as “the systematic collection and analyses of information coming from areas of crisis for the purpose of a) anticipating the escalation of violent conflict b) the development of strategic responses to these crises; and c) the presentation of options to critical actors for the purpose of decision-making.”

A clear and unambiguous early warning policy was set out in the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts which stated that the EU would monitor potential conflict situations on the basis of “accurate information and analysis as well as clear options for action for both long and short-term prevention” and that the EU would strive for coherence, “in early warning, analysis, planning, decision-making, implementation and evaluation.”

Specifically, the Commission made a commitment to “work with the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR) for common foreign and security policy on regular reviews of potential conflict zones, including the establishment of early warning mechanisms.” Meanwhile, “Member States, their Heads of Mission, EU Special Representatives, EC delegations and other representatives of the Commission, as well as the Council Secretariat, including the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS), should provide regular information on developments of potential conflict situations, i.e. through the development and use of standard formats and methods for early warning reports.”

The emphasis undoubtedly shifted after the events of 11 September 2001 toward enhancing the EU’s security and fighting terrorism. Nevertheless, the European Security Strategy restated the early warning vision, “conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early. An early identification and understanding of risk factors increases the chances of timely and effective action to address the underlying causes of conflict.”

The early warning ambition remains firmly on the agenda. The European Council of June 2005 approved the Presidency report on conflict prevention, which included the assurance that, “efforts have continued to extend the EU’s early warning capabilities and further improve the link between early warning and early action. This has been done through the integration of a broader range of resources from Member States and the refinement of early warning methodology.” Policy development has included the work to link early warning with the new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) planning capabilities and the refinement of indicators on key issues such as genocide prevention and state failure.

Within the Council there have been continued efforts to ensure more systematic follow up by regional working groups to early warning issues. The intention is to adopt early action procedures that make use of the broad range of instruments at the EU’s disposal.


8. Ibid.
The following sections examine the early warning methodology developed within the European Commission, explore the processes of completing Country Conflict Assessments and highlight some of the successes and limitations of work to date.

The watchlist exercise

In line with the EU Programme on Conflict Prevention the Council is supposed to schedule, “a broad consideration of potential conflict issues at the outset of each Presidency, including at the time of the yearly orientation debate, prepared with assistance from the HR, relevant Council bodies, including the Political and Security Committee (PSC), and the Commission, to identify priority areas and regions for EU preventive actions.”

The debate is conducted on the basis of a watchlist, which is an all-source assessment drawing on the full range of information available including intelligence deriving from military and non-military sources. The Joint Situation Centre (JTCEN) provides this list in collaboration with the Policy Unit, the EUEMS and the European Commission’s Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX). The format of the watchlist aims to stimulate debate amongst EU Foreign Ministries on how the EU can best respond to these issues. Thus DG RELEX has from the outset participated in the production of early warning data for the EU’s policy bodies.

Country Conflict Assessment

The European Commission’s contribution to the watchlist exercise has been facilitated by the checklist for root causes of conflict/early warning indicators developed by the Commission, with the input of the Conflict Prevention Network. Country Conflict Assessments (CCA) are completed on the basis of this checklist. The objective of completing CCAs has been to:

• Increase awareness within the EU decision-making forums of the problems of those countries/regions with the highest assessed risk of an outbreak, continuation or re-emergence of conflict.
• Heighten the effort to ensure that EU (and in particular EC) policies contribute to conflict prevention/resolution.

The CCAs have helped to ensure that the Commission’s Country Strategy Papers are informed by an analysis of issues such as the balance of political and economic power, the control of the security forces, the ethnic composition of the government for ethnically divided countries, the potential degradation of environmental resources and so forth. As a result of such analysis, at the level of the programming of assistance, the Commission has made an effort to place more emphasis on the strengthening of the rule of law, support to democratic institutions, the development of civil society and the reform of the security sector. The Commission has also engaged more and more in rehabilitation activities as well as demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration programmes (so-called DDR programmes).

Checklist of root causes of conflict/early warning indicators

The checklist of root causes of conflict covers the following eight thematic problem areas: legitimacy of the state; rule of law; respect for fundamental rights; civil society and media; relations between communities and dispute solving mechanisms; sound economic management; social and economic inequalities; geopolitical situation.

The assumption is that these clusters of problems address a sufficiently broad range of the key causal factors behind outbreaks of violent conflict. Just as there is no simple consensus on what causes violent conflict, a wide variety of alternative sets of indicators have been proposed for the purpose of early warning. These include sets focusing on genocide (Davies et al, 1997), human rights abuses (Schmid, 1997), state failure (Esty, 1995), environmental conflict, economics (Collier 2003)

9. The Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) was a network of academic institutions, NGOs and independent experts, and was a project managed by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. In 2000 it was mandated by the European Commission to prepare a document that could be used as a basis to prepare the checklist. The final list, elaborated by the Conflict Prevention Unit of the European Commission, benefited from the work of the CPN. The checklist is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfp/cpcm/cp/list.htm.
and minorities (Gurr 1998b).” The approach proposed by the Conflict Prevention Network to the European Commission aimed to synthesise existing work with the focus on violent conflict.

**Process and methodology**

Early warning techniques can be classified as either data-based (quantitative) or judgement-based (qualitative) where the former includes the collection and analysis of large data sets and the latter is based on the subjective assessment of experts.

The CCA process was initially a firmly qualitative approach. The exercise was primarily concerned with efficiently communicating the mass of political opinion existing within the EC system and the processing the information in a format which allowed cross-country comparison. The root cause indicators served to reduce the amount of information to a minimum set of predefined core areas. Political officers in delegations and desk officers were obliged to limit themselves to these areas.

The CCA is essentially a set of questions that are sent to Commission desk officers and EC Delegations, present in more than 130 countries.

For each problem area there is an accompanying set of indicators. For example, the indicator “incapacity to ensure macro-economic Stability” is included under “economic performance”. Before evaluating the indicator, three or four context-setting questions are first posed which have to be answered “yes”, “no” or “don’t know”. Then the indicator is evaluated on a five-step scale: strongly disagree; somewhat disagree; undecided; somewhat agree; strongly agree; this indicator does not apply. An evaluation of whether the situation in the country in this respect is worsening, stable or improving is also requested. Finally there is an opportunity to give any comment or reaction and to indicate any possible or ongoing European Commission response to the presence of the indicator.

**Lessons learned**

In spite of its positive aspects, the watchlist exercise has a number of shortcomings. There have been two primary criticisms of the initial CCA approach:

- Is the indicator coverage is correct? (i.e. Does the set of eight problem areas with the subset of indicators really identify the causal factors behind conflict. Is there appropriate weighting between the various problem areas).
- Are the responses are reliable? (i.e. Did the person completing the CCA have access to the correct information. Are the questions inherently subjective, preventing any consistent data collection).

Criticism that assumes that the CCAs are the only early warning instruments available is unfounded. The CCAs have never been conceived as the sole instrument for monitoring and early warning of potential conflicts. Other sources include regular reporting from delegations on issues such as human rights, open source information monitoring via the Commission’s Crisis Room and the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid’s disaster monitoring system, the Impending Crisis Online News System (ICONS). The ambition is that this type of early warning information should help determine the best course of action and to prioritise resource allocation.

Work has continued to improve the methodological base, and thereby the credibility of the CCAs so as to make the policy recommendations more compelling. The aim has been to streamline the process of data entry and subsequent analysis and to improve the quality of information available to desks and delegations when completing the CCAs. One important improvement was the ability, since 2004, to update the Country Conflict Assessments via an intranet based platform coordinated by Tarîqa, a crisis room service at the Directorate-General for External Relations. This reduces the complexity of processing the data enormously and also makes the system more transparent. The latter point is important in order to allow a judgement to be made on the reliability of the information being processed.

The system has subsequently been enhanced through the use of cluster analysis. This is a statistical procedure designed to reveal natural groupings (or clusters) within a data set that would not otherwise have been apparent. Using a two-step cluster analysis, the optimum number of clusters is automatically selected and models can be created simultaneously, based on categorical and continuous variables. This adds two key functionalities to the CCA exercise.

Firstly cluster analysis allows the isolation of specific variables. If, for example, there was...
interest in analysing which countries displayed a high proportion of human rights abuses and also weak judicial institutions this can be instantly displayed.

The second functionality is to allow the easy overlay of additional statistical variables on the in-house political analysis. For example data such as the UNDP Human Development Index, the Carleton Conflict Indicators, or Freedom House Rankings can be triangulated with the baseline CCA data. In fact the triangulation does not have to be limited to quantitative data; qualitative assessments such as the political analysis provided by academic experts can be processed in the same way.

An additional area of research conducted by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) on behalf of Directorate-General for External Relations has been into pre-operational event-based conflict alert/early warning systems. Trials have been undertaken of linguistic parsers which extract and classify news events for conflict risk assessment and prevention. This “news monitoring” approach can be distinguished from efforts to track structural indicators of the root causes of conflict since it exclusively monitors the incidences of pre-selected variables such as outbreaks of violence, protest or arrests. Such systems are typically based upon the news from the Reuters feed. The trials were wider, and were instead linked to the JRCs multilingual European Media Monitoring. The initial CCA product can therefore be supplemented with additional information and, by exploiting available technologies the resulting information can be presented in a manner compelling for policy matters.

**Conclusion**

It is hard to imagine anyone being against the policy of the prevention of violent conflict, yet for a number of reasons difficulties remain in determining the approach. Understandably attention focuses on the most acute crises and the political and media spotlight often falls on those areas. On the other hand, policy makers can be trapped in bureaucratic inertia and compelled to focus on the conduct of established policies rather than anticipating new problems. The watchlist exercise aims to overcome this but it nevertheless initially took a “crisis management” (ongoing or imminent crisis) rather than the conflict prevention (in the peacebuilding/long-term sense) approach privileged by the Göteborg programme and it has proved difficult to examine more structural crisis and countries where there was no immediate danger of violent conflict. Moreover, ensuring appropriate actions were taken on the basis of the analysis presented in the Country Conflict Assessment’s proved problematic.

The continued development of the CCA methodology and the numerous possibilities of providing supplementary quantitative and event-based data will be crucial to strengthen the credibility and persuasiveness of the analysis and indeed the whole conflict prevention approach. It will however remain the case that a deficit in early warning is only one of the many barriers to an effective conflict prevention policy. More often than not, policymakers have been well aware of looming crisis but have failed to act. The contribution that early warning systems can make is to remove the possibility of escaping political responsibility with the claim “we did not act because we did not know”.

Tarîqa is an internal, open source intelligence platform developed by the Crisis Room of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for External Relations (the code has been compiled by Pascal Havelange). It contains an integrated and multimedia content database that is specifically designed to provide updated support for early warning and crisis response.

“Tarîqa” is a Sufi term, which in Arabic means “path” or “brotherhood”. The Tarîqa user community comprises around 400 analysts from geographical/thematic desks in the Directorate-General for External Relations and Development, as well as personnel in 72 Commission Delegations worldwide, notably in areas prone to crises.

Users of Tarîqa have access to more than 14,000 different full text databases; an interactive Geographical Information System with satellite imagery; and declassified military maps covering the whole world. More than 400 hours of audiovisual material broadcast from 43 satellite positions can also be accessed from the system.

The core feature of Tarîqa is its integrated, advanced information retrieval tools, which are available through an interface that requires no prior technical knowledge or skills. It is built around more than 900 pre-defined database queries each using specific and regularly updated lists of keywords. The analysts only make a query when they need the latest information on a particular subject. The information is then automatically filtered and ranked in terms of relevance.

**Tarîqa’s key features:**

- It only uses primary sources.
- It is assessment-orientated and authoritative – focused on testimonials, documentaries, academic research and investigative journalism.
- The system values internal knowledge: all Tarîqa tracking is developed through interviews with the geographical/thematic desks; its functions are crafted to mirror the needs of the diplomatic community; and pages can be easily maintained and upgraded as the geopolitical situation evolves.
- It allows multiple reading paths (quick overviews/in-depth analysis, project and policy orientated content).
- It uses exclusive, hard-to-find open sources and is geared to become a sharable resource.
- It has a flat structure – everything on a given subject should be reachable from one single page and with just one click of a mouse.
- Core content is made accessible to slower Internet connections – particularly important if accessing from a country with low bandwidth.
- Tarîqa is low cost from an IT perspective: the system is fully automated, technical training is minimal for end users, and maintenance is limited to upgrading the lists of keywords.
CHAPTER 25: REAL-TIME CRISES: NEW REAL-TIME INFORMATION TENSIONS

Summary

The credibility and public perception of both the wisdom and conduct of the new generation of security operations “on the cusp” during moments of acute tension and crisis is increasingly distorted by the new asymmetry in information emerging in real-time from a theatre of conflict, regardless of how that theatre is defined. This asymmetric power created by the proliferation of cheap information technologies is forcing a new capacity for democratic scrutiny and accountability of security operations in a crisis that can challenge uncomfortably the needs of operational security. The media matrix is changing fast, and official mindsets are failing to embrace the new realities and keep up. Low-cost information technology is empowering a new breed of “information doers” and ad hoc groupings to challenge those in power, especially the credibility of what they say and claim in a time of crisis. This complicates and challenges both the capacity and ability of those with the responsibility to tackle a crisis. Unless these dynamics are embraced with a new approach, the “credibility crunch” during operations will become sharper, thereby undermining the reputation of the institutions of government, security and crisis management in times of acute operational pressure, especially when there are vivid images of casualties with bloodshed and an apparent threat to national resilience and survivability.

Analysis – the tyranny of real-time

The new matrix of real-time recording and uplink technology available to anyone, including government, military and security personnel, now means that even the most remote, hostile and, in theory, operationally secure locations are transparent. Assumptions of omnipotence are being challenged, and with it their image and reputation.

The tyranny of real-time predicted by this author twelve years ago is now here. Tyranny means cruel and arbitrary, and that is the nature of revelations in this new transparent information environment during security and “blue light” operations in a crisis. But the self-assured institutional capacity to embrace doctrinally the new reality remains far from mature, even in this multi-billion dollar era of reliance on IT and networking capability. Indeed, there is evidence that institutionally there remains active resistance and resentment to the new realities that continue to put many in the military behind the curve. In many respects, despite the fast-changing new realities, the mindset continues to be one of denial and official approaches are slipping further and further behind that curve.

Doctrinally, it can be said that this new information asymmetry is in parallel to the new weapons asymmetry that on 11 September 2001 turned civilian aircraft into guided missiles for a total cost of US$ 160 000, and facilitated for just US$ 16 000 the massive destruction of commuter trains in Madrid on 11 March 2004. In information terms, a US$ 40 flash card and US$ 300 digital camera can have a similar impact on the reputation of government, politicians and all agencies responsible institutionally for crisis management.

In its newest, crudest and most vivid form, the video images from a terrorist or insurgent website taken on a camera worth a few hundred dollars and uplinked via a website costing a few dollars a week have – asymmetrically – identical and arguably more power and influence on credibility and public perceptions than the statements from a US President in the Rose Garden or Defence Secretary at the Pentagon. This applies to the image on a TV set, a newspaper front page or, increasingly, a news “blog” website home page. Asymmetric impressions are further distorted by the proliferation of unclassified and uncensored video of incidents that is proliferating on websites without any accompanying explanation or context of the incident recorded. Most vividly, video from helicopter and warplane pods showing the use of deadly force against unidentified “civilians” now circulates with even the dates, locators and times still visible.

The new matrix of “information-doers”

This is a new, under-recognised “cusp” for political and security credibility in times of…
In the hours immediately after the bombings on the London transport system on 7 July 2005, the BBC alone received 20,000 emails, 3,000 text messages, 1,000 digital images and 20 video files. Other major news broadcast organisations experienced a similar information deluge, which tested to the extreme the filtering and checking processes of all newsrooms. Even though the likely phenomenon had been thought about, the reality on the day was overwhelming and a major test of capacity.

Most amateur dispatches from around the London bomb locations included graphic eye witness accounts from the new breed of instant “information doers”. Some came from victims of the bombs who had escaped but experienced the horror. Most significantly, in real-time many challenged directly the official version in the first couple of hours that there had been a “power surge” on the London underground. Contrary to official versions they confirmed there had indeed been bomb explosions and there were large numbers of casualties. They thereby changed public perceptions and undermined the credibility of the official police and eventually ministerial versions as they emerged.

Such challenges in the first hours of a real-time crisis, when national resilience and survivability can be at stake, inevitably generate profound questions in the public mind about the robustness and competence of the institutions of government, even if there is a logical explanation for the apparent tardiness of response by those institutions. Experience shows, however, that the public is not understanding of that reality.

Similarly in late July 2005 during police operations in north-west London to detain alleged bombers of the London transport system, images of the massive security operation taken by amateur information doers circulated almost instantly via broadband and WiFi onto both the internet and then broadcast outlets before the police had even thrown a security cordon around the locations.

This is confirmation of what this author long ago warned would be the tyranny of real-time. However imperfect and incomplete are its revelations, the new ubiquitous technology catches unaware and surprises with what it reveals. This new phenomenon is mirrored time and again in even the most remote and inaccessible locations of the world. It cannot be reversed. For planning purposes it has to be embraced.

By acquiring and using cheap, highly effective technology available to all, these new information doers show their capacity to record dreadful events and then broadcast them asymmetrically from low-cost platforms like laptops, PDAs or – increasingly – the latest generation of mobile phone and WiFi technology. Distance or remoteness poses no limits. These transmissions are usually well ahead of the capacity of the government and security systems even to confirm an incident, let alone react from a position of detailed knowledge and assessment.

**Challenging the official version of events**

The immediate impression left by such images and “reporting” can sometimes be stark. Yet it is often subjective, opinionated and polemically inclined with the views of the information doer who is recording or transmitting. While it has an impact on public perceptions, it is frequently - though not always - distorted and unreliable. In the vital early stages context and qualification are missing. As such, while the minutes tick by in a real-time crisis, experience shows it is now virtually impossible for government and security institutions to roll back and reverse indelible but inaccurate impressions already made.

This dissemination of impressions in an asymmetric way often challenges the credibility of official versions of events. In real-time, official channels are often unsighted about an incident. During the 7 July bombings in London, the emergency cabinet meeting in Downing Street was standing by for more than an hour waiting for even a basic first brief from the police and security services. In the meantime, the real-time coverage of TV channels was broadcasting vivid and harrowing confirmation of the horrors unfolding. As in the tsunami catastrophe on 26 December 2004, in this connected world the public seem to
expect (unreasonably) perfect 20/20 official explanations and confirmations immediately because that is what the new transparent information technology is allowing media broadcast organisations to do. But government systems can never assess and assimilate crisis information that fast. As a result, they cannot counter effectively the fast-emerging claims and counter claims being made asymmetrically.

At the extreme, it can be argued that during moments of crisis this generated a new frailty and brittleness in the democratic process. It forces the machine of government to be reactive and provide political accountability to a public which swiftly sees and hears unfiltered and possibly distorted versions of events that are not channelled through official channels first. Yet the vivid impact of graphic imagery usually skews impressions and endures, and often it cannot be corrected in a timely way.

In a similar vein, the impression left by minor tactical incidents with casualties and loss of life can often be profound because it gives an exaggerated impression of events that militarily are far less significant than the impact suggested. This in itself is nothing new. As the instant images of the mob attack on a British Warrior APC in Basra, Southern Iraq, on 19 September 2005 illustrated vividly, what is new and changing exponentially fast is the capacity to uplink minute by minute in real-time via cell phone or satellite phone from a backpack or the pocket of a pair of cargo pants an instant images of the mob attack on a British that demanded immediate withdrawal from Iraq.

It must now be assumed that this new and prolific breed of information doers (including what can be called “ITV” or Insurgent TV) are everywhere. Most are not members of the media as traditionally defined. Many do not start the day seeking to “cover a story”. Instead they have the technology in their pocket and happen upon an event. As a result none will ever be “embedded” with military units. Indeed most will not even be known to military units. Each is, however, a powerful asymmetric medium for bearing witness, recording and then real-time transmission in some form. Almost none of these information doers will ever be controlled by the military, despite the current top-down assumption that they will, can be and should. They cannot.

Trouble ahead for the military?

This author continues to detect an active reluctance especially on the part of US military and security audiences to embrace this principle of information asymmetry as a new challenge to assumptions of information power. Indeed – even now - there has been outright hostility and entrenchment of mind-sets based on the principle that because of their technological capability government military and security forces will always command the information high ground. In the new information environment this is a flawed assumption.

For some three years this author has signalled to audiences of government officials, security professionals and corporate executives that the new asymmetric power of tiny digital cameras and flash cards carried unseen in a backpack or the pocket of a pair of cargo pants would one day record events that profoundly embarrass the highest political and security powers in a matter of hours. The audiences’ reactions were usually robustly dismissive, not least because of their assumed control of operational security, their access to great volumes of networked data, and the fact that “military personnel would never do such things”.

This ingrained culture of rejecting such a troubling and foreseeable reality on the new cusp of crisis management underscores the new doctrinal challenge to be embraced not tossed aside. The global impact in April and May 2004 of the revolting revelations confirmed by the digital “trophy” images of brutality inside Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison highlights these profound new challenges to be confronted. In its crudest terms a digital flash card had the asymmetric power to seize headlines globally and devastate the US reputation irreversibly, especially in the Arab world. A senior US official administration confirmed to this author that the images had done more damage to the US international reputation than a violation of the highest level of security and Top Secret classifications. It also forced humiliating public cross-examination of the US Defense Secretary and senior CENTCOM commanders in Congress. Secretary Rumsfeld later confirmed that as a result he twice offered his resignation to the President. While deeply unsettling, this illustrates the
extent of the asymmetric power of a US$ 40 smart card and digital camera. And the Abu Ghraib images were not a one-off: instead they highlighted a growing and under-acknowledged trend that was further illustrated by incidents like the video of British soldiers in 2004 apparently beating up protesters in Southern Iraq.²

**Legality and accountability called into question**

There are further problematic and troubling issues for military operations "on the cusp" when it comes to legality and public accountability. No longer are there just rumours or innuendo about inappropriate and allegedly unlawful operations in defiance of both the spirit and letter of the Laws of Armed Conflict, Geneva Conventions and International Criminal Court. The new information asymmetry is providing video and documentary evidence of what some will see as questionable military activities that – it must be assumed – could in future form the basis for prosecutions for war crimes or other violations of codes of military behaviour. Given the new reality, what should be the orders to personnel under pressure in a crisis area who see someone with a camera that they fear might record what some could view as unlawful or questionable activities, even in the emotional heat and nervousness of a major crisis?

The new vulnerabilities, discomforts and challenges to legitimacy of this new challenge may now be being recognised at last at the highest levels. The British Defence Secretary John Reid used a recent policy speech to note the new vulnerabilities because of the shift from government assumptions of information supremacy. Mr. Reid highlighted (as this author has done for some years) the new legal and human rights scrutiny of all operations which he said means "soldiers have been left confused and unsettled". He warned of what he called the new "uneven playing field of scrutiny".³

**Concluding remarks**

Like nuclear weapons, the new asymmetry in real-time information is here. Enabled by dramatic and exciting technological developments that new scrutiny cannot be reversed or dis-invented. Its impact is far-reaching on those expected to manage a crisis.

The notion of "on the cusp" during new times of major crisis must therefore be embraced and further defined in order to improve both the public perception of operations and the credibility of leadership by government, security and "blue light" agencies alike. After all they have a duty of public accountability within a transparent, democratic political system. Yet in this new transparent information environment the new IT technology and media scrutiny now tests those duties and their credibility uncomfortably to new, asymmetric limits that have to be understood.

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2. See "Brutal" on p1 of News of the World, 12 February 2006
3. Speech at King’s College, London, on 20 February 2006
CHAPTER 26: INTERPRETING TIME AND SPACE, AND FORESEEING CRISES

Summary

Crisis management, by its nature, implies immediate, decisive action, but there is a danger that in responding to “crises”, we are isolating specific events from their wider context. Moreover, in a world where instantaneous media coverage beams “facts” around the world, the perception of a specific “crisis” may take on greater importance than the real situation on the ground, thereby influencing policy-makers’ responses. When the need to respond to a specific, delineated “crisis” overwhelsm other related needs, it is more than likely that the “solutions” identified are inappropriate and of short-term value only. To properly understand the world, and the complex situations and problems thrown up, requires us to take a step back and analyse the world’s situations and events with a more objective view, thereby avoiding the “panic” responses too common in crisis management.

Crisis management: an addiction to exceptional situations?

April 1987: just 100 km from Mongok, in south-eastern Burma, a battle is raging – or so all the press releases, television channels and news commentators tell us. But on the site, from where I stand, everything is truly peaceful. The Buddhist monks, brightly coloured pagodas and landscapes give an image of total serenity and calm. In fact, this is just the umpteenth episode in a fictitious war that continues to provide copy for press agencies to show how hard it is to control the production of opium in Burma. This war between the central power and “ethnic minorities” is not only a television show: it also pertains to diplomatic actions, UN financing, and preaching for patience and calm. In fact, this is just the umpteenth episode in a fictitious war that continues to provide copy for press agencies to show how hard it is to control the production of opium in Burma. This war between the central power and “ethnic minorities” is not only a television show: it also pertains to diplomatic actions, UN financing, and preaching for patience and calm.

Two problems are posed here: the first has to do with the desire to face and understand an extraordinary event and its long-term implications. The second has to do with the nature and the modus operandi of the providers of information and the capacity of the rest of the world and the “decision-takers” to perceive that information. We are, indeed, dealing with a paradox: by dint of consuming preformatted, routine information, policy-makers, both national and transnational, only take action in “crisis situations”, meaning that they react, disregarding their capacity to anticipate. “World management” – the epitome of an anticipatory attitude – has become “crisis management”, in other words intervening only when a situation is exceptional or perceived as such. How have things come to that? How has this addiction to exceptional situations, which may be understandable from the standpoint of the media, become daily practice for “policy-makers”? In response to this question, analysts and observers from circles as diverse as the press, NGOs, peacekeeping forces and intelligence professionals tell us how the perception and reporting on a phenomenon is often as important as the phenomenon itself. However, the medium used for perception is not neutral. Since information has become a product like any other (and here the word product is not pejorative), it comes in many forms and is presented by a multitude of interests which can no longer be summarised in the traditional tandem “power – right to information”.

Even if the world is becoming globalised, it is at least as disparate as those who report on it. This shows the degree to which a piece of information that comes to light is the result of subjective filters, and above all a “perception consensus”. In 1997, while doing a statistical study in France on medical analyses of former heroin users treated with methadone, I commented that a significant percentage of these patients who were seeking a substitute for the heroin “buzz”, consumed cocaine in addition to the substitution drug. Prevention professionals


Michalis Koutouzis. Now an independent consultant working for both the EU and the UN. Michalis Koutouzis is the author of numerous TV documentaries, academic papers and books on the business of illegal trade and trafficking, and money laundering issues. For ten years, he was research director in the Paris-based Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues (OGD). Michalis has two PhDs one in ethnology and one in history.
told me that the staunch substitution policy would no longer tolerate this kind of information. Six years later, “considerable consumption” of cocaine was discovered, necessitating “urgent” action.

Once the “information-compromise” is “given”, it becomes the subject of additional information and analysis; it is enriched with new variants, and new protagonists use it, giving it the interest that they prefer, which corresponds with their own interest. The “perception” becomes an objective in itself, determining new markets and, with this in mind, it must gain time and space, for example, on television to reach the relative durability needed for exploitation. So, competition for the exploitation of an event creates excessiveness. Excessive focus on an event has a cost, which is not neutral, leading to actions and dividends. This is undoubtedly the first contradiction arising from globalisation of an issue and the many players reporting on it. On the other hand, this selective focus prevents anticipation. It results in “panic” vision and action that draws on the archetypes buried in the collective subconscious of our societies.

Consequently, the main guarantee of the duration of information becomes its exceptional nature, referring to something that by definition is fleeting. Anticipation, on the other hand, necessitates research and investigation without preconceived ideas. Globalisation, the multiple – and at times contradictory – requirements and stimuli resulting from the “extreme need for durability”, the lack of resources, acceleration of time and particularly the hegemony of techne, deprived of the duality of its philosophical aspect,1 are some of the many obstacles of setting up an investigation process. In addition, an excessive focus accepts few shades of grey. Information must be in black and white. At the time of action, the information tool simplifies issues: for example, it doesn’t matter if Serbians and Bosnians exchange goods (weapons) and services (smuggling networks) in nightclubs during the curfew in Sarajevo. Choosing sides makes this information secondary.

Researchers, for their part, are sucked into a utilitarian environment and despair at having the world as an object and so add their names to the list of those who have something to sell with regard to the exceptional things that become permanent.

The hegemony of crises and our perception of the world

Focusing on crises clouds perception of the complex world from which, nevertheless, the crises have stemmed. Information that encourages acceleration and the “panic” model that determines perception combine to give the image of an effervescent, accelerated world. But is this really the case? For the three-quarters of humanity most affected by globalisation, the situation is actually stagnant or regressive. Of course there are “islands of modernity” like the offshore institutions in the Carribean or the Indian Ocean – they too are the result of a “compromise”. Actions for integration, normative in Afghanistan, military in Iraq, technological in India, economic in China, judicial in Cambodia, etc., affect only a tiny minority of the individuals who deal with or are stakeholders in the logic of those enclaves. Therefore, when speaking of Afghanistan and its “democratic process”, which aims to establish a moderate Islamic constitution and a civil society free from clans and warlords, one is talking about two different things: setting up a non-internalised process for a few, and, on the other hand, dealing with imported requirements by absorbing them. For the international community, the UN and the European Union, who are the protagonists of these mutations, the perception takes the place of the situation.

If one looks at all of the variations of the above, we can affirm that the concept of hegemony or, more simply, globalisation of a Western model, is perceived – not real. It keeps records of areas, practices, “integrations” at its own perception level, but not at the level of a real “unification”. Undoubtedly, Cambodia now has an anti-drug law, but what good is it as long as there is no civil code? It puts Cambodia on record as a country involved in the “war against drugs”. Consequently, that concept distorts reality (drugs in Cambodia). Selective focus transforms an unsolved, isolated problem into an integrated “whole”. We are convinced that we have a grip on this olos – the totality – whereas, in fact, we are dealing only with a perception of action in a local reality.

Having the perception of acting on behalf of a part of the world, unfortunately, is not the same as understanding and acting on the entire

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1. Anticipation, on the other hand, necessitates research and investigation without preconceived ideas. Globalisation, the multiple – and at times contradictory – requirements and stimuli resulting from the “extreme need for durability”, the lack of resources, acceleration of time and particularly the hegemony of techne, deprived of the duality of its philosophical aspect, are some of the many obstacles of setting up an investigation process. In addition, an excessive focus accepts few shades of grey. Information must be in black and white. At the time of action, the information tool simplifies issues: for example, it doesn’t matter if Serbians and Bosnians exchange goods (weapons) and services (smuggling networks) in nightclubs during the curfew in Sarajevo. Choosing sides makes this information secondary.

