The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience

Study 4

Rebuilding Post-War Rwanda

by

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Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda
Contents

Preface 5
Acknowledgements 8
Executive Summary 9

Introduction
Purpose and Scope 19
Methodology 19
Organization 21

Chapter 1: Political and Economic Background 22
Economic context 22
Ethnic composition and relations 23
Political History 23
Genocide and killings of moderate hutu 24
Migration of refugees 25
Composition of new government 25

Chapter 2: Overview of Assistance to Rwanda 27
Initial donor initiatives 27
Assistance pledged during the Round Table Conference 28
Problems and prospects 29

Chapter 3: Support for Economic and Public Sector Management 35
Macroeconomic and public policy reforms 35
Policy action by the government 36
International interventions 38
Problems and prospects 38

Chapter 4: Assistance to Agriculture 41
Post-war situation 41
International interventions 41
Problems and prospects 45

Chapter 5: Rehabilitating the Health Sector 51
Post-war situation 51
International interventions 51
Problems and prospects 54

Chapter 6: Rehabilitating the Education Sector 57
Post-war situation 57
International interventions 57
Problems and prospects 59

Chapter 7: Assistance to Vulnerable Populations 62
Post-war situation 62
International interventions 62
Problems and prospects 66
### Chapter 8: Psycho-Social Healing
- Post-war situation 69
- International interventions 69
- Problems and prospects 71

### Chapter 9: Promoting Human Rights and Building a Fair Judicial System
- Post-war situation 74
- International interventions 75
- Problems and prospects 83

### Chapter 10: Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced People
- Old caseload refugees 91
- New caseload refugees 92
- Internally displaced persons 95
- Problems and prospects 96

### Chapter 11: Cross-Cutting Issues and a Vision for the Future
- The consequences of the genocide 100
- Relationship between NGOs and the government 101
- Unrealistic expectations for repatriation 102
- Long-term development of Rwanda 102

### Chapter 12: Recommendations and Lessons Learned
- Recommendations for Rwanda 105

### Bibliography
- 111

### Appendix:
- List of Organizations/Officials Interviewed in the Field 118

### Annex:
- Abbreviations 120

### List of Figures
- Figure 2.1 Allocation of grants for Rwanda crisis 31
- Figure 9.1 Examples of international assistance for the judicial system 77
- Figure 10.1 Old caseload Rwandese refugees 91
- Figure 10.2 Refugee population, July 15, 1994-May 5, 1995 92
- Figure 10.3 Old and new caseload refugee returns 93

### List of Tables
- Table 2.1 January 1995 Round Table Conference: financial tracking 28
- Table 2.2 Disbursement of Round Table Conference pledges 30
- Table 4.1 Principal Round Table donors for rehabilitation of agriculture and rural economy 42
- Table 6.1 Distribution of TEPs 58
- Table 7.1 Response of 64 Rwandese children about the war 62
- Table 7.2 Demographic effects of the war and genocide 63
Preface

Within a period of three months in 1994, an estimated five to eight hundred thousand people were killed as a result of civil war and genocide in Rwanda. Large numbers were physically and psychologically afflicted for life through maiming, rape and other trauma; over two million fled to neighbouring countries and maybe half as many became internally displaced within Rwanda. This human suffering was and is incomprehensible. The agony and legacy of the violence create continuing suffering, economic loss and tension both inside Rwanda and in the Great Lakes Region.

For several years preceding the massive violence of 1994, the international community contributed to efforts to find a peaceful solution to escalating conflict and provided substantial assistance to alleviate the human suffering. During the nine months of the emergency in 1994, April to December, international assistance for emergency relief to Rwandese refugees and displaced persons is estimated to have cost in the order of US$1.4 billion, of which about one-third was spent in Rwanda and two-thirds in asylum countries. This accounted for over 20% of all official emergency assistance, which in turn has accounted for an increasing share, reaching over 10% in 1994, of overall international aid.

This growth reflects the worldwide proliferation in recent years of so-called complex emergencies. These tend to have multiple causes, but are essentially political in nature and entail violent conflict. They typically include a breakdown of legitimate institutions and governance, widespread suffering and massive population displacements, and they often involve and require a range of responses from the international community, including intense diplomacy and conflict resolution efforts, UN policing actions, and the provision of multilateral and bilateral humanitarian assistance by official and private agencies. A complex emergency tends to be very dynamic, characterized by rapid changes that are difficult to predict. Thus complex issues are raised regarding the timing, nature and scale of response. The Rwanda complex emergency shares all these characteristics and more.

Although some evaluations of international assistance for complex emergencies have been carried out, experience from the planning and execution of large-scale aid for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction has not been extensively documented and assessed. Recognizing both the magnitude of the Rwanda emergency and the implications of complex disasters for constricted aid budgets, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its development cooperation wing, Danida, proposed a Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda.

This initiative resulted in the launching of an unprecedented multinational, multi-donor evaluation effort, with the formation of a Steering Committee at a consultative meeting of international agencies and NGOs held in Copenhagen in November 1994. This Committee is composed of representatives from 19 OECD-member bilateral donor agencies, plus the European Union and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD; nine multilateral agencies and UN units; the two components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC and IFRC); and five international NGO organizations.

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1 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America, Commission of the EU, OECD/DAC, IOM, UN/DHA, UNDP, UNHCHR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, IBRD, ICRC, IFRC, ICVA, Doctors of the World, Interaction, Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, VOICE. Several other countries supported the evaluation, but did not participate actively. France suspended its participation in the Steering Committee in December 1995. The cost of the evaluation has been met by voluntary contributions from members of the Steering Committee.
Objective of the Evaluation

The main objective of the evaluation is to draw lessons from the Rwanda experience relevant for future complex emergencies as well as for current operations in Rwanda and the region, such as early warning and conflict management, preparation for and provision of emergency assistance, and the transition from relief to rehabilitation and development.

In view of the diversity of the issues to be evaluated, four separate evaluation studies were contracted to institutions and individuals with requisite qualifications in the fields of (i) emergency assistance planning and management; (ii) repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees; (iii) history and political economy of Rwanda and the surrounding region; (iv) institution and capacity building in development; (v) conflict and political analysis; and/or (vi) socio-cultural and gender aspects. Institutions and individuals were also selected for their proven ability to perform high-quality, analytical and objective evaluative research.

The institutions and principal individuals responsible for the four reports are listed below. Space precludes listing all team members for each study, which ranged from four persons for Study I to 21 for Study III, in all, 52 consultants and researchers participated. Complete identification of the study teams may be found in each study report. Several of the studies commissioned sub-studies that are also identified in the respective study report.

Study I: Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors
The Nordic Africa Institute (Uppsala, Sweden)
Tor Sellström and Lennart Wohlgemuth.

Study II: Early Warning and Conflict Management
Chr. Michelsen Institute (Bergen, Norway)
York University (Toronto, Canada)
Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke.

Study III: Humanitarian Aid and Effects
Overseas Development Institute (London, United Kingdom)
John Borton, Emery Brusset and Alistair Hallam.

Study IV: Rebuilding Post-Genocide Rwanda
Center for Development Information and Evaluation,
US Agency for International Development; Development Alternatives, Inc.;
Refugee Policy Group (Washington, DC, USA)
Krishna Kumar and David Tardif-Douglin.

Evaluation oversight was performed by the Steering Committee (which held four meetings between December 1994 and December 1995), and by a Management Group, comprised of one lead bilateral agency for each study: Study I: Claes Bennedich, Sida, Sweden; Study II: Jarle Hårstad, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway; Study III: Johnny Morris, ODA, United Kingdom; and Study IV: Krishna Kumar, USAID/CDIE, USA; and Niels Dabelstein, Danida, Denmark, as chair. The evaluation teams were responsible to the Management Group and the Steering Committee for guidance regarding such issues as terms of reference and operational matters, including time frames and budget constraints, and they were obliged to give full and fair consideration to substantive comments from both groups. The responsibility for the content of final reports is solely that of the teams.

The approach taken to this evaluation has reflected two concerns:

• to try, through involving experienced outsiders, to examine as objectively and critically as

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2 See Appendix I of the Synthesis Report for the full Terms of Reference
possible an experience about which it is impossible for any person with humane values not to be deeply affected;

• to engage leading Africans in a critical review of the analysis, findings and recommendations while they were still in draft.

For this last reason, a panel of distinguished experts from Africa has provided a critique of the report through participation in two panel discussions with the authors of the reports and selected resource persons. The panel comprised: Reverend Jos, Chipenda, General Secretary, All-Africa Conference of Churches, Kenya; Dr. Adama Djeng, President, International Commission of Jurists, Switzerland; Professor Joseph Ki-zerbo, Member of Parliament, Republic of Burkina Faso; and Dr. Salim A. Salim, Secretary General, Organization of African Unity, Ethiopia. Also, Mr. Gideon Kayinamura, Ambassador of Rwanda to the UK; Ms. Julie Ngiriye, Ambassador of Burundi to Denmark; and Ms. Victoria Mwakasege, Counsellor, Embassy of Tanzania, Stockholm, made significant contributions through their participation in the December 1995 Steering Committee Meeting.

While the Steering Committee is particularly grateful to these African participants for contributing their wisdom and keen insights at one stage of the evaluation process, it is also acutely aware of the fact that African researchers and institutions were not, with the exception of selected sub-studies, involved in its execution. However, the Steering Committee is committed to disseminate the evaluation widely among African leaders and organizations and anxious that they participate fully in discussions about the evaluation's recommendations.