2. The distinction between duration and time sheds a new light on the traditional opposition between physical time and psychological time, because time shaped by the imaginative consciousness produces effects in the world to the point that it can be confused with the real duration of things. Spinoza, Letter XXII.

3. As Jaques Ellul indicates, “the technical society” – where a technical system is installed – increasingly tends to be confused with the “technical system”, produced by the conjunction of technical phenomena characterised by self-sufficiency, uniqueness or indivisibility and globalisation. In “Propagande et démocratie”, Revue française de science politique, Vol. 2, No. 3, July-September, 1952.

4. Another example of this integration process: in Cambodia, dozens of meetings and more than four years of negotiations with the UNODC have not yet resulted in an amendment of the anti-drug law to replace the following phrase “…a fine and/or a prison sentence…” with one that would remove the “or”: “…a fine and a prison sentence….”
world. Iraq is a significant example. The American intervention maintained that its purpose was to spread a democratic process in the “Middle East”. But, like Communism of yesteryear, this geographic area is multicultural, diverse, contradictory, and above all, unstable. Any hypothesis concerning its evolution is imaginably, except unconscious imitation.

The leading entropy with regard to our tools of perception is not inevitable. There is in fact a difference between hypnotic addiction to television, multipurpose Internet, satellite photography, and analytical software depending on our entry and those of others. In other words, how can we shake free from the structural subjectivity of multiple messages? How can we differentiate between seeing and knowing? How can we rank without getting caught in the spiral of a symbolic perception that is indivisible?

Know thyself

Great Britain is covered with a video surveillance web which aims to capture the entire territory and its inhabitants on film. This has not prevented terrorist attacks. But this web, viewed in police investigations and on television, has enabled us to see what we should have realised long ago: the opposition between the English, Welsh and Scottish on the one hand and British citizens with origins in former colonies on the other. This opposition, in a former merchant empire that produces schizophrenic citizens as concerns their identity, is now taking the form of fundamentalism. But ever since Disraeli, integration policy (with its enthusiasts and its opponents) has been based on an official ideology that has made the concept of the empire the catch-all for unification of British classes and subjects. Since the 19th century, any shift, weakening or excess in this empire, and its entry into the intangible domain has produced reactions that were often violent, as is the case today. This is an example of “Long History”, of those who go through centuries and remain insensitive to the hazards of a selective perception and the actions that result from it. This example was not chosen by accident: Great Britain is a well-structured country, fully aware of its history and traditions. It is also conscious of the complexity and stratification of its society and the contradictions that result from this. Nevertheless, it is not free of panic perception, the olos syndrome, nor the simplification used by the media and the professionals referred to above who manage this group of concepts.

So what can we say about newer, less organised structures, which, moreover, owe their existence as much to political power as to the power of symbolism, as is the case of the European Union? The Union today is an excellent example of a verification tool. A privileged “customer” for producers of panic information. It has the difficult responsibility of putting things in perspective and creating its own hierarchies with regard to multiple messages. Nevertheless, it can only understand the world by understanding itself and by becoming fully aware of its vulnerability, the contradictory multiplicity of its own services (and their action) and the globalising tropism that sometimes paralyses it. The European Union could then fully exploit the fact that it is the largest supplier of open intelligence sources, and that its vocation is to share them with all Member States. In addition, the Union has an advantage over the countries that comprise it (and others): it has arisen from a myth and it does not necessarily cultivate new ones. In a way, this lack of imaginary justification could enable it to see the world as it is, and not as the member countries might fear it is or want it to be.

Its institutional complexity, once internalised and rationalised, could give it the tools capable of putting panic and subjective information into perspective and could provide it with a clear-sighted vision of the world. How could it achieve this? By proposing an anti-empire model that assumes global disorder. By becoming the only player in the world who does not add normative disorder. By accepting that all information is important not because of the message it carries but because of the party sending the message. By taking the time to look at the nature of concepts rather than what they offer within a panic vision of the world. By refusing olos as the objective of a fragmented approach and considering the multiple aspects of reality, which is the very nature of this “whole”.

Fragmented space, variable time

In a meeting of “specialists” on Afghanistan and the production of opium, I was asked, “What is the most crime-promoting aspect in the country?” I answered without hesitation: the construction of new roads. Before the area had even been pacified, it was brought into contact with the rest of the world – a world based on consumption and the desire for possession. A few days later in Madagascar, I...
made the opposite analysis: the systematic looting of the mineral wealth of this country is based on the fact that the territory is broken up, and feudal territories have developed that have destroyed the roads over the last 30 years. This destruction has transformed the territories into strongholds. Reconstructing them is part of recovering the territory and fighting organised crime. Consequently, by taking these two examples, given the real context, roads, perceived in their own right, should or should not be constructed. Conversely, roads as a symbol of progress and integration must imperatively be constructed. The difference is not insignificant.

As a symbol of progress, any construction is recorded in accounts and included in statistics, and is considered to be a global asset by institutional donors like the European Union, the World Bank and the UN that make things easier for themselves and list the results for areas that are “integrated” by their action. This simple example shows how much detailed knowledge introduces multiple variables, which must be considered before any action is taken. But the complexity of the operations of an institution that has an imperial ambition—and at the risk of necrosis of its action—means that it must “generalise” and must proceed using schemes called “models for action”, that it describes as success stories. In this case, it is acting for itself and not for the recipient of its action. However, the logic would enable it to refine its analysis, and see the territory as a place for action and synergy, and not as integration according to a model.

If the international organisations are acting in good faith, they are supported by a globalising ideology (the last one still active) pertaining to the “market economy” which does not handle nuance very well. For 20 years, the World Bank has refused any positive approach to the informal economy. Today, it perceives this economy as “an innovating and positive driver”. This militant change in attitude today prevents it from considering the link between the informal economy and the criminality that victimises a large share of the countries it supports. Yet, if this economy, which is now integrated, can be managed in southern European countries—which were long criticised by the institution before being given as an example—conversely, in the emerging countries (Russia, for example) it tends to be taken over by practices of organised crime and produces “oligarchies” rather than economic progress. Once again, the same modus operandi has different effects and therefore it cannot be modelled. Trying to do so will only accentuate the distortion in other places, and reinforce a fragmented perspective at home. Finally, the institutions created by the Bretton Woods agreements manage to consider at the same time and in the same report that “financing oil companies in risky countries helps to reduce disorder”, and that “the exploitation of sources of energy in these same countries contributes seriously to instability”.

Assuming and promoting complexity

In a world of free information, refusing to recognise a variable means running the risk of being accused of manipulation. In other words, information obliges. The times of colonial empires fighting foreign wars far from the eyes of the rest of the world are definitively over. Although space may be broken down in terms of perception, it has become audible, as have the endogenous analyses produced there. In the meantime, confusion of times, areas and the complex interrelations between them and the autonomy of the new analysis of peripheral areas are glossed over, both by state administrations and by the press, as well as by international organisations.

In Europe, the perception has become one of an entity (the European Union), which has no need to attract, find its position, or even to explain itself—just being there is enough. It still takes on the perception of a follow-the-leader empire. But for the European Union, the essential question should not be what do we observe and with what accuracy, but who is doing the observing and with what intention. Is the intention to understand or to interfere? If there is no answer to this question, then in...
the best of cases, it is left open, and in the worst it is not asked. There is another hypothesis that is close to our analysis. Contradictory interests and complex relations have found a way to get along, in order to undertake a major project (European construction), but each for different reasons, and at times contradictory reasons. Thus, there is a multiple vision that clouds the differences by exhibiting the lowest common denominator, a technocratic and overzealous administration. In this case, the message that comes across is obviously distorted and may suggest that resources are wasted and invested to glorify the symbol of an Empire that doesn’t show its real nature. The response will be that the communication was given in full by the European Commission or the European Council, and that is probably true. Then comes the problem of relaying: has the EU made a distinction between “information” and “communication”, between “explaining” and “convincing”? An explanation, even subjective, reinforces autonomy; communication, conversely, increases the number of independent relays with their own analytical subjectivity.

The European Union, as the “promoter” of perspectives and projects, as an anti-empire alternative, will not be won over without a struggle. It must therefore stop being a simple “customer” for panic information and must be convinced to enter into the global information arena as a producer of complex information and perception.

This is the price of permanence based on the short term, and a challenge. In other words, to produce history rather than myth, one must demonstrate complexity. This is no doubt the subject that Europe handles the best, but it shifts its eyes to that fact. The time has come, however, to make this one of its crucial arguments.

Deleting the image, surpassing the moment

Managing, anticipating and simply governing, is a question of eumetrics. Placing oneself at the right distance from the event, the places and the people. Not hurrying to react to a sudden image and not wasting time either, by cultivating institutional complexity, successive filters, fields of competence, administrative borders, all forms of “home territory”. Joint subjectivity of information and perception requires functioning in a common pool of active appreciation. Active, because it must produce a continual perception; active as well because this perception must be transmitted as information.

The interpretation of the 2005 Bolivian crisis could be an example of this “return to information”. The election of Evo Morales, a peasant, trade unionist and coca grower, is generally represented as a return to the old days by a Latin America whose past was rich in major social conflicts and guerrilla movements. Morales himself, and the US State Department contribute to this image-making, both of them cultivating a belligerent, anti-imperialistic discourse. But the context in which this new conflict is described ignores two new aspects, which we feel are fundamental, and which are not considered by information agencies and analysts. The first has to do with the strong renewal of the concept of borders in Latin America which is the result of its entry onto the oil market in the globalisation era. Where are the major conflicts and challenges taking place? Since the devastating wars of Paraguay, the Pacific and Chaco, most of the countries have borders considered to be “indefinite” where they are relatively inaccessible (Andes, Amazon). This is a constant of long history leaning on the Brazilian tradition of a “Latin American nation” used as an ideological tool for this de facto acceptance. But the question of the border comes up again, particularly when it comes to transporting gas as well as for certain major reserves. On the one hand, major infrastructures must be constructed within these “undefined” areas, and on the other, certain gas and oil fields overlap several countries. This new emphasis on borders indicates, however, new regional capacities for emancipation. This “information” should anticipate a reflection on the effects of globalisation on North American supremacy in this region and show that it is running out of steam. Like roads, globalisation is not necessarily negative and above all, for Latin America, it is not synonymous with “American imperialism”. On the contrary, in the name of globalisation and internationalisation of the market, the US “home territory” is seriously challenged.

The reflection that introduces geopolitical complexity must find ways to enter the information arena, while allowing for a political redeployment, which is in reality already being enacted by European companies (as well as Chinese, Russian, Canadian, Japanese, etc.) specialised in the oil industry and infrastructure works. If the strength of image and perceptive habits remain invariable, and standardised concepts and discourses are not challenged, this is because panic information focuses on incidents (elections in Iraq) or a limited area (Afghanistan), and traumatic repetition (attacks) give them a long-lasting,
universal value. This is also because we have a cyclical and repetitive interpretation. The result is the setting up of tools and policies that – conceivably – are only effective in the primary matrices in which they were conceived. But they are perceived as acting on the globality, on an olos, which thus becomes imaginary.

However, to quote Guy Debord, "our times do not demand just a vague response to the question what should we do? If we want to stay abreast of things and to respond to them, almost every week we must answer the question 'What is happening?'" In addition, this question cannot rely on the analogies and standards of a cyclical, routine perception – on the contrary, as the primary matrix, it must achieve autonomy from panic information and its interested relays.

Thus, the challenge to globalisation of information and standardisation of perception needs an action on "sources" which, to be effective, must accept the role of an important player in the creation and perception of independent information. The European Union should therefore define means of perception and information and offer the rest of the world (as well as the Member States) its own vision of the world. It should also consider its own complexity, as the subject of information and coherent scheme alongside other systems of governance. Not with obsessive concern for promoting this model, but as a guarantee of autonomy and independent analysis. Finally, it should think of itself as a distributor of its own information, choosing to give its own explanation, as a body and a political and cultural project assuming its own complexity.

CHAPTER 27: DEVELOPING THE ROLE OF OSINT WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Summary

Dramatic changes to the intelligence landscape over the last fifteen years necessitate a complete change in the methods used in this sector, particularly in relation to the use of open source intelligence (OSINT), and of expertise in general. This presentation puts forward three essential reasons why the changes are required, especially with regard to changing the methods for approaching crises and the type of relations to be maintained with intelligence services. In short, the reasons cited include the emergence of crisis intelligence, the security upheavals of the last decade and the changing nature of security intelligence.

The intelligence crisis and the arrival of crisis intelligence

War intelligence”, the product of the various conflicts of the 20th century, was originally conceived as a defence mechanism directed first and foremost against foreign countries. The secret service was meant to prepare for military confrontation and a network of defence attachés represented an essential component of it. During the Cold War, it was built on relatively stable geopolitics based on national threats: the USSR, communist countries and allies, and East-West confrontation areas. In order to gather quantitative data on equipment, forces and military infrastructures, services developed a type of technology which gradually homogenised the profile of the personnel and weakened the quality of the recruits from the moment the scope of research became wider.

Security systems became progressively enormous with the US budget for intelligence today standing at approximately US$40 billion shared between 14 agencies. This amount would exceed the GDP of Romania or Nigeria. The intelligence community accounts for about 40,000 people. For example, between Canada (CSIS), New Zealand (GSCB), the United Kingdom (GCHQ) and the American NSA, signatory countries of the UK-USA treaty, there are 47,000 people working for the Echelon tapping network.

The community’s philosophy - the enemies of our enemies are our friends - is double-edged. An important role has been attributed to the renegades and the political parties in opposition to enemy dictatorships: take, for instance, Ahmed Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress, and the current Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi for the CIA, and Maryam Rajavi and the Iranian People’s Mujahedeen for France in the 1980s. Many current terrorists know the security services perfectly: for example, Osama Bin Laden, or Gulbuddin Hekmatyar recruited in Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets, or the Turkish Hezbollah in their fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the PKK.

Intelligence works externally and has a mirror-type structure of an opposing State possessing the same means (espionage and counter-espionage, diplomatic cover, specialised military espionage service, etc.). The spy has a status: often working under diplomatic cover, he is expelled in the event of a blunder but parallel and similar measures allow both countries to come to a draw. In the event of capture, the spy is exchanged and is rarely killed. Retaliation is always proportionate to the aggression.

1. European Company for Strategic Intelligence.
2. Centre for the Analysis, Long-range Planning and Evaluation of Defence.
3. Delegation for Strategic Affairs.
4. One of the USSR supervisors at the General Directorate for External Security of the French Government during the 1980s had never been to a socialist country.
The use of increasingly technical resources and the mistrust of the political power with regard to these “special” services gave birth to occasionally extremely specialised organisations (e.g. the NSA alongside the CIA in the USA). France has “only” six services gathering intelligence or specialised police services at its disposal, the same number as Japan. Fragmentation leads to mishaps, as was the case in 1991, when the French Ministry of Defence had four internal intelligence services as well as authority over the General Directorate for External Security and the Gendarmerie. This breakdown into individual operations necessitates the use of coordination mechanisms, which are always difficult to operate between competing services whose first rule of thumb is sometimes excessive secrecy (National Security Council in the USA, the Comité interministériel du renseignement (CIR) and now the Conseil de sécurité intérieure (CSI) in France).5

The crisis that all intelligence services in Western countries experienced during the 1970s and 1980s started with the exposure of the use of illegal means for shameful objectives: the CIA’s Operation Condor to insert military dictators in Latin America, Iranagate to deliver arms to the mullah’s regime, action against Greenpeace in France, or the involvement of the Italian services in the Bologna station attack – these are the services in crisis facing globalisation, new geopolitics and new threats.

The three upheavals of the last decade

The economic war: business and “transactions”6

Coming from the United States, this new post-Cold War service mission transposed military methods to the economic domain: action driven by the State, with the deployment of technical espionage resources (Echelon network) for the benefit of private companies. The former military Allies (France, Great Britain, etc.) became economic adversaries against which espionage methods were used to listen to businessmen and to reveal transactions involving corruption.7 This development would create difficulties for the services.

The new missions led spies to become interested in the “retro-commissions” paid to senior government officials of their own countries at the time of big export deals. The French Elf affair revealed the extent of certain practices, and the transaction involving the sale of frigates by France to Taiwan in 1991 is only just starting to become clear. This is a general phenomenon and the involvement of the national political elite can lead to a constitutional crisis, as in the case of Carlos Menem in Argentina, President Fujimori and the Head of Secret Services Montesinos in Peru, the indictment of the director of the Civil Guard for corruption in Spain, the flight of Prime Minister Bettino Craxi in Italy, and the arrest of Holger Fräih – former Secretary of State and Head of the Intelligence Services at the end of the Kohl Government - in Germany. Maybe the USA will be next, given the questionable relations revealed by journalists between Vice-President Dick Cheney and the Haliburton Company, which has won a number of contracts for reconstruction in Iraq. Mixing internal and external intelligence tends to lead to external intelligence services carrying out internal police investigations.8

Corrupt intermediaries who are good at mixing business and politics put the services in a difficult position. With the Governments - particularly the French – often hiding behind the defence of secrecy in refusing to provide the judge with a list of illegal acts - what ethical position can be expected from services that traditionally practise a “secrecy defence” to protect the country militarily in a “secrecy defence” to mask internal embezzlement? An ethical crisis is feared, which will hopefully benefit the journalist rather than the businessmen.9

Organised crime: limitations on transparency of financial matters

Drug trafficking and organised crime have been subjects for internal security requiring new forms of intelligence action for a long time. The creation of the Drug Enforcement Authority (DEA) in the USA or of Tracfin, a French financial services coordination body, are examples of this development. But during the Cold War, the military was the priority.

5. The French military information research centre, the Centre d’Etudes du Renseignement Militaire (CERM), compartmentalised between three armies, was axed by Pierre Joxe. Tired of not receiving any of its own intelligence from its services, the Minister decided to regroup them to create a directorate for military intelligence called the Direction du Renseignement Militaire in 1992.
6. The “Interministerial Intelligence Committee” and the “Internal Security Council” respectively.
7. The missed opportunities for coordinated action likely to have prevented the attacks of September 11 according to the US Congress on September 11.
9. The Stillwell-Carey Agreement puts an end (at least on the face of it as far as the USA is concerned) to reciprocal espionage.

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with "external" services given pre-eminence over internal ones. In Afghanistan, the CIA has gained the upper hand against the DEA, which fights drug trafficking but lets warlords traffic opium freely; the FBI of Edgar Hoover pursued American communists instead of dealing with the Italian-American Mafia; and the general proceeds of Irangate, which aimed to help the Contras in Nicaragua, are the product of drug trafficking and arms trading.

The geopolitics of dirty money are fundamentally different to those of war intelligence. They involve small tax-haven countries, large money markets and computerised banking activities, and require a change in the objectives, geography, means and methods of a system which is barely prepared for the new task.

Researching intelligence on the financial aspects of trafficking leads to a collision with the practices of the business world, which uses the same networks as those used for money laundering10. The US Government opposes an agreement in the framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development on tax havens so as not to hinder the activity of its businessmen. Similarly, the British Government will not accept stricter regulation of activities in the City. The declaration of “a global war against terrorist funds” made during all the emotion of September 11, has left the services without any means of tracking the cash flows of Bin Laden and fellow terrorists.

In these two new missions, the old rules of reciprocity are no longer respected and practices can become very violent: the number of French and Taiwanese deaths11 in the Taiwan frigates affair demonstrates that secret agents have lost their protected status. The same goes for General Dalla Chiesa in Italy, famous for his success in the fight against the terrorism of the extreme left, who was assassinated by the Mafia when he wanted to apply the same methods to fight the “Mob”.

10. See Laske, K., (2004), Des coffres si bien garnis, Denoel, and the notes of the General Directorate for External Security cited on pp. 132 and 133. The case of the French Chief of Staff being listened to by the French services following retro-commissions is recalled.

11. In this respect, the controversy that pitches the American justice system against the Time journalists who had revealed the past as a CIA agent of the wife of the Ambassador Joseph Wilson, probably through secret information provided by the White House, is interesting.


13. For example, the deaths of Thierry Imbot and of the Taiwanese colonel, Yin Chin Feng.

Terrorism and proliferation: the limitations of technical resources and the choice of the allies

During the 1990s, the services showed certain contempt for the “grey areas” in which crises that no longer have anything at stake seem to perpetuate themselves, like Afghanistan, evacuated by the Soviets12. The low levels of interest in the threat of terrorism were grounded in the strong conviction of the military and political superiority of the West. Bill Clinton, in the aftermath of the attacks on American embassies in East Africa, was happy to aim cruise missiles at the camps of Bin Laden and a chemicals factory in Sudan, showing the limitations of the “war against terrorism” at the time.

But terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - the current threats - have become intertwined, taking on a supranational dimension due to their organisation, networks, protection and objectives, and disrupt traditional methods. Here too, the external-internal distinction is obsolete. State terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s13, which the services had been able to follow and counter quite effectively because it used State methods, gave way to the present “terrorism without borders”.

Technical methods of seeking intelligence have subsequently lost some of their appeal. Terrorist networks are human environments that have to be penetrated, without employing major State logistics - satellite photos and tapping are not very good at detecting them. This is probably why the first alerts since the 1993 attack against the World Trade Center, were not heeded. “The intelligence” of the organisers of the attacks of September 11 on the American homeland relied on the simplicity of the methods used, thus bypassing all usual alert indicators: the use of civilian rather than military resources, the choice of civilian targets, the use of normal objects rather than weapons by militants with no known political past. Supported by logistics in several different countries, it caught the specialised and poorly coordinated services off-guard.

If nuclear proliferation implies heavy infrastructures easily detected with technical methods, this is not the case for chemical, bacteriological and biological proliferations, which can be developed in conditions that are technically undetectable. The Iraqi precedent has already served as an example. The first UN inspection missions in Iraq worked mainly on the basis of US satellite intelligence and in 1995 they believed that they had visited all of Saddam’s programmes for weapons of mass destruction. Following the flight of Kamel Hassan, the son-in-law of the dictator, it was discovered that practically nothing was known about non-nuclear information, things
which could be concealed within ordinary contexts (e.g. biological weapons in hospital environments), which could only be evaluated by humans. The failure of the CIA and the British secret intelligence service MI6, with their lack of human resources, to detect weapons of mass destruction in Iraq today demonstrates this clearly.

-faced with these new enemies, the traditional allies are changing. War intelligence has sometimes collided with the interests of the Government backing it. Thus for a long time, the CIA was forbidden by the White House from carrying out investigations in Saudi Arabia, the main American ally in the region. It was the same for the Shah’s Iran prior to the Islamic revolution. French services have the same problems in Africa15. Today, it is necessary to collaborate with countries or services that are volatile regarding various issues such as Saudi Arabsians and Pakistanis vis-à-vis Islamists, and Pakistanis vis-à-vis drug trafficking and trafficking of nuclear materials.

From war intelligence to security intelligence

Intelligence in crisis

The big democracies threw themselves into post-Cold War international security with blind confidence in their military supremacy. For 15 years, international attention has been focused on the Gulf with the first war against Iraq, Yugoslavia and the different States emerging from its break-up, Somalia, Rwanda, Timor and then Haiti. Attention was then turned back to Afghanistan and Iraq or the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Ivory Coast today: Iran and North Korea are still being monitored, as are French language African States. No fixed arrangement can cover the new, geopolitical totality of crises and new international actions. Politicians have never made real choices relying on “services” to anticipate what will happen.

The security intelligence field must comply with new constraints. It has to understand the multiplicity of - sometimes allied, sometimes rivals - players in the changing strategies, (e.g. the KLA during the war in Kosovo, the strategy of the Americans in Iraq), to cover the variety and diversity of the crises that can be caused by insecurities and to adapt to new types of actions by the political powers which can decide without reason to intervene (e.g. Timor or Somalia), sometimes on their own (Rwanda), sometimes as part of a coalition (Afghanistan). From strategic military information, intelligence has become the parameter of an unpredictable political decision. The political powers never made a real choice, always requesting more services while failing to avoid the structural contradictions between the different recent missions16.

International security is no longer played out through military supremacy but through crises and threats, where those involved are not just the States, but also groups united by new and unpredictable solidarities, “e-communities”, with global and multisectoral strategies. They often use ordinary means of communication (Internet, mobiles, etc.), sometimes from ungoverned areas such as the tribal areas of Pakistan, and work indiscriminately inside or outside of the country.

Security intelligence research is the product of a synthesis of different approaches. It requires a mammoth evaluation of crisis situations and of the strategy of players, and is made up of evaluations and summaries rather than interceptions and detailed data. It is obtained by direct human contact as much as - and perhaps more than - by technical means. Security intelligence has become a continuum, which synthesises the surveillance of groups within State borders, and their contacts with others groups in foreign countries.

Osint then intelligence

The explosion of the Internet and of the information society has completely changed the traditional role of intelligence. Whereas beforehand it was relatively easy to explore open knowledge on the Soviet enemy and to qualify as “intelligence” everything that was found on the subject, today it is necessary to conduct an extremely exhaustive inventory of what open information offers, in order to devote the available resources to finding what is missing16. The US Senate experimented with making an inventory of the information available on the Internet on Burundi in the event of intervention of US troops, and the study shows that 90% of useful information is available on the web16. Following various consultations, the USA built a large interministerial documentation service called the Foreign

14. Only one agent in the CIA spoke Pashto when George Bush decided to go to war against this country and four double agents in Iraq before the war according to a US Congress report.
15. Libyan attacks against civil Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian planes, for example, in the 1970s and 1980s.
16. See the case of the 1995 assassination of Judge Borel in Djibouti who was investigating the 1990 attack on the Café de Paris.
17. One interesting example is that of the Carlyle fund, a company of the economic war created by the CIA to take shares in foreign companies specialising in critical technologies. One of the members of the rich Bin Laden family had invested funds in it.
Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS), which works on the orders of all the authorities and services for a systematic and coherent approach on open sources.

Intelligence is increasingly becoming a human activity that resembles economic intelligence, which has at its core external experts who are specialised and can travel and circulate easily (e.g. geographers, political scientists, journalists, businessmen, academics, and humanitarian workers). Due to a lack of constructive thinking on the subject, the intelligence community uses the same sources and obviously arrives at the same conclusions18.

Privatisation of intelligence methods

The commercialisation of satellite images allows undeniable access to information that is linked to intelligence. Thus, the European Commission in Brussels has requested a study on Iranian nuclear potential to be carried out by the Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen (IPSC), which specialises in the analysis of satellite images of such quality and accuracy that they are as good - if not better - than those of the CIA.

Blurring of borders between external and internal intelligence

Already in Europe, the terrorist attacks of the 1970s and 1980s provided police services with a new role. Internal security and the necessity of prevention made it essential for the organisation to be modified: the French department for the security of the territory, the DST, obtained permission to open outposts in other countries which were normally exclusively handled by the General Directorate for External Security, and the DEA has been competent abroad for some time.

Such organisation implies different working methods and set-ups. The collaboration between the different authorities is presently as poor as between the services themselves19. The intelligence community, which is still highly militarised, should at least include customs and treasury services. New information technologies allow for the sharing of data, which is fiercely opposed by the services.

The organisation and the assignment of services still follows the major rules laid down by the era of “war intelligence” (division between the police and counter-espionage, internal versus external intelligence, military intelligence on its own, and a multiplicity of different services). Since September 11, the primacy of internal intelligence over external intelligence has now been confirmed, involving a degree of risk for democratic principles. The US’ so-called “Patriot Act” law, which is essentially designed to increase the security of the US territory, gives priority to intelligence collected for this purpose to services that are external (financial and biometric data, containers, etc.) and centralised.

It is in the new relations between the different authorities and academic expertise that the intelligence services will truly find their niche. Maintaining expertise is a public service, which reaffirms the importance of humanitarian sciences thought to have been abandoned long ago.

18. See in particular the reports prepared by NATO (Nato open source intelligence, November and February 2002) and at the initiative of the Americans (Intelligence exploitation of the Internet, October 2002) www.osint.net.

THE ROLE OF OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

Interview with Axel Dyèvre

Could you explain the difference between traditional and open source intelligence?

Intelligence agencies are primarily focused on obtaining information that is not available to ordinary citizens, for example through networks of agents, by monitoring electronic communications, or by examining satellite photography. Certainly, the vast majority of these agencies’ funding is dedicated to these forms of intelligence. On the other hand, the amount of publicly available information is growing daily, with huge numbers of formal, and an even greater number of informal contributors posting information on the web. This information is often equally useful to take mission critical decisions. The fact that it is not classified does not mean that it is easy to find or easy to interpret. The challenge for intelligence or risk analysts is to identify all the actionable information and analyse it.

What’s the relevance of OSINT in crisis or conflict prevention?

In today’s information society, OSINT (open source intelligence) is set to play a pivotal role for those working in crisis response, whether they are working in the field, in crisis prevention, in conflict evaluation or in event monitoring.

All too often, information in the public domain is neglected by decision makers or opinion leaders in favour of information from traditional intelligence sources such as human intelligence (HUMINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT).

This is paradoxical. Intelligence services, and particularly the CIA, have carried out many studies in recent years on the relation between intelligence and OSINT. The figures varied, but all of the studies shared similar conclusions: between 35% and 95% of the information used by the US Government Intelligence, after processing, came from open sources. This said, you should note that the amounts allocated to OSINT by US agencies did not exceed 1% of their budgets. Therefore economic argument in favour of OSINT cannot be refuted: 1% of expenditure contributes to at least 35% of the results!

It is not surprising therefore that intelligence services all over the world are becoming increasingly interested in OSINT. As part of the post 9/11 reform process of the intelligence community, the CIA announced in November 2005 the creation of a special structure to deal with Open Source, the Open Source Centre. In December 2005, John Negroponte, the US Director of National Intelligence, appointed Eliot A. Jardines as Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Open Source. His mission is to set up a policy framework for the use of OSINT within the American intelligence community.

How do you explain the uncommon performance of OSINT?

Well it’s very simple: as Steven Mercado suggested in an important article published in the CIA’s Studies in Intelligence Journal, “There are far more bloggers, journalists, pundits, television reporters, and think-tankers in the world than there are case officers”. All these actors can cover the ground in much more detail than any security agency. With nearly one billion surfers, tens of thousands of news sites and over 43 million blogs, that is a potential mass of several hundred thousand items of information published every day. Some of them, filtered with the right tools and the right competence, could turn out to be key elements to take decisions in conflict prevention or crisis response, whatever the crisis. It is necessary to overcome the confusion that exists between the interest and reliability of an item of information and its degree of secrecy. For example, an extremely secret source can provide erroneous information, while on an analysis in a newspaper or on a website may prove correct!

Of course, it is human nature to confuse the messenger and the message, but when it comes to intelligence or mission critical information, the value of a source and the value of an item of information have been subject to parallel evaluation.

How could OSINT be used in conflict prevention or in the course of a crisis response operation?

A very important advantage of OSINT is that the information is public (mind you “public” means that it is not classified, it doesn’t mean that it’s easy to find...). In the context of European and multilateral operations, involving governmental players (including military and civilian intelligence), humanitarian

1. On this subject, see: Markowitz, Joseph, (Summer 1993), “The Open Source Role”, Horizons 1 and 2, OSINT

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organisations, international and private institutions, the use of OSINT is particularly useful. Being unclassified at the origin it can be released without problem to those in the field and at headquarters. Every one of the crisis responders has a “need to know” basis for that information and by passing it on nobody breaks any confidentiality rule. Think of information concerning physical security threats: imagine being able to gather all the (public) threat reports coming from all the actors on the ground in Kabul, and then sharing that information in real-time….

So this means the end of secrecy then…?

Not really. As I said before, raw OSINT information is naturally unclassified. But in the open source intelligence process, further interpretation and analysis of that raw information can lead to sensitive conclusions, which may deserve a classification depending on the impact its disclosure may create. With OSINT it is the analysis that creates the value, not only the source.

But if I understand you correctly everyone could become an OSINT analyst.

There is a part of truth in what you say, but just a small part. There are many misperceptions concerning OSINT. If you are good at using Google it is not enough. If you also have a subscription to a database service it is better, but it is still not enough. OSINT is, first of all, a process that takes a lot of time and if a non-specialist with outdated resources tries to use OSINT, it takes even longer. Identifying useful open sources (the art of sourcing), qualifying them, categorising and structuring the signals they carry is a skill that can be learnt, but it cannot be improvised. To excel in OSINT you need to adopt a robust, scientific methodology. You also need to avoid working using the “means at our disposal”: you need to have the right human resources, and the right technology.

What is the most important skill for an OSINT analyst?

The capacity to detect the different nature (legitimate or illegitimate) of the influence strategies carried out by the various sources. New information and communication technologies have changed the parameters of our information environment significantly. The first change is the speed at which information (or disinformation or propaganda) spreads. The second major change is the new access modalities. We are theoretically in a situation where we can be permanently connected (or permanently capable to communicate). All the information published on the planet is now, theoretically, within everyone’s reach. So you have to stay tuned in all the time or you risk alienating yourself from the epicentres of information. Finally, in the global business of crisis response, analysts have to master the Internet. The importance of the Internet as a vehicle for spreading information is undeniable both because of its audience and because journalists use the Internet on a large scale as a source of information. So traditional media, the very media on which the listener and reader rely for selected and validated information, basically use the same information and validation channels as their audience. This closes a loop, and dramatically increases the possibility to influence because transmitters and receivers are tending to become more and more intertwined.

I presume OSINT analysts have to be good at finding things, first and foremost.

Absolutely. The volumes of information involved are enormous. You have the web and you also have the printed and audiovisual reporting which is distributed in a different way then you have a plethora of databases accessible via the Internet that distribute and archive specialised information from all over the world. For an example, LexisNexis provides access to approximately 30 000 different sources that cannot be found on the Internet. Then increasingly you have weblogs or blogs, which are online publications mostly produced by individuals. It is clear that the credibility and quality of an article published in Le Monde, Le Figaro or the Washington Post has nothing in common with a message posted on a blog. But we should not lose sight of the fact that the “Lewinsky Affair” was stirred up by a blog, and that the obscurity of the source did not prevent the scandal from assuming global proportions!

What would be the added value of OSINT for crisis responders and particularly for those in charge of reconstruction and rehabilitation?

The context does not change. You need to have tools that facilitate the process of filtering valuable content from noise. Then you need to be able track exactly the evolution of events; then review them critically to distinguish truth from manipulation; relevant content from the irrelevant; mission critical information from ordinary news coverage; and true details from details that may anticipate very relevant consequences.

Let me explain how it works. Following the earthquake in Pakistan on 8 October 2005, a Donors’ Conference was held in Islamabad on 19 November 2005. This event gave rise to a real influence strategy by the Pakistani Government, to get its views across the donor community. If you track the subject “Kashmir – earthquake – reconstruction” using a dedicated software, for example the
Pericles’ monitoring and analysis system, you will be able to tap massive flows of information in all languages and be alerted about any “anomaly” in the behaviour of the information. An “anomaly” can be defined as an unusual amount of articles covering the same topic or an unusual correlation between a person and a debate. With this type of software the user defined the type of anomaly he or she wants to find. In the case of the earthquake in Pakistan the interesting element for someone responsible for the reconstruction is the attitude of the players involved (political leaders, international and national organisations, governments and NGOs), with regard to the specific issue of damage assessment. Evaluating the cost of reconstruction was the key issue of the Donors’ Conference. Over 5 000 public news sites worldwide were active in that occasion on that topic. In the months leading up to the Donors’ Conference, nearly 1 300 documents from media, governments, international institutions and NGOs discussed the upcoming event. Out of all these documents, about 150 were specifically related to damage assessment.

The specific ability of the Pericles system to locate the geographical origin of this information, categorise it by its tone, enables swift detection of any type of anomaly. For example, in the days leading up to the conference, the subject of damage assessment suddenly took a very political turn. The Pakistani Government had engaged in a genuine (and understandable) operation to influence donors to agree to their terms. This was happening while the emotion aroused by the earthquake was subsiding worldwide. Pericles had not only detected this decline in the global attention but also had spotted that from 11 November, the issue of reconstruction and particularly that of damage assessment was attracting more and more coverage in Pakistan. On 9 November, Pakistan’s English language newspaper, Dawn, published an article entitled “Government, Donors differ on Damage”, indicating that the Damage Assessment Team consisting of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) valued the cost of reconstruction at US$2.78 billion. But the same newspaper stated a few lines later that the Pakistani Government contested that conclusion, putting the cost at three times that figure. This was taken up with varying degrees of precision by the rest of the Pakistani press, but the information was hardly covered anywhere else in the world!

Was it a deliberate choice or the fruit of lack of attention to the Pakistani context?

The influence campaign by the Pakistani Government continued on the 11 November, when Reuters agency published a news story saying that the Damage Assessment Team had evaluated the damage at US$5.2 billion dollars. According to the press agency, this figure came from an adviser to the Pakistani Government! The story was at that moment relayed all over the world. The figure was gradually confirmed by the donors, and even became the basis of the conference of 19 November. That day the Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz declared: “It’s a very successful day for Pakistan. The results are better than our expectations... these are the fruits of our policies and recognition of Pakistan’s role in the region”.

On 28 November, an article entitled “Pakistan seeks opportunity in face of tragedy” in the Dallas Morning News, covered by a large number of American newspapers, pointed to the success of the Pakistani Government’s influence campaign, by insisting on the positive effects that the reconstruction aid should have on the country’s economy. That article highlights how Pakistan was able to exploit its strategic position in the “war against terror”, to win over the US Government and all the donors to share its view.

3 Pericles is a Global Intelligence Platform, created and developed by the French software editor Datops. It comprises three main parts, functioning on the intelligence cycle model and adapted to an intelligence organisation. These include the following:
- agent server with automated capture and tagging;
- linguistic and semantic indexations; and
- automated classification with graphical visualisation and analytical tools.

Pericles is able to monitor millions of websites, forums, blogs and databases, as well as gather and treat thousands of documents per hour.
One of the main reasons I was spurred on to cover the earthquake in Pakistan (October 2005) was the scant coverage in the Swedish media. Hurricane Katrina, by contrast, dominated Swedish airwaves for a considerable period when it wreaked havoc in the USA.

I flew to Pakistan about a month and half after the earthquake, at a time when winter was fast approaching, temperatures had dropped considerably and rain was hampering relief efforts. I decided to concentrate on the city of Balakot, one of the worst-hit towns in north-west Pakistan. In total, I spent two weeks there walking around from dawn until dusk capturing the daily lives of ordinary people in the aftermath of the earthquake. Usually when I work, I prefer to focus on one particular place as it is a way to build relations with the local people and try to understand what they are going through. Many of the people I met were still suffering from the shock of what had happened. Children were especially affected and were in dire need of psychological help.

The photos you see here were taken using Fujifilm 200 ISO and 400 ISO and with the two cameras that I usually use a Nikon F100 and a F4.

[ Pieter Ten Hoopen ]
29 November 2005, Balakot, Pakistan
Men are sitting in line, waiting to collect 25,000 rupees as a compensation for their destroyed houses.

© Pieter Ten Hoopen / Moment / Agence Vu
1 December 2005, Balakot, Pakistan

More than two months after the earthquake, people still search for the bodies of their family members.

© Pieter Ten Hoopen / Moment / Agenzia VU
5 December 2005, Balakot, Pakistan
Chazat is 17 months old. She broke her arm and suffered dehydration in the valley on her way down from the mountains to the clinic.

© Pieter Ten Hoopen / Moment / Agenza VU
4 December 2005, Balakot, Pakistan
Young boy traumatised after the earthquake, which totally destroyed the city of Balakot on 8 October 2005

© Pieter Ten Hoopen / Moment / Agence VU
December 2005, Balakot, Pakistan
Food distribution after the earthquake

© Pieter Ten Hoopen / Moment / Agence VU
December 2005, Balakot, Pakistan
Afghani labour workers cleaning the centre of Balakot

© Pieter Ten Hoopen / Moment / Agence VU
1 December 2005, Balakot, Pakistan

Young girls are collecting clothes to face the winter that has just started in Balakot.

© Pieter Ten Hoopen / Moment / Agence VU
1 December 2005, Balakot, Pakistan

The old city hotel

© Pieter Ten Hoopen / Moment / Agence VU
**CHAPTER 28: MAKING SENSE OF INFORMATION OVERLOAD**

**Summary**

Having too much information at hand risks overwhelming anyone who needs to analyse and make sense of information. Traditional methods of analysis and information-sharing need to be reviewed if smart organisations are to adapt efficiently to this new information-rich environment. Information technology solutions can provide effective assistance in the role of information analysis.

An old paradigm needs replacing

In the industrial era, information was scarce: it was hard to know how many battleships the British had, how many missiles the Russians had, even maps locating electricity grids were state secrets. In that context, information was power.

Today information is not just available, it is overwhelmingly abundant. The problem is to make sense of it, to grasp which nuggets of information to look at more deeply, and which to leave aside. In this context, thinking is power.

Unfortunately, our societies are geared towards the industrial era and its problems. The pedagogic approach of schools and universities often emphasises learning of facts, reflecting that the scarce resource of yesterday was information. Our governmental institutions are similar, having the additional “benefit” of hierarchy, where “information” is passed up and down lines of command in long and wearisome processes, while the real world outside moves at light speed.

Societies and governments in the 21st century can no longer afford to live by the industrial era precepts and fail because of the three fallacies. The skills of thinking and communication must become the essential assets, and these skills can empower individuals if – and only if – mind-sets and organisational structures are then adapted as well. In schools, this would require the teaching of thinking, in governments, the investment of time in collective thinking processes.

If fundamental changes are not made, then attempts to introduce post-industrial tools – such as open source intelligence – will simply fail, as industrial-era organisations function as: industrial-era organisations function as if:

1. the expert knows best;
2. complexity means analysis paralysis;
3. completed analysis is mission accomplished.

Towards a new paradigm worth of open source

**Share and Analyse**

All too many institutions try to “make sense of the world” using the old logic of “the expert knows best” even when faced with the mass of information produced by open sources. Rather than looking for a holistic view, bringing in individuals from many different backgrounds to share their expertise in a constructive, open process, they salami-slice issues and allocate them to specialists, often leading to power struggles about who is actually “competent” on a given issue. Although an expert may know a lot about one subject, they cannot always and automatically relate this to the broader picture, and moreover are prone to have their own deeply entrenched beliefs and views which are hard to challenge, as they are “the expert”.

In order to develop an alternative – shared thinking – tools can help (just as they do in every other area of human activity). Software, such as the Eidos suite, can help diverse groups to share their understanding of a problem by, for instance, establishing what the main issues are and how they causally relate to each other. As the picture is built together, a common language emerges for the group, and learning takes place. By “outsourcing the brain” to an electronic platform, it is possible to turn personalised arguments into object-oriented conversations. Moreover, it is then possible to establish which factors are “drivers”, as by their connectivity, they stand out from the crowd (numbered balls on the right corresponding to the boxes on the left, location determined by number and strength of arrows, with those issues bottom left not being of great significance for this group of analysts).

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Visualise and Organise

In the industrial-era organisation, visualisation is often limited to written documents; just look at how most parliaments and governments present and discuss complex legislation\(^1\). If comments on this form of analysis are requested from others, the suggestions can usually only take the form of written amendments to the text. This promotes linear left-brain logic, totally ignoring right-brain processes. Moreover, it provokes arguments based on a misunderstanding of individual words. This approach reflects another fallacy, which is fear of complexity leading to analysis paralysis. As everything seems to be linked to everything, it is easier to pretend that a piece of energy policy legislation is, for example, distinct and separate from environment policy, even if in reality the former may have a negative impact on goals trying to be achieved by the latter.

But complexity need not lead to analysis paralysis. By investing time in advance to bring their different experts together for a day of thinking, an organisation can save time later, as the participating experts become more adept at “flying high and flying low”, in other words being able to see how incoming information fits into a bigger picture, and then to zoom in on the particular facet which is their own expertise.

For instance, using Eidos tools to gain this “helicopter approach” in the world of open source intelligence, it becomes possible for groups to develop and play with real-time scenarios. A group can take each of the key drivers identified, and suggest plausible, relevant, different and challenging sub-scenarios of what could happen to that key driver. By means of a matrix, the group can establish which sub-scenarios are consistent with which others.

The computer can then suggest plausible scenarios. Having organised the input received, analysts can thereafter use the open source search mechanisms to see if there are any “weak” or “strong” signals indicating that a given scenario appears to be emerging.

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1. There is a (possibly apocryphal) story that an elected Member of the UK House of Commons was accused of contempt of Parliament for attempting to illustrate a point he was making during a debate on the floor of the house by holding up a paper with a chart printed on it!
By visualising and organising, it is possible to understand systematically what is happening – and also to conceive of systemic-level strategies and policy responses in return. By working through complexity in a rigorous manner, rather than simplifying and ignoring it, a group will gain real insight, without falling into the analysis paralysis trap.

**Interact and Review**

The industrial product was mass produced. It was built, sold and then thrown away. Despite the fact that so many analysts reports suffer exactly this fate (being written, handed over to the "client", and never actually acted upon as the reader has not "bought-in", or simply does not have time to read) many organisations still persist in producing analysis in this way. Analysis has become a goal in itself, regardless of whether it leads to any change in the organisation receiving it.

The 21st century needs something different: useful analysis cannot afford to be ignored in a world where competitive advantage is driven by brain power. An initial insight will need to be tested, adapted, and even turned inside out. The analysis provided must be interactive and adaptive; indeed, it should always be possible to review what was done before and see if something has changed without having to throw away all the work completed.

Here any form of software presents an advantage, in that the files can be accessed and adapted. The Eidos suite takes the concept a couple of steps further, allowing users to challenge assumptions and interact at every stage. For instance, when deciding on what strategy to adopt in the face of various plausible scenarios over various time periods – one year, three years and ten years – a decision-maker can "play" with the assumptions made by his or her analysts to see the sensitivity of any given strategy to a scenario coming about. In this way, a seamless process can be established which runs from analysis coming in from open (and other) sources, through to constant "strategising", where strategy is not a one-off decision taken every five years, but an ongoing thinking process.
Time for the 21st century
S.A.V.O.I.R.

Investing time in having groups of individuals think about issues together in advance is seen as self-evidently necessary in some organisations, and completely alien in others. It is perhaps no surprise that the first type of organisation is more often small, and in the private or voluntary sector, whereas the latter is more often large and in the public sector. But it is a reality: if organisations wish to draw the maximum benefit from open source information, they cannot just bolt it on to their existing structures. Instead, they will need to re-think how they Share and Analyse incoming information, how they Visualise and Organise the consequent knowledge flows, and how they Interact and Review the decisions that must be taken as result. With tools such as Eidos, an alternative process of this variety becomes much simpler.
CHAPTER 29: SCENARIOS FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Summary

It can be argued that one of the characteristics of a crisis is a certain element of suddenness. Crises “flare up” and it is often difficult to predict how or when they will occur. Hence, “preparedness planning” – planning for different eventualities – is part of the crisis manager’s toolkit. Scenarios are built on the interplay between “givens” and “uncertainties”. The givens offer a base to describe possible futures when different outcomes of uncertainties are taken into account.

Scenario analysis was developed in a time of relative geopolitical stability. The world was bipolar, and strategies could be developed on this basis. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and with the growing impact of globalisation, the issue of the global system is up for discussion. The hypothesis is that complexity has increased – the relative amount of givens has decreased while the number of uncertainties has increased.

Scenario analysis is – like all forms of analysis – a method for simplification. The presumption is that one can cover most relevant issues in creating, say, between four and six scenarios. Experience tells us that the utility of scenario analysis quickly diminishes when one moves above this number of “images of the future”. With a large number of scenarios, the analysis tends to reflect existing complexity, doing the job of cutting through seemingly chaotic conditions and delivering insight to core circumstances and problems. In this world of geopolitical complexity and instability, is it possible to still deliver value through a restricted number of images of the future?

The trivial answer is that four to six images of the future are better than one, especially in conditions of uncertainty. A map of the future that works with more than one outcome can accommodate more information than traditional forecasting. This observation is valid but it does not meet the challenge that more is demanded of all forms of future-oriented analysis when complexity increases. How should scenario practice develop to meet this challenge?

Developing scenario practice

This issue will be discussed in three ways:

• First, I will make a few observations concerning the question of method. The main conclusion is that more attention must be paid to the aesthetic aspects of scenario construction. The fact is further underlined that the narrative is not just a means to communicate a given scenario, e.g. through giving it a catchy name, it is at the heart of the process and a method in itself.

• Second, I will have a look at the geopolitical discussion. During the past 10 to 15 years, a number of theories and predictions have been presented concerning the direction in which the world is moving. Many of them have become natural points of reference for the discussion on geopolitics. Any relevant “scenario cross” on geopolitics must address central themes of these ideas. Is it possible to capture them in this way?

• Finally, the scenarios presented will be discussed in terms of crisis management and early-warning systems. Do they point out different kinds of possible crises and, consequently, emphasise inclusion of different variables and indicators in an early-warning system?

Method

Scenarios resemble any other future-oriented scientific endeavour. Working with “givens” and “uncertainties” is not peculiar to qualitative scenario practice. Rather, it is the standard way of operating when constructing, say, econometric models.

In modelling, the “givens” could be said to be the properties ascribed to endogenous factors in the model: what the factors are, the equations that bind them together etc. “Uncertainties”, on the other hand, can be interpreted as similar to the exogenous variables. These are the variables that the econometrician allows to vary, testing different outcomes when plugged into the model.

Thus, the analyst can – and often does – produce a number of alternative images of the future through introducing different exogenous variables or different values of these variables into the model. The result is answers to a number of “what if” questions. What happens, under given assumptions, if the oil price increases, if China revalues its currency or if the currency is revalued while oil prices move upwards simultaneously?

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And, indeed, what is offered is a form of scenario analysis – econometricians present their results as scenarios. It is standard practice in long-term economic forecasting to present a “normal” development, an “optimistic” development and a more “pessimistic” one. The same goes for urban planning and its population assumptions. In this area, one is often met by “maximum”, “minimum” and “middle of the way” forecasts. It is debatable whether these should called “scenarios” or “alternative forecasts”. I would call them alternative forecasts.

It is often standard procedure when constructing scenarios of the kind discussed in this seminar that both the method and the means of presentation get their inspiration from modelling. The process is a kind of “intuitive modelling”. We identify driving forces (variables), construct matrices specifying the interaction between them, identify general outcomes based on this interaction etc. When presenting scenarios, we often do it in the form of causal chains, showing the variables as boxes with causal relationships depicted as arrows between them. Using the language of economics and natural sciences gives the audience a sense of scientific thought, with its rigour and logic.

However, there are problems with this ideal when complexity increases. For econometricians with their computer-based models, there is a problem of transparency. The audience (decision-makers, general public etc.) cannot see – let alone understand – the properties of the model. It tends to be a “black box”, assessed by its predictive performance in the past. With growing complexity and incremental tinkering with a model, it also tends to become a black box for the analysts themselves. This is not a problem, as long as the model goes on performing well in its predictions.

But in a process where intuition plays an important role – when research is brought to a facilitated seminar where the participants go about identifying “crosses” or “trees”, formulating outcomes and giving them names etc., there is a very real problem with increasing complexity. And, as noted above, we are in such a situation: geopolitical variables must today be introduced to a much larger extent in the thinking when producing scenarios.

However there are problems with this ideal when complexity increases. Scenarios deliver value in more ways than econometric models. Value is not just attached to the content of the scenarios, being able to say that we got it right sometime in the future. Analyses of the effects of scenario exercises show that the process delivers a lot of value. Letting people reflect about the future together, in a fact-based and structured setting, opens new perspectives, creates contacts, offers a common language and makes participants sensitive to the relevance of contextual circumstances. A computer program cannot replace a good workshop.

The problem is that the number of variables or driving forces that can be handled intuitively is finite. It is impossible to say exactly where things get so complex that a discussion loses focus – this probably varies from audience to audience. But in a world where actions led by Subcomandante Marcos in Chiapas, Mexico result in higher interest rates for my home in Uppsala, Sweden within hours or even minutes, chances are that this limit is easy to transcend. So, are we left with a tragic choice between quality of process and quality of outcome – i.e. the scenarios?

It is a fair guess that the academic discipline that works with the most complex social phenomena is history. Understanding geopolitics is at the core when studying world history, and it has probably been so as long as history has existed as an art and an academic discipline.

History enlightens us about historical eras, revolutions, world wars, and the rise and fall of dominant powers. Even if scientific ideals and quantitative methods nowadays form a part of the discipline, the core method is something different. Much of what is studied is too complex to be able to analyse in this way. The best way to learn about the French revolution is probably not by describing it with econometric techniques and creating a model. Historical narrative still holds its ground for good reason.

Depicting complex situations and developments using the means of a narrative or story is common way of making sense of historical data, especially when the subject matter is geopolitical. The ability to tell a good story is thus more than a way to illustrate your findings – it is the core competence of the good historian and “research method”.

Why is this so? The narrative is an extremely efficient way of creating insight into complex matters and processes. You seldom have to tell the whole story in order to gain an understanding: a good narrative is open-ended and new snippets of information can easily be inserted into the plot as they surface. At the extreme we find poetry: a good Japanese haiku offers insight into deep, existential issues with a few words. The trick is creating a narrative that stimulates further reflection and development, and doing this is not just a question of

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1. This happened as a result of the Taco Bell War in 1994. Zapatista activities were met by attacks from the Mexican army. A presidential candidate was killed during a political rally. The Peso fell sharply, US/G7 guaranteed billion dollar funds to bail out the Mexican economy. Concern about the future of the Mexican economy caused global interest rates to rise.
of the trade. My observation is that this way of working differs from the one resembling the tools of natural science. The point is that practitioners, in order to accommodate the increasing contextual complexity that follows from today’s geopolitical situation, must strive to become even more adept at developing scenario planning as an art.

This brings us to a few conclusions

• The first is that aesthetic/artistic skills will become even more important when creating scenarios (not just when communicating the final results).

• A second conclusion is that what Kees van der Heijden calls “deductive scenario structuring” is probably more appropriate when handling complex issues. This way of working means that one – after establishing key events or key trends – describes a future state and then proceeds by creating the best possible story that leads up to this end-state. Here we can ask which factors or events fit best in a such a story and new facts – maybe not uncovered by previous research – can be inserted.

• A third is that aesthetic presentations of core narratives of scenarios must be introduced much earlier than is often done in the process, aiding the participants in an association game where one identifies what fits and how, in the story you are writing together during the exercises. Causal links might enter the discussion – but then as a part of the story, offering deeper understanding of the plot.

Inductive structuring, on the other hand, does not start off with an image of the future that can capture the imagination; scenarios are reached by starting with the individual variables and assumptions of causal chains between them. The narrative is the result, not the starting point. This means that the power of the narrative method does not play the same role during the process.

The geopolitical debate: sketching scenarios

It is easy to overstate how much simpler things were in the past. International politics have always been among the more theoretically sophisticated branches of political science, theory lies closer to the surface when discussing international phenomena, and some tools – such as game theory – were created to understand factors like the nuclear race. History also shows how simplistic thinking could result in disastrous decisions - for example the Vietnam War.

However, I maintain that complexity is greater today. In recent times, new classes of theories have been presented. The discussion often (but not always) centres round the feeling that we are now experiencing a new world, where new and more sophisticated concepts are needed to come to grips with what is going on. Communism, after all, seems to be a thing of the past, at least as a leading geopolitical force. Many of the ideas form standard themes in readers in International Studies.

Can they be grouped together to form a restricted number of scenarios? If so, they could be used as vehicles to discuss possible types of crises that we confront today. More general scenarios about the development of the global system would offer input to discussions about crucial conflicts that give rise to crises of different kinds.
Some theories are “liberal-deterministic”. They reflect a conviction that liberal institutions – such as the market and plural democracy – will prevail globally. Economic globalisation, technological development, the promise of increasing productivity and wealth globally are important drivers to this end, and liberal institutions are presumed as necessary in order to realise these gains. Often the “knowledge economy” is presented as further boosting such development; a free and open society is necessary for knowledge to be dispersed freely.

An example of work including themes of these kinds is Robert Reich’s book The Work of Nations. In this book a new class, the “symbolic analyst”, is described. The trade of this class is creating, interpreting and rearranging knowledge and symbols. Symbolic analysts are globally active, and meet in projects in different places. Another example is Thomas L. Friedman (author of The Lexus and the Olive Tree and recently The World is Flat), who argues that now, thanks to globalisation and the Internet, every individual is potentially a decision node in the global system. Once again, knowledge is hard currency for success, understanding the system and its development is crucial for all of us. Open societies are necessary in order to accommodate wealth-creating activities, but can also make you vulnerable to a quick crisis. The “Electronic Herd” can bring wealth, but also quickly move away when troubled by, for instance, domestic instability.

Finally, we have Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History? In this book he describes a forward-looking, liberal world in contrast to that of the “historical” period where traditional values were important. Economic calculation, consumer demands and environmental concerns will replace the ideological struggle of the Cold War. A final, but much less clear, example might be Manuel Castells book The Information Age, which will be further commented on below.

Another class of theories are those that build on a leftist tradition. According to these theories, nothing much has changed, apart from the fact one of the poles in the bipolar world – corporate capitalism – became much stronger after 1989. The bad guy in the story is, and always has been, global corporations. Classical concepts, some of them going back to Karl Marx, are now employed on a global level. Sweatshops and 19th century working conditions exist in the industrial zones in China and Southeast Asia. We witness a new scale of exploitation, of “hypercapitalism”.

Naomi Klein’s No Logo is a very good example. The Marxist roots are not explicit, but they are there. Echoing Marxist ideas that capitalist conditions will permeate all relationships of society, Klein shows how corporate interests are invading what in the past were public spheres (as when McDonalds takes over school canteens, or Nike uses black inner-city areas as stages to market their sports shoes). Exploitation of workers in poor countries is another characteristic, as is the common class interest between these workers and their counterparts in the West who are losing their jobs. At the same time, Klein describes the modern world; what made her book an international bestseller is probably her ability to merge classic leftist thought, insights in modern corporate strategy (such as the importance of branding) and theories of globalisation. Another example is Noam Chomsky, who claims that imperialism now has been more widespread since the fall of the Soviet Union, and that the combat against terrorism is an excuse for imperialism. Finally Joseph Stiglitz’ book Globalisation and its Discontents should be mentioned. A strong criticism of IMF and World Bank practices, it is not based on a Marxist tradition. However, the main claim that big business – the Washington Consensus – is a main driving force gives reason to place him in the “leftist” category.

Liberal determinism does not rule out conflicts (including terrorism), but the general trend is, nevertheless, a movement toward increasing consensus about the desirability or necessity of liberal institutions. Leftist ideas, on the other hand, are true to form; they place conflict at very centre of their descriptions and predictions. These conflicts are of a well-known kind: workers versus capitalists or rich versus poor. A third class of theories is also conflict-based, but introduces a new (or rather the revival of very old) global conflict. The reasoning is culturally based.

The most well known example is, of course, Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilisations (1993). He traces different kinds of conflicts in history. After the treaty of Westphalia, conflicts were mostly between princes and emperors. The French Revolution introduced another one: conflicts centred on competition between states. With the Russian Revolution came conflict between ideologies, first between liberal democracy, fascism/Nazism and communism and then, after the Second World War, between communism and liberal democracy. Now, with the end of the Cold War, we are experiencing a new pattern: a cultural clash between Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and probably also African civilisations. After the events of 11 September 2001, interest in Huntington’s theory grew, probably because he in this respect (but only in this respect) shares the worldview of Islamic fundamentalism. Fundamentalists, too, see the world as a clash of cultures and civilisations – in their case between Islamic and heretic ways of life.

Finally, we have a class of theories that can be called political or neo-nationalist. Their point is
that since the fall of the Berlin Wall we have witnessed a revival of nationalism, the feeling of belonging to a nation-state (which is a political entity). The main proponents of these ideas belong to the Realist school of International Studies, which has national interest as its point of departure and then predicts developments through assumptions of self-interested rational action.

One example is John Mearsheimer, who just after the fall of the Wall published an article titled Why we will soon miss the Cold War (1990). With bipolarity gone, it predicted Europe would soon fall back into old practices with renewed rivalry between its nation-states. The glue – the common enemy – is gone. Thus, the field is open for the old rivalries to resurface (the war following the break-up of Yugoslavia would be a good illustration). According to Mearsheimer, a controlled proliferation of nuclear weapons was the best hope for stability – creating a system of deterrence between the nation-states.

Another example is Charles Kupchan’s book The End of the American Era (2002). Like Mearsheimer, the basic idea is that the end of the Cold War creates leeway for national interests to resurface. Witness George W. Bush, who is following a unilateralist-isolationist tradition, which in its essence can be traced back to George Washington. The result will, according to Kupchan, be an end to the unipolar world we have experienced during the past 15 years. Other players are asserting themselves: a continued unification of Europe is expected as a result of, among other things, US foreign policies. Similar cooperation based on a national-regional identity can be expected in Asia. A multipolar world is predicted, where regional political blocks will compete for power - unless the US acts wisely today, in which case a cooperative relationship between the actors is possible.