The following resource persons have commented on drafts at various stages and/or participated in panels or workshops: Mary B. Anderson, Consultant, USA; Hanne Christensen, Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues, France; John Eriksson, Consultant, USA; Professor Andr Guichaoua, Université des Sciences et Technologies de Lille, France; Sven Hamrell, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Sweden; Larry Minear, Humanitarianism and War Project, Brown University, USA; Professor Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Colegio de Mexico, Mexico; and Stein Villumstad, Norwegian Church Aid, Norway.

The Synthesis Report was prepared by John Eriksson, with contributions from the authors of the four study reports and assistance from Hanne Christensen and Stein Villumstad in the preparation of findings and recommendations.

This evaluation was initiated on the premise that in spite of the complexity and chaos that characterize Rwanda's experience, it would be possible to identify applicable lessons to be learned by the international community in attempting to respond to future complex emergencies and in its continuing attempt to help Rwanda rebuild its society. The international teams who have produced this evaluation believe they have identified such lessons. It will be up to the governmental and non-governmental leaders of the international community for whom this evaluation has been prepared to apply the lessons.

Niels Dabelstein
Chairman of the Steering Committee for
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda
Acknowledgements

Academic scholars, development experts, representatives of multilateral and bilateral agencies, staff of national and international non-governmental organizations and the officials of the Rwandese government have been most generous with their time and resources in the conduct of this study. The members of the management and steering committees provided valuable comments on the earlier drafts of the report. Finally, the numerous men and women of Rwanda, who have shown remarkable resilience in the face of genocide, freely shared their experiences and hopes with team members. Taken together, these thoughtful people have helped the study team in conceptualizing the study questions, collecting necessary data and information, drawing necessary conclusions and recommendations, and in reviewing drafts of the report. Their number is too large to permit individual acknowledgments.

However, the study team must mention a few esteemed colleagues without whose support this study would not have been initiated or completed. Scott Smith, director of the Center for Development Information and Evaluation, and Michael Calavan, director of Program Operations Assessment in the Center, provided material and intellectual resources for the study. Nan Borton and William Garvelink, director and deputy director, respectively, of the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, not only partially funded the study but also shared ideas and experiences. Janet Ballantyne, senior Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Bureau of Policy and Program Coordination, has been unwavering in her support, and helped to bypass much bureaucratic red tape. Richard McCall, Chief of Staff to the Administrator, provided invaluable guidance and help at critical moments in the study.

The study team also acknowledges its debt to Ted Kliest of the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and John Eriksson, leader of the synthesis team. Both have been most helpful. Finally, the team is grateful to Niels Dabelstein, who has managed the entire Joint Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance to Rwanda with exceptional skill and energy.
Executive Summary

The primary objective of this report is to examine the effectiveness, impact and relevance of international assistance on repatriation, rehabilitation, reconstruction and long-term development in Rwanda in the aftermath of the violence that destroyed or severely damaged much of Rwanda's social, cultural and economic institutions. Three considerations have been taken into account in framing and answering the evaluation questions. First, the focus of this evaluation has been on the activities of the international community. Second, an evaluation by definition focuses on completed or continuing activities. It is not meant to be a needs assessment, therefore the areas in which the international community was not involved are not focused upon. Finally, the objective has been to draw lessons from its experience in order to formulate specific recommendations for Rwanda and for future complex emergencies. The report is based on interviews with relief and development agencies in the US and Europe, and on field visits to Rwanda and neighboring countries. During field visits in late April to early May 1995, a team of 10 relief, refugee and development experts met with agency representatives, government officials and a cross-section of Rwandese. The report is a synthesis of the sectoral and topical reports prepared during the field visit.

Overview of assistance to Rwanda

Aiding the people of a war-torn nation rehabilitate and reconstruct their society is a politically delicate process that requires substantial financial commitment and programmatic coherence from the international community. It requires a multi-faceted, coordinated effort to rebuild not only economic, but also, and perhaps more importantly, social and political institutions devastated by war and violence, tasks for which the international community is ill-prepared. In the case of Rwanda, the challenge has been especially daunting because of the genocide, which resulted in the deaths of five to eight hundred thousand people and the subsequent exodus of two million. As a whole, the international community has made a considerable effort, with varying degrees of success, to meet the unprecedented challenge of helping post-genocide Rwanda rebuild.

From April 1994, through the end of the year, the international community focused largely on saving lives by providing food, shelter, and medical and sanitary services to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The vast majority of the assistance was expended to support refugee populations in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi. Emergency food aid was and continues to be massive. It has undoubtedly prevented large-scale starvation and malnutrition among the affected population.

Attention began to shift towards rehabilitation and reconstruction in September 1994, when the international community realized the severity of devastation brought about by the civil war and genocide. Well before that, however, relief agencies had embarked on more limited programs of rehabilitation. Since then, the UN and donor agencies have supported a wide array of projects and programs in different sectors and regions throughout the country. Additionally, many of the 102 international NGOs present in the country in December 1995 moved into the rehabilitation phase through their initial participation in emergency humanitarian assistance. Much of the initial "first phase" rehabilitation was funded through the January 1995 UN Consolidated Appeals Process. However, the primary framework for the transition from emergency to rehabilitation and recovery assistance has been the January 1995 Round Table Conference for Rwanda Reconstruction, which provided funds for reconstruction, and a mechanism by which disbursement of those funds could be tracked.
Disbursement of financial assistance to the new Rwandese government faced a range of problems-absorptive capacity, questions of legitimacy and accountability, to name a few, and consequently, has been slow. In light of the potential social, political and economic costs of delays, financial support for national recovery has been surprisingly slow. This is especially so of funds pledged at the Round Table Conference. Of US$707.3 million pledged, only US$68.1 million had been disbursed mid-way through 1995, which amounted to less than 10 percent of the pledged amount. Only about a third of the funds disbursed was left for direct assistance to the government for balance of payments support, purchase of vehicles and equipment, technical assistance and so on. This remaining amount, US$22.8 million, represents three percent of the total pledged amount. The delay in disbursement of pledged funds has been caused by many factors; however, the delay is undermining the government’s overall capacity to pursue timely initiatives for economic recovery and political stability. According to UNDP, by September 1995, nine months from the initial pledging conference, about one-third (US$244.3 million) of the initial funds pledged had been disbursed. By year’s end, roughly half the funds initially pledged had been disbursed. Additionally, the level of pledges had risen to slightly over US$1 billion.

Of the more than US$2 billion estimated spent on the Rwanda crisis since April 1994, the vastly larger share has gone to the maintenance of refugees in asylum countries. Independent analysis of UNHCR financial tracking figures and financial information from key individual donors broadly confirms this point. Although such a disproportionate allocation is understandable – refugees must be supported – it appears to Rwandese who have lived through the horror of genocide that the international community is more concerned about the refugees than the survivors.

**Support for economic and public sector management**

The war destroyed the macro-economic and institutional infrastructure necessary for the successful and balanced growth of a modern market-based economy. In spite of this and the numerous difficulties involved in regaining control of the economy and the public sector, the present government appears committed to continuing and accelerating reforms begun under the structural adjustment programs of the previous regime. In consultation primarily with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the government has taken a series of measures – de-monetization and reduction in money supply, devaluation and reliance on market determination of exchange rates – that confirms its seriousness about economic reform. It adheres to the principle of keeping the public wage bill to no more than 50 percent of its pre-war level, but is finding that exceedingly hard to do for a variety of reasons. It is not clear if the government will be able to exercise the monetary and fiscal control necessary for economic stability in the future. Special conditions – large volume of foreign currency in the economy, and a low stake in the value of the Rwanda franc, for example – early in the process of reconstruction facilitated monetary reforms.

Maintaining macro-economic policy in favor of growth and development, and keeping public recurrent expenditure under control are important challenges for the government as well as the international financial institutions. The World Bank has reopened its local mission and initiated an Emergency Recovery Program. The IMF has sent consultative missions to Rwanda. Other donors have provided a number of experts to key branches of the government, provided salary supplements and helped furnish offices so the economic and public management apparatus of the government can begin to function again. In spite of the relatively good start in economic management, there have been delays in the disbursement of the World Bank’s Emergency Recovery Credit (part of the Emergency Recovery Program) that could perpetuate the post-war economic crisis. The December 1995 resignation of Rwanda’s Central Bank governor, and his request for political asylum, signal turmoil within the macro-economic management apparatus.

**Assistance to agriculture**

The war had a devastating effect on agriculture and the rural economy. In response, the
international community undertook a variety of agriculture rehabilitation programs, most notable of which were the provision of seeds and tools to farm households, the multiplication of local varieties of major crops, and assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture. In particular, over two seasons, each household received a “package” of bean, sorghum, maize and vegetable seeds and one or two hoes. Fifty percent of farmers were reached in the first season of seeds and tools distributions, while 80 percent were aided in the second season. Subsequent analyses avoid estimates by season and, instead, estimate 62 percent of farmers received seeds, and 72 percent received tools. In conjunction with the distribution of seeds and tools for the resumption of agricultural production, relief agencies, guided by the World Food Program, provided food aid for “seeds protection.” This activity was guided by the logic that provision of food aid would reduce consumption of more expensive selected seeds.

General distribution of seeds and tools, as well as food aid through the first two seasons, however, is feared by some Rwandese relief personnel to have begun to induce dependency on the part of some recipients. Continued untargeted general distribution into the third season will certainly exacerbate this dependency. If the WFP follows through on its announced plan to more closely focus on the vulnerable and needy, based on a recent WFP/FAO survey, the potential for encouraging dependency should be mitigated. However, the criteria by which some aid is to be targeted by some NGOs appear so inclusive as to be of little use for targeting. Many farmers who have received material assistance for agriculture are squatters on land vacated by persons killed or having fled during the war. An unanticipated effect of seeds and tools distribution may be to entrench and appear to validate their hold on the land. This may be an unavoidable part of agricultural rehabilitation in Rwanda, but its potential negative ramifications must be understood. Equitable resolution of property rights and land tenure issues are of paramount importance to peaceful return of refugees and the achievement of peace in the countryside.

Although seed multiplication has focused primarily on volume and local adaptation, much remains to be done to re-establish seed development, focusing ultimately on pest and disease resistance. There has been little progress rehabilitating livestock herds throughout the country. At the same time, there is a serious problem of over-stocking in the north-east. Another area of relative neglect is the export sector, specifically coffee. Projects have been identified and funds committed for the export sector, and, toward the end of 1995, activities began. But earlier rehabilitation of localized processing centers and assistance in coffee harvesting and marketing could have rapidly injected funds into the rural community. Finally, the international community has played a very small role in the rehabilitation of rural enterprises, especially small and medium enterprises.

Rehabilitating the health sector

By mid-July 1994, Rwanda’s entire health delivery system had collapsed and was in complete disarray. Over 80 percent of its health professionals were killed or had fled the country. NGOs, UN agencies, the ICRC and bilateral donors arrived with trained health professionals, medicines, supplies and equipment. They re-established basic curative services in urban and rural areas and helped repair and restore damaged water systems. Non-governmental organizations were instrumental in delivering primary health services to the population. Yet, because many NGOs lacked previous experience in the region, did not conduct proper needs assessments, and were poorly coordinated, there was much duplication of effort and waste of scarce medical resources. Donors have provided limited direct assistance to the government for strengthening its management, coordination and information systems capacity in the health sector. However, for example, WHO was instrumental in providing direct technical assistance to the Ministry of Health in health policy formulation, guidelines and health sector reform. Early in the process of rehabilitation, UNICEF prepared a report proposing a range of programming actions, subsequently undertaken during the year. The Ministry, with assistance from WHO and UNICEF, has reconstituted the country’s vaccine stocks, immunization equipment, and system for immunization. The re-establishment of a safe blood supply has been prioritized, and the National AIDS Prevention Program is again receiving some direct support from donors. Implementation of
STD/AIDS interventions, however, has been unacceptably slow given the potential magnitude of the HIV-infection problem in Rwanda. Water and sanitation systems are being rebuilt with the assistance of donors and NGOs, with most progress in Kigali.

The impact of international assistance for the rehabilitation of the health sector has been positive on balance. Health delivery systems have largely been brought back to pre-war levels, but weak initial needs assessments, the absence of program strategy development and ineffectual program monitoring and evaluation on the part of some agencies have hampered interventions in the health sector. The inability or unwillingness of some NGOs formally to engage the Ministry of Health in the project assessment, design and approval process further diminished successes in the health sector, and has contributed to a perception on the part of government officials that emergencies are perpetuated so as to allow relief agencies to “stay in business.”

Rehabilitating the education sector

International assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction of education, initially focused on the primary level, has played a limited but valuable role, emphasizing emergency supplies of material, rehabilitation of structures and food aid salary supplements to teachers. The UNICEF/UNESCO Teacher Emergency Program, specifically “school-in-a-box”, co-designed by UNHCR, was provided to most of the primary schools that opened in September 1994. World Food Program, through its program of food aid salary supplements to teachers, helped keep teachers on the job in the absence of funds with which to pay their salaries. In spite of these interventions, international assistance in education has been largely characterized by ad hoc emergency interventions with limited impact. The international community’s weakness in support for the rehabilitation and restoration of education is due in part to the programming limitations of emergency funds. Education activities are, for the most part, excluded from these funds because they are not deemed life-saving. Later in the year, funding became available through the Round Table process. Of US$18 million requested in January 1995 by the Rwandese government for rehabilitation of the education system, US$4.1 million had been disbursed (as per Round Table tracking) by year’s end. By then, pledged assistance to formal education programs had grown to US$50.4 million.

Assistance to vulnerable populations

Genocide and war altered the country’s demographic composition so radically that women and girls now represent between 60-70 percent of the population. By some estimates, between one-third and one-half of all women in the most hard-hit areas are widows. Further, several thousand women were brutally raped. During the initial stages of emergency assistance, women were not given special treatment as a group. Rather, it was assumed that they, like other beneficiaries, would benefit from the assistance provided to various sectors. The exceptions were the World Food Program and CARITAS/Catholic Relief Services food support programs specifically targeted toward vulnerable groups, including female heads of households.

Under existing Rwandese law, property passes through male members of the household. As a result, widows and orphaned daughters risk losing their property to male relatives of the deceased husband or father. Consequently, there is an urgent need to change judicial guidelines and legal interpretations of laws pertaining to property, land and women’s rights. Save the Children, UK and US, and UNICEF are supporting the Ministries of Family and Rehabilitation and other women’s groups in their advocacy efforts in this area, as well as funding technical assistance to the judiciary. Numerous Rwandese NGOs are disseminating information and creating awareness of this problem. However, one year after the genocide, there were no comprehensive national programs of family support for the survivors. Over time, however, those NGOs working in the community began to recognize the distinctive needs of women – widows, victims of violence and rape, and heads of households – and developed ad hoc initiatives to support communities in caring for the most vulnerable.
Estimates of the number of unaccompanied children in the region vary between 95,000 and 150,000 although there is substantial debate on the numbers. Some relief agencies believe the number well exceeds the higher figure, while other organizations consider it vastly exaggerated. There is a wide array of international and national NGOs implementing mostly ad hoc programs for unaccompanied children. Only the larger and more experienced have developed longer-term comprehensive national programs that support institutional capacity building, and have established strong working relationships with the government. The key areas of intervention are in registration, tracing and reunification; the provision of foster care; and capacity building. By the third quarter of 1995, 11,500 children in Rwanda and the camps had been reunited with their families. Some NGOs rushed into the country staking claim to or opening up new centers for unaccompanied children and orphans without any long-term planning and without the guidance and direction of a strong coordinating body. There was also a lack of collaboration with or support of national organizations, which was particularly inexcusable after the situation had stabilized. Creation of unaccompanied children centers was a necessary, short-term response that was not intended to be a long-term solution. Unfortunately, the establishment of centers has provided a livelihood to too many people to be discontinued easily. The only way current interventions can be sustained is if donors are willing to make long-term commitments financially to support child care institutions.

Psycho-social healing

The brutal nature and extent of the slaughter, along with the ensuing mass migration, swiftly and profoundly destroyed Rwanda’s social foundation. Vast segments of the population were uprooted, thousands of families lost at least one adult and tens of thousands of children were separated from their parents. Because neighbors, teachers, doctors and religious leaders took part in the carnage, essential trust in social institutions has been destroyed, replaced by pervasive fear, hostility and insecurity. The social upheaval has affected interpersonal and community interaction across ethnic, economic, generational and political lines. Some groups, unaccompanied children, for instance, are relatively visible as “victims of violence,” whereas the victimization of others, such as women and individuals who were forced to kill, is less apparent.

Relatively little attention has been paid to the problem of psycho-social healing. Donor efforts have concentrated primarily on trauma counseling for children. In addition, some organizations, mostly those religious in nature, have attempted to confront the ethnic animosity directly through reconciliation workshops and community healing initiatives, and indirectly within the context of their other programs. What few programs there have been for psycho-social healing have tended to overlook the needs of women. Also, the international community may be misapplying its experience with post-traumatic stress disorder. Missed opportunities in exploring indigenous concepts of mental health and methods of healing conceivably stem from initial lack of understanding of Rwandese society, psyche and culture, and the absence of adequate language skills, so vital to confidential communication.

Promoting human rights and building a fair judicial system

The international community has supported human rights initiatives in three key areas so as to promote the process of national rebuilding: establishment of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, reconstruction of the justice system and assistance to the UN human rights field operation. The impetus for these initiatives was the findings of the UN Special Rapporteur and a Commission of Experts, who looked into alleged human rights violations during the war. By May 1995, six months from the establishment of the Tribunal, it had made only limited progress. From the outset, it faced problems of logistics, funding and staffing, which caused long delays. With staffing changes in October 1995, the pace of investigations stepped up. Thirteen months from its establishment, the Tribunal issued its first indictments of suspected war criminals, against four
alleged leaders of the genocide. Despite recent progress, delays in establishing the Tribunal and making it operational have postponed reconciliation, which can hardly be expected to occur in the absence of justice. Further delays will reinforce the perception that the world is indifferent to the Rwanda genocide. The absence of official representatives of the Tribunal at the conference on “Genocide, Impunity and Accountability,” hosted by the Rwandese government in November 1995, while defensible for reasons of impartiality, further disappointed its citizens.