The theories illustrate main themes in the geopolitical debate during recent years; different driving forces, expected outcomes, trends and events. Suppose that we are scenario practitioners with the assignment to design images of the future global system. Who are the system’s main actors? How is power distributed? Which conditions can we envisage for the “transactional” arena? Research has produced the results presented above. How would we proceed, following the “deductive scenario structuring”, identify key uncertainties and sketches of future states to guide the process? Can the current debate be captured and simplified into a limited number of scenarios, as the method presupposes?

An attempt to do this is as follows. The theories all touch on, and differ, concerning two central issues that can form the key uncertainties of the scenarios (i.e. the cross):

- One issue is the character of elites and their power bases. Some of the theories, the leftist and the neo-nationalist ones, build on that well-known power bases such as ownership of capital or political positions still will be most important. In both kinds of theories we see well-known elites such as politicians or industrialists forming the world.

Other theories, liberal determinism and the culturally based one, do to a larger extent emphasise the role of what Pierre Bourdieu calls “cultural capital” – possessing knowledge, ability to use this knowledge, using symbols and creating new ideas. In liberal determinism, symbolic analysts play a key role; they are important nodes of the network economy (and one of the more advanced of them, Friedman, claims that the Internet allows more or less everybody who is logged on and has sufficient knowledge to be a node). With Huntington it is evident: important actors are the ones that are main representatives of the cultural system – opinion leaders, as it were. In one part of the world it can be the clergy, in another corporate leadership or symbolic analysts.

- Another issue is the future of globalisation or the inter-connectedness of the global system. In liberal determinism, culturally based and leftist theories we see continued strong globalisation. The entire world is the playing field for different forces – global corporations or different kinds of individual symbolic analysts. In fact, globalisation has eroded other kinds of borders – national, regional, time differences etc – giving these new forces a freer reign to form events (it is important to see that Huntington’s theory does not necessitate geographic concentration of civilisations. The perpetrators of the London bombings on 7 July 2005 were born and bred in Britain.)

In the neo-nationalist theories geography plays a much larger role. Nations or regions such as the European Union are defined by geography, and the theories presuppose that politics and power follow such borders. Thus, one can assume that globalisation is less advanced in these theories than in others.

Summing up, we can construct the following “scenario cross”:

![Scenario Cross Diagram](image-url)
What kinds of scenarios can we find from these dimensions, and how do they correspond to current debate and theories on geopolitics? Let me offer some sketches.

In cell one, we could offer a scenario whose main plot is about the revival of the nation-state. As far as I understand, Mearsheimer never really explains why nationalism should re-enter the scene. It is simply there from the beginning, and when given a chance (like the collapse of the Soviet Union) it will just come back. It is as if, with the Berlin Wall gone, Europe will revert to a pre-Second World War reality. But a lot of developments have taken place during the second half of the 20th century. A nationalist scenario that is based on the modern, knowledge-based economy of the 21st century would be the following:

Globalisation means that competition between national economies is sharpened. At the same time, we do not see that new elites – symbolic analysts – are especially willing to relocate internationally. Given half a chance, they prefer to stay in their home countries. This means that the important asset in the modern economy – the bearers of “cultural capital” – can be viewed as a national resource, and national economic strategy is about keeping and developing this asset. Developing favourable conditions for universities and research, innovative companies and others form an important part of different government’s policies.

Sharpening economic competition pit Member States of the EU against each other. Federalist projects, such as visions of common social and educational policies, the Euro, and so on tend to reflect, at best, a lowest common denominator and at worst, common interests of an club of large states. Conflicts between EU policies and national needs become increasingly apparent, and countries start to opt out from the system – initially by disobedience and after some time through open rebellion. The Euro collapses when France, Germany and Italy continue to refuse to follow the rules of the Stability Pact, and no real consensus is reached round the next long-term budget. The internal market is weakened by different kinds of “hidden” trade barriers. The Union might not collapse totally, but it resembles a discussion club as time passes. Other attempts at creating regional organisations around the world go through the same kind of process – e.g. visions of an Asian block are hampered by Japanese-Chinese conflicts.

The scenario in Quadrant 2 would lean on theories of the liberal determinists on the one hand and on the other the culturally based theory. Their common denominator, as observed above, is that elites with a power base of “cultural capital” play the main part. In the case of liberal determinism, we find versions of symbolic analysts whose expertise in creating and handling different kinds of information are important. In the culturally based theories, important power would be concentrated to groups that define the content and significance of a given civilisation or culture. These could be the clergy or politicians (in their role as opinion leaders rather than elected representatives), media personalities etc. A possible “clash of civilisations” depends on perceptions, how we perceive “civilisations”. Everything hinges on how we understand for instance “Western Culture” and “Muslim World”, and opinion leaders are the ones that influence understanding. Furthermore, both theories presuppose globalisation.

The scenario could be a version of the many kinds “techno future” scenarios constructed in the 1990s. Strong technological development, globalisation and eroding borders are the keywords. Global networks, not only commercial ones but also political and cultural, form the playing field when forging geopolitical relationships. An individual’s (or a region’s) influence and gains are defined by the centrality they hold in these networks. And centrality, in turn, is determined by the ability to understand, operate and hold together different kinds of networks. Eroding borders increase productivity; activities that were not possible yesterday are today. But this world creates both winners and losers – wealth shifts as does power when its basis shifts.

A multitude of global networks are formed. Some of them are in conflict with each other; the “network society” encompasses many parts of life. In his trilogy The Information Age, Manuel Castells describes how global networking becomes the form of organisation not just for business, but also for crime, feminism and – indeed – the anti-globalisation movement itself. The “clash of civilisations” can thus be interpreted as a struggle between networks of the liberal determinist kind and counter-networks, where the latter consist of people who feel that they are losers, or who perceive their lives as otherwise invaded by for instance Western-centred business networks. In this perspective, Bin Laden’s special talent is the understanding of how to make terrorism global through networking where information, capital, knowledge and will (the will to sacrifice) is concentrated.

In Quadrant 3 global businesses would be playing the leading part. Observations and data unearthed by the leftist theories would come to use. “Big business”, with its shareholders and managers, is very much a concept of the 19th and 20th centuries. As we saw, a Marxist influence can be traced in most leftist theories of today. When Castells published
his trilogy, his main critics came from the left, claiming that the shift to the network economy actually did not exist - in essence capitalism has not changed just because we now see business organised in new forms.

This scenario would be written as a contrast to the one in Quadrant 2. The networked society is insecure, it is prone to boom and bust. Furthermore, if symbolic analysts are the critical factor for production, the global corporation would try to rein them in to form a part of their system of value creation. We see big global businesses consolidating and concentrating. Concentration is necessary in order to realise scale in a global economy, but also a method to increase certainty. A large company can spread risks, and the more uncertain the world gets the larger the company needs to be.

In order to enhance loyalty from employed symbolic analysts and also to coordinate flexible action over the world, corporations will function as worlds in themselves, organising many facets of life for their staff. People within these corporations shift loyalty and identity to the corporation during employment. They form a kind of global community, for many stronger than for instance "Europeanness", national identity or professional groupings. Politics is on the defensive: no country or region can afford not to be a good host for global corporate investment and political debate centres round how to attract such capital. The world is moving from a bipolar structure via a unipolar parenthesis into a multipolar geopolitical pattern.

This trend should be bad news for free trade. Suppose that China continues to keep its currency cheap or a real estate bubble bursts in the main cities of coastal China, bringing the currency down (as occurred in the Asian crisis of 1998). In an inward-looking climate, the US and EU could respond with protectionist policies directed against China but also against each other. From a European perspective, this would boost integration and federalist ideas once again, bringing the EU out of the pause for thought it is now undergoing. Access to big markets is a condition for survival for every developed economy, and with a weakened global economy, full participation in the regional economy is necessary. Investing in the fully efficient internal market means deepening political cooperation in social affairs, education policies etc. If a European economy is to be able to deliver the same wealth as the American one under protectionism, it would be argued that a "United States of Europe" would be necessary to bring down transaction costs. A multipolar world with looser international commercial connections, and with stronger possibilities for political conflict (a strongly weakened NATO fits into this story), is the result.

**Crisis-scenarios and early-warning systems**

What kind of crises would follow from the four scenarios? It is evident that each possible world depicted by the scenarios implies different kinds of crises. To use terminology from the realist school of international relations, "teutonic plates" are different. The "rifts" between them vary, the actors involved are different, their relative interests and objectives vary. A sketch of possible crisis scenarios would be as follows. They point out different emphases of early-warning systems, what the crucial variables would be in these systems:

- In Scenario 1, where the nation-state is once again important, we would focus on interstate conflicts as a main source of risk. Crises would be preceded by diplomatic signals, sabre-rattling and political processes building up to the crisis. Alliances between individual states will be important. Following Mearsheimer, Europe could revert to something resembling the pre-Cold War map.

- In Scenario 2, global networks are the main players. This means that our early warning systems would focus on network analysis, understanding power structures within and between networks that are more or less loosely knit together. Individuals and their contacts are important, and also communication and discussion groups over the Internet. In contrast to Scenario 1, covert sources will play a more important role.
• In Scenario 3, global business is an important actor with its investments around the world. Conflicts would arise between winners and losers in this economy. It is likely that these conflicts would arise within states rather than between them. In certain regions or among certain segments of society, winners would be prominent. In other regions or segments of society people will experience costs of globalisation. A good example is current debate about the stability of China, with possible regional conflicts between coastal China and inner regions, or an enhanced rural-urban conflict. Our early warning system would thus focus on states' domestic conditions in terms of regionalism, social unrest etc.

• Scenario 4, finally, resembles in some ways the second half of the 20th century. Once again, we experience global power blocks that cooperate, compete and are possibly in conflict simultaneously. As in Scenario 1, political signals are important leads to what the future might hold. In contrast to Scenario 1, we cannot (as realists do) concentrate on inter-state, or inter-power block, relations. Some power blocks, such as Europe, would still be a more loose-knit landscape. Inner cohesion cannot be taken for granted even less when nation-states are the main actors. Our early warning system would thus have to focus on the interplay between international and intra power block processes.

The scenarios are, as pointed out, ideal types. It is easy to spot different aspects of reality that fit into different scenarios. This is what makes them possible and relevant: we can identify elements of all four today. However, this is not a reason to discard scenario analysis as a means to tailor your early-warning system. The ideal types offer us categories that help us describe reality; points of reference that both simplify and identify core trends that run in different directions. The situation in Iraq is a good example, where we can observe a struggle between on the one hand attempts to form a functioning state and on the other activities aiming at creating a clash between (religious) networks.

Conclusion

Today’s geopolitical complexity (in comparison to the situation during the Cold War) does not challenge scenario analysis as such. One of the points of using scenarios is that they can handle more uncertainty and complexity than other methods that help us reason about the future. On the contrary, certain elements of scenario analysis and its method tend to become more important. Scenario analysts should look closer at methods used by historians – the academic discipline that probably has the longest record of working with geopolitical phenomena.

This means that aesthetics – meaningful beauty or elegance - become more important, as it always has been when working with the historical narrative. It also means that the concept of “colligation” becomes more interesting. The question asked when working with colligation is, “What fits in?” rather than “What causes what?” Scenario building becomes even more of an art, and models taken from natural sciences (such as econometric modelling) become less relevant when large-scale geopolitical phenomena take a more prominent part in scenarios.

“Deductive structuring”, where one starts with a sketch or a core scenario, and then proceeds by building on this, is thus to be preferred when working with geopolitical complexity. It allows participants in the process to play an association game at later stages and ask the question, “What fits in with this general plot?” Aesthetic representation – narratives, films, role-playing etc. – can be an important aid in this early stage of the work.

The four sketches of possible geopolitical futures offer examples of possible starting points for such a discussion. They are based on current theories of geopolitical developments, and show how these can be used in a scenario setting. In some scenarios, ideas from normally competing schools are combined, as when liberal determinism and ideas connected to the “clash of civilisations” form a common scenario. In other cases ideas that are seen as closer to each other are broken up to form kernels of different scenarios, as when a distinction is made between realist ideas – based on national interests - depending on whether these build on the classic nation-state or regional entities such as the European Union.

Finally, the scenarios offered in order to illustrate the ongoing relevance of scenario planning are shown to be relevant also when designing early-warning systems. Which variables or indicators are deemed to be important depends on our expectations of the future direction of geopolitics. Here, different scenarios play out in different directions. We can thus clarify what kind of assumptions might underlie different choices: what to include or give priority when interpreting early warning systems. Before discussing signals of early warning, we have to answer the question, “Early warning of what?” This is what scenarios help us to do.
Chapter 30: Risks and Forecasts in World Affairs

Summary

This talk is about forecasting; not the long-range variety which involves a million variables, but the forecasting of the near to medium term – the bit which lies just over the horizon of our knowledge. It is not concerned with intelligence. Intelligence is about facts, about knowing. Forecasting is about the imaginative extrapolation of known facts into the future.

Human kind has a poor record on forecasting (Joseph was exceptional) so this is not a problem specific to the UK. Over the last fifty years how useful it would have been: in the 1950s to forecast the Sino-Soviet split; in the 1960s renewed troubles in Ireland; in the 1970s the Iranian revolution; in the 1980s the collapse of the Soviet Union; and others. Wise and perceptive individuals have of course made wise and accurate predictions of the future; but decision-makers find it difficult to act on hypothesis alone. There has been no system to give bones to such prediction and so to make pre-emptive action less than a gamble.

The methodology of forecasting has not changed much since the days of the Delphic Oracle. Can we do better? Building on best practice as demonstrated at Delphi I suggest a possible road to methodological improvement.

The trick is to narrow one’s ambitions by asking the questions that matter on the issues that matter. Don’t aim for a full picture of the future world; it’s too complicated and you’re bound to get something wrong. By all means, however, read and digest well-constructed scenarios because they will help you to think about the future and so envisage what could happen. They will help you to ask the right questions. A good start to doing this is to list, on any issue, the outcomes, which you most hope for and those which you most dread. You then ask not ‘Will this happen?’ but ‘What is the likelihood that this will happen?’ Judgement of likelihood is the key to the whole process of what could be called ‘The Balance of Forces.’

To achieve such a judgement on any question (e.g. what is the likelihood of a European Federation over the next five years?) you need to identify two sets of forces, the forces which are pushing events towards that outcome, and the forces which are impeding that outcome. You then look at the ancillary factors, that is those which are likely either to strengthen or weaken the main forces. In this way you construct a model of likelihood which can be depicted as a chart in which the various forces are seen either strengthening or weakening the main question. Regular monitoring of all the forces demonstrates whether likelihood of the event in question is increasing, diminishing, or standing still.

You can put almost any question through this system, including way-out possibilities which will probably, but not certainly, stay out there, and outcomes so unfashionable that no-one talks about them. And Delphic best practise?

Never commit yourself to a specific outcome, only to its likelihood.

The problem

In June 1997 there was a run on the Baht. The Thai Government tried to cope with it themselves and after losing a substantial chunk of their reserves devalued their currency ad called in the IMF. This is the sort of thing with which we in Europe, and perhaps especially in Britain, are well acquainted. It has happened often before. We know the form. Friendly central banks rally round to give a hand. The IMF staunches the wounds with a supply of ready cash. The world economy moves serenely on its way.

It was not surprising, therefore, that the initial reaction to the devaluation of the Baht was to regard it as a minor glitch in a minor economy. Pundits described it as a hiccup. But it wasn’t. Twelve months later the Thai economy was in deep trouble; the economy of Indonesia was in ruins; the economy of Malaysia had retired behind a protective barbed wire fence, Russia had defaulted on its debts and western stock markets had dropped sharply. For the loss of a nail a shoe was lost and for the loss of the Baht the dream of a new economic order in which, thanks to

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1 This article is derived from two interventions delivered by Sir Colin McCall in two separate occasions: at the Roskill Memorial Lecture at Churchill College, Cambridge, February 16th 1999, and in the context of the “Enhancing EU Civilian Crisis Response” Conference, November 14th-15th 2003 Brussels.
To the more sober of economic observers there was of course no surprise in the fact that markets could still go down as well as up. What was surprising and disquieting, not only to observers but to the practitioners of finance, was the fact that in an age of unparalleled sophistication none of the main players had been able to forecast that a crisis of major proportions was on the way.

In June 1981 it was announced that, as a result of pressures upon the defence budget, the solitary warship stationed in the area of the Falkland Islands, H.M.S. Endurance, was to be withdrawn. Hardened to accepting the removal, on economic grounds, of much loved symbols of British power the general public in the United Kingdom accepted the decision with stoicism. The Foreign Secretary however wrote to the Defence Secretary to ask that Endurance be spared on the grounds that its removal would send the wrong message to the Argentinians at a time when our dealings with them had become very difficult. The Ministry of Defence decided that the pressure of other priorities made it impossible to meet the Foreign Secretary’s request; and ten months later the Argentinians were ensconced in Port Stanley.

Both these incidents, one in the private and one in the public sector, demonstrate a weakness in our armour; namely that, in the field of political and economic affairs, we have no formal method for measuring risks which lie just over the horizon. This is the problem which I would like to address today.

I can quite see that the immediate reaction to the statement of this problem is to say ‘well this just shows that we don’t have a decent intelligence machine, either in government or in the financial world’. But I must make a distinction here. Intelligence is about knowledge, about facts. Forecasting is about imaginative extrapolation from known facts into the future. If you know something already you don’t have to forecast it. So I’m not talking here about intelligence; What I am talking about is the capacity to make judgements based on available facts about likelihood and about risk in the near to medium future, the next five years, just over the horizon of actual knowledge. I should make it clear that I regard this as very different from long distance forecasting which is a much more difficult and complicated business – there being so many variables. The workers in this long-range field face huge problems and are doing some fascinating work both in this country and abroad. I regard them with admiration and sympathy and wish them well. I am happy to limit my own comments to the medium term.

We all of course live with risk. That’s what the insurance business is about. And in the business world risk management is regarded as an important feature of everyday business. Companies are evidently good at judging the risk that other people will pay them their fees, that the bridge under construction will not be delayed by strike action, that the tower block will sustain an earthquake. What, like governments, they appear to be less good at is judging the likelihood that the fault lines of our global society will erupt and put their affairs at hazard.

Governments I think have a special problem with the concept of risk. In this country, as you may know, for a very long time they traditionally took out no insurance. And to this day it is my impression that risk is an unwelcome visitor in the world of policy. The Franks report shows that as the Falklands crisis developed there was quite frequent mention of the risk of military action but it was always hedged with qualifications which reduced its impact. There was no existing methodology which would have enabled people to track systematically the growing likelihood of the worst case scenario, a full-scale invasion of the islands. Such an analysis might just have tipped the scales of priority for the Ministry of Defence; and encouraged HMG, by adding earlier an element of force to its dealings with Argentina, to move beyond a policy of slow moving negotiation over the islands whose success or failure depended upon the willingness of the Argentinians to remain patient as, in their eyes, the ball was constantly kicked into the long grass.

So there is a real weakness in our capacity for spotting trouble – or indeed opportunity – over the horizon of what we know. This weakness is not peculiar to the UK. It is, fashionably, global; and it stretches way back in history. Joseph was exceptional. What could be done to improve things? Is there an available method?

Finding a method

Well, there is quite a choice of methods. In the past of course seers, soothsayers, entrail readers and sibyls were much in demand. Sadly, none of these systems has a reliable track record. However, those concerned, from the Oracle at Delphi to the fortune teller at the village fete in August, display one common characteristic, a mastery of ambiguity; and this, you may be surprised to hear teaches us an important lesson; indeed it leads us to the first rule which should guide us in the search for a methodology. This is: -
Never commit yourself to a specific outcome

You may regard this as cowardice and of course it is. But no system – even opinion polls – can long survive the lethal cocktail of confident prediction topped by contradictory outcome. So we have to look for a system which enables the forecaster to be useful without putting his neck on the block.

One favoured approach is scenarios. This involves building upon a mix of existing knowledge and intelligent imagination a series of snapshots of what the world, or the specific part of it under study, could look like in 5, 10, 20 or even 40 years time. The greater the time distance of course the less the connection with known fact and the greater the input of imagination. Great care is taken to ensure that each snapshot is logically cohesive within itself. The snapshots are then presented to the decision-makers who are encouraged to consider what they would do if scenario A, B, or C were to come to pass.

The great thing about the scenario process is that it encourages decision-makers to think about the future and to consider action to cope with it. In many cases this is enough to justify the effort involved. But I doubt whether the scenario approach by itself would have prevented the Falklands War or persuaded the leaders of the Western world to try and control the flow of capital into South East Asia. Scenarios do at least offer what they would do if scenario A, B, or C were to come to pass.

Rule 1 must be: Never commit yourself to a specific outcome.

Read and digest all relevant scenarios and use them as a background for worrying and hoping.

So what is the next step? It is to ask specific questions. We need to stifle our natural longing to have a read-out on the whole state of the future world and concentrate on those things which we really want to know. Our Rule 2 must be:

Ask the questions which really matter.

A good way of focusing down onto the questions which matter is to ask ourselves what it is in any context that we most fear and what it is that we most desire. What, in other words, are the big questions?

In taking this approach we have of course paid a price, in that we have not only reduced the scope of our questioning but we may have missed completely some key danger or development the possibility of which has not occurred to us. I am sorry about this element of risk but it can be significantly reduced by dutiful obedience to Rule 2, the absorption of all relevant scenarios. Downbeat scenarios are in particular very good at giving one the feeling of measurability. In short it’s a marvellously useful word, and our Rule 4 should be: When you’re tempted to think of risk or threat, think of likelihood.

The balance of forces

My favoured methodology for the judging of likelihood is what I call rather grandly ‘The Balancing of Forces’. This means that you marshal on one side factors that are pushing the situation towards the outcome which one has in mind, say the invasion of the Kuwait, and, on the other side, the forces which are restraining that pushing. You may find that the two sets of forces are roughly in balance, which means that the likelihood of the event in question is currently small. What you need to do thereafter is look at those factors again at regular intervals and ask whether in the interim anything has happened to weaken or strengthen either the pushing force or the restraining force. The case of the Falkland Islands presents a very simple demonstration of this process. If in 1980 one had asked what was the current likelihood that the Argentinians would invade the Falkland Islands you would have found a balance between the driving and restraining factors. On the driving side you had the fact that the Argentinian in the street did not just believe but knew that the Malvinas belonged to Argentina. There was therefore a quantity of political ammunition constantly available to any politicians who saw it as in their interest to play this card. On the restraining side you would have found the islands defended, albeit thinly. And there were other restraining factors: the continuing hope that negotiations would win them the prize without war, and the desire of the...
Argentine government to maintain good relations with the United States. The driving forces and the restraining forces were just about in balance. The likelihood of invasion was therefore reasonably low.

But a review of the situation two years later would have found a very different situation. The driving forces had been strengthened. General Galtieri faced political problems which made it tempting for him to bolster his popularity by heating up nationalist feelings over the Falklands. The prospect of finding oil round the islands appeared also to have increased. At the same time the restraining forces had been diminished: first by the seemingly endless spinning out of negotiations by the UK which made the Argentinians lose hope of obtaining their goal by this route: then by fact that Argentina had become valuable to the Americans for the help which it was giving them in Central America: and finally by the announced withdrawal from the defense of the Falklands of the solitary guardship, HMS Endurance. This, as the Foreign Office rightly believed, carried the dangerous message that the UK were not serious about defending the islands and were therefore unlikely to respond to an invasion by the use of force. The Argentinian press became steadily more strident in their demands for action. In a very short period the likelihood of an Argentine invasion had risen from low to high. Sadly there was no available methodology for tracking the relentless rise in the likelihood between these two poles.

The crisis over the Falkland Islands was relatively simple and was to some extent a replay of an earlier crisis. But the financial crisis in south east Asia, for all the familiarity of Thai Land’s predicament, took place essentially in uncharted waters. Never before had the world had a global economy of such size and technical sophistication. This made it much more difficult at the time to analyse the forces at work and to identify the dangers which would spring from it.

Nonetheless, it is surprising that when we have so many new-found capabilities in so many fields medium term forecasting on this issue was not much better than that relating to the Falklands war. To start with we didn’t seem to ask the right questions. It is no good saying “when will the markets fall?” or “can the bull market go on for ever?”. These questions are too general. We need questions which lead us into proper analysis of the forces at work. So we should have been asking what are the forces now at work which could bring the markets down? I am not an economist but I suspect that one answer would have to be the collapse of markets in emerging countries. What, one would then have asked, are the factors that could bring about that fall? And this question would surely have focused us upon over-capacity, debt, and the strength and reliability of the financial structures in the countries concerned. These would be the factors to watch and having thus identified the forces or factors which might lead step by step to a collapse we could then have asked what factors were working in the opposite direction and sustaining the markets for and in emerging countries. Clearly we would feature in our answers to this question the healthy state of the United States economy and the fact that Europe was moving out of recession and potentially towards a period of restructuring which would release wealth. These would provide markets in the future. But Japan would probably not: so this restraining factor would itself be subject to restraint (or qualification). An analysis along these lines would I suggest have alerted us to the delicacy of the balance between the two sides and have induced us to watch closely the factors involved, trade, overcapacity, debt etc. We would thus have created a measuring instrument to indicate whether things were getting better or getting worse. And we would probably have started earlier to look hard as Russia and Brazil.

**Applying the method**

All these points are of course now history: we have crossed what was previously the horizon. But now we have a new horizon which poses equally important questions.

If I were managing a major organisation with global responsibilities and interests I would want to have access to a unit which would look over the horizon in this way and keep me posted on the increasing or decreasing likelihood of trouble along the fault lines. I would ask this unit to look at perhaps thirty or forty big questions, some of which I would hope to remain permanently in the very unlikely categories. Thus within Europe I might want to know the likelihood, however remote, of a break down in European monetary union. I would want to see identified the forces which could bring about such a break down and the restraining factors which could prevent this happening. I would want an update on this question at six monthly intervals in times of volatility and at yearly intervals when all was calm.

All this work would be unclassified. You don’t need secret intelligence to identify the main forces in politics or economics. But work of this sort which helped to raise the eyes of business chiefs and ministers above the problems of the next few months could improve the chances of changing course in time to avoid the iceberg.

One of the boons of developing a capacity for judging likelihood is that it allows a government
or business to keep a check on possibilities which it is currently unfashionable, or politically undesirable, to treat as in any way likely in the future. For instance, one item of conventional wisdom today is that we have seen the last of conflict between major powers. This may be correct, but it may also be incorrect. Another is that globalisation, both economic and political, is inevitable. Another, that the world is no longer susceptible to ideologies. Another, that our Western values are universal. The very fact that these ideas are widespread represents a force pushing them towards realisation.

But there are restraining forces too:

- The resistance to globalisation of those who feel no benefit from the changes which we press upon them;
- Resistance from vested interests;
- Resistance from people who resent what they see as the imposition of western culture and western values, in short our ideology, upon cultures which they regard as superior to our own;
- Resistance simply from people who feel a loss of identity as they are folded into the global pudding and who fear that the decisions which really affect their livelihood lie in the hands not of their leaders, elected or otherwise, but of nameless men in grey suits meeting in smoke-free rooms somewhere in the western hemisphere.

These resistances may themselves be balanced in the countries concerned by those who want to accept our table d’hôte of values and systems, but cumulatively they represent a stock of political ammunition which could be marshalled to create if not a conflict at least a stand-off between the West and a substantial slice of the rest of the world. And we have just had over forty years of stand-off and know what it can mean; and what it can cost. Unfashionable, but worth watching.

The important thing is to ask the right questions. There are plenty to ask. Will the selling, or perhaps I should say the hard selling, of the western ideological panacea produce conflict? Will we see a significant move towards protectionism? Will the Chinese Communist party retain its grip upon China? Will the underlying political differences between China and the United States lead to a serious political rift? Will there be a change of political structure in Japan? Will India and Pakistan succeed in maintaining a nuclear balance? Will a resurgent Russia attempt to regain control over parts of its former empire? Will the Palestinian problem produce another war? Will Europe or part of it become a Federation? Will the ANC in South Africa manage the aspirations of its black members without destroying the South African economy? Will there be growth and congruence of hostility to the existence of a single super power? Will we gain the upper hand over drugs, crime and terrorists?

These are just some of the big questions which in my view deserve constant attention. It is however one of the hard realities of life that work of this sort is seldom popular. In a world in which well-educated people read their horoscopes in magazines with ill-concealed anxiety, and there are reputed to be more fortune tellers in Paris than there are priests, the medium range forecaster ploughs a lonely and largely unloved furrow. A friend who was years ago the head of the planning staff in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office told me that he and his highly intelligent team wrote numerous papers aimed at raising the eyes of their ministers and colleagues above the entrenchment of day to day preoccupations. It was almost invariably the case, he told me, that these papers were the object of immediate, elaborate and even exaggerated eulogies by those for whom they had been written. And that was that. They were never referred to, or seen, again. It is of course the case that busy and important people find their noses held consistently close to the grindstone of the day-to-day. Thus preoccupied they find it genuinely irritating to have their attention distracted by what can only be hypothesis about the future. They in particular do not relish bad news of which they often have a fair ration anyway and groan at the prospect that the future could have yet more bad news to deliver. And this is understandable. Pessimists do not make good leaders. Confidence in both politics and business is built upon optimism. Businessmen cannot cry stinking fish. Politicians do not shout from the rooftops the likely failure of their policies. Casandra would have been a poor fund manager.

But there is I think a way round this. Forecasters to not have to be harbingers of doom. The studies which I have in mind would be studies of likelihood, and they would cover the likelihood of desirable outcomes as well as of undesirable events. And they would provide a readout of likelihood aimed showing whether the chances of a certain stipulated outcome had increased or decreased since the subject was last appraised. Decision-makers would be under no obligation to act on any single study but the amalgam of studies would provide a background against which the wise chief executive or minister would at least consider the desirability of preemptive action. No system will ever cover every contingency. There will always be horrible surprises. But the fact that there will be some surprises does not mean that we should despair of ever anticipating anything.
Visual presentation

In looking at this issue I have been indebted to a friend who kindly lent me a fascinating, and beautifully written, book by two American probabilists, Joseph Kadane and David Schum, in which they analyse all the evidence in the famous 1920s American case of the anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti. These two men were tried and convicted of the murder and robbery of two security guards carrying a payroll to a show factory in South Braintree Massachusetts. Kadane and Schum look at each item of evidence and what it is supposed to prove and then balance it, first those items of ancillary information which weaken the likelihood of the evidence being correct and second those ancillary items which strengthen the possibility. This system is hearteningly close to the system of balancing forces of likelihood which I have been advocating for looking into the near future. Kadane and Schum have also produced a masterly system of rendering all this pictorially and I have taken the liberty of adapting this pictorial system to demonstrate my proposed method of balancing forces. So my final offering is two diagrams, the first depicting a situation of likelihood in a near fictitious scenario at a given date and, on the second sheet, the same situation twelve months later when a number of extraneous events have brought about a change in the balance of forces and therefore in the likelihood of the event in question. The diagrams are simply headed “Will they Invade?” and although as you will see they are based on a Falklands-type case they are meant as an illustration of the method and are not a statement of history.