The justice system of Rwanda was manipulated by the former regime despite constitutional provisions ensuring its independence. Human rights abuses relating to arrests, detention, trial without counsel and widespread corruption were frequent in the past. If Rwanda is to establish a legal system that helps ensure the rights of all citizens, it must construct a justice system that substantially improves on that which previously existed in the country. Several assistance initiatives are under way. These programs, however, do not approach the level of assistance that was broadly recognized as being required to “restart” the justice system. The real challenge, however, is not so much of marshalling sufficient human and technical resources as of institutionalizing a new political culture in which differences are settled through discussion and accommodation and not through violence and bloodshed. The paralysis of judicial process, the inability to try suspected criminals, is not solely due to lack of staff and equipment, which could be alleviated with outside assistance. There also appears to be a lack of political will to proceed.

The human rights field operation for Rwanda was the first field operation to be undertaken under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and to be administratively supported by the UN’s Center for Human Rights in Geneva. The Commissioner for Human Rights and the government of Rwanda agreed to the deployment of 147 human rights field officers, one for each of the country’s communes, although subsequently the 114 field officers were not deployed by commune. The objectives of the field operation were to investigate the genocide, monitor the human rights situation, help re-establish confidence, and provide technical assistance in the administration of justice.

A perception exists among experts and informed people that the human rights operation in Rwanda has failed to accomplish its stated mission. Its impact on the prevention of human rights violations and promotion of human rights has been minimal. However, it should be recognized that several factors, many of which were beyond the control of the human rights field operation, contributed to its poor performance to date. Informants identified the following set of factors: a broad and ambiguous mandate, poor preparations prior to deployment, limited logistics and resource support, ineffectual leadership, absence of a coherent strategy, poor coordination between headquarters and field staff, bureaucratic infighting within the UN system, apathy, if not hostility, of the Rwandese government, and a highly politically charged environment. Obviously, the entire blame for the failure cannot be laid on the leadership of the HRFOR and the Center for Human Rights. In October 1995, a new chief assumed leadership of the field operation in Rwanda. Initial reports indicate that he is re-examining and re-evaluating the entire operation to make it more relevant and effective. It is too early to tell the outcome of his efforts.

Return of refugees and internally displaced persons

After the victory of Rwandese Patriotic Front forces in July 1994, the old caseload refugees, primarily Tutsi who had left Rwanda beginning in 1959, began returning in large numbers. The government has estimated a total of over 700,000 to have returned. Old caseload returnees have benefited from international assistance through direct aid to families, rehabilitation of commune structures and services, and assistance to government ministries, particularly the Ministry of Rehabilitation. However, the slow process of disbursing funds pledged for repatriation and reintegration at the Round Table Conference constrains the capacity of the government to facilitate the process.

Further, despite the efforts of the international community, very little has been accomplished in the
repatriation of 2 million new caseload refugees who fled to Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi, largely between April and July 1994. Most of these refugees were intimidated or terrified into flight through a premeditated, orchestrated attempt on the part of hard-line elements of the fleeing government to maintain leverage and a claim to legitimacy. The many accounts, both actual and false, of violent reprisals, arbitrary arrests and detentions of Hutu in Rwanda have also significantly discouraged repatriation. Only a small number of new caseload refugees have returned thus far, according to UNHCR, not more than 200,000 in 1994, and fewer than 100,000 in 1995. While the pace of repatriation can be accelerated by implementing the recommendations outlined (in the section that follows), the international community should prepare itself for the eventuality that a substantial portion of the refugee population is still unlikely to repatriate soon for three reasons. First, between 10 to 15 percent of the refugees in the camps (adult and adolescent) are alleged to have participated directly in mass killing. These refugees and their families would be understandably reluctant to return. Second, the transmigration of people has been common in the Great Lakes region in the past. Many Kinyarwanda-speaking “ethnic Rwandese” live in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire. Consequently, refugees are not in totally foreign milieus; there are bonds of history and language that help mitigate refugees’ nostalgia. Finally, the experience of past complex emergencies shows that it usually takes years, even decades, before significant voluntary repatriation takes place. Even then, rather than going back to their country of origin, many refugees settle in host (or third) countries. It is, therefore, imperative that the international community demonstrate more realism in planning its initiatives for the refugees than it has done so far by considering a wider range of solutions to the crisis.

Lastly, the record of the international community in facilitating the return of internally displaced persons has been mixed. The camps posed a potentially explosive threat to national security and essentially prolonged the transition from emergency to rehabilitation and reconstruction. The government maintained that massive repatriation of refugees would not be feasible until the IDP camps had been disbanded. The international community agreed to the need for closures, but was unprepared for the aggressive tactics employed by the government. The tragic events at the Kibeho camp, in which thousands of displaced persons were killed, epitomized the gulf between government exigencies and relief agencies’ moral stance and mandates, and the tragic consequences of the lack of real communication. The Kibeho incident, about which facts are scanty, weakened an already tenuous relationship between government and relief and development agencies, making the coordination and cooperation necessary for large-scale rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts that much more difficult.

**The consequences of genocide**

Post-genocide Rwanda is dramatically different from pre-genocide Rwanda. The systematic attempt on the part of some Hutu to exterminate the Tutsi group has transformed the social, political and economic landscape of Rwanda. It has also profoundly affected the existing political and cultural institutions. But, above all, it has undermined the social trust that binds people together. Just as the Holocaust redefined the Jewish identity, so has the Rwanda genocide left a profound impact on the psyches of both Tutsi and Hutu.

The international community took steps to investigate the genocide and punish the instigators by establishing an international Tribunal; however, it has largely failed to incorporate the implications of genocide in the design and implementation of assistance programs in Rwanda. It has treated and continues to treat the present crisis like other civil wars in which the international community intervened and assisted the suffering population. Such an approach has distorted assistance priorities, undermined the effectiveness of assistance programs and alienated the present government. For example, the international community has tended to overlook the plight of the survivors of the genocide; by and large, they have not been treated any differently from other segments of the population. On the other hand, the international community has spent immense resources on the refugees. It is not that the refugees do not deserve assistance but that such assistance should be balanced with assistance to survivors.
The international community’s apparent lack of understanding of the psychological impact of genocide has also contributed to the distrust – and even the open hostility – of the Rwandese government towards the UN human rights field operation. Its legitimacy has been vastly compromised because it is perceived as one-sided, focusing on current human rights violations instead of on crimes against humanity. Overall, limited mandates of the bilateral and multilateral agencies, the established modalities for allocating resources, and the procedures for delivering aid in the field are institutional factors that have led to the inability of the international community to respond adequately to the unique consequences of genocide. However, beyond institutional roadblocks, cultural insensitivity within the international community at times devalued the tragic social and human dimensions of the genocide as perceived by the Rwandese. Perhaps the most lamentable example was the rush to promote reconciliation over the understandable resistance of those who had suffered immensely.

**Long-term development of Rwanda**

In examining the question of long-term development of Rwanda, two considerations should be kept in mind. First, the success of Rwanda’s march towards a politically stable and economically sustainable society will depend upon a complex set of conditions and circumstances. For example, Rwanda will be shaped by its distinctive social, cultural and economic institutions, the emerging regional alignments and interests, and the vision shown by its leadership. The international donor community can influence such factors, but cannot control them. Second, the transition process is not likely to be a smooth one. Rather, as has been the case with many complex emergencies, the process is most likely to be characterized by periods of ups and downs, stagnation, and even regression. There is a need to take a long-term perspective.

A broad consensus seems to be emerging that the country should give top priority to building an effective judicial system based on the rule of law; ensuring physical security to returning refugees and survivors of genocide; and promoting rapid economic growth in agriculture and small business sectors. In this regard, past social and economic policies can not be the model for Rwanda’s future integrated development, which emphasizes human resources. The government will have to face the problem of ethnicity and political participation, and encourage a culture of tolerance and respect for democratic principles and human rights.

However, it appears increasingly probable that efforts at the national level alone are not sufficient to solve the refugee return problem. Because of the growing political and ethnic tensions in Burundi, the presence of two million Rwandese refugees in neighboring states, and the high population density of the country, a regional approach will be key to longer-term resolution of the crisis. Such an approach may require resettlement of populations, redrawing of national boundaries and greater regional political and economic integration. Whether Rwanda, its neighbors and the international community will take the bold steps necessary to achieve a durable regional solution to this complex problem is a question that history alone can answer.

**Recommendations for assistance to Rwanda and lessons learned**

**General recommendations**
The Study IV team recommends that the donor community should:

° channel a greater proportion of pledged assistance directly to government ministries to strengthen national institutional capacity;
° suspend normal administrative procedures for development assistance to disburse funds rapidly for the activities to which the Round Table Conference committed itself.

**Sector-specific recommendations**
In agriculture, donors should:

- terminate programs of general distribution of seeds and tools;
- assist the government to clarify land tenure legislation and property rights in light of competing claims on land;
- accelerate programs aimed at the rehabilitation of traditional export crops, especially coffee, and development of non-traditional exports;
- accelerate programs for restocking livestock on small farms.

For social sectors, donors should:

- require NGOs to coordinate their activities in the social sectors with the government within the framework of national priorities and policies;
- assist the government in developing and implementing cost recovery mechanisms to be integrated into the emerging health care delivery system;
- provide greater assistance to rebuild the education system, particularly primary school education and vocational training, focusing on teacher training and curriculum development.

For vulnerable groups, donors should:

- help develop and implement economic rehabilitation programs for women who have lost their husbands and other male family members;
- support a comprehensive program to remove legal and other barriers to women’s ownership of productive resources, particularly land;
- fund women’s organizations that create economic opportunities for women, provide training and financial assistance and engage in self-help activities;
- enhance the capacity of families, single female-headed households and communities to cope with the support of orphans and unaccompanied children.

In the field of human rights and justice, donors should:

- give the new leadership of the Human Rights Field Operation six months of assured funding, and make continued funding conditional on the formulation and implementation of new strategies and activities that will produce results by the field operation;
- commission an in-depth evaluation of the field operation’s effectiveness, outputs and impact to be conducted in May-June 1996 by a consortium of international human rights organizations;
- make support to reconstruction of the justice system a top priority, and develop a systematic approach to that end.

To expedite the work of the International Tribunal, donors should:

- ensure that the Tribunal has an adequate budget to enter into long-term financial arrangements for administrative costs and staff;
- second qualified prosecutors and investigators to assist in carrying out the work of the Tribunal;
- recommend that the Prosecutor be given the authority to hire staff and incur administrative expenses without the approval of the Legal Counsel’s Office in New York;
- encourage the Prosecutor to formalize communication with other UN bodies, particularly UNHCR and UNHCHR, as well as the UN Special Rapporteur, to facilitate cooperative arrangements for conducting investigations.

To promote voluntary repatriation, donors should:

- as an interim step, provide assistance to host governments to relocate refugee camps away from the borders of Rwanda, thereby removing a source of instability to the new government, which impedes its ability to begin to deal rationally with the problem of repatriation and resettlement;
- request the government to form “peace committees” in each community to monitor and protect the security of returnees;
encourage and support the government to define precisely the degrees of responsibility for genocide, spell out procedures for arrest and prosecution of the participants and to disseminate such information widely;
- demand that the government enforce its stated policy of restoring land to new caseload refugees, and publish and widely disseminate in refugee camps regulations related to the ownership and recovery of property;
- promote programs to send delegations consisting of senior officials of donor agencies and the government to refugee camps to assure the safe return and resettlement of refugees who have not actively participated in the genocide.

### Interventions in future complex emergencies

Lessons learned from the Rwanda experience of relevance for interventions in future complex emergencies are the following:

- Mechanisms for rapid delivery of rehabilitation assistance should be developed so as to shorten the transition from emergency assistance to reconstruction aid. There is a relationship between political instability plus economic stagnation and complex emergencies. Any delays in programs to rehabilitate social, political and economic structures of a country emerging from a war put earlier gains at great risk;
- Self-regulation of the NGO community would improve impact and ensure optimal use of the vast resources expended during the rehabilitation phase. A comprehensive code of conduct would improve accountability and efficacity of NGO relief agencies;
- Interventions should stress political and social reconstruction, focusing on the judiciary and the development of institutions of civil society. The collapse of political and social institutions is a key factor that differentiates complex emergencies from natural disasters;
- Mechanisms for sharing available background information about the historical, political, social and economic contexts in countries in crisis should be institutionalized.

### Conclusion

International response to the humanitarian crisis provoked by the civil war and genocide has been generous and, in the emergency phase, rapid. Greater ambiguity about objectives, the legitimacy and capacity of the new government and the durability of peace, coupled with more deliberate processes for development assistance, have led to delays in assistance for reconstruction and development. In some cases, simple political miscalculations have led to impasses between the government and donors.

Finally, the international community cannot be expected to do everything, nor should it try to do so. Most of the responsibility for reconstruction, rehabilitation, reconciliation and recovery belongs to the Rwandese. The ultimate determinant of the durability of solutions will be the degree to which Rwandese themselves believe in them and have, or would have, instituted them even without outside assistance. Nonetheless, the international community has already brought and can bring many resources to bear on the crisis. How these are used can tilt the balance in favor of peace and reconciliation and away from war and destruction.
Introduction

The crisis in Rwanda has tested the capacity of the international community to respond. More than half a million people were massacred in less than 10 weeks of genocide and civil war. Unprecedented numbers of people were then uprooted from their homes and fled to internal or external asylum. Scores of refugees suffered immeasurably or died en route to, or within, camps. The exceedingly brutal and widespread nature of killing in Rwanda makes the crisis one of this century’s most profoundly tragic and least understood. The depth of destruction to social and cultural institutions has been so great as to be nearly complete.

Within this context, the international donor community resolved to conduct an overall evaluation of humanitarian assistance to Rwanda since the April 1994 outbreak of war and genocidal violence. The evaluation has focused on four principal areas: (a) the social, economic and political evolution of Rwanda and the historical context of the present crisis; (b) diplomatic and peace-keeping efforts to avert the crisis and establish a mechanism with which to gauge the risk of civil war and facilitate informed response; (c) initial emergency assistance to victims of fighting and to internally displaced people and refugees; and (d) programs aimed at the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, rehabilitation of livelihoods, reconstruction of society and development. This report of Team IV focuses on the last of the four areas.

Purpose and scope

The report’s primary objective is to examine the effectiveness, impact and relevance of international assistance on repatriation, rehabilitation, reconstruction and long-term development in Rwanda. Three important points have been taken into account in framing and answering the evaluation questions. First, the focus has been on the activities of the international community. Although there are other actors – local, national and regional – who are playing critical roles in the repatriation, rehabilitation and reconstruction process in Rwanda, their efforts are examined only to the extent to which they relate to the activities of the international community. Second, an evaluation by definition focuses on completed or continuing activities. It is not meant to be a needs assessment. Consequently, only those areas have been emphasized in which the international community has been active or, in some cases, should have been active. Finally, the objective has not been to judge the performance of the international community but to draw lessons from its experience in order to formulate specific recommendations for Rwanda and for future complex emergencies.

Methodology

In view of the complexity of the evaluation issues and the difficulty in obtaining primary information in Rwanda, a multi-faceted approach to data collection and analysis was followed. This approach was based on a set of distinct, but interrelated, studies that complemented and supplemented each other. Owing to time limitations, the first two studies ran concurrently, as did the two field studies. The findings of the team were periodically presented for critical review in workshops to which experts in humanitarian assistance were invited.

The evaluation began with interviews with aid agencies. From these and a comprehensive literature
review, a background paper was developed to provide an in-depth view of the changing situation in Rwanda that directly fed into the two field studies. The team conducted in-person and phone interviews with staff of international organizations involved in repatriation, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development issues in Rwanda. Meetings were held in the New York offices of the UN Departments of Humanitarian Affairs, Political Affairs, and Peace-Keeping Operations, and UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF.

NGOs met with during this initial phase of research included Save the Children/UK, International Rescue Committee, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Human Rights Watch/Africa, CARE, CRS, InterAction (an association of US NGOs) and the US Committee for Refugees. In addition, major bilateral and multilateral donors were interviewed about their funding for rehabilitation and reconstruction activities, including the relevant departments of government of the US, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan and Canada, as well as those of the European Union, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Phone interviews were also conducted with the home offices of non-US-based relief agencies including Trocaire, Action Nord-Sud, World Council of Churches, MSF/Belgium and Tear Fund.

A comprehensive literature review was conducted to improve the formulation of questions for the Rwanda evaluation and to provide a validity check for its findings and conclusions. The review focused on lessons from past disasters. The findings were presented in a round-table discussion, during which some 25 experts, including prominent academics, UN and donor country policymakers, NGO practitioners and consultants convened to share lessons from Central America, Cambodia, Bosnia, Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique, Afghanistan and other emergency areas.

Subsequently, two field studies were conducted. One focused on the progress and prospects for repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons, the other on questions about rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, and cross-cutting issues. To gather the needed data and information, the field study teams a) conducted key informant interviews with knowledgeable individuals in Rwanda and asylum countries; b) visited many organizations and governmental institutions at national and local levels; and c) interviewed a sample of the affected population through group meetings and informal surveys in the countryside and in and around refugee and IDP camps.

The first field study, conducted by a five-member team, was carried out in Kenya, Rwanda, Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi from April 21-May 18, 1995. The team met with UN, NGO, church, current and former government representatives and toured refugee camps, transit centers, open relief centers, communes and camps for internally displaced persons. Over 28 days in the region, the team met with individuals representing UN agencies – UNHCR, UNREO, DHA, UNICEF, UNHCHR; government Ministries of Rehabilitation and Women’s Affairs; NGO representatives from CARE, CONCERN, International Federation of the Red Cross, American Refugee Committee, International Refugee Committee, CARITAS, Norwegian Church Aid, ActionAid, Church World Action, and others; representatives of Rwandese women’s groups and other associations; camp and commune authorities; ousted leaders; RPA soldiers; and new and old caseload refugees and returnees and internally displaced persons.