Summary

So, to summarize, I am making a plea for the systematic study of likelihood in political and economic affairs. Just to remind you, I advocate four basic ground rules:

1) **Never commit yourself to a specific outcome** (because if you do not only risk discrediting the system but you will confuse the forecasting of the likelihood with the statement of fact)

2) **Read and Digest all relevant scenarios and use them as background for worrying and hoping** (because this will make you think about possibilities in the future)

3) **Ask the questions which really matter** (thinking in particular of the outcomes which you would most welcome and those which you would most hate)

4) **When you are tempted to think of risk or threat think of LIKELIHOOD**

Against this background, proceed as follows:

A) Formulate your big question in terms of the likelihood of a specific outcome (e.g. what is the likelihood of Chinese devaluation)

B) Then identify
   i. The main factors which are pushing towards the outcome, and
   ii. The main factors which are impeding that outcome, and also
   iii. The secondary factors capable of strengthening or weakening the main factors on both sides.

C) Then make a judgement on the likelihood of the specified outcome based upon the Balance of these various Forces.

D) Thereafter watch like a hawk for changes which could affect any one of the various facts and so alter the existing balance.

Conclusion

During the Cold War the political corset imposed upon the world by the conflict between the super powers made it perhaps less vital than it is now that we should look hard at the likelihood of political and economic change in the years ahead. Nonetheless it would surely have been valuable in the 1950s to have kept watch on the likelihood of a Sino Soviet split, in the 1960s on the likelihood of renewed troubles in Ireland, in the 1970s on the likelihood of an Iranian revolution, and in the 1980s on the likelihood of the collapse of the Soviet Union. And what about BSE?

Today, when bad things happen which have not been foreseen, the focus of public anxiety is usually directed to the primeval and, often quite and hunt, for a scapegoat. This makes people feel virtuous and helps press circulation but does not improve things. It would surely make more sense to use the impetus of public worry to address the general lack of a medium-term forecasting system and to try out ways in which this gap could be filled. There are doubtless many different and better ways of doing this than that which I have outlined in this Chapter, and no system will be infallible; but so meagre is the current effort in this direction that almost anything would be an improvement on what we have, or do not have today. The introduction of a methodology need not mean that we all have to become pessimists or that politicians would be debarred from pointing to the sunlit uplands. A situation in which leaders, both in government and in business, gave time to thinking about the likelihood of crises and opportunities just over the horizon would itself be a sunlit upland that is not only desirable but attainable.
Oxford Analytica Global Stress Point Matrix™

Rank ? Global Stress Point  Impact ? 1-year  5-year
1  INTERNATIONAL: Oil price shock  70  51%  40%
2  INTERNATIONAL: Avian flu pandemic  55  56%  52%
3  INTERNATIONAL: Terrorists detonate dirty bomb  45  52%  52%
4  CENTRAL ASIA: Risk of major disorder  35  64%  69%
5  NIGERIA: Large-scale disorder in the Delta  25  67%  52%
6  CHINA/TAIWAN: War  70  24%  37%
7  NORTH KOREA: Military conflict  50  33%  53%
8  BALKANS: Danger of return to serious disruption  20  62%  48%
9  RUSSIA: Rise of assertive nationalism  30  33%  53%
10  PAKISTAN: Islamisation threat  20  34%  46%
11  UNITED STATES/IRAN: US Strike on Iran  25  24%  33%
12  SAUDI ARABIA: Fall of House of Saud  35  16%  32%
13  IRAQ: Civil war  25  21%  33%

One-year restrainers/Drivers (Hover over the drivers for description)

Type  One Year  Five Year  Description
1  Restrainer  -10  -8  PLA does not have the military strength
2  Restrainer  -9  -10  Taiwan in no way amends sovereignty provisions
3  Restrainer  -6  -8  Beijing thinks Taiwan’s economy will become gradually integrated
4  Restrainer  -5  -4  Possibility of US military intervention
5  Restrainer  -5  -6  Beijing sees progress towards political unification
6  Restrainer  -2  -8  DPP loses power
7  Restrainer  -1  -7  Opposition KMT-PFP take power
8  Restrainer  -1  -1  Taiwan renounces independence
1  Driver  1  4  Beijing assesses it has military edge
2  Driver  1  3  US-Japan formalise or strengthen security umbrella for Taiwan
3  Driver  1  3  Taiwan builds up diplomatic recognition
4  Driver  1  4  Taiwan amends sovereignty provisions
5  Driver  2  5  PLA insists Taiwan should be taken
6  Driver  3  4  DPP holds the presidency and takes parliament with pro-independence allies
7  Driver  3  6  Beijing loses patience as Taiwan drifts further from its grasp
8  Neutral  0  1  Beijing uses Taiwan as nationalist rallying point at time of domestic difficulty
9  Neutral  0  1  Taiwan declares independence
Since its inception, the European Commission has been involved in crisis response on behalf of the European Community. In subsequent steps, linked to the development of Common Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP)/European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the EU has decided to develop its ability to undertake a full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks. In parallel, international experience with crisis response over the last decade has shown a change in the nature and scale of crises to which the EU must respond. Overall, the Commission and the EU must be enabled to make active use of all the instruments at its disposal (inside and outside the EU), adapting them in turn to the needs of each individual crisis.

Figure 1 provides a general overview of the different stages of crisis and the challenges involved at each stage, which also apply for EU activities in the field.

Figure 1: Restoration of infrastructural services

Source: UNOSAT – the United Nations satellite and imagery programme

A wide range of tools making use of open source, geo-spatial and information technologies have been developed by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in support of the Commission in policy areas where security, risk and conflict are prominent concerns.

The activities of the JRC related to crisis management include:

- remote sensing and interpretation of satellite imagery for specific applications including situational awareness/assessment, damage assessment, and monitoring conflict resources;
- monitoring and mapping of security events in crisis areas;
- monitoring and retrieving of security- and crisis-related information from the live, surface and hidden web and applying multilingual text analysis and entity extraction in real time;
- developing Web-based virtual and real-time crisis environments by automatically combining, analysing and visualising crisis-related data, numerical modelling results and GIS to support crisis-preparedness exercises, monitor crisis development, predict the extent and type of damage, and improve situational awareness and information-sharing throughout the crisis cycle.

In the context of increased cooperation between the Commission and the Council in
preparation for a future joint external-action service, the JRC has also started making available its instruments to relevant Council services, where appropriate.

**Crisis/conflict prevention and early warning**

Depending on the nature of the security challenge at stake (man-made violent conflict, non-proliferation, etc.) the JRC has developed specific activities, of which four examples, mostly combining several of the techniques described above, are emphasised.

**Monitoring of conflict resources**

Diamonds, drugs, and timber etc. are often considered as “conflict resources”, especially in crisis areas (or in failed states) in developing countries. The JRC has developed a technique to monitor, by means of very high resolution (VHR) satellite imagery, presumed illegal mining activities in rebel-held areas to support the Commission led Monitoring Group of the Kimberley Process. The work of the JRC has confirmed the validity of VHR satellite imagery as a means for detection and detailed temporal, quantitative and qualitative, assessment and monitoring of three types of diamond mining activities (see Figure 2).

Support to counter-proliferation

News monitoring and open source intelligence are key tools which allow analysts to keep informed during a crisis and more importantly have early warning of emerging crises. The Internet has evolved into a powerful and fluid source of news, intelligence and opinion. However, new technologies are needed to manage the huge flux of information. JRC has developed an automatic media monitoring system, the Europe Media Monitor (EMM) which scans 850 news sites in 30 languages round the clock, detects new articles and filters the textual content into one of 650 topics.
Each topic is defined as a rich combination of multilingual keywords. Some 35,000 articles a day are processed in real-time. A breaking news algorithm detects new topics, and alerts can be generated by e-mail and SMS. A News-Brief summary (see: http://press.jrc.it/) is updated every ten minutes. Specific topics such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and nuclear proliferation are reported in the news and this feeds into the analysis reports for country-specific activities which JRC produces. Long term analysis of news is done every 24 hours to record events, places and persons linked across time and language (see: http://press.jrc.it/NewsExplorer).

An open source intelligence suite which exploits EMM technology provides analysts with powerful tools to search, retrieve and analyse thousands of web pages. The system exploits language technology techniques to extract entities (persons, places, organisations etc.) from large sets of text files. These files can be the retrieved pages from Internet searches, collected by EMM techniques, or local documents. The entities are stored in a database, and related by their co-occurrence in sentences and documents. An associated tool can scan the content of any website and identify pages containing defined keywords, and monitor a set of sites at regular intervals. These tools have been successfully applied to nuclear safeguards studies and are particularly useful in identifying networks of related persons. Figure 3 is a visualisation of related and relevant entities derived from news reports of the 7 July 2005 attack in London.

Export control. The employment of efficient and effective instruments (including multilateral ones) is more necessary than ever before to respond to the challenges of security in the area of non-proliferation. The JRC has been working since 2005 to enhance EU analysis and early-warning capacity applied to small arms (SALW) and dual-use goods transfers. For these types of goods, export authorisations are required, and their trade can be subject to sanctions or other restrictive measures, at either EU or UN level.

While Commission trade policy analysts are busy planning for legislation to strengthen controls, JRC is investigating ways information technologies can help to detect exports of SALWs and dual-use goods to countries of concern, to detect unauthorised re-exports, smuggling to undeclared destinations and mis-declaration of sensitive goods.

The product of this research is an integrated system to help monitor officially declared trade using multi-source data, to search for indications of possibly illicit activity, to monitor the implementation of sanctions and other restrictions, and the identification of hot spots and other risk situations. The integrated monitoring system will benefit decision-makers (including the IAEA, who are keen on such intelligence input in the area of nuclear non-proliferation) who need to prevent or deal with crises, as well as regulators who need to guarantee that their regulations are indeed implemented.

For the moment, the data is mostly on imports and exports of traded goods (in value, quantity or number of units) aggregated monthly for EU25 (source: Eurostat’s COMEXT database) or yearly for all other world partners (source: UN’s COMTRADE database, after data validation by experts in arms transfers from PRIO of Oslo). The technologies include multi-source data marts, interactive navigation in trade data, graphical data visualisations and indicators.

Challenges for this work include the lack of a satisfactory correlation between the control lists (e.g. Annex to Regulation 1334/2000 on export controls for dual-use items) and the goods nomenclatures used by customs (e.g. the CN or HS codes) for which data exists. As JRC has been working for some time for customs in the area of detecting false declarations of origin for containerised cargo over maritime routes, it may in the future become possible to...
introduce, in the work outlined above, the possibility to analyse the means of transport associated with the trade transactions for such sensitive goods.

Route-based risk analysis. Ninety percent of the world’s cargo is transported in maritime containers, but only 2% is physically inspected by customs authorities, opening up the possibility for illicit activities, such as avoiding customs duties, circumventing quotas or smuggling nuclear materials and weapons. Today, it is widely believed that the only viable way to control containerised cargo is through information-based risk analysis followed by non-intrusive detection technologies. In this way, it becomes possible to target high-risk consignments and proceed with physical checks, only where needed.

The JRC, in collaboration with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), has developed a technology, ConTraffic, to automatically gather and analyse data on global maritime container movements to identify potentially suspicious consignments. The work is carried out in the framework of mutual assistance between EU Member States’ customs services. The ConTraffic system was tested very successfully for cases of false declaration of origin such as to circumvent anti-dumping duties and quotas, to smuggle prohibited or counterfeited goods.

Figure 4 shows how ConTraffic can provide customs with additional information with respect to what is indicated in customs declarations, i.e. intermediary trans-shipment ports and the origin of the goods. Through ConTraffic’s risk analysis, abnormal events can be identified, thus allowing customs authorities to target physical inspections better.

The JRC is currently extending the ConTraffic system to address maritime security and specific security-related concerns including illicit trafficking of security-sensitive goods. ConTraffic can contribute to relevant EU and international regulatory activities (such as the Container Security and Proliferation Security initiatives) by providing new indicators, based on global routes analysis for containerised cargo, that can support real-time control operations at ports and feed into a common set of minimum-risk rules for container security in the EU.

Crisis alert and response

The European Commission is a major frontline donor and coordinator of EU civil protection and humanitarian assistance. Rapid financing procedures are in place to allow the EU to make emergency funding decisions within hours of a disaster. To facilitate this, the JRC is often called upon to deploy state-of-the-art earth observation tools and to react swiftly to mobilise high-resolution satellite and information technologies to provide relief services on the ground with up-to-date disaster maps. These help indicate, for example, the existence of viable transport routes and damaged zones. This, in turn, greatly benefits emergency rescue, humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations, saving countless lives.

The Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS)

The JRC, in collaboration with UN-OCHA has developed the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS), which has the objective of alerting the UN and EC to potential humanitarian disasters, and to provide the international disaster-response community with a platform to ensure easy exchange of information.
The web-based GDACS system gathers early warnings on hazardous events through defined protocols directly from European and non-European organisations making physical observations. GDACS is able to establish alerts, with a minimal delay compared to the source organisations, for events that it has defined as potential disasters. These early warnings are integrated with estimates of population density and vulnerability, as well as the potential impact of those events on the population.

GDACS currently addresses earthquakes, tropical storms, volcanoes and tsunamis. GDACS not only identifies disasters, but it also communicates, through e-mail and SMS, alerts to all stakeholders involved in international disaster response. It provides a platform to exchange disaster-related information in a structured and reliable manner, particularly in the response phase, in order to ensure a coherent and effective response.

The JRC was very active in addressing the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004 and South Asia earthquake in October 2005, by alerting and providing information products for emergency response, humanitarian relief and reconstruction. At the time of the tsunami and earthquake events, GDACS sent out a red alert about 30 minutes after their occurrence, triggering response in the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) of the Commission’s Environment DG and the United Nations. These alerts include maps on population distribution and critical infrastructure produced on-the-fly. A new simulation model for tsunami wave propagation has been developed by the JRC and integrated in GDACS to allow the identification of potential areas of risk and the time it would take the tsunami waves to reach them.

**Figure 5:** The red alert report issued 26 December 2004 just after the earthquake in Indonesia

**Figure 6:** Calculation of the tsunami event with the JRC tsunami model, which was integrated in GDACS after the Indian Ocean tsunami event

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**Damage assessment**

In the aftermath of a disaster – natural or man-made – there is a need for near-real time information on the whereabouts and extent of damage. Situation and damage assessments are traditionally carried out through field reporting. The JRC has developed a standardised procedure to assess damage by combining very high resolution satellite image analysis and damage information from the field. The damages assessed from field reporting and image analysis are combined within a grid reporting system based on grids of 10 x 10 arc/sec (300 x 300 m) to report damage in a standardised manner, consistent in time and space.

The grid reporting system provides an appropriate framework for statistical extrapolation of the damage to areas for which no field verification is available.

In support of emergency response and humanitarian relief operations in the Indian Ocean tsunami (http://tsunami.jrc.it/) and South Asian earthquake (http://disasters.jrc.it/PakistanEarthquake/) disasters, the JRC produced, in conjunction with the RESPOND partnership, timely space maps and synoptic assessments of damage (based on the grid reporting system) to support the Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), DG External Relations and European and International aid agencies. These maps and assessments provided by JRC and its RESPOND partners have had a positive impact on relief operations.

**Conclusion**

Timely, reliable and relevant information are key components to prevention, anticipation and effective response to crises and disasters. The key components of relevant crisis related information for decision-makers are:
• Timely characterisation and detection of risks, hazards and threats, both known and unknown;

• Regular situational assessments and analysis of crisis evolution, or situation at hand, in near real-time; and

• Timely communication of alerts and information to relevant stakeholders involved in crisis/disaster response.

The JRC, through its policy-targeted research, is demonstrating that open-source, information and geo-spatial technologies (including space) play a notable role in providing the capacity to monitor and gather intelligence in order to recognise an emerging crisis or threat, provide early warning and the means to prevent crises.

In addition the JRC is contributing towards improving communications and links between science and technology and those who use the results in prevention, preparing and responding to crises, by means of engaging closely with European and international stakeholders involved in crisis/disaster management in all its phases.

Figure 7: Satellite picture collected over the city of Muzzafarabad (Pakistan) with damages assessed using the grid-based reporting system
CHAPTER 32: GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE FOR AN ASYMMETRIC THREAT

Summary

The role of intelligence, and the process of gathering, analysing and using it, has come under intense scrutiny as a result of perceived failings in the context of 9/11 and the war in Iraq. Yet the questions being asked are not new, and many historical examples illustrate the need for a clear understanding amongst policy-makers of the potential and limitations of intelligence. That said, the intelligence community needs to review its structures and processes to counter the new types of threat thrown up in recent years.

Reviewing intelligence practice

Debate had been rumbling about inadequate intelligence practice even before the recent review of the US Central Intelligence Agency’s performance was published. The report, by CIA Inspector-General John Helgerson, was released in late August 2005 as a classified document. After three years in production, it roundly criticised senior CIA officials for their handling of the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. And it dammingly points to a need for a significant overhaul of the Agency’s activities. Issues of organisation, technology and personnel were trenchantly cited as requiring attention.

The issues surrounding processes, methodologies and the inherent politics of secret intelligence, open sources and war’s legality also have a long European history. But because of the internal uncertainty and public mistrust that has been created, these methods are now patently in need of wider debate and clarification. Some of these questions go to the reason for intelligence; its theoretical purpose and the real and political outcomes it can generate.

The UK’s Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction was published on 14 July 2004, and begins with a quotation from Clausewitz’s On War.

“Much of the intelligence that we receive in war is contradictory, even more of it is plain wrong, and most of it is fairly dubious. What one can require of an officer, under these circumstances, is a certain degree of discrimination, which can only be gained from knowledge of men and affairs and from good judgement. The law of probability must be his guide.”

This is an interesting quotation to use at the outset as it sets a tone and understanding. It suggests Clausewitz is being used in order to persuade the reader that intelligence is certainly not a science and that much of its value is at least questionable and that we perhaps should not blame politicians for acting on what turns out to be bad intelligence. But Clausewitz was referring to intelligence produced during war itself. He was not discussing intelligence and information that was collected before any war has begun.

Intelligence in war time is constructed for a particular commander on the battlefield and it needs to be specific, actionable and timely. The prime objective is to give immediate tactical advantage for an attack or to provide information that will help avoid the potential of partial or outright defeat. Some peace-time intelligence for the military, policy-makers and other government officials – such as America’s Presidential Daily Brief – also aims to give specific usable tactical advantage.

However there is another type of intelligence that is used to give briefings and predictive analysis to policy-makers, the military and officials. Here, different methods should be used to commission, produce and deliver this type of intelligence although invariably at present they come from the same analyses. All of these methods are traditionally locked into a national culture. They are American, British (even English as opposed to Scottish), French or Indonesian, and the information is rarely shared with other nations or even allies. Perhaps surprisingly, it is often not even shared between intelligence and police agencies internally within a country. This was certainly true of information and intelligence prior to 9/11.

Sharing information

The need for national intelligence has not gone away, but now challenging the national intelligence structure is a new need for international, cross-border cooperative intelligence. Again it seems unlikely that the more linear, tactical intelligence relevant to the battlefield, and this cross-border intelligence should come from the same group of analysts, although in the intelligence community that is what is expected.

In a global world of terrorist threats, this cross-border analysis – backing up the traditional immediate-threat approach – is particularly...
relevant, but to be effective will require a predictive element if it is to satisfy the needs of its audience. At present, the types of intelligence product traditionally produced in Europe and the US do not include a number of products now thought necessary.

However, just so no one should think this a new problem, years before the Post-Modernists these two fundamental techniques were parodied by G.K. Chesterton in a novel called The Man Who Was Thursday, first published in 1908. It came at a time when there had been anarchist terror attacks in London and Europe.

In the novel Chesterton creates "philosophical policemen" who are separate from the average beat bobbies patrolling the streets. One of these philosophical policemen explains their methods.

"The ordinary policeman tries to discover from a ledger that a crime was committed. We [philosophical policemen] discover from a book of sonnets that a crime will be committed..."

He continues by explaining what they have discovered by using such techniques is that...

"We [now would] say that the most dangerous criminal at large is the entirely lawless modern philosopher. Compared to him, [your average] burglars and bigamists are essentially moral men..."

I want to give a deeper analysis of these two positions in the light of a world post-9/11 and to add two more.

Limits to intelligence

But first I would like to offer some context. The Old European World perhaps snobbishly suggests that Americans tend to look toward the future and be less troubled by their own, or anyone else’s past. It also does not coordinate what it knows on any intelligence subject.

But now both America and Europe are asking some deeper historical questions about intelligence organisations and processes, although again they are not going back far enough to satisfy some Old World audiences. But even the intelligence currently being produced is now said to be suspect.

How, a number of senior people have asked, was it possible for most of the intelligence to fail to predict Hamas’s victory in Palestine? Because of their apparent failings and the current cultural infatuation with information, the intelligence community in general is currently under enormous pressure to change and reform its organisation and procedures. And some of this has already begun. In the US it has a history that goes back to around the time of the Second World War and Sherman Kent.

In the US, Sherman Kent has been dubbed the father of their intelligence community. In the 1940s, he argued that social sciences and intelligence analysis needed a systematic method, “much like the method of the physical sciences” he said.

The record would show, in fact, that Kent found individuality, eccentricity, and even “oddball thinking” valuable for a unit facing tough substantive challenges, as long as the analytical talent was there. He understood the absolute need for loyalty and discretion in a security agency. But when, in the early 1950s, McCarthyism threatened to force on the bureaucracy an unreasonable standard of conformity, he quipped: “When an intelligence staff has been screened through [too fine a mesh], its members will be as alike as tiles on a bathroom floor – and about as capable of meaningful and original thought.”

However Kent’s methods have been critically contrasted with the range of writers from David Riesman to Jane Jacobs through to Jacques Derrida who find social patterns and emerging trends in history, literature, philosophy and theology. They took a more post-modern approach and seemed to sometimes succeed in their predictive analysis, almost against the odds.

These two apparently opposite ways of looking at intelligence, set out by G.K. Chesterton, go to the centre of some of the current issues surrounding intelligence, and they range from an empiricist to a post-modernist perspective. Post-modern in the sense that the very process, underlying cultural bias and the reading of intelligence has been brought into question.

Many of these issues have been critically reviewed from the perspective of reinforcement of a political agenda, seeking support for action through biased use of framed intelligence, through to the cultural lens that is sometimes too obviously overlaid on “foreign” data and intentions.

Questioning the process

Whilst this is not new to political analysis and background intelligence during peacetime, there have recently been serious questions as to the way intelligence in Europe and the US was fashioned to take Britain and America to war in the Middle East.

But these are not new issues for European or American intelligence agencies.

French intelligence briefings and analysis of the Algerian situation in the late twentieth century, and of Muslim inner-city violence in protest at social conditions and the police response have been shown to be lax and wanting.
In America the CIA’s National Intelligence Estimates on China during the 1960s are dry compilations of data from which an analyst’s report of November 1970 concluded that there was little prospect of improvement in Sino-American relations.

Working at the same time, US generalist scholars like Donald Zagoria drew patterns and understanding from the culture and mores of the Chinese elite, and made a more personal evaluation concluding that agreement between the two sides could be achieved. Kissinger achieved a deal with the Chinese within a year, and seemed to prove the intelligence analysis wrong and Zagoria correct.

However Sherman Kent and the traditional European Intelligence model cannot be circumscribed so neatly. When asked, Kent said he saw intelligence as he saw the study of history, which he believed was crucial to an understanding of the present and the future, and for this you needed accurate data.

But to derive useful lessons you first needed to test the authenticity of sources, and then curb your own predilections and prejudices which always try to support a convenient answer.

But when he and his team failed to anticipate in 1962 that the USSR would introduce offensive nuclear weapons into Cuba, he believed the best analytical standard had been applied and yet they got it wrong. In his view, the problem lay not in the analytical method but in not applying it rigorously. It seems, perhaps intuitively, he did understand the limitations of the traditional, almost linear approach that was the CIA’s methodology but, despite himself, refused to acknowledge it by introducing other methodologies.

Recently we have seen the problems of these two apparently fundamentally different types of philosophical approach come into conflict again.

Former US President Bill Clinton asked for exactly that from former CIA Director James Woolsey in the mid-1990s. Like all US presidents, Clinton received a daily briefing from the CIA, which aimed to give immediate information and actionable intelligence about issues of international importance. Clinton, however, asked Woolsey if he could produce background briefings similar to a 24-page, 10,000-word article entitled “The coming anarchy”, by Robert D. Kaplan published in the US magazine The Atlantic Monthly in February 1994.

This open source analysis piece concerned problems in the West African state of Cote d’Ivoire and its neighbours. It highlighted issues of crime, social and medical diseases, inner-city violence and tribalism, and overlaid them with a historical view of how the 19th century European plan had not taken into account social, cultural or natural boundaries. Kaplan argued that this process had contributed significantly to the social and racial issues faced by Cote d’Ivoire in the mid-1990s and could become an indicator of future inner-city problems in the West.

This discussion between the President and his Director of CIA did not go far. In Woolsey you had the old-school conservative who was shocked at the idea that a modestly staffed open-source monthly magazine with a very limited budget could be of any use to the President of the United States when he had the intelligence community with its 30 billion dollar annual budget. After this they rarely met.

Product of intelligence

The intelligence community still provides the same kinds of finished intelligence that it did in Clinton’s day. It comprises four categories:

• Current intelligence, which addresses day-to-day issues and warns of near term consequences e.g. the Presidential Daily Brief.

• Research intelligence, which comprises in-depth reports to support specific operations or decisions.

• Estimative intelligence, which works through and compiles knowable facts and will make predictive assessments of the way these facts may change. For example, how many fighter jets has North Korea got at present, and given its production or buying capability how many might it have in five or ten years?

• Warning intelligence, which act as a subset of estimative intelligence focusing on developments that could have sudden effects on US security or policy.

Anthony Campbell, former head of intelligence in then Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s cabinet office, said: “The confusions of what intelligence is there to do and what definitions and weight we should give to each aspect of it run very deep, and yet even these issues still do not get to the real heart of the problem. There is also a management and training issue for analysts and users.”

The concept of intelligence as “hard-wired” logic which has immediate consequences for future action still exists in the military. However if you ask what this means to an officer in the Singaporean, Columbian, Canadian, US, French or Australian navies you will get subtly but culturally significant answers.
But before we default to the different cultural interpretations, what of the facts themselves? Captain Richard Sharp, former editor of Jane’s Fighting Ships, encapsulates much of the debate over the validity of “facts” that lie at the heart of effective intelligence and how they should be gathered. He says: “You have to first understand who I am writing the book for. I am not writing it for the civil servants in Whitehall or analysts in Washington’s intelligence community or the military strategists in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) or NATO. I am writing it for the person on the bridge of a battleship once they are at sea. What happens at sea is real and requires the facts presented in a way that enables action. If I were writing it for a land-based intelligence officer I would collect slightly different material and present it in a completely different way.”

**Control of the process**

Sharp points to some of the deeper issues surrounding so-called facts and brings into question the problems of control: Who controls the information contained within a message? Perhaps more importantly, why were those particular messages created?

The most effective way of influencing opinion is by the selection, arrangement of and additions to the appropriate facts. But in the intelligence community, there is a cliché that the facts should speak for themselves. This apparently rational instruction comes from a more ordered, pre-Edwardian time when facts were often perceived to be totally separate and independent of the viewer. This was at a time when it was seriously believed that, with some intensive research it would be possible to know all of history. This was challenged by a modernist viewpoint that separates language from the objects of reality. The self-assurance in the previous singular view of the world came into question.

This modernist approach has now run up against the so-called post-modernist, enlighteened understanding that is often used to justify the politicisation of policy that does not appear, or attempt, to fit the underlying reality. For example, links were made between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, but no evidence was uncovered to substantiate such links.

This more extreme view states that no matter how information, knowledge or intelligence is assessed, it can never give anything other than an understanding of how the person who puts together the facts sees them. Given the loss of assurance in facts that has taken place over the last century, it could be suggested that certain facts are only selected when they are called upon to support an argument.

The traditional intelligence process says that, having collected the data and ordered it into a factual report consisting of the ascertainable facts, the next step is to deliver this to the policy-makers and politicians. In this simplistic process, the intelligence analyst is supposed to deliver a flat, factual report to the policy-makers and let them sell the action they want to take to the public.

This process of intelligence-gathering is locked in the pre-electronic industrial process of a factory environment: raw material is pushed in at one end and finished machinery emerges at the other. No part of the process needs to talk to any other as each knows its function. And what is eventually produced may or may not be relevant to the user, but that is not the production line’s problem. So, different intelligence-gathering agencies need to communicate and work with each other to ensure the intelligence they produce is relevant.

This, I think, begins to suggest some of the deeper issues surrounding so-called facts, and brings into question some of the problems of control. Who controls the information contained within the message? Perhaps more importantly, why were those particular messages created and what purpose are they meant to serve?

Every commercial journalist and photographer knows that the most effective way of influencing opinion is by the selection, arrangement and additions to the appropriate facts.

The Thursday 5 May 2005 issue of the International Herald Tribune had a page 3 headline that said, “UK papers offer choice of realities”. According to the article, “Voters have a wide range of alternative realities from which to choose, depending on which newspaper they read. The country’s 11 daily nationals toss impartiality out of the window during election season. Opinion pieces are dressed up as news stories and printed on the front pages. The papers print news that flatters their candidates, and cheerfully leave out or distort news that does not.”

More recently, the Danish cartoons addressing Muslim belief have ruptured relations between Europe and parts of the Middle East and some Muslims across the globe. The message, no matter how conveyed, is rarely this obviously biased, but every message contains, in the eyes of the post-modernist, an undercurrent of culture focus.

However, in the intelligence world there is a bureaucratic cliché that the facts should speak for themselves. Even as we tend to dismiss this as worthy, if naïve sentiment, still the attempt at fundamental honesty should not be dismissed. However this now seems to come from a less self-critical, more comfortable period when
facts were true and spoke only for themselves. A time before Carr’s What is History? and Derrida’s Deconstruction. Also a time before Hermann Hesse says at the outset of The Glass Bead Game, “History’s third dimension, no matter how dryly it is done, how sincerely the desire for objectivity, is always fiction.”

In its extreme position, post-modernist understanding suggests that no matter how we assess information, knowledge or intelligence, we can never achieve anything other than a better mirror of the author as that particular reader sees them. The facts as they exist, we are told, are only pieces of a particular type of fiction used to manipulate the argument.

Reduced trust

Given this loss of assurance that has taken place over the last century, today we might suggest that the facts only speak when the author calls on them to address an argument or influence understanding. Intelligence and information, we might now suggest, are by their very nature selective.

But these questions of selection and control go back a lot further than the 20th century. They have been implicit since Gutenberg. Caxton and the other Renaissance printer/publishers dragged the creation and dissemination of information away from the censoring grip of the Catholic churches. In so doing, they helped to create some of the deeper cultural and social implications then the intelligence domino effect we have seen since 9/11 will continue to occur.

This is where one small – perhaps dubious – piece of untested intelligence information, previously unconnected, is now connected and reconnected until it reverberates with far more apparent significance and prominence than it deserves. This was true of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the “45-minute warning” that depicted Iraq as having a capability it did not possess and was offered at the time as a major political reason given for the US/British invasion of Iraq. This piece of information was taken from an unconfirmed classified intelligence report. It was given importance and prominence by its selection (which has been accused of political bias), by the report itself, and by each step in a – particularly fast – media dissemination.

The issues of accuracy and independence are similar in both the classified and unclassified intelligence and commercial publishing worlds. But if we are going to deliver intelligence reports, rather than propaganda, then the independence of the process should be made real at all times.

The words that Margaret Thatcher used when she was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom “are they one of us?” should be guarded against and avoided when politics and intelligence are seen to overlap in some unholy alliance of an agreed agenda. The process becomes unacceptable when the policy requires some created “facts” to make it valid or saleable to the public.

Like knowledge at its best, political intelligence should appeal to human reason rather than authority. Always in the background, there is the shadow of a political or commer-
cial advantage knocking against the ethics of independent cultural understanding. This should be recognised and clearly understood. It will not go away.

Validating information

The new electronic information revolution in all its guises of dissemination is changing the quality and quantity of information available to a significantly larger audience than was ever available in print. It is altering and compressing the timing of that dissemination. People watched in real-time as the second plane crashed into the tower in New York on 9/11. This had never happened so dramatically before and it has changed people’s relationship with dramatic events. The first moment most government officials even in the US became aware of 9/11 was from a CNN live broadcast.

Such processes are altering people’s perception of news but also politics and policy-makers’ response to events.

We have, over the centuries, expanded and democratised the production and delivery of information of all forms. But none of these delivery platforms have made the content easier to validate. Intelligence must fulfil the role that policy-makers have set for it. But this is only the beginning. What is now required is to offer some scenarios and find necessary predictions for likely outcomes, and needs data and analysis from a wide variety of verifiable sources to be linked.

There should be an objective “air gap” between policy-makers and civil servants’ collection, analysis and report compilation. For intelligence to be actionable, it must answer the real questions that the customer is asking, but it must also tell them something they were not aware they needed to know.

So that no one should think I am advocating large amounts of bureaucratic time for no purpose, as an example we as publishers have to have our copy libel-checked by an independent legal checker in real-time. This, along with fact- and sense-checking is built into our editing process, ensuring independent oversight and a large degree of objectivity, which is again regularly audited.

Reviewing the process

So, if we were to look at the whole process afresh I think we might come up with a new methodology and a different intelligence focus. First, we require an understanding of the threats and opportunities and the way the task and questions are being asked. These should be reviewed both from the users’ and analyst’s viewpoint. We should separate our existing, almost traditional, threats from the more recent, less understood problems. The facts would then be collected and compared in each case.

This takes you only so far. What is now required is to offer some scenarios and find necessary predictions for likely outcomes, and needs data and analysis from a wide variety of verifiable sources to be linked.

History, so an aphorism runs, is what a country wants to remember and tries to forget – a truism that dents the notion of learning from our past mistakes and problems. To remedy this, one major requirement within the intelligence process is to have historical methodologies which take account of the problem of Historical Attention Span Deficient Disorder (HASDD) posed by Professor Christopher Andrew of Cambridge University. This, in the American and European context is very real and needs to be addressed.

This historical analysis would also start another process, making connections that may exist in the social, economic and political spheres. Here is some of the post-modern aspect. The cultural colour and specialist understanding would be rooted in historical facts and analysis, and give current and future scenario views. This was of course what Clinton was looking for from the CIA when he had heavily annotated “The coming anarchy” article from The Atlantic Monthly. It is what is required to truly understand the issues of the Middle East. This cannot be done without a clearer regional cultural perspective, which is based on real indigenous understanding.

The process of linking these scenarios back to historical archives is more complex, and here requires specialist knowledge and general understanding of the subject and subjects. This process works even for the new threat.

If we look at what was known prior to 9/11 about Al-Qaeda we discover there was a lot of knowledge. It was known that they were training commercial pilots, months before 9/11. We knew that once they had targeted a place or person they continued until successful. We knew they used suicide bombers. We knew their major target was the USA. Historically we knew suicide had been used by Japanese pilots against the Allies, particularly the Americans in WWII. We know that the twin towers had been truck-bombed by Al-Qaeda and they had failed to make a significant impact. There are a number of other things we
knew about Al-Qaeda, including that they did not call themselves that until some time after the CIA branded them and gave them a global identity.

There needs to be different levels of collection, listing, comparisons and analysis; different teams, made up of different types of individuals, for different scenarios. The people who monitor the “stable” world of, for instance, heavy war equipment and its capabilities, or state-on-state violence and warfare, or the state of geopolitics have a long and, to some extent, established history. They are the Sherman Kent analysts.

But the new world of apparent irrationality, of terror, of freedom fighters and insurgency also has a long history; it is just that we have culturally forgotten it. A second group of analysts who sit apart from the first group should concentrate on “new” threats that require a more creative approach. That new approach may well require an international sharing element, or the real inclusion and enhancement of organisations such as Interpol, Europol and NATO and ASEAN.

The information revolution has changed the fabric of commercial organisations from a hierarchical, top-down, stovepipe industrial organisation to a far more organic network of cross-functional teams. Most among the worldwide intelligence community have not embraced these changes and neither have politicians. While harnessing technology is also important, so too is an understanding of the threats and opportunities posed by the “information age” and the way that tasks are being framed in this environment. Traditional threats should be separated from the more recent and less understood problems of asymmetric terrorism, and treated in different ways.

How do we separate the individual’s intelligence process from the self-contradictory, reflective and organisational mirroring often seen in many operations? One way is to abandon correct and impartial analysis and instead aim for consistency. Here, analysis is still based on a comprehensive listing, a methodological comparison and a well understood and transparent system of linking, yet consistency in the approach to a problem gives it purpose and edge.

Decision-makers should therefore be made aware of an agency’s cultural or operational stance and be reassured by the resultant consistency of message. However, this does not protect against the unexpected, such as the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, various Indian nuclear tests since 1998, the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US and the aftermath of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

A varied approach to intelligence generation is required. There need to be different levels of collection, listing, comparison and analysis, and a number of mixed-skill teams for as many scenarios as possible. More fundamentally, agencies and politicians need to define the underlying purpose they are attempting to achieve. If “objective” intelligence is what is required, then the air gap between collector, analyst and user needs to be real to ensure objectivity and clarity.

Politicians need to recognise that people will attempt to subvert “objectiveness” and that this will be built into the process as a given from the outset. Therefore a three-tiered approach is needed to attain some form of “objectivity”. To be truly effective, it would need to include a version of the old-world intelligence process of Sherman Kent, the new post-modernist briefing similar to what Clinton asked for and some form of scenario planning where different views of the future are given different potential outcomes. Briefings should not be produced ad hoc and only when demanded. These should be standard parts of the intelligence process, no matter where the information is used.

This is not a complete solution, rather an opening statement in a long-needed dialogue before we change our intelligence organisational structure. Agencies need a more systematic approach to the different elements in the information-intelligence mix. They also need to define exactly what they are trying to achieve with each part of the process, and where the positives and faults with each element lie.
I returned to Iraq one year after the war to see what state the country was in and how the people were living. Together with some journalists, we followed in the path of the soldiers considered by many Iraqis to be invaders rather than liberators. We were expecting to find peace and democracy. The tyrant had been brought down but the country was in complete chaos. The occupiers were being brought down almost every day by guerrilla gunfire, not just in the Sunni triangle but also those regions where the Shia majority lived.

Equipment used: Leica M6, Mamiya 7
Films: Fuji NPZ, Fuji NPH

[ Stanley Greene ]
Baghdad, Green zone
© Stanley Greene / Agence VU
Iraq 2004, one year after

Destroyed monument of Saddam
(Baath Party - Iraq Secret Services quarter)

© Stanley Greene / Agence VU
Iraq 2004, one year after
Baghdad
Al a da mia. Spiritual leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq has replaced statue of Saddam Hussein.
March/April 2004

Meladi Army, marching through the streets of Baghdad

© Stanley Greene / Agence VU
Iraq 2004, one year after Baghdad
Moqtada Sadr, anti-coalition demo
Baghdad, 31 March
© Stanley Greene / Agence VU
Iraq 2004, one year after

Baghdad, Sunni gunmen protecting Sunni mosque against coalition forces
© Stanley Greene / Agence VU
Iraq 2004, one year after
Baghdad, former bureau of Baath Party

© Stanley Greene / Agence VU
Iraq 2004, one year after

Baghdad, cock fight, illegal under Saddam. Islamic Court wants to ban it again.

© Stanley Greene / Agence VU
Iraq 2004, one year after
Mohammed, members of his family were killed in Fallujah. When his surviving uncle came to see him, he was arrested by the Marines at the hospital. One leg has already been amputated and the other leg will also be removed. Shell fragments scatter his face and are lodged in his stomach.

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Iraq 2004, one year after
PART VI: CONNECTIVITY AND SECURITY OF THE FIELD STAFF
CHAPTER 33: MAINSTREAMING SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Summary

Security awareness and the management of risk should be a characteristic of responsible programme management. Yet there are “barriers to change” which need to be overcome for risk management good practice to be firmly accepted.  

Mainstreaming good practice

RedR-IHE is a London-based NGO with over 25 years experience providing training and support services to frontline humanitarian aid agencies. A strength of the RedR-IHE security programme since its inception in the mid-1990s as an inter-agency research initiative has been its focused relevance on the challenges faced by aid agencies in their increasingly insecure operating environments. The relevance has come from the way in which the training curriculum, and the management model that grew from it, framed itself as “a research-led training project and a training-led research project”. Almost unknowingly it promoted an “evidence-based” approach to management that sought out good practice by reviewing the “science base” of thinking on security from several sectors (academic, military, police, private security firms), as well as harvesting the experience of the real-life challenges of aid practitioners.

This tradition of “learning through doing” has led to a focus on the need for mainstreaming good practice. Feedback from workshop participants over the years, and the observation of the trainers who have delivered these workshops all over the world, seem to be pointing in the same direction. Namely, that whilst almost everyone who attended the training valued the process, and could see why the approach was useful, the “reality” of organisational life would always be the most severe limitation to adoption of the good practice for security promoted on the training. There was a certain irony here: on the one hand organisations “valued” their people and their security enough to send them on a course, but their people-centric values seemed to run out of energy when it came to adapting organisational practice in the ways the training was suggesting.

Investing time

Individual managers, no matter how committed or attached to the approach, would invariably run into what we came to term “barriers to change” when they attempted to implement the approach within their organisations. They say that organisational values, known collectively as the organisational culture, are only really revealed when it comes to making resources available, especially in conditions of resource scarcity when choices have to be made between equally appealing organisational objectives. So the typical “barriers to change” that came back from frustrated practitioners were “we don’t have enough time for this” and/or “we don’t have enough money for this”. But since good security management at field level is really about good programming based on holistic understandings of where we are working, it does beg the question “if we don’t have time for this, then what do we have time for?”

To some extent this is inevitable when attempting to disseminate good practice. Similar challenges are faced by those trying to promote other forms of “good practice” with regard to staff management, gender equality or equal opportunities. Certainly there is a clear need to build up the awareness and knowledge of individuals as a means of developing a common language and approach to managing security throughout the sector. But until this language and approach is understood and accepted organisationally, and permeates the way an organisation thinks and acts from top to bottom, then the impact of training-based approaches are going to be partial and transitory. This is especially true in our sector, where staff turnover is one of the key challenges to organisational learning, memory and capacity development.

Championing change

In essence, for security good practice to be “mainstreamed” we are talking about significant cultural change within organisations. For this to
occur, leadership needs to come from the top, and that means Chief Executive level. Senior leader needs to become “change champions”. This is the starting point for the mainstreaming component of RedR-IHE’s security programme: a series of one-day seminars and workshops for the senior leadership of aid agencies and consulting services at HQ level to assist and facilitate the development of a culture of good practice.

Finally, it is crucial to think of the “end state” to which this process is aspiring. What does it, or will it mean, to have “mainstreamed” good practice with regards to security management? It is clear that the definition of a successfully “mainstreamed” organisation will be rooted in the culture that pervades the organisation and its people, rather than a bureaucracy cluttered with endless checklists and procedures, all bound together in some oppressive ring-bound folder that will consume your excess baggage allowance. This is not to say that security policies, procedures and practices do not need to be formalised into a living security plan; of course they do, but rather that an organisation that has succeeded in mainstreaming security good practice will not be primarily defined by this.

Instead, security will be the lens through which all activities are seen, and decisions made. Security awareness and risk management good practice will be so ingrained in the organisational culture that it will simply be understood that “this is the way we do things around here”. Equally, this will be a culture where people will not have to be told that we all have a responsibility for security: every member of staff will understand this, and act accordingly. For senior leadership, this mainstreamed culture of security good practice may be the source of further significant dilemmas, such as when to suspend an existing programme or turn down new donor money if the security conditions are not right. But nonetheless, an embedded security culture should make such demanding dilemmas into routine decisions, and provide a clear guide to action that will service the agreed and understood best interests of the organisation and all its stakeholders in the long term.
Control Risks Group
Practical steps for corporate-level crisis management

Control Risks is an independent, specialist risk consultancy with 18 offices on five continents. They provide advice and services that enable companies, governments and international organisations to prepare for a variety of unforeseen and potentially financially damaging events. In the event of nightmare scenarios becoming a reality – an executive kidnap, devastation from natural disasters, extortion demands from local guerrillas – Control Risks enables its clients to respond quickly and effectively to preserve life and to secure operations and reputation.

No two security crises are the same. Dealing with a terrorist attack targeted at your company poses completely different challenges to dealing with an attack aimed at the area in which you operate. Likewise, responding to a violent takeover of your company’s assets is very different to responding to serious civilian unrest. Yet many private and public organisations maintain just one crisis-management plan, and it comes as a shock when, in the event of a crisis, they find it close to useless. That is why it is crucial that companies undertake risk assessments at an early stage in the investment cycle.

While there is no blueprint for a crisis plan, there are certain characteristics that all good plans contain. Below are a few of these characteristics.

1. Crisis plans should include clear lines of authority, a single coordinator, and provide for the rapid availability of resources in the event of an incident.

The early hours of an incident are crucial to establishing facts, avoiding mis-steps that could lead to an escalation of the situation, and mounting an effective communications campaign. Straightening out unclear or disputed lines of authority in the middle of a crisis will waste valuable time and create a sense of confusion that could complicate the response. To minimise the scope for such problems, private and public organisations should ensure that crisis-management procedures and lines of authority are agreed in advance by all relevant parties. Plans should provide explicit criteria for deciding when to delegate the role of crisis coordinator to an in-country manager or another party who may be in a better position to manage the situation.

2. The key players in any crisis plan should be evaluated to ensure that they are physically and mentally fit. Entities operating in particularly crisis-prone areas should assess the physical or psychological health hazards associated with a particular posting.

Candidates who suffer from chronic stress or anger-management problems can endanger themselves or others during an incident and, as such, can be unsuitable for deployment to high-risk countries. In some cases, companies may be able to address these problems by offering training to reduce high-risk behaviour. But in all cases, companies should conduct a security risk assessment for guidance in determining whether a given country or location should be classified as high-risk for the purpose of deployments.

3. Good crisis plans rely on up-to-date training for the key players. Private and public organisations should ensure that employees have the confidence to act individually and collectively to safeguard themselves and the company.

Employees selected for overseas assignments should receive a pre-departure programme that includes a comprehensive security briefing. Frontline staff deemed to be at high risk by virtue of their location or their profile may require a supplemental hostile environment training (HET) course. Among other topics, the HET should teach staff how to calm a situation or prevent an escalation if they are involved in an incident. Local employees should receive training on security, emergency response procedures and avoiding high-risk behaviour during an incident. All employees should receive regular personal security briefings.

4. Good crisis plans require easy communications between the affected area and the crisis management teams. For high-risk assets, private and public organisations should consider the installation of silent alarm systems linked by satellite to a 24-hour monitoring system as a means of providing instant notification of an incident and communications during an incident.
Such alarms, already in widespread use in the shipping industry, allow an authorised on-site operator to send a coded distress signal without attracting the attention of an adversary. The 24-hour monitoring centre sends a coded reply to the operator and notifies company managers if it fails to receive a pre-agreed response from the affected site. Managers can then investigate the alarm and activate the crisis management and contingency plans if necessary. Private and public organisations should restrict knowledge of silent alarm systems, particularly in environments where local employees may pose a potential risk. Private and public organisations may also wish to consider installing concealed GPS systems in vehicles and marine vessels to assist in pinpointing their location during a crisis.

5. No matter how well-organised a company’s crisis planning is, without strong physical security nothing can be done to protect employees. Private and public organisations can install a variety of safeguards to restrict access to a high-risk site or limit movement within that site after a crisis. Design of these systems must strike a balance between security and safety.

Private and public organisations should consider the use of anti-intrusion devices, lockable gates, retractable stairways, caged stair heads, dazzle lights, manual or remotely operated water hoses, lockable doors and the creation of secure safe havens. Private and public organisations should ensure that security measures do not interfere with the ability to evacuate the asset quickly in the event of an accident or emergency.

Control Risks constantly reviews and updates its risk ratings. The map shows its rating for risk in countries around the world as at March 2006. Businesses should regard all risk-mitigation measures with the same willingness to introduce changes as circumstances demand.
Why are risks in certain missions so often overlooked?

The risks involved in travelling abroad are often underestimated for a number of reasons. Firstly people are often unaware of the potential dangers of their country of destination. This could be a question of a “force of habit”. If they are used to travelling to countries that have a reputation for being dangerous they may, or may not, take a few precautions during their first trip but if after that they have not experienced anything out of the ordinary they will be less inclined to take precautions for the next trip. Secondly, some countries may be risky but they may not have attracted as much media attention as other countries with media-grabbing risks such as for example the frequent kidnappings in Columbia or attacks on foreigners in Iraq. Lack of media attention also means that people are often ill-informed and therefore do not take any special precautions prior to setting off on their travels.

When is it excessive to be concerned about our own security while travelling and when is it perfectly justified?

People should always assess the security risks of the countries they are travelling to. Based on sound information about the actual risks and the specific cultural features of the country in question, they will be in a much better position to take appropriate steps to ensure their own security. For example, the “bunker mentality” often adopted by expatriates in the Gulf states may be construed as a sign of a lack of confidence in the inhabitants or the police force particularly in the case of Africa (Algeria, Nigeria, Angola,…).

What makes, say, Cairo a dangerous destination and Mexico City a relatively safe one?

Cairo is definitely no more dangerous than Mexico City. When an assessment is made of the risks, the gap between reality and the common perception tends to increase. Increased publicity, reflecting cultural and emotional factors, for a number of developments, has a direct impact on the risk assessment process. This can often lead to a distorted assessment of the actual situation. In reality, crime kills more people than international terrorism.

What parameters should one take into consideration to evaluate the risk of a given mission? Who is at risk? What sort of risks are we talking about?

Security risks are a growing concern not just for tourists but also for entities sending staff abroad to work or sending employees on business trips to foreign countries. Tourists and expatriates who fail to adopt a low profile or ensure that they are well-informed before their departure are jeopardising their own and maybe others’ security. There are five main risks that travellers should be aware of:

1. Risk of crime

Expatriates and business travellers are all the more exposed to the risk of crime because their incomes and lifestyles often contrast sharply with most of the people living in the countries they are visiting. While their awareness of what types of behaviour to avoid is often relative. Consequently, they are exposed to several risks:

- Personal security: aggression, lynching, murder, rape…
• Property: intrusion, thefts of all kinds (burglary, car, extortion…)

Often such crimes are carried out by individuals or small groups of people. However, they can also involve large organised gangs or mafia-linked groups armed to varying degrees.

The following four indicators are useful in assessing the relative risk of crime:

• The number of murders.
• The number of thefts.
• The level of fraud.
• The number of rapes.

2. Social climate

The social climate should be monitored closely, taking into account the possibility of attacks on expatriates and business travellers. Both tend to be prime targets for criminal gangs or terrorist organisations.

Social climate-related risks include the following:

• Institutional risk: this is an analytical survey of the indicators of corruption in the law enforcement and legal system, which provides a means of assessing how the rule of law operates in the country or city in question.

• Government stability: this assesses how effective the executive authority is, whether there are any rebel forces and whether changeovers in political power are peaceful or not.

• Political violence: this refers to all the various clashes between the different political groups (political parties, trade unions, partisans,…).

• Ethnic, xenophobic and racist violence; assesses the current situation in relation to such crimes.

3. Terrorism

Terrorism-related risks are assessed in the light of the incidents and threats from local and international terrorists groups within a particular country.

4. Kidnappings

Such risks are assessed on the basis of the number of kidnappings involving nationals and expatriates carried out within the country. The reasons for such kidnappings (for example, political, mafia, financial, religious) should also be taken into account.

5. Geopolitical

The risks tied in with this factor reflect the country’s strategic importance both regionally and internationally. It also reveals its political and diplomatic approach on the international stage. Other yardsticks taken into account are border incidents, secessionist, independence or separatist activities.

Can you make a distinction between exposure to risk when travelling for a few days, when touring for several weeks and when living for several years in a given place?

The exposure to risk is not necessarily based on a length of stay but more a question of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. For example, risks linked to airports, access roads, particularly in Africa, or “express kidnappings”, where travellers are abducted with the sole aim of securing a ransom quickly, do not have any bearing on the length of a trip but on the whereabouts of the person. Expatriates may be exposed to different risks such as those to their property, as well as aggression in the home, but such crimes can also happen in the person’s home country.

What would you recommend as a security checklist for travellers?

Before setting off, people should learn various items of information about their host country. For example, the history, geography, demography and general security of a country can tell us a lot about the potential risks.

GEOS also recommends that those travelling for business should find out about:

• The employer’s travel security policy.
• The employer’s country information database (if there is one).
• Feedback from previous trips made by members of staff.
• The advice the Foreign Office issues to travellers.

With regard to health advice, GEOS recommends that people should:

• Undergo a medical examination before departure.
• Take along a copy of their medical records.
• Check the validity of their international vaccination certificate and ensure that they are covered for the country they are visiting.
• Take along medicines that are suitable for the country of destination and their own requirements and habits. They should include any medical prescriptions relating to the products, as these will be routinely requested so as to ensure they are not narcotics.
As for the administrative formalities, GEOS urges people to:

• Check the validity of their administrative documents (passport, visa, identity card, international driving licence and so on).

• Take along photocopies of these official documents, but leave the original copies in the company or hotel safe.

Are staff working for NGOs more or less exposed? What should an NGO operating on the ground in a crisis area do to protect its personnel?

NGOs do not enjoy any favourable security treatment. In fact they are even more exposed: they are regarded as key targets owing to their operational vulnerability. Above all, warring factions and insurgents often consider NGOs to be “in the pay of the West”, which frequently means being “dependent upon those in power”. “Confessional” NGOs (those with religious affiliations) are, of course, the most vulnerable, according to this logic. Here, too, the best way of preparing yourself for any risk is to be informed about the local situation and cultures and, above all, the security conditions. The ethical scale of a mission often helps to cloud a person’s judgment of the actual risk. Added to that is the fact that staff who are used to living in sensitive areas abroad may be a bit blasé about the actual risks. Management should bear this in mind and seek to impress upon them the importance of being properly prepared for every eventuality.

What would be the security profile to adopt when leaving for an ordinary study/assessment mission in Damascus. What should one do when assessing a tsunami/earthquake area, what should be done in a terrorist-prone country (Saudi Arabia, India, Bangladesh)?

In Damascus, places that are immediately associated with the West, such as major hotels and diplomatic representations, should be avoided, and people should not wear anything or behave in any way that attracts attention. They should remain cooperative and comply with any requests made by police officers.

Travellers can reduce the risk of terrorist attack by steering clear of any target locations and adopting a low profile. There is no comparison between the situation in India and the one in Saudi Arabia. Westerners may be targeted just for being a Westerner in Saudi Arabia, while in India, you just have to take basic precautions about where you go and the company you keep. The risk of terrorist attacks cannot be measured in terms of the number of previous incidents or the number of victims. The key factor is whether a person is a target or not.
CHAPTER 34: WHY AID AGENCIES MUST STRENGTHEN SECURITY COOPERATION

Summary

Contemporary humanitarian aid personnel increasingly work in dangerous environments where the risks of being targeted by irregular forces with nil regard for human dignity are rife. These challenges have necessitated many international NGOs to pursue ways of promoting safety and well-being of staff working in high risk countries. This paper aims to highlight the benefits of establishing joint NGO security coordination networks as the way forward for dealing with those challenges within the context of a high risk country.

The number of humanitarian workers killed while working in high risk countries has increased dramatically in recent years. According to the Afghanistan Non Governmental Organisation Safety Office (ANSO), 37 humanitarian workers were killed in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2004. Other criminal acts against Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have also been on the increase; these include hostage-taking, sexual assault, armed robbery, and malicious damage. This has been exacerbated by the increasing prevalence of irregular forces whose moral values have been diminished after many years of civil conflicts, eroded perception of NGO neutrality, religious extremism, and chronic poverty, among others.

The aim of this paper is therefore to highlight the importance of developing networks for security collaboration and coordination as the way forward in tackling the emerging challenges described above. It is this writer’s view that the successes of the Afghanistan NGO Security Office (ANSO) or the East Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) Centre de Communication, (CDC) and others, can form the basis for establishing similar networks in other countries where security is a big concern.

Need for change

Traditionally, humanitarian agencies have depended heavily on acceptance as the key element of the security triangle: acceptance, protection and deterrence. Although this has previously worked well, recent experience in some complex emergencies such as Iraq, Afghanistan and others where the perception of neutrality has been lost begs humanitarian organisations to rethink their security strategies. As pointed out in the guidelines by the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, “showing the flag is not sufficient in ensuring the security and safety of humanitarian personnel”; on the contrary, it could even attract attacks; hence a need for broader approaches to security management. Furthermore, in some regions, anti-western terror groups do not draw a line between NGOs, multinational forces, UN agencies and government agents, and because the former are the comparatively under resourced, they are often most vulnerable. As way to meet these challenges, some agencies have adopted various strategies, some of which are not consistent with the core values of the sector. These include an increase in the use of armed protection as recently observed by the author in Afghanistan, Somalia and Haiti, or “embedding” the agency vehicle in a UN convoy under military escort. The need for a review as proposed in this paper is driven by the following dilemmas:


• Growing need to increase protection and deterrent measures against the fact that humanitarian organisations cannot justify heavy expenditure on security.
• How best to maintain liaison with military actors without compromising neutrality; in complex emergencies sometimes NGOs have no choice but to seek the support or protection by military forces.
• The expanding need for NGOs to continue speaking out on behalf of those undignified by the scandal of conflict without seriously endangering their staff.
3. Hundreds of Afghans rioted over reports that American interrogators at Guantanamo Bay prison flushed at least one copy of the Koran down a toilet.
offices every two hours from 20.00 to 06.00
hours. CDC is also responsible for maintain-
ing HF radio contact with staff travelling to
and from the field.

CDC is funded through contributions from
members. According to Chirha Murhambo,
Christian Aid’s Programme officer in Bukavu,
the fee is currently US$190 per member. This
is used for payment of salaries, equipment
maintenance and purchase of stationery.

The office has been a good success as gathered
by this writer during a security review of the
region last year. At different one-on-one meet-
ings with different agencies, all five represen-
tatives spoken to were in no doubt that it had
helped to improve safety and well-being of
NGOs in the area.

Joint security network for NGOs in Haiti

The security network for Haiti, christened Sys-
teme de Securite Inter-ONG (IOS) is probably
the youngest such organisation. It started oper-
ating on 1 September 2005 with the appoint-
ment of a joint Security Officer. Currently
there are 11 member agencies: Action Aid,
Christian Aid, Oxfam GB, Concern World-
wide, German Agro Action, Lutheran World
Federation, Acted, Initiative Developpement,
Protos (Belgian), Helvetas (Swiss), and
Diakonie (German). The office is hosted by
Christian Aid in Port-Au-Prince. Funding is
through contributions by members estimated
at about US$2 000 per agency per year.

Keeping IOS afloat has been a great challenge.
Although many of the smaller NGOs are keen to
join, they have no provision in their budgets to
support the initiative. Some of the big NGOs
“have not felt” the need to join at this stage when
the office is still considered under resourced.

It is hoped that once up-and-running, the ini-
tiative will go a long way in establishing the
bases for NGOs to share security information,
including with other key players such as the
UN and agreeing on common strategies.

Unfortunately their funds are limited and
could do with some support from donors.

Sudan NGO Security Initiative

The idea of setting up an initiative for Sudan
based on the ANSO model came up in May
2005 as a strategy to cope with a very difficult
security environment. But this proved to be
quite a challenge as no agency was willing to
host the office, fearing a punitive response from
the Khartoum government. Others argued that
they already had their own security officers and
plans. However, it did appear from the various
emails flying about at the time that those who
opposed the idea mistook the proposal for some
form of privatisation of security management.

Despite these difficulties more than 10 agencies
have so far signed up and enough funds have
been pooled for an initial assessment. Like in the
case of Haiti, optimists believe that once the ini-
tiative is up and running, others will want to be
part of it, after seeing the benefits.