A second five-member team visited Rwanda from May 9-June 3, 1995 to conduct the second field study. The team had planned to leave earlier (April 26) but was delayed because of the incidents in Kibeho; thus, joint meetings and coordination with Study Team III were not possible as originally planned. The team visited markets, seed multiplication projects, farmer cooperatives, food aid distribution centers, primary and secondary schools, rural health clinics, hospitals, orphanages and prisons. Over 27 days, the team met with individuals representing UN agencies; donor representatives from EU, USAID, Belgium, International Fund for Agricultural Development, the World Bank; representatives of the Rwandese government – Presidency, Prime Minister’s Office, Ministries of Rehabilitation, Planning, Health, Education, Agriculture, Justice, Women’s Affairs and the Central Bank; NGO representatives from CRS, World Vision, SCF-US and SCF-UK, CONCERN, Nairobi Peace Initiative and many others; representatives of Rwandese civil society; farmers and small business people; and individual households.
From June to September 1995 a three-person team, assisted at times by specialists who had authored certain sub-reports, prepared this report. Following the reception of comments from the Steering Committee, further revisions were made.

**Organization**

The report is presented according to major topics. Chapter One provides a political and economic background of Rwanda. Chapter Two is an overview of the major programs for rehabilitation and reconstruction. Chapter Three assesses efforts to support macro-economic policy reforms and capacity building, as well as measures designed to provide a stable monetary and fiscal foundation for recovery. The impact of programs aimed at the rehabilitation of agriculture and the rural economy is reviewed in Chapter Four.

The social sectors are covered in the subsequent three chapters. Interventions to rehabilitate the health sector are reviewed in Chapter Five. Chapter Six examines assistance to rebuild education, especially at the primary level. Chapter Seven focuses on vulnerable groups including widows, orphans and unaccompanied children.

The significant and complex issue of psycho-social healing and reconciliation is addressed in Chapter Eight. Chapter Nine examines assistance to the national judicial administration, the record of human rights monitors and support for the International War Crimes Tribunal. International efforts to facilitate the return and eventual resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons are analyzed in Chapter Ten. Chapter Eleven reviews cross-cutting issues and a vision for the future. The final chapter presents recommendations for continued assistance to Rwanda as well as lessons learned from the Rwanda experience for other complex emergencies.
Chapter 1

Political and Economic Background

Rwanda is a small, mountainous, landlocked and extremely densely populated country in Central Africa whose history has been marked by ethnic violence. It is bordered on the south by Burundi, which shares a similarly troubled and violent history. Its neighbor to the west is the Kivu region of Zaire. The Kivu has a large “ethnic” Rwandese population. To the north is Uganda, which also has a Kinyarwanda-speaking population (both Hutu- and Tutsi-related Hima or Ankole). On the east is Tanzania, whose north-western region has traditionally been an area of Rwandese migration. The mountainous terrain of Rwanda is partly responsible for its unique settlement patterns in which families or households live in individual homesteads on hillsides or collines rather than in villages. Cool climates and few tropical diseases make much of Rwanda highly habitable. High, well-distributed rainfall and good soils, especially in the volcanic regions, have permitted the sustenance of large populations.

Before the 1990 civil war intensified into genocide and mass migration (between April and July 1994), more than nine in 10 of the Rwandese population of nearly eight million lived on farms, making Rwanda a highly agrarian society. The largest city, the capital Kigali, had a population of a little more than 300,000 people. The next largest town had a little more than 30,000. Population density before the genocide was very high and population pressure severe.

Economic context

The Rwandese economy is based on the largely rain-fed agricultural production of small, semi-subsistence and increasingly fragmented farms. It has few natural resources to exploit other than its eco-tourism potential, and it has a small, relatively uncompetitive industrial sector. The production of coffee and tea, however, is very well suited to the small farms, steep slopes and cool climates of Rwanda, and has ensured access to foreign exchange over the years. Nonetheless, Rwanda is extremely poor and faces the stark prospect of an even poorer future because of the juxtaposition of rapid population growth (in spite of the large number of people killed) with continued reliance on semi-subsistence agriculture.

From the 1960s through the early 1980s, a generally conservative approach to economic management combined with favorable terms of trade for Rwandese commodities – primarily coffee and tea – led to slight positive balances and a stable currency, and contributed to a congenial environment for development projects. In the earlier period, agricultural production kept pace with and even exceeded population growth rates. By the mid-to-late 1980s, however, the collapse of world coffee prices and continuing high public expenditure led to an economic crisis. The crisis peaked in 1990, when the first measures of a structural adjustment program were carried out. While the program of structural adjustment was not fully implemented before the war, key measures such as two large devaluations and the removal of official prices were enacted. The consequences on salaries were rapid and dramatic. Purchasing power declined as the cost of imported goods increased. This crisis affected the educated elites, most of whom were employed in the civil service or in parastatal enterprises. Juxtaposed against the developing rebel insurgency from Uganda, the hiring freezes and other cost containment measures of structural adjustment contributed to the perception of (largely Hutu) elites that their future was bleak.

At the same time, agriculture, the mainstay of the economy, was experiencing a growing crisis.
While population had grown at the extremely high rate of three percent each year, agricultural technology had progressed very little. Consequently, per capita production of food had been declining. The population density in 1994 was approximately 466 persons per square kilometer of arable land. Farm sizes were declining, and were on average smaller than one hectare by 1994. Agricultural productivity continued to decline as near-continuous use of farm land with little use of fertilizer led to soil exhaustion and erosion. Rwandese farmers were acutely aware of population pressure, the limits to traditional solutions such as fallowing, and the high cost of modern solutions such as fertilizers. Out-migration, used frequently in the past as the solution of last resort, was becoming less tenable as populations (and resentment of immigrants) in neighboring countries were growing. The realization that there were too many people on too little land facilitated (but did not cause) widespread participation in politically-motivated massacres of ethnic minorities and moderate Hutu.

**Ethnic composition and relations**

According to the 1991 census, the ethnic makeup of Rwanda before the war was roughly 90 percent Hutu, eight percent Tutsi and less than one percent Twa (an aboriginal group). The post-war composition is unknown. The Hutu are generally believed to have migrated into the region nearly 1,000 years ago, and to have found the Twa already there. The Tutsi, according to the predominant view, began to appear in the region 400 years later (15th century) and were assimilated by the Hutu. The Tutsi took on the language and incorporated traditions and cults of the Hutu, and lived in proximity to them. While there were clear ethnic distinctions, clan affiliation, which cut across ethnic lines, seems to have been more important in pre-colonial times. Gradually, Tutsi military rule and administration were established over the Hutu and Twa.

For 500 years the minority, traditionally cattle-herding Tutsi, dominated the agriculturalist Hutu and hunter-potter Twa in Rwanda as in Burundi. During much of the colonial period the Belgian administrators, operating under a racialist myth of Tutsi superiority, entrenched Tutsi hegemony by removing Hutu chiefs, favoring Tutsi in education, and concentrating administrative positions in the hands of Tutsi. Furthermore, Belgian policy reinforced and rigidified ethnic identity, changing what had been a more fluid ethnic and socio-economic classification into one that was almost purely racial. In 1959, however, with the support of Belgian colonial rulers, Hutu overthrew the Tutsi monarchy to begin what turned out to be 35 years of political dominance in Rwanda.

**Political history**

The Hutu revolted against their increasing marginalization on ethnic grounds. Their revolt was successful largely because Belgian administrators shifted their support from the Tutsi aristocracy to the Hutu majority in response to the democratic fervor sweeping across Africa. The first republic (1962-1973) was led by an intellectual leader of the principal pro-Hutu party, and thus had the overtly ethnic goal of regaining Hutu power. This period was marked throughout by ethnic confrontations in which many Tutsi, especially chiefs and sub-chiefs, were killed or forced to flee. There were cycles of raids by Tutsi exiles, and repression and massacres of Tutsi by the Hutu-dominated government and military. Finally, this period saw the end of all Tutsi-dominated political parties and overt Tutsi participation in politics.

The recently-exiled regime came to power by coup in 1973 as the Second Republic. Until the mid-1980s it was widely regarded as relatively incorrupt, serious about development, and a good steward of international assistance. Throughout that period, Rwanda appeared to make important gains in the economic and social spheres. Roads and other communications infrastructure were built and maintained, access to social services – schools and medical centers – increased, and soil conservation works – reforestation and terracing – were expanded. Ethnic tensions seemed to have declined; there were few incursions by Tutsi exiles during most of the 20 years of the Second

The apparent tranquility and progress concealed important unresolved social and political tensions, and structural weaknesses within the economy. Rwanda’s development policies and programs were increasingly characterized by lack of vision, increased regional and ethnic bias, and inadequate emphasis on the development of human resources. Large infusions of development assistance contributed significantly to bolstering a system of patronage, reinforcing the perception of the State as employer and provider of first resort, and later enabling a massive military buildup.

This was the internal context when, in October 1990, the RPF launched from Uganda an offensive that had been in preparation for many years. The Rwandese Army, with Zairian, French and Belgian military assistance, repulsed the attack. This led to a protracted period (1990 – mid-1992) of simultaneous fighting and negotiating. Concerted peace negotiations began in Arusha, Tanzania in June 1992 and led ultimately to the August 1993 signing of the Arusha Peace Accords.

Throughout this period of intense negotiations the government was seriously fractured. Earlier, under pressure from the international community, the President had been obliged to allow formation of political parties to compete for power in a new multi-party democracy. Some of these opposition parties were included in the transitional government; some were more closely allied to the RPF than to the ruling MRND. Among the key negotiators in Arusha were members of opposition parties who shared the RPF’s distrust of the ruling party. This led to the Hutu hard-liner perception that their interests were being ignored and fostered strong opposition to implementation of the peace agreement. As the Arusha negotiations were proceeding, the opposition parties began to split, largely along ethnic lines or lines of ethnic accommodation. It was during continued negotiations on power-sharing and the composition of the new government of transition that the President’s plane was shot down on 6 April 1994 as he was returning from meetings in Arusha.