Suggested roles for a joint
NGO security office

Roles for a centralised security office would
depend on respective local context. The list
suggested below is therefore only a guide:

- As the focal point for security coordination
  with the UN, internationally mandated
  police forces and military, Embassies and
  other relevant security stakeholders.
- Maintaining a generic country security plan
  and coordinated contingency plans for the
  wider NGO community.
- Coordinating evacuations.
- Organising joint security training pro-
  grammes; it is always cheaper when differ-
  ent organisations pool resources to carry
  out training.
- As the centre for receiving incident reports
  throughout the area of operations; this
  helps NGOs to learn from each other’s
  experience and good practice.
- Receiving threat warnings from various
  sources and alerting NGOs accordingly
- Route assessments and classification.
- Host for meetings to discuss security and
  information sharing; such forums help to
  build solidarity between different NGOs.
- Assistance with security induction of newly
  recruited staff.
- Provide assistance to smaller NGOs in set-
  ting up their own security procedures as
  appropriate.
- Play a leading role in exploring opportuni-
  ties for sharing of security resources, e.g.
  radio repeaters and so on for the common
  good of all NGOs.
• Liaising with local police.
• Provision and manning of a dedicated security radio channel.
• Setting up and ensuring a functioning NGO “security tree,” for quick dissemination of critical security alerts and information.

Recommendations

There is no doubt that security cooperation between humanitarian organisations working in a high-risk country is very important. While recognising that field security is discussed at various forums on an ad hoc basis, there is a need to set up an office with responsibility for the coordination, bearing in mind that actions of one agency could have an impact on the security of others. Indeed, it should be remembered that local militants often cannot distinguish between different NGOs.

Those advocating for setting up these proposals should not be discouraged by the fact that some agencies have appeared unconvinced of the relevance. This is likely to remain the case until there are more success stories like ANSO and CDC. The success of the Sudan and Haiti initiatives is therefore very important for charting the way forward. If they succeed, more would want to be part of it. Alongside soliciting support from more NGOs, those spearheading the initiatives for the two projects should also explore options for donor funding.
Can you briefly explain the work of Mercy Corps?

Mercy Corps is an international relief and development organisation based in the US and the UK. We’re active in around 35 countries around the world and we’ve just celebrated our 25th anniversary. We’ve been directly involved in most major disaster response operations for the last 20 years or so, but we’re also involved in longer-term community-based development in countries in transition – whether they be economic, political, or security-related transitions.

In your experience of emergency relief operations, what lessons can be learnt with respect to coordination and cooperation between different civilian, military and humanitarian actors?

We need to be careful here not to generalise. Since September 11 a disproportionate amount of attention has been given to a few operations – notably Afghanistan and Iraq – in discussions about coordination in emergency relief operations. This is not surprising given the funding and media attention given to these two emergencies, but they are not necessarily reflective of the so-called “normal” kind of emergency to which our agency responds. Throughout Africa – certainly in West Africa and East Africa – conflicts have been on-going for some time, and while some involve international peacekeeping forces or other international military forces, just as many do not. The lessons to be learnt on cooperation depend on who’s there, and what kind of relief efforts are needed.

That said, cooperation and coordination continue to be the “holy grail” within the international community’s crisis response efforts. Effective coordination is so difficult to achieve because it has to occur on so many levels: not just at the international and strategic level, but also at a regional level where the disaster or conflict has regional implications and all the way down through national capitals to the field level.

It’s often at the field level that we find both the best and the worst examples of coordination. Where the different actors – governments, UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – face common challenges, we often find very good cooperation. This is true, for example, in areas where staff security is a prevailing concern. Inter-agency collaboration on security management is an area in which we’ve seen some progress in recent years. I expect that this trend will continue, and that we’ll see more initiatives underway within both the NGO and the UN communities, particularly with regards to information sharing.

What role does ICT play in ensuring effective cooperation and coordination?

Information and communications technology is critical to every major aspect of a crisis response operation. Each operation is so inherently complex and interdependent that it places a tremendous premium on the integration of all the various interventions – whether they be political, military, social or human rights-related.

If we take the example of security coordination again – it’s very clear that the ability of agencies to achieve effective security management depends largely on their communications infrastructure. If a host country wants to control the allocation of frequencies and communication practices, this can present enormous hurdles for security management. In some cases, the UN or major intergovernmental organisations can negotiate with host governments and include NGOs – all of them or some of them – under the UN’s communications umbrella. But if there is no “empowered” state actor, you often have a “free-for-all”. In that kind of environment, it is much tougher to develop and manage shared or consolidated communication systems. It is one of the greatest frustrations in our line of work that often you have staff in the most remote and insecure areas, and they are unable to communicate effectively with us or us with them.

Collective forms of communication can be very important tools for managing risk and improving security. They can take the form of a basic phone tree, a radio network – often administered by a UN entity – or websites that provide consolidated information on crisis situations that users can access on a demand basis.

Afghanistan is an interesting model. The primary service provider of security-related information, the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), has developed a cell phone SMS-based alert system for truly urgent security-related messages and behind that a much
larger and more extensive e-mail-based update that goes out every few days.

What about coordination and cooperation at a planning and strategic level - what lessons can be learnt there?

The real challenge here is that, however good an organisation is at performing its particular task, it will never be enough on its own because of the interdependence of the various issues and challenges associated with crisis management operations. I think more real world case studies would be very useful in this debate, to see where it worked and where it didn't.

Let's take Afghanistan as an example. In this case, different national groups took lead responsibility for different aspects of the reconstruction and development efforts. The Germans are responsible for police training, the Americans in charge of military training, and the Italians in charge of judicial reform - just three of several pillars of the overall reconstruction effort. But these tasks are so inter-related, that failure in any one of these areas directly impacts on the success of the others. What's the point of having an operational police force if there are no judges to prosecute cases or no prison space for those who are prosecuted? And if the army is developed more quickly than the police, it will soon find itself engaged in policing functions that can stretch its capacity and blur the lines between the responsibilities of the military and the interior ministry. So again it points to the need for close integration and coordination between initiatives in these situations.

Of course high level planning does go on, but there's no overall mechanism to ensure that progress is being made in a coherent way. The only body that could effectively play this role would be the national government of the host country - but in Afghanistan the government is the recipient of the capacity-building we've just been talking about, so it's a catch-22 situation.

What about civilian-military cooperation? From your experience, what are the key issues?

The question of how closely civilian and military components can and should operate together is an important topic. How closely should they conduct planning, implement activities, monitor and evaluate them? Here, there are perhaps lessons to be learnt from the US experience since September 11.

For various reasons the US administrations turned to the Pentagon to serve as its primary implementing arm, not just for military tasks but also for state building and in some cases humanitarian activities both in Afghanistan and Iraq. I think there was a perception that the military had a unique ability to respond quickly and effectively to almost any challenge put in front of them. What this did was to circumvent the US State Department and civilian side of the US government that was primarily responsible for state building activities, democracy and governance support, and humanitarian assistance. It led to a gradual eroding of civilian state capacity that meant they have been less able to play the role for which they are mandated.

So while a few have talked of the need to have a seamless operation between civilian and military services - with no internal barriers - I would urge caution. I see the benefits of presenting a homogenous view of the EU from overseas, but in many of the situations where the EU is active there are good reasons why a visible separation between its civil and military sides is necessary - even if behind closed doors there is close cooperation. This applies must directly to operations in countries in crisis, where the creation of winners and losers is impacted by the behaviour of international actors.

Keep in mind that the EU itself doesn't do much on the ground, rather it contracts others to do it. Very often those implementing the work - whether it be peacebuilding activities, humanitarian or reconstruction projects - are in fact NGOs. If the EU is relying on these entities to implement the bulk of its work overseas, it needs to think strategically how it can best ensure their success. And that's not just in terms of meeting programme targets and objectives, but also in keeping their staff safe. If one or two NGO workers are killed, it's likely that all civilian activities in that area will be either suspended or shut down. So, there needs to be great sensitivity around how NGO activities are perceived by the local population.

More often than not, the humanitarian community has sufficient capacity to address urgent humanitarian needs. In such cases, military involvement in humanitarian situations often complicates the issue and can inadvertently make our jobs tougher or potentially endanger our staff. There needs to be a clear distinction in the minds of local populations, not just in that country but also in neighbouring countries, of the difference between humanitarian, unarmed, independent aid providers, on the one hand, and military forces pursuing political objectives on the other hand. For example, in Afghanistan, coalition military forces can, on any given day, be involved in both relief-type activities and launching military raids - perhaps in villages right next to each other. So it is essential that civilian and humanitarian workers are recognised by the locals as non-combatants. Otherwise we may end up putting their lives at risk.
That message seems to be sinking in. In the early days of the Afghan war, military forces - primarily special operations forces - were conducting relief-like activities while wearing civilian clothes and driving civilian vehicles. The only difference between their appearance and that of humanitarian workers was the bulge under their shirts or the weapon barrels pointing out of the land cruiser's window. Following intense pressure from humanitarian agencies, the US military has sought to ensure that all troops engaged in "humanitarian-like" activities now do so in uniform. To be clear: whether or not military forces engaged in combat choose to wear uniforms is a different question and isn't really any of our business. But it becomes our business when military forces go into the same villages, meet the same people that we do, dress like us, drive vehicles like ours and are less than clear about what their interests are.

The greatest contribution that military forces engaged in crisis response operations can make is to provide a secure environment in which the various other actors, not least of which the locals, can rebuild and do the work that needs to be done. In exceptional circumstances, usually due to questions of security or particularly tough logistical challenges, the military is sometimes in a unique position to provide aid to communities at risk. In such cases, there is more or less unanimous support among the NGO community for military intervention, so long as it is coordinated with humanitarian agencies.

The military and humanitarian communities have different jobs; we both need to be good at them in our own way. There will be situations where we do bump into one another in crisis situations, and in those instances we need to build greater mutual understanding, communication, and cooperation to help ensure that we can both accomplish our respective missions.
Short introduction of Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO)

The ANSO programme has been running in Afghanistan since 2002. It is entirely devoted to providing security coordination and services to NGOs. It is the only actor in Afghanistan that has the sole mandate to provide security assistance to NGOs and to assist NGOs in developing their security management capacity. In addition, ANSO acts as the security advocate on behalf of NGOs, working closely with NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), the Afghan government and foreign missions.

ANSO has a staff of almost 50 people, located in five offices around the country. The office in Kabul acts as an information centre, collecting information from the Regional Security Advisors in each of the five operational regions corresponding roughly to the north, south, east, west and central portions of Afghanistan. ANSO’s national and international staff are tasked with collecting reports of security incidents; disseminating news of those incidents; and attempting to investigate the underlying reasons for those incidents. At the end of each week ANSO creates a weekly brief that summarises incidents that have happened during the previous week; follows up on incidents reported during that week; provides a brief analysis of the situation; and then produces a colour-coded threat level map of each of its five regions. ANSO is rated highly among beneficiaries for being the first to report incidents and get information out quickly.

What is ANSO’s main role in Afghanistan?

CW: We provide timely and accurate information on security issues to the NGO community across the country. Our information and analysis helps them decide how to deploy their staff and what they need to do to keep their staff safe. We aim to help them continue to deliver the work that donors pay them to do.

What are the main security threats and risks facing the NGO community?

CW: It’s hard to generalise. Afghanistan is such a huge country and it depends where you are. In the northern and western regions the largest threat is road banditry and organised crime, whereas in the south and eastern part of the country politically motivated violence is a real concern. In those regions, insurgents are directly targeting the international military forces and the UN. Some NGOs get targeted too - insurgents fail to make a distinction.

CF: Even in the northern region we’re seeing a shift towards more political violence since the elections in 2004. An NGO worker was recently killed in the region. It may have been a case of mistaken identity as a UN worker was killed in the same location some two days earlier.

CW: At last count some 24 NGO workers have been killed since the beginning of 2005 – the same number as for the whole of 2004. Afghanistan has the highest NGO death toll rate worldwide.

How does this affect the NGOs ability to recruit staff and carry out their work?

CW: Of course, the country directors I talk to tell me that recruiting for Afghanistan is very hard. Many of the people with experience, who stayed for decades during the Taliban time, do not want to work there in the current environment. It’s not often mentioned – especially by the US Government – but in fact during the Taliban time there were about 40-45 international NGOs working in Afghanistan with very little hassle. The Taliban restricted them, watched them very carefully and, if they overstepped certain cultural barriers, they were very politely but forcefully asked to leave the country. But they were not attacked. That started after the Taliban regime was ousted.

As a result NGOs today tend to have many young staff and, one of the things I think is absolutely critical, is that these staff are adequately trained before being deployed. Even experienced NGO workers often do not understand what they’re getting into in Afghanistan – it’s a whole different ball game. If you don’t follow the rules, you risk being shot. It’s considered acceptable to use deadly force to settle an argument – even arguments that may be trivial to us.

But there are still some 2 500-3 000 international aid workers in Afghanistan and approximately 800 NGOs. A large majority of those are...
national NGOs - the big international NGOs are mainly involved in capacity-building among the local civil society. In 2004, Médecins Sans Frontières pulled out of Afghanistan - they had lost five staff members during the year.

How do you cooperate with the international institutions and the military?

CW: Our relationship with the humanitarian aid office of the EU – based in Kabul – is excellent. The EU pays an important share of our budget, but aside from that, the staff in the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid are excellent to work with – very down to earth and professional.

There are two military presences in the country – the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the coalition forces. Both operate in totally different ways. At the moment our cooperation with ISAF in terms of information-sharing is relatively good – while it is less good with the coalition forces. But this reflects the fact that there are no institutionalised procedures of cooperation between the NGOs and the international military forces. It depends wholly on the personnel involved. When I started, the cooperation with ISAF was virtually non-existent, but there was good information sharing with the coalition forces. This reversed with the staff changes and it will now doubt change again.

There are of course cooperation agreements between the UN and the military forces but NGOs are not included – which is why we come in as a buffer. NGOs in Afghanistan are very reluctant to work directly, or even communicate directly, with the military because it could make them a target. That’s why they come to us with any requests for military assistance – mostly medical assistance - and we then contact the military.

To give a concrete example: I was called at 7 o’clock in the morning with news of a crash in a remote region involving two internationals and one national NGO staff. The car had fallen down a 50-metre ravine and one of the international members of staff had suffered a severe neck injury. We were able to locate him via the Global Positioning System (GPS) scan from his cell phone and contacted the military forces responsible for that area. Thankfully they responded very quickly and flew him by helicopter to the next big city where he was stabilised. Later the same day he was flown to Dubai and he survived. That’s the kind of thing that happens, not every day, but too frequently for my taste.

How has your programme been received by the NGOs?

CW: I think the ANSO programme is very successful and conceptually works very well. But it is not without its problems. We still have resource limitations and the budget is seemingly never enough, particularly for a good IT and communications infrastructure and vehicles. But even with those shortfalls and a very high turnover of international staff, we are able to meet the primary responsibilities of our mandate, which is to continually inform the humanitarian community of what’s happening around them.

We have around 1 800 people on our e-mail distribution list. I get about 300 e-mails per day from the beneficiaries the NGO community – asking for assistance, giving information. And I get called around the clock by people wanting information, inviting us to meetings, and so on. So the interaction exists and given that beneficiaries’ participation is entirely voluntary, this would indicate that the service works pretty well.

In fact we’re reliant on the NGOs to provide us with information on the ground.

With just five regional offices and the HQ, and with just 6-7 national staff, we can never hope to cover the whole of Afghanistan. By contrast, there’s at least one national or international NGO working in every district in Afghanistan so they have to be our principal information source. We then analyse the information, work with it and disseminate it.

What are some of the personal risks and challenges you face working in Afghanistan?

CW: On a personal level, the accommodation is extremely basic – that’s OK for a while but it is difficult for extended stays – and basically we have no social life. Even if we just want a walk around the block there’s a high risk of kidnapping. Insurgents seem to have got wise to the fact that kidnapping internationals for ransom may pay off.

And professionally, the frustration is not to have sufficient resources to run a better service. With the donor funds we have, we can run a basic service but we lack several things in our infrastructure that would enable us to meet more of the needs of our beneficiaries. Right now we simply don’t have the manpower or resources.

CF: Yes, to give an example of how thinly our resources are stretched. In the northern region I’m dealing with around 200 people from almost 60 organisations – and they are the ones I have a formal relationship with. There must be the same number again of people and organisations with whom I have no formal relationship. It’s a real challenge to know who’s out there, where they are and what they’re doing. Ultimately it’s voluntary
participation, so it’s difficult for us to continually update our records and to know what the NGOs need from a safety point of view.

And how do you see ANSO’s role evolving in Afghanistan?

CW: It would be great to say that ANSO’s services would no longer be needed in the next few years. That would mean that NGO staff are no longer being killed. But to be honest I don’t see any imminent improvement to the situation.
CHAPTER 35: THE ROLE OF ICT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Summary

Sharing of relevant and reliable information between the main actors of the international crisis response community is a key to sustainable results in promotion of peace worldwide. This article identifies ways information and communication technology (ICT) can be used to facilitate peace-building and humanitarian activities ranging throughout the conflict cycle - from early warning to post-conflict reconstruction. Main ICT initiatives, challenges and solutions are identified.

The importance of ICT for crisis management

ICT is crucial to crisis management, yet there is surprisingly little research into its use. To address this gap, the Swiss Government established the ICT4Peace Project to make a preliminary overview of the many uses of ICT before, during and after conflict.

Since the end of the Cold War, crisis management – the responses available to the international community in the different stages of the conflict cycle – has involved a wide range of agencies: governmental, non-governmental, national, international, civilian and military organisations. Sometimes they share objectives, but often they have conflicting priorities. Agencies may not be willing or able to share information for reasons of capacity limitations, technical barriers or political sensitivity – and it is worth noting that these barriers can apply equally within an organisation, as much as between organisations.

Inaccurate, misleading or inadequate information leads to inefficient programmes that fail to achieve their objectives, the continued suffering of local populations, or even the loss of life of agency staff. New technology has the potential to improve the effectiveness of our work in responding to crises and conflicts – as long as, at the same time, we generate the political will to implement the necessary changes within our institutions and across historically separate sectors.

Early warning, conflict prevention and early responses

While it is accepted that conflict prevention is less costly in human and financial terms than intervention during a conflict, there are significant political and practical obstacles to prevention. Satellite communications and the Internet have increased the speed with which we learn of conflicts, and provided the basis for greater understanding of conflict. Yet often the political will to prevent conflict is lacking, with a key issue being lack of accurate, timely information about the likelihood of conflict. Early warning systems offer one answer, yet early warning may not translate into early action; for example, in the case of Rwanda there were relatively unambiguous warning signs, and yet the international community failed to act. While there are understandable concerns about the practice, these do not constitute a solid case against the principle of early warning.

The ICT revolution has created the opportunity to develop tools to manage a wider range of data more systematically, applying statistical techniques to predict and analyse conflicts. While such systems continue to develop, they are only the starting point. It is still unclear what role ICT can play in preventing conflict, but the best examples can be found in the ways in which improved communications technology can build bridges between groups in conflict. This can be at the diplomatic level, but also at the community level, where social reconciliation may play a role at least as important as that of diplomatic initiatives. Examples of this can be found in the work of organisations such as War Torn Societies Project International, which promotes links between communities using media, such as video exchanges, providing communities in conflict with a better understanding of each other – very often the first, vital step towards peace.
Humanitarian interventions, peace operations and post-conflict reconstruction

While inter-agency coordination in field operations is a priority, it is also extremely difficult, hindered by differences in mandates, resources and capacities. Ironically, in conflict-related emergencies, this very complexity increases the need for effective coordination. More widespread use of ICT has become essential to manage these operations, although ironically the adoption of new technologies itself has not been coordinated effectively.

One widely-known concept is the Humanitarian Information Centers (HICs) operated by OCHA. HICs are service providers established in post-conflict and post-disaster zones to support humanitarian interventions through provision of information resources (that would otherwise be unavailable) to UN, NGO and sometimes governmental actors. Other examples are the creation of the WFP Fast IT & Telecommunications Emergency and Support Team, which sets up telecommunications for the UN system; on the NGO side, Télécoms Sans Frontières which plays a similar role in setting up emergency telecommunication systems; and from the private sector, the Ericsson Response Team which assists both sides in setting up field operations and reconstruction. Online, several initiatives have begun to create online humanitarian response clearing houses, such as Reliefguide, GlobalHand and AidMatrix, attempting to match needs with suppliers, potentially changing the way in which relief itself is delivered.

The impact of Geographic Information Systems (GIS)

GIS technology in particular has made an impact, providing map products that are more up-to-date, thematically relevant and more widely disseminated than ever before, helping to guide interventions more effectively. The best example of this is the IMSMA system (provided by the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining), which develops and disseminates data on issues related to mine action. GIS has spread rapidly, with actors such as the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission joining established actors such as the HIC. On the ground NGOs, such as the UK-based MapAction, specialise in satellite earth imaging matched with locally deployed teams to create real-time maps of disaster areas; at the policy level, agencies (such as UNOSAT) and interagency groups (such as the Geographic Information Support Team, or GIST) work to improve the use of geographic information.

ICT and Early Warning

Within the UN, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) provides ReliefWeb and IRIN as information services that offer information that can be drawn on in identifying and profiling emergencies. ICT-enabled early warning initiatives are also seen in the European Commission, with the Tarîqa system developed for the Directorate-General for External Relations enabling EC delegations around the world to follow global developments relevant to their work through one portal. Tarîqa integrates multiple public information sources, filtering news from thousands print, radio, and television channels and building a customised portal for different geographical desks in the Commission.

The Frühanalyse von Spannungen und Tatsachenermittlung (FAST) System created by SwissPeace is considered to be a major advance, employing both qualitative and quantitative methods by blending data analysis with interpretation by country experts. Another interesting project is Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) “Early Warning Indicators for Preventive Policy”, which provides statistical analysis of a database comprising more than 1,200 structural and event indicators from a range of sources.

4. www.reliefweb.int
5. www.irinnews.org
6. www.swisspeace.org/fast/
7. www.sipri.org
peace, security and the relief of human suffer-
ing. At the operational level, we need to ensure
that staff have access to the information
resources that they require to work effectively,
but also the mechanisms for sharing those
resources with their partners. These tools will
become increasingly vital for ensuring that indi-
vidual activities on the ground truly meet the
needs of affected communities.

In practical terms, the obstacles to sharing are
often found in the disparities between different
organisations’ access to ICT resources, both tech-
nological and human. This is felt most acutely in
the divide between civilian and military actors,
headquarters and field levels, and international
and local organisations. There are ways of
addressing this, for example through provision of
“common services” that are available to the
entire community (such as the UN Joint Logistics
Centre, which works in the field to provide serv-
ces and products to the humanitarian communi-
ty); or through investment in public infrastruc-
ture, ensuring better access to key technologies
such as mobile telephony and the Internet.

There are a number of obstacles that must be
overcome in order to fully realise the potential
of ICT for crisis management, and the greatest
obstacles are undoubtedly institutional rather
than technological. Interoperability is key in
this regard; ICT managers have strong incen-
tives to build their own internal information
infrastructures, and much weaker incentives to
focus on inter-organisational information-
sharing. In practical terms this means that,
although hardware and software need to be
based on common technical standards to con-
nect organisations, those organisations often
procure technology from different vendors
that are not interoperable. In the absence of
frameworks that significantly alter these incen-
tive structures, it is hard to build the necessary
tools to overcome those institutional barriers.

Data also needs to be in common formats so
that it can be shared between organisations;
organisations, however, tend to become very
attached to their own formats and are unwill-
ing to change in order to share with others. Of
course, when considering whether to share
sensitive information, individuals and organi-
sations need to have confidence that the secu-
ritiy of information is not compromised.
Obviously this is particularly difficult in a
conflict setting, and may appear to be impos-
sible between actors with differing interests –
such as between civilian and military actors.

Inaccurate or misleading information can
have serious consequences during a conflict,
and even basic issues around quality of infor-
mation can make people feel that sharing that
information poses an unnecessary risk to their
own credibility or security. However, while
the question of security cannot be over-
looked, ICTs can play a key role in facilitating
trust relationships. The principles of Open
Source Information – seen in the develop-
ment of the Tarîqa information system by the
Community – offer a new way of dealing with informa-
tion that can avoid the traditional problems
of classification and declassification.

Conclusion

Our agencies need to look beyond our tradition-
al partnerships, to the full range of actors we work
with in today’s crisis management operations. It
means building wider and stronger networks,
based not around institutional affiliations but
around communities of practice in fields such as conflict prevention, humanitarian operations and reconstruction. ICT offers both the opportunities to create and sustain these networks as never before, and also the tools to make all of our work more effective.

All of these issues must be addressed in a transparent and open manner, in a framework of trust between different stakeholders, realising that technology is a means to an end – and not an end in itself. It is only through this approach that organisations can work towards the same end goal – broadly speaking, to minimise human suffering, and enable people and communities to live with dignity – and can overcome the institutional barriers that still hold us back today.

Interagency information-sharing in the field

It has become increasingly clear that common standards and policy support are critical for successful ICT use in emergency operations. The 2002 Symposium on Best Practices in Humanitarian Information Exchange presented guidelines for practitioners, as well as identifying challenges faced in the field. The best example of policy development is the Tampere Convention which came into force in January 2005, and facilitates the international transportation and installation of telecommunications services for disaster relief operations. OCHA and the International Telecommunications Union are responsible for promoting implementation of the Convention; OCHA also convenes the Working Group on Emergency Telecommunications, to work on issues of deployment and interoperability. Meanwhile, groups such as the UN Geographic Information Working Group focus their efforts on data standards, which are key to sharing information more easily between agencies. The NGO community, the Interagency Working Group (a seven-member consortium) have produced a comprehensive report on their field information requirements, as part of their collaboration to improve the capacity of the sector to respond to emergencies.

8. www.reliefweb.int/symposium/
9. www.reliefweb.int/telecoms/tampere/
10. www.ecbproject.org/publications_4.htm
What is FITTEST?

FITTEST is the World Food Programme’s (WFP) Fast IT & Telecommunications Emergency and Support Team launched in the Great Lakes region of Africa in 1999. It provides rapid intervention in emergencies and support to WFP operations in ICT (Information and Communications Technology). Today, the response team handles numerous projects related to IT networks, electricity systems and telecommunications both for WFP and interagency projects.

How can FITTEST help?

- **Emergency preparedness and response**
  FITTEST upgrades all aspects of IT, electricity and telecommunications infrastructures including computer hardware and software, networking equipment, radios, telephones and satellite connections, and electrical utilities. It supports ICT operations in the most demanding situations with the primary goal of improving field staff security.

- **Standardisation and training**
  FITTEST enhances the existing ICT environment up to WFP and UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) standards and helps local ICT support staff to become more efficient through on-site training.

- **Supporting large-scale and special projects**
  FITTEST offers valuable support for a range of activities – such as office moves, interagency ICT projects and deployment of nationwide data and radio networks.

In summary, FITTEST delivers comprehensive ICT services in the fields of telecommunications (radio, telephone, satellite), IT (hardware, software, computer networks, Lotus Notes, WINGS, Internet, email) and electricity (including wiring, power rectification equipment, solar power and generators). It rapidly implements integrated and sustainable ICT systems that support priority needs such as staff security.

Examples of FITTEST missions:

- At the request of the Humanitarian Coordinator, FITTEST acted as telecommunications coordinating unit for the Darfur and Sudan emergency. Enhancing the system to a level never experienced in Sudan before, with sustainable operation handed over to UNDSS in country.

- At the request of the Humanitarian Coordinator, FITTEST acted as telecommunications coordinating unit for the post-conflict Iraq re-entry, supporting the UN and NGO community by setting up the common security communications network covering the whole of Iraq, Internet cafes and radio rooms at all operational centres, including deployment and support staffing.

- At the request of OCHA and the Security Management Teams, FITTEST redesigned and upgraded the interagency security communications systems for all UN agencies in Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan during the crisis in Central Asia.

- Assessed the common UN security telecommunications systems in Nepal, Chechnya, Iran, Bhutan, Laos, Eritrea and Honduras.

- Installed the WFP ICT and electricity systems in support of all recent emergency operations including Kosovo, Angola, East Timor, Mozambique, India, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central Asia, Iraq, Sudan, Liberia, tsunami areas, Chad and at present Niger.

- Assessed and upgraded all WFP field operations to full UN Minimum Operational Security Standard (MOSS) compliance for security communications.

- Provided staff training on WFP ICT systems in Kampala, Nairobi, Dakar, Panama, Islamabad and Skopje.

- Provides regular training for WFP Security officers in the usage and security management of telecommunications tools and systems.
• Coordinated/assisted in the WFP office move in Bangkok, Khartoum, Dar es Salaam and Conakry.
• Defined and documented the new WFP HF and VHF radio standards and provided training-of-trainers.

FITTEST operations

In 2002, FITTEST consolidated all its stocks and staff in the new WFP support base in Dubai. This enables the unit to respond to emergencies within 48 hours with engineers and equipment. Currently the unit has a technical stock worth US$ 2.8 million, enough to cater for over 23 emergency field offices. The Dubai Support Office is also providing procurement and logistics contingency services to WFP operations.

FITTEST staffing

FITTEST is a team of about 20 highly qualified engineers supported by administrative and stock maintenance staff. The team expands and shrinks following or anticipating corporate demands. The team is a core component of WFP’s ICT rapid response capacity.

Who requests support from FITTEST?

• The WFP Regional/Country Office management through the Regional ICT Officer.
• WFP Headquarters in Rome.
• Humanitarian coordinator through WFP Headquarters.
• FITTEST independently identifies a priority intervention.
• In exceptional cases other UN agencies request support and are considered on a case by case basis.

How does FITTEST operate?

FITTEST has developed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to maximise its effectiveness in the field. This includes close cooperation with local and/or regional ICT structures. In most interventions, the FITTEST team becomes an integrated part of the local set-up and reports directly to the ICT management in the designated location.

Who approves a FITTEST mission?

Initially, FITTEST develops mission-specific Terms of Reference, including a cost estimate which is approved by the FITTEST Chief. Once approved by the client and once funding is identified, security clearances and travel authorisations are requested. Upon receipt of the clearances, the FITTEST Chief gives final clearance for the mission and deploys the required staff and resources to the field.

Who pays for FITTEST services and equipment?

Services and equipment are provided to the beneficiary Country/Regional Office or Interagency operation on a cost-recovery basis. FITTEST has no fixed budget that covers the team’s regular operating costs, such as tools and administrative staff, but recovers its fixed costs by charging a small overhead fee for the services rendered.

FITTEST contacts:

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The safety and security of aid workers is essential for the effective delivery of relief and development assistance. The ability to deliver aid to populations in need depends on logistical and security considerations. The international relief community has developed very sophisticated, multifaceted logistical support mechanisms, but has only recently begun to address the security considerations of relief and development operations.

Recent events have dramatised and highlighted the critical nature of allowing aid workers to operate safely. The bombing of the Canal Hotel in Baghdad in 2003 led to temporary paralysis of UN work in Iraq; killings of camp workers in Sudan led to the withdrawal of agencies from areas of Darfur province and southern Sudan. Killings of staff in Afghanistan led to the withdrawal of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) from that country. The kidnapping of a CARE worker in Kabul led to a pause in development programmes in Afghanistan while negotiations were underway for her release; the threat of street violence, kidnappings, and killings continue to dramatically hamper relief efforts in Chechnya.

The Safety Information Reporting Service (SIRS) works together with leading civilian agencies to provide aid workers with information that will enhance their awareness of safety and security issues in the field.

The service’s mission is to support leading civilian agencies in responding to an emergency. Its primary goal is to collect and provide data in a neutral, systematic, and structured manner in order to support decision-making in the field. Its primary functions are to collect safety and security data from participating organisations, synthesise it into an overall picture of the security situation, and present the information in a variety of formats to promote a common situational awareness.

SIRS is envisioned as an operation that coordinates support activities to NGO "security focal point" operations in the field. These kinds of operations exist in a variety of forms, sponsored by a variety of institutions, in Afghanistan, Iraq, Indonesia, Haiti, Sudan and are emerging in Kashmir, Nepal and northern Uganda. SIRS provides a variety of technical and operational assistance packages to local and regional safety information operations. Such assistance helps to improve safety of aid workers, as well as raise their awareness of the risks in their area. It also provides a better operational context for organisations considering relief and development activities.

Specifically, SIRS will aggregate and promote best practices and standard operating procedures related to creating and compiling safety assessments, developing safety communication systems, and deploying incident mapping and management systems. But more than just acting as a repository for best and current practice, SIRS acts as an agent to seek funding for local NGO security efforts and to assist with the local and regional implementation of such best practices by providing training, consulting and operational services. A result of such activities, SIRS collects safety incident data and identifies the critical needs, which can then be addressed at the local, regional and global levels. The SIRS concept grew out of a series of Information Technology and Crisis Management (ITCM) conferences begun in 2002, hosted by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) in collaboration with the US Institute of Peace (USIP). The 2004 conference focused on security issues as a catalyst for technical and organisational collaboration to improve security management. Participants in this conference identified the need for better tools for sharing security-related information between different actors in the field. They called for the development of a prototype of a suite of tools and services focusing on field security.

As a result of the conference, CMI and USIP pursued a project to develop a comprehensive incident mapping, reporting and threat-monitoring service to be used in any environment by a range of actors to share information related to the safety and security of civilian personnel.

In the summer of 2005, a joint team of CMI and USIP personnel began a stakeholder consultation process that led to a fact-finding trip to Kabul and Banda Aceh. This in turn led to two formal consultative meetings with stakeholders in the autumn and winter of 2005. The recommendations resulting from the field trip, plus a more formal proposal of the SIRS concept, were presented to key stakeholders at the European Union headquarters in Brussels on 13 November
2005. The participants had useful and positive feedback, and encouraged the team to proceed to vet the idea with a larger group of potential collaborators. In December, CMI and USIP hosted a meeting in Saint-Paul-de-Vence, France with 44 people from 39 organisations participating, including representatives from national governments, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and corporations.

The SIRS concept was proposed and vetted in a series of workshops held over three days that investigated and discussed aspects of moving the concept forward. Specific discussions included investigations into the concept; the security environment for aid workers; existing initiatives; potential governance structures; operational considerations; and external relationships with other types of actors including national and local government agencies; international organisations; the NGO community; military organisations; commercial enterprises; and local populations. The participants worked together to craft a provisional mission statement, goals and objectives, and brainstormed on how to move the concept to reality. Participants agreed that SIRS should become an independent organisation that represents a security focal point for the crisis management community. Until SIRS is a fully developed field service, however, CMI and its partner organisations will act as incubators for its development.
THALES ON CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN SECURITY

Interview with Edgar Buckley

Edgar Buckley: joined Thales as Senior Vice President, European Business Development, in September 2003 following a career in British government and international organisation service. From 1999 until 2003 he was NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Operations, responsible for NATO defence policy and operational issues. From 1996 until 1999 he was the Assistant Under Secretary of State in the UK Ministry of Defence responsible for policy on military operations.

What are the most important security challenges facing the EU at the moment and in the foreseeable future?

In its 2003 Security Strategy, the EU identified five main threats facing Europe: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. All of these can combine to pose even greater threats. Undoubtedly, the combination of terrorism with proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons would be the most frightening eventuality. Even without weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism is a clear threat to our lives, our freedoms and our values. We must oppose it in every way possible, while at the same time looking to address the underlying reasons for its support by others.

In parallel, the EU must prepare to play its part in external security operations, such as the one it is currently leading in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EU has a unique capability to combine military operations with civil support actions and to back these up with real political and economic incentives to achieve peace. It also has a unique moral authority in its region, linked to the transparency of its strategy for peace.

The EU cannot know when it will be called upon to act in a future crisis but it can be certain that such calls will come, and when they do it will have to act quickly and succeed in what it undertakes. Preparation for future crisis operations is therefore an urgent political obligation. But the EU is severely challenged by the fragmentation of authority for civil and military actions, and by problems of interoperability among the services and forces of its Member States. Technical solutions exist to enable joint, civil-military, multinational forces to come together and be deployed quickly and effectively, but political consensus to implement them is not easy to achieve.

How can the European industry contribute to the successful achievement of the objectives set in the European Security Strategy and of the build-up of a genuine European capacity?

Industry’s role is vital. In the defence domain, this has long been understood and accepted. But in Europe that realisation has been slower to become established where homeland security threats are concerned. There was no mention of industry, for example, in the EU’s security strategy document. By contrast, the US was quick to see that industry would have a key partner role in this sphere. Its homeland security strategy, published shortly after the September 11 attacks, gave prominence to the private sector’s role.

Europe too now recognises industry’s role, in particular that we need to support industrial research in the security domain in order to develop the solutions we need and to ensure that Europe maintains its appropriate influence as security standards are prepared. As evidence of this, a Group of Personalities, with strong industry representation, prepared a report for the EU Commission, which led to a Preparatory Action for Security Research and Technology. The research studies carried out under this relatively small-scale preparatory programme are already providing essential reflections and solutions. Two of them in particular - ESSTRT and SeNTRE - are aimed at guiding the EU’s security research activity towards the most important new security needs as seen by the customer governments. All those involved in this work are convinced that the follow-on European Security Research Programme can significantly assist Europe to respond appropriately to current and future threats. The creation of the European Defence Agency is another indication that the importance of the supply side is now better recognised at the political level.

Industry for its part is preparing to launch a new European public-private forum in the homeland security field to deepen the dialogue and ensure that Europe’s voice is heard. This forum, which will promote active participation by all sectors involved in this domain, is intended to be established early in 2006.

Looking to the three specific strategic security objectives of the Union, industry has much to contribute. So far as addressing direct threats is concerned, industry will provide new and better ways to support security monitoring and respond to attacks. This will enable European political leaders to help frame global approaches to these issues, so that they are not simply asked to accept solutions proposed from the outside. To help build security in the EU’s neighbourhood, industry can act both with the Member States themselves and with neighbouring countries to deliver consistent and interoperable approaches. Finally, to assist in the creation of an effective international order, industry will play its part both by directly
supporting international organisations such as the UN, the OSCE and NATO, and by supporting international agreements such as those relating to the supply of weapons and transfer of defence technology.

In what ways can industry contribute to more effective civilian ESDP capacity and more generally to the civilian crisis response capacity of the international community?

The main challenge is to support a unified civil-military approach to deployments and operations in the field. Typically, in complex peace support operations, there are difficulties in communicating with and coordinating the efforts of all those involved. The military side, if well-organised, can effectively communicate with itself, but that is not sufficient because often it is the civil contribution which is critical: new approaches to communications and command and control are needed, to allow a more “plug and play” approach so that all those involved can share information when they want to.

There are of course other challenges. For example, assisting in establishing or re-establishing public communications facilities, public utilities and secure ground and air transport, rebuilding energy infrastructure, and ensuring minimum standards of law and order. In all of these areas and others, industry has a key role to play.

But the most important point to keep in mind is that we need to prepare for these tasks multinational. Industry can assist in defining multinational standards to support these preparations, including in the important domain of network centric operations where work is already underway through the Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium.

What are the opportunities and challenges in developing solutions for civilian crisis response operations? How can the identified obstacles be overcome? How can we improve collaboration between stakeholders?

The main obstacles to better civilian crisis response are lack of resources, slowness of deployment, problems of communication and coordination, and mutual misunderstanding and distrust. From the EU standpoint, what is needed is that the Union and its Member States should develop rapid deployment capabilities on the civil side to complement those of their military forces, and that they should pre-plan as much as possible their working cooperation approaches to NGOs and other international organisations whom they will probably be working alongside.

We should also keep in mind the trend in government to outsource services to industry as a way of providing cheaper or better outcomes for the consumer. Outsourcing can play a role in civil crisis response operations too, for example to provide air traffic control, security or telecommunications services. Industry needs to be consulted early to be ready to provide such contributions.

The EU is already taking the lead in this domain through its civil/military planning unit. Industry can assist by contributing to standardisation and interoperability discussions. We can also support better public-private dialogue, which may go some way towards helping build trust and support calls for increased resources. Industry sees itself as one of the stakeholders in this domain and wants to play its part in improving overall capabilities.

What is the role of the European security research programme in this development?

The European Security Research Programme (ESRP) is a key step to ensure that European industry is able to marry developing technologies to real operational requirements and with an increased tempo. The ESRP therefore needs to be established at the appropriate high level, bearing in mind that much greater sums are being devoted to this sort of research in the United States. The ESRP also offers a real dialogue between industry and the EU on the priorities for technological investment. This is a particularly important aspect since industry also needs to invest its own resources in these efforts. We are willing to do so but we need to have reasonable confidence that there will be a market for what we produce as a result. The EU has established the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) with industry to assist dialogue and help guide priorities in the ESRP. Other partners need to be heard as well, which is where a new public-private forum can play a key role.

In concrete terms, industry looks to the ESRP to assist in developing new approaches in three fields: supplying immediate operational needs (e.g. ICT systems, surveillance systems, command and control facilities); developing new technologies and applications to address security needs (e.g. early warning/detection systems, secure interoperable radios, border security systems, open-source intelligence systems – data mining); and ensuring civil-military and multinational interoperability (e.g. through developing new open standards for network centric operations). The ESRP will be a key enabler for much of this work.
Eutelsat is one of the world's three leading satellite operators with capacity commercialised on 23 satellites that provide coverage over Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia and the Americas. Its satellites are used for broadcasting over 2,100 television and 970 radio stations and also serve requirements for TV contribution services, corporate networks, mobile positioning and communications, Internet backbone connectivity and broadband access for terrestrial, maritime and in-flight applications. Eutelsat's broadband subsidiary Skylogic Italia markets and operates services through multimedia platforms in France and Italy that serve enterprises, local communities, government agencies and aid organisations in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas. Headquartered in Paris, Eutelsat and its subsidiaries employ 500 commercial, technical and operational experts from 27 countries.

Objectives

Satellite communications are particularly well-suited to relief and humanitarian operations in the field, as a result of five unique features:

• coverage of very large geographical areas;
• independence from terrestrial infrastructure and natural terrain conditions;
• sharing of transmission bandwidth between all points of the network;
• instant transmission of signals to all points located in the coverage (cost is independent from the number of points); and
• complete transparency to all formats of information sent.

Eutelsat offers Disaster Recovery solutions via satellite designed to swiftly restore voice and data communications between all types of locations in emergency situations and for all types of activity for example, businesses, governmental services and NGO’s.

The frequencies of Eutelsat satellites (Ku band) make them particularly attractive for the implementation of emergency systems through the use of small, low-cost and easily transportable ground terminals.

Experiences in the field

Eutelsat systems have already been used in several emergency situations, both inside and outside Europe.

Following the December 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, the Italian Civil Protection Agency needed a solution that would help its field agents working in different location in Sri Lanka to communicate between themselves as well as with their headquarters in Rome. The solution had to combine independence from a largely destroyed terrestrial infrastructure, portability and user-friendliness, while allowing voice communications as well as e-mail, instant messaging services and Internet access for reporting on the relief effort. Implementation of the network was carried out in four days, but this period can be substantially reduced if a cell for emergency satellite communications is created either in Eutelsat or in the entities devoted to crisis management.

Another solution has been developed for NetHope, which is responsible for maintaining and operating the voice and data communications infrastructure of member humanitarian organisations in over 40 countries, from Paraguay to Nepal. NetHope was seeking a common voice and data communications solution for all its member organisations, present and future. The system had to be universal, provide coverage all over the world, including the most remote areas, be easy to use and maintain, enabling humanitarian staff to connect anywhere, anytime, while remaining affordable.

Description of the systems

Eutelsat’s Disaster Recovery solutions are based on three main components:

• The satellite terminal: this equipment enables communication via satellite and can be connected to WiFi access points to guarantee access to satellite links by field teams working remotely from the satellite terminal. For greater ease of use in emergency situations, the satellite terminals are available in a light, portable “flyaway” version, and include an integrated GPS receiver,
satellite modem, and Voice-over-IP adaptor, as well as a lightweight, foldable antenna.

- The broadband link Eutelsat offers two types of broadband services: dedicated (IP Connect) and shared (IP Access), depending on actual communications requirements. For the needs of humanitarian operations, the best solution has been proven to be the use of a dedicated frequency band shared among all the terminals involved in the operations.

- The Network Operation Control (NOC) Center located in the Turin teleport that automatically provides the frequencies required by the network, continuously monitors the network status and guarantees assistance to remote terminals in the event of on-site problems.

The application in Sri Lanka comprised PCs, WiFi access points and internet connections operating through D-STAR satellite broadband terminals. The network also provided VoIP telephone and videoconferencing services between Sri Lanka and Rome. Connections were established through capacity on Eutelsat’s W6 satellite, which is equipped with a steerable beam that was pointed over the region, and the Skylogic teleport in Turin.

The NetHope solution called upon Eutelsat’s two-way satellite broadband connectivity D-STAR system. This provides NetHope a one-stop, one price solution for all its member organisations around the world. The network uses capacity on four satellites, including the African beam on Eutelsat’s recent W3A satellite. Communications with humanitarian staff in remote areas around the globe has been improved, and Internet access and other basic communications means have been made available to local populations.

**Security**

Security has to be dealt with from different perspectives. In particular:

- From the point of view of information security, Eutelsat systems enable the transmission of encrypted messages and data and the creation of Virtual Private Networks inaccessible by unauthorised persons;

- From the point of view of equipment reliability and network availability, the satellite terminals are designed and manufactured to achieve very high reliability. The same applies to the NOC, which features redundant equipment. Moreover NOC staff ensures 24/24 and 7/7 network control and assistance to remote users.

- From the point of view of on-site intervention speed, Eutelsat has an extensive network of installers, able to intervene swiftly in the different regions of the world.
Insta DefSec provides services and products for crisis management environments. Insta iCM – Inter-organisational Crisis Manager – is a solution for situational awareness and crisis management. Insta iCM is designed to facilitate decision-making and coordinate operations between crisis management organisations both in international and domestic crisis situations.

Objectives

The objective of using Insta iCM is to improve the safety and security of field personnel by improving access to relevant security-related information. Insta iCM has been developed and demonstrated together with end user organisations with the aim of developing it into an internationally interoperable management and information-sharing system for civilian crisis management organisations.

Experiences in the field

Insta iCM has been widely tested in different kinds of international and domestic crisis environments. In the Insta iCM exercise (hosted by OSCE) in Sarajevo in October 2004, all the security officers of the international organisations working in Sarajevo found the exchange of information with other organisations with the help of Insta iCM easy and beneficial for their operations. The following organisations participated in the exercise: CAFAO, EC, EUPM, EUMM, OHR, OSCE, UNRFSO and SFOR.

In September 2005 Insta iCM was used by Finnish officials in the international Barents Rescue 2005 exercise in North Norway close to the North Cape. With the help of Insta iCM the people in the field shared their situational awareness with other Finnish officials both in the exercise area and offices in Finland. Barents Rescue is a series of exercises in which Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish and Russian search and rescue officials explore their capabilities and train for joint search and rescue operations. Barents Rescue 2005 included a realistic exercise of the evacuation of more than 500 people from a passenger ship and an oil tanker that “had collided”. The northern location guaranteed that the whole exercise was conducted under extreme arctic conditions.

Another concrete case where Insta iCM has been used was the CITY04 joint exercise where Finnish Search and Rescue officials cooperated in realistic training for domestic crisis scenarios in southern Finland.

Description of the solution

Insta iCM operates on modern PCs and laptops. The system is browser-based, which makes it easy to access anywhere in the world.

The ease of use and versatility of Insta iCM enable it to be quickly deployed in all kinds of crisis situations and environments. The flexible technology platform enables scenarios to be created varying from complex homeland security or international crisis environments where numerous systems and data sources are integrated to straightforward catastrophe scenarios where fast deployment and simple ease of use are essential.

Insta iCM is not dependent on any network technology, but it can be accessed over any available existing or newly deployed data network, such as GPRS, WLAN, satellite networks or TETRA.

Security

The solution supports different security levels and data confidentiality requirements. Role-based access control using PKI-based smart card authentication and encrypted information distribution is recommended for high security requirement environments. For uses where transparency is essential, the system can be configured to have low-level access control or none at all.

Insta DefSec’s Security Systems provide a wide range of products, services and expertise for high-security environments. Solutions enable secure interoperability between different organisations, networks and systems.

Increased situational awareness in a crisis arena saves lives

1. CAFAO (Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office); EC (European Commission); EUPM (European Union Police Mission); EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mission); OHR (Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representatives); OSCE (Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe); UN Regional Field Security Office; and SFOR (Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
ANNEX 1: EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT ENTITLED:
For a European civil protection force: Europe Aid by Michel Barnier

In January 2006, the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso and the President of the European Council Wolfgang Schüssel invited him to undertake a study on the EU role in responding to major crisis. Michel Barnier has made in his report entitled “For a European civil protection force: Europe Aid” 12 proposals for improving the European Union’s crisis response capability.

Introduction

In January 2006 Wolfgang Schüssel and José Manuel Barroso, Presidents of the Council of the European Union and of the European Commission respectively, asked me to draw up a report on the EU’s response to major cross-border emergencies for the June European Council.

Since the tsunami of 26 December 2004, the EU and other players, in particular the United Nations, have been eager to improve their response to emergencies. Since January 2005 the EU has been working on the basis of an action plan. Successive EU Presidencies have since shown their resolve to boost the EU’s capacity to show solidarity at home and abroad.

As the tsunami so tragically shows, the price of not including a Europe in the crisis management response is a high one to pay. First and foremost, a series of hastily organised individual responses is no match for an EU response that has been planned, organised and tested against specific scenarios. Secondly, multiplying responses results in a lack of coordination that diminishes the EU’s impact and visibility on the ground. The EU response can only be made more cost-effective by properly organisating the Member States’ civil protection capabilities and consular assistance on the basis of common scenarios, training programmes and exercises.

When drafting this outlook report, I naturally took account of the progress of the many projects under way at the Council (especially in the Permanent Representatives Committee) and the Commission. I had talks with a number of Member States, and I sounded out the Commission and the Council’s General Secretariat.

When all is said and done, I wanted to place the work under way in a political context. I have therefore taken the calculated risk of framing my proposals and the associated timetable in the medium term, and more specifically with an end date of 2010, by which time, one way or another, the countries of the EU will have created the post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, provided for in the Constitution, which they wanted and accepted unanimously in Rome. By 2010 the Council, the Commission and the Member States will be working together more effectively on the EU’s external action. I therefore hope that the reader will make the same mental leap into the medium term. This is the only way in which we can get over the present hurdles and shortcomings. I also hope that no more disasters will be needed in the interim to set our thinking, resources and expertise on the right track.

My mission statement poses the question of what the EU can do to improve its response, especially to major emergencies outside the EU.

External emergencies differ in a number of ways from emergencies inside the EU:

• They affect sovereign states, which are free to decide how to respond to an emergency and whether to request assistance from abroad.

• The EU Presidency coordinates the response politically in close cooperation with the United Nations, national and local authorities in the country concerned and non-governmental organisations. We need to find ways to increase the speed and effectiveness of their collective decision-making.

• There are many tools at the EU’s disposal. Naturally, national or regional civil protection resources can be drawn on. At any rate, we have a presence on the ground through humanitarian aid, coordinated at international level by the United Nations and channelled at EU level through the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid. Last but not least, the EU implements reconstruction programmes. We need to work out how best to pool these resources and maximise synergies.

Such emergencies, often in far-off places, affect more than one country and call for capability projection. This projection of men and resources is currently lacking.

Lastly, such emergencies call for consular assistance, since EU citizens are naturally more vulnerable when they are far from their country of origin. In 2003 there were more than 30 million trips by Europeans outside Europe. The falling price of air travel will increase this number in the years ahead. In the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004 about 200,000 people died and thousands disappeared. In Thailand alone, 2,500 foreign tourists, many of them EU citizens, died. At issue is whether the Member States of the EU are willing and able to work together to improve their assistance to citizens in difficulty.

Obviously, if the Member States and the EU institutions take up the proposals outlined in this report and decide to improve our civil protection response considerably, that will apply to emergencies in far-off places as well as to disasters within the territory of the EU. In 1999 Turkey and Greece were hit by earthquakes at the same time. In the more distant past, some 100,000 people were killed by an earthquake and tidal wave that destroyed the Sicilian city of Messina in 1908. Exactly twenty years ago the Chernobyl disaster, just across the border from the EU, affected the whole of Europe. And the bombings in Madrid and London have shown that a European September 11 is possible.

## The need for Europe

Our countries’ citizens need new proof of the EU’s added value. Voters in France and the Netherlands have told us this quite bluntly. Whether it is the earthquakes or storms of 1999, the wrecks of the *Erika* and the *Prestige* off our shores, the floods that hit Central Europe in 2002 and again this year, whether it is the tsunami or the earthquake in Pakistan, Europe is expected to show solidarity: the EU is called on to act and the Member States asked to help.

Obviously, a better EU response to these emergencies reflects a real duty to help as well as responding to the citizens’ political expectations. It has been at the very heart of the European project for fifty years now. Since 1950 Europe’s peoples have shown solidarity towards each other but also towards the other peoples of the world. It is not by chance that we find this demand for solidarity in two recent initiatives:

- The European Union Solidarity Fund set up in 2002 at the behest of the Prodi Commission in the wake of flooding in Germany, the Czech Republic and Austria can mobilise 1 billion a year for devastated regions of the EU.
- The draft European Constitution, for its part, contains a solidarity clause (Article to protect democratic institutions and the civilian population in the event of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster).

The same needs are being expressed and the same proof asked for beyond our continent: international instability, new threats and environmental hazards oblige us to respond. The citizen has consistently asked for this: as recently as December 2005, 77% of EU citizens expressed their backing for a common foreign and security policy and 68% for a common external policy.

Javier Solana has clearly identified the five main threats facing Europe: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organised crime. The governments of each and every Member State have a duty to protect themselves and to respond to these new geopolitical threats. It is also in their interest to do this together.

The Treaties and the risks being what they are, we can and must find the will and the resources to act together more effectively now. But one way or another, sooner or later, we will need the solutions offered by the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, and in particular the following innovations:

1. a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs with authority over all services involved in external action (external relations, development assistance and humanitarian aid); a European External Action Service will help the Minister fulfil his or her mandate (Article III-296);
2. the solidarity clause (Article I-43) referred to above and its implementing procedures (Article III-329);
3. a European policy on the prevention of natural disasters and on civil protection (Article III284);
4. EU action on humanitarian aid in the context of the principles and objectives of the EU’s external action (Article III321);
5. a public health policy covering, in particular, the fight against the major health scourges (Article III-278);
enhanced cooperation (Articles I-44 and III-416 to III-423) making it easier for those Member States that wish to take things further and make them faster to do so.

**What the EU is already doing**

Since the early 1990s the EU has been able to respond to emergencies. The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid was set up in 1992. The Commission – like a number of Member States – is already a very active member of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative and of the donor support groups set up by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

In 2001 Margot Wallström, who was Environment Commissioner at the time, proposed a Community Civil Protection Mechanism, which triggers a movement of solidarity in the event of emergencies both inside and outside the EU. Depending on the circumstances, this solidarity currently involves pooling certain resources available in the Member States (transport, equipment, medical teams, etc.). It is designed to respond to the consequences of natural and man-made disasters (industrial and maritime accidents, terrorist attacks).

Lastly, the EU has worked to consolidate its emergency response and provide back-up over time. Preparing reconstruction and stabilising fragile political situations are two key areas of EU action. Just as humanitarian aid and the rapid reaction mechanism have their role to play, so do large-scale reconstruction programmes.

Moreover, since 2003, at the prompting of Javier Solana and the Council of the European Union, civilian crisis management operations in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) have been added to this arsenal, helping respond effectively to emergencies with a common foreign and security policy dimension. Twelve such missions are currently under way in, for instance, Bosnia in the Balkans, Rafah in Palestine and Aceh in Indonesia.

Building on and learning from this, I have worked out 12 practical, operational solutions. They address three concerns:

1. making humanitarian aid and civil protection more effective,
2. providing EU citizens with greater protection and assistance,
3. strengthening overall consistency.

**Twelve proposals for improving the European Union’s crisis response capability**

Our twelve proposals for improving the European Union’s crisis response capability rest on the ideas developed in the second part of the report and on progress in the projects and discussions currently under way in the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Member States.

In general they call for voluntary participation by the Member States and they are spread over a four-year time-frame.

We propose:

1. A European civil protection force: “Europe Aid”.
2. Support for the force from the seven outermost regions of the European Union.
3. The setting-up of a Civil Security Council and a greater role for the General Affairs and External Relations Council.
5. An integrated European approach to crisis anticipation.
6. Six European Union delegations to specialise in crisis management.
7. A clear information system for European Union citizens travelling outside the Union.
8. The pooling of consular resources.
9. The creation of consular flying squads.
10. The setting-up of “European consulates” on an experimental basis in four geographical areas.
11. The establishment of a European consular code.
12. Laboratories specialising in bioterrorism and victim identification.
Proposed timetable

1 July 2006 – 30 June 2007 (Finnish and German Presidencies)

• Humanitarian aid/civil protection

1. Establishment within a year of the following seven scenarios - MIC in close cooperation with the Member States and the stakeholders (other Commission Directorates-General, the Council General Secretariat’s Civil/Military Cell):
   - earthquakes and tsunamis
   - forest fires and other fires
   - flooding
   - industrial and nuclear accidents
   - terrorist attacks
   - disasters at sea
   - pandemics.

2. Establishment of a “menu” of needs for each scenario.

3. Those Member States that wish to do so start taking account of the “menu” in their organisation.

4. Alignment of MIC and the Directorate-General emergency structures for external relations.

5. Reinforcement of MIC with Member State experts to form the basis of the operations centre.

6. European Council decision to establish a EuropeAid civil protection force.

• External relations

1. Study into possibility of "common" financing from the CFSP budget for operations to evacuate EU citizens abroad.

2. Empowerment of heads of delegation to act in emergencies in liaison with Member States’ diplomatic and consular services and establishment of contingency fund for heads of delegation.

3. Identification of six regional delegations and preparation of organisational set-up for three of them.

4. Establishment of structure for the two "emergency" and "consolidation" databases.

• Assistance to EU citizens in the event of a crisis/Consular matters

1. Assessment of the Member States’ consular capacities, in order to anticipate needs in the event of a crisis, and identification of best assistance and evacuation practices at national consulates abroad.

2. Preparation of Commission proposal on the four pilot areas for establishing EU consulates.

3. Start of work on EU consular code.

1 July 2007 – 30 June 2008 (Portuguese and Slovenian Presidencies)

• Humanitarian aid/Civil protection

1. In follow-up to the Berend Report, the Council, Commission and Parliament hold a tripartite meeting to adapt the EU Solidarity Fund Regulation to finance civil protection training and the purchase of certain types of equipment.

2. Preparation of operations protocols by the "enhanced MIC" (future operations centre) assisted by the Member States and the Council General Secretariat.

3. Feasibility study on legal cover necessary for civil protection missions within the EU.

4. Stepping-up of joint training and implementation of an annual exercise open to all Member States and organised by the future operations centre.

5. Commission proposal for setting up a European civil protection force (EuropeAid). Adjustment of visibility factors for external aid.


7. Launch of feasibility study for foundation or specialisation of a European victim-identification laboratory and one or more laboratories specialising in bioterrorism.

• External relations

1. Entry into service of the three regional delegations specialising in crisis management after finalisation of organisational setup.

2. Introduction of new administrative and financial framework for heads of delegation.

3. Creation of the two "emergency" and "consolidation" databases.

4. Training of first joint assessment teams for "emergency" and "consolidation".
5. Application of institutional provisions on external action and civil protection.

• Assistance to EU citizens in the event of a crisis/Consular matters

1. Identification and training of consular flying squads of volunteer diplomats.

2. Presentation and adoption of the Commission proposal on the four experimental regions for setting up EU consulates. Failing that, enhanced cooperation for those wishing to press ahead.

3. Presentation of Commission proposal for an EU consular code.

1 July 2008 – 30 June 2009 (French and Czech Presidencies)

• Humanitarian aid/Civil protection

1. Discussion in Council of act creating the EuropeAid European civil protection force.

2. At end of period, adoption of act creating the EuropeAid European civil protection force or, failing that, start of enhanced cooperation between those countries wishing to press ahead under Article 43 (Title VII of Treaty on European Union).


4. Proposal for EU regulation on the legal cover necessary for civil protection operations within the EU.

5. Initial application of scenarios and their testing during the annual exercise.

• External relations

1. Evaluation of first three regional delegations specialising in crisis response.

• Assistance to EU citizens in the event of a crisis/Consular matters

1. Introduction of consular flying squads and first joint training courses.

2. Evaluation of working of four experimental regions and extension to other areas.

1 July 2009 – 30 June 2010 (Swedish and Spanish Presidencies)

• Humanitarian aid/Civil protection

1. Launch of initial approval procedures for units of the “EuropeAid” force. The Member States choose items from the proposed “menu” that they undertake to make available to the force.

2. Grouping of humanitarian action and civil protection under the authority of a single European Commissioner.

3. First integrated operation involving humanitarian aid and the resources of the European civil protection force.

• External relations

1. Extension of organisational set-up of first three regional delegations to another three.

• Assistance to EU citizens in the event of a crisis/Consular matters

1. Drafting of an EU consular code.

2. Foundation or specialisation of a European victim-identification laboratory and laboratories specialising in bio-terrorism.

3. Adoption of EU consular code. Failing that, enhanced cooperation between those countries wishing to press ahead.
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