**Genocide and killings of moderate Hutu**

Immediately after the plane was shot down, the elimination of opposition leaders began. Ironically, what was ultimately to become an attempt to annihilate the Tutsi began with the assassination of moderate Hutu in the coalition government. While there is not yet any proof who shot down the Presidential plane or who ordered its destruction, circumstantial evidence – motive and access – points to elements within the former President’s own entourage. Determining who killed the President is critical to interpretation of the resulting events. In the first few days, political and ethnic killings and fighting between government forces and RPF took place, largely within Kigali. With the evacuation of expatriates and the retrenchment of the United Nations Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) peacekeeping troops, and ultimately their reduction in force, the hunt for Tutsi spread throughout the countryside. The advance of the RPF continued ostensibly to stem the genocide.

Compared with the force it could have brought to bear on the situation, the international community stood by silently and watched in horror as Rwanda was gripped by the grim race against time of Hutu extremists and Tutsi rebels: The RPF advancing to stop the annihilation of Tutsi and the Hutu extremist-controlled army and militia determinedly set on the extermination of their enemy. By the time the Hutu extremist military and militia had enacted as much of their scorched-earth policy as possible and fled the country under the pursuit of the RPF, more than 500,000 people (mostly Tutsi) had been killed, and more than two million had been taken out of the country. As the enormity of what had happened in Rwanda began to dawn on the rest of the world, the response became massive, but also disproportionate. The vast majority of resources went to maintain refugee populations in asylum countries although the genocide of Tutsi and the massive killing of moderate Hutu took place with the complicity of many of the refugees.
Migration of refugees

The migration of refugees began as early as April 1994 with the flight of Tutsi fortunate enough to have been living along the borders of Rwanda or to have had access to vehicles and evaded the militia. This flight was dwarfed by the subsequent massive outflows of Hutu ahead of the RPF advance, first into Tanzania and then into Zaire.

In just two days at the end of April 1994, an estimated record 250,000 people fled to Tanzania. By the end of the month 1.3 million people had left their homes. As the RPF gradually secured control of the west, vast numbers of Hutu took refuge in the newly-established French Safe Zone in the south-west, while others fled to Goma, Zaire, creating the swiftest and largest human migration in recorded history. By the time the RPF had unilaterally declared a cease-fire (July 18, 1994), approximately 25 percent of the Rwandese population had fled the country.

The migrations into Zaire, especially, were characterized by premeditation, orchestration and leadership by hard-line Hutu government and community authorities. In an intensive propaganda campaign, they spread fear among the population of reprisals by advancing RPA troops. Some were forced to flee by threats of physical violence. In Goma, Zaire, refugees camped on volcanic rock, which offered virtually no trees for firewood and shelter, no water and little possibility for making latrines. The extremely poor sanitation conditions contributed to the ensuing cholera and dysentery epidemics that killed approximately 50,000 people.

Besides refugees, many people were uprooted and displaced within the country. Initially, Tutsi and moderate Hutu fled their homes to churches, schools, stadiums, and other public places traditionally used for asylum. Many of them were killed in these places. Some survived and returned to their homes, others settled away from their homes for fear of their neighbors. Some camps for internally displaced persons (IDP), especially those established in the French Zone (Zone Turquoise) became havens for Hutu-extremist militia. As such they were considered highly threatening to the new government, and were targeted for closing. The process of closing the IDP camps culminated in the deadly April 1995 confrontation at Kibeho in which many thousands of persons were killed, largely by RPA troops.

Composition of new government

The government that took power at the end of the war was in principle a coalition government of transition, made up of representatives of various political parties. It took as its inspiration and claim to legitimacy the Arusha Accords. Accordingly, the position of Prime Minister was given to the Hutu president of the moderate wing of the fractured MDR party. A Hutu RPF leader was named President. In reality, however, the power behind the new government was Tutsi-RPF: the military leader of the victorious RPF became Vice-President and Minister of Defense. The alliance between military and civilian, RPF and other coalition members, and Hutu-Tutsi has been uneasy.
Endnotes


2) The remaining one percent were expatriates, largely from neighboring countries, residing in Rwanda. Pre-independence estimates of ethnic composition were 85 percent Hutu, 14 percent Tutsi and one percent Twa. Government of Rwanda, Recensement Général de la Population et de l’Habitat au 15 août 1991, Kigali, Rwanda, 1993/2.

3) The first multi-party government was set up by President Habyarimana at the end of 1991, and was followed by a more meaningful coalition in the spring of 1992. Despite these appearances of power sharing, in reality power continued to reside in the hands of the President and other northern Hutu politicians from the 1991 advent of multi-party democracy until the July 1994 end of the Second Republic.

4) Interviews with refugees in Goma, Bukavu and Ngara, April-May 1995.


6) Debate continues over the extent and nature of killings at Kibeho. The international inquiry established in the aftermath, while some donors withheld direct aid to the government, did little to clarify what had happened. Officially, UN agencies, at least, accept the lower figures initially set forth by the government: that around 300 people were killed. Unofficially, some relief workers and even agency heads are convinced that many thousands died.

7) The president of the RPF became Vice-Prime Minister, thereby putting three of the four top posts in the government into RPF hands. Of the 20 ministerial positions, six were given to RPF, three were given to each of the three principal opposition parties, and the rest to smaller parties or unaffiliated individuals. After repeated conflicts with RPF members of the government over the human rights abuses and other excesses of the RPA, the Prime Minister resigned (or was fired), only a little over one year from the formation of the government. At the same time, four ministers were fired.
Chapter 2

An Overview of Assistance to Rwanda

From April 1994 through the end of the year, the international community focused largely on saving lives by providing food, shelter, and medical and sanitary services to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The vast majority of the assistance was expended to maintain refugee populations in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi. Emergency food aid was and continues to be massive, provided mostly by the US and EU through pipelines managed by World Food Program (WFP), Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). It has undoubtedly prevented large-scale starvation and malnutrition among the affected population.

Attention began to shift towards rehabilitation and reconstruction in late September 1994, when the international community realized the severity of devastation brought about by the civil war and genocide. Since then, the UN and donor agencies have supported a wide array of projects and programs in different sectors and regions throughout the country.1 One year into the crisis there were about 130 NGOs represented in Rwanda. Many of them have continued into the rehabilitation phase of assistance through their initial participation in emergency humanitarian assistance to Rwandese refugees and internally displaced persons. Relations between NGOs and the government, however, have been characterized by wariness, bordering on suspicion and hostility in some cases. In December 1995, 38 NGOs were expelled, and an additional 18 had their activities suspended, pending further negotiations. Most NGOs, some 102 in all, remained operational.

Initial donor initiatives

The World Bank Emergency Recovery Program, which grew out of two donor meetings held in Paris in September and October 1994, was among the first major initiatives specifically aimed at reconstruction. It was designed to “(a) help the new government begin the restoration of key economic and social services, rebuild the institutional capacity necessary for sustainable economic recovery, and design a coherent economic policy framework; and (b) provide the private sector with the means to resume operations and create jobs.”2 The program included US$200 million in funding for 1995, of which US$50 million was the World Bank’s own Emergency Recovery Credit to finance reconstruction-related import needs and short-term technical assistance, mostly for private sector needs assessment and rehabilitation. By the end of 1995, direct funding to the government under this credit had not yet been disbursed. Assistance to the private sector had been released, and the terms of the credit allowed some reimbursement of expenses incurred back to November 1994. In contrast to the impasse on the Emergency Recovery Credit, the World Bank had expeditiously helped finance early rehabilitation and reintegration programs through a US$20 million grant to UN agencies in August 1994.3

In a separate initiative, UNDP designed the “Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme in Rwanda” in September 1994 as a “flexible mechanism for providing technical assistance and donor funds in support of the government’s rehabilitation programme.”4 The UNDP program was based on an assessment mission conducted in early August, 1994, making UNDP the first major development partner to return to Rwanda in the post-war period. The purpose of the program was to mobilize resources for small-scale infrastructural and income-generating projects. The UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) also submitted a comprehensive “Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan” in October 1994, which identified areas of urgent need in order to focus and
coordinate emergency reconstruction. It sub-divided rehabilitation needs into three categories: infrastructure, essential services, and vital socio-economic needs. Proposed projects were later subsumed under the Round Table Conference activities (explained below). Under the Normalization Plans numerous infrastructural repair projects were undertaken.

In addition to the Secretary-General’s Trust Fund for Rwanda, established in July 1994 for emergency aid, a second Trust Fund was established by UNDP at the request of donors in November 1994, to accelerate the disbursement of funds for rehabilitation. It provides a means for adapting aid to the conditions of the country, to lighten the bureaucratic load of donors, and to provide for rapid, flexible disbursement. The Netherlands had promoted the idea and has proven to be its principal backer. Nearly one year after the war ended, the Netherlands and the UK together had provided US$12.9 million to the UNDP Trust Fund (US$10.8 million and US$2.1 million respectively). By November 1995, the contribution of the Netherlands alone amounted to US$16 million. These funds have been used largely for providing administrative support to the government, rehabilitating the judicial system, and refurbishing the city of Kigali.

The UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal of January 1995, while still primarily a program of emergency assistance, had important rehabilitation and reconstruction components. In fact, most rehabilitation work up through May 1995 was funded through the Appeal. As stated in the Appeal document, “The [Appeal] reflects the UN agency and NGO response to the Government’s needs with respect to emergency assistance and first-stage recovery requirements...” The agencies most closely associated with rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in the Appeal have been WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF and FAO. The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), which coordinated the Appeal process, has played a key coordinating role during the emergency and transition period for such activities, through the UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO). There were also a number of additional UN and NGO emergency (flash) appeals.

### Assistance pledged during the Round Table Conference

The most critical post-emergency event in international assistance to Rwanda was the “Round Table Pledging Conference for Rwanda Reconstruction” held at the initiative of the new government of Rwanda, in January 1995. A national policy framework expressing the government’s priorities, around which rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance could be mobilized (including programs explained above), was presented by the Prime Minister and the main technical ministers concerned (reflecting the political components of the government), and discussed. This policy was articulated in a document entitled “Program of National Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Socio-Economic Recovery,” prepared by the government in collaboration with UNDP and in consultation with the World Bank and other donors. This consultative process, along with the positive response of the donors during the Round Table Conference, was the basis for the financial commitments presented at the Round Table Conference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Requested*</th>
<th>Pledged**</th>
<th>Committed</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Support</td>
<td>189.6</td>
<td>186.2</td>
<td>111.2</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repatriation and Reintegration</td>
<td>273.7</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and Reconstruction</td>
<td>300.9</td>
<td>314.2</td>
<td>284.5</td>
<td>94.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Round Table Process and Unallocated***</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>141.3</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>75.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>764.2</td>
<td>707.3</td>
<td>523.1</td>
<td>245.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Requested in January 1995 by the government through the Rwanda Recovery Program.
** Pledged amounts, as revised after the conference; Committed and Disbursed amounts as per
Table Conference, led to the agreement of all parties concerned on the establishment of a more formal coordination mechanism as a follow-up to the Conference.

Since then, the ad-hoc unit set up within the Ministry of Plan (and assisted by UNDP) has provided support to monitoring of international assistance. Table 2.1 presents the amount of assistance requested by the government in January 1995, the amount pledged (as revised in May) and amounts committed and disbursed as of September 1995. As the table demonstrates, pledges in support of the Rwanda Recovery Program have been substantial. As the year progressed, the level of pledged assistance grew to slightly over US$1 billion. The donor community largely accepted the government’s proposed program with the exception of the request for US$273.7 million for repatriation and reintegration of refugees. The government based its estimates on the assumption that most old and new caseload refugees would return by the end of 1995. Donors rightly questioned this premise and pledged less than one-fourth of the requested amount. Furthermore, some donors had already pledged assistance to the UN and relief agencies for repatriation, under the aegis of the Appeal (or other flash appeals). Such assistance covered transport facilities for refugees, the provision of food aid at way stations and the distribution of seeds and agricultural implements.

### Problems and prospects

#### Delayed disbursement of pledged funds

“We must come to grips with the reality that this inaction [in the aftermath of genocide] is an erosion of value systems that will engulf us all.”

– Senior official of major donor

”Donor suspension of aid to the government was made in error...there was no clear mechanism to resume aid.”

– Representative of donor, Kigali

Disbursement of emergency assistance to Rwanda through initial UN agency and NGO appeals was relatively rapid. On the other hand, donors have been slow to provide assistance to the government for national recovery. As detailed in Table 2.1, donors pledged US$707.3 million during the Round Table Conference, but nearly halfway through the year only US$68.1 million had been disbursed, less than 10 percent of the pledged amount. Of this amount, US$19.4 million was disbursed for programs outside the Rwanda Recovery Program – such as food aid contributions to WFP, UNREO operating expenses, the Bujumbura Conference, and the international Tribunal. Twenty-one percent of the remaining funds disbursed went to pay arrears to the World Bank and the African Development Bank. Of the US$38.3 million that remained for disbursement, US$5 million funded UN and other agency activities, and US$10.5 actually comprised “old money” counterpart funds, little of which remained in bank accounts in the aftermath of the war. Thus, at best only about a third of the funds disbursed was left for direct assistance to the government for balance of payments support, purchase of vehicles and equipment, technical assistance and so on. This remaining amount, US$22.8 million, represented only three percent of the total pledged amount. This situation began to improve substantially towards the end of the year. A UNDP update of the Round Table Conference funding status shows that nine months after the pledging conference a little over one-third of pledged assistance had been disbursed, and one-quarter actually received in Rwanda (see Table 2.2).9 By the end of the year roughly half had been disbursed.

The delay in disbursement of pledged funds has been caused by many factors. Many donors, most notably Belgium, the EU and the Netherlands, suspended direct assistance to the government
because of their opposition to the excessive force used by the government in closing IDP camps, specifically in Kibeho. Assistance frozen in the aftermath of Kibeho has been reinstated. Additionally, the World Bank and the government continue to disagree over assignment of a procurement agency to help the government manage procurement of commodities and technical assistance under the Emergency Recovery Credit. Another impediment has been the lengthy procedures for designing, assessing and approving development projects, which can take from one to two years. Furthermore, some donors have placed implicit and explicit conditions on assistance that have influenced the pace at which certain types of funds are released.

Table 2.2
Disbursement of Round Table Conference Pledges
(percent of May 1995 pledges)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
<th>Rec’d in-country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


An example of implicit conditions is the priority of the EU that the political base of the new government be enlarged, and the statement in the same document that the EU should “progressively and under certain conditions recommence development assistance to Rwanda.” (translated from French, emphasis added). Since the only pre-civil-war political parties not represented in the new government were those largely implicated in the genocide, this requirement amounted to a highly unpalatable condition that the government was very unlikely to accept. The Common position of the European Community has not, however, prevented the Commission from implementing a rehabilitation program decided upon in November 1994.

Finally, the limited absorptive capacity (limited technical and administrative staff), unwillingness to accept foreign technical assistance, and reasonable concerns about the political legitimacy and durability of the new government, made it difficult to rapidly disburse funds directly through it. Overall, however, regardless of the factors, the delays in disbursement of funds are undermining the government’s overall capacity to pursue timely initiatives for economic recovery and political stability.

Disproportionality of assistance
Of the more than US$2 billion spent on the Rwanda crisis since April 1994, the vastly larger share has gone to the maintenance of refugees in asylum countries. The EU has estimated that as of May 1995, it alone was spending US$400,000 per day to maintain the refugee camps. Figure 2.1 shows quarterly allocation of grants, or use of funds, for humanitarian assistance related to the Rwanda crisis for the one-year period from April 1994 to March 1995 from eight of the largest bilateral donors and the EU. As the figure suggests, roughly two-thirds of all assistance, both emergency and rehabilitation aid, was provided outside Rwanda. Furthermore, only about 11 percent of the grants of these same nine donors during the one-year period was provided specifically for rehabilitation and reconstruction.
While gross measures such as these cannot give the full picture, the figures do suggest a disproportionate response, especially in light of the nature of Rwanda’s refugee crisis. Such a disproportionate allocation is understandable, though hardly justifiable. In spite of attempts on the part of some major donors to balance their assistance, it appears to Rwandese who have lived through the horror of genocide that the international community is more concerned about the refugees than the surviving victims of the genocide. Further, the refugee camps, which are totally dependent on international assistance, pose a serious security threat to Rwanda because they have been heavily armed by shipments from abroad.

“Humanitarian assistance has been biased. The major focus has been on Zone Turquoise and refugee areas. Survivors have been overlooked”.
– Rwandese officer of international NGO

Moreover, increased rehabilitation and reconstruction expenditures to promote economic growth and social reconciliation in Rwanda could provide an inducement to some refugees to return home. The above discussion is not intended to convey the impression that international assistance to Rwanda and refugees is a zero-sum game in which assistance to one comes at the expense of the other. For the European Union, for example, different sources of financing exist for different problems and types of beneficiaries, so it is not simply a matter of shifting funds, but rather of increasing the amount of funds allocated to rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Confusion between the appeals process and the Round Table

“...The mandate question that arises when attention turns from relief to development was reflected in the confusion between the Round Table and the Consolidated Appeals [processes]”.
– Official of UN agency, New York

“We should have explained the process better to the government”.
– UNDP official

Confusion persists about assistance provided through the UNDP-supported Round Table Conference versus the DHA-sponsored Appeal. Conceptually, their mandates are different: the Appeal provides a mechanism to mobilize resources needed for funding the UN specialized agencies’ response to emergencies, while the Round Table Conference mechanism provides a forum to the government to discuss its national policies with the donors, and to the donors to
pledge resources in support of the implementation of national policies. Meanwhile, whether or not the conceptual distinction between the emergency phase and the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase is clear-cut, who has the responsibility to raise funds and the onus of defining the priorities to address in such complex emergencies remain the central issues. There is a considerable overlap that has created some friction between the two UN agencies. Understandably, therefore, the government does not always know through which assistance mechanism funds for reconstruction are passing. This complicates the issues of accountability and transparency, and also makes simple tracking difficult. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether the funds solicited and pledged during the Round Table Conference represent the rehabilitation and reconstruction needs for one year (1995) or reflect the value of development assistance over a number of years. The Rwanda Recovery Program, as well as the July 1995 mid-term evaluation of the Round Table process, clearly state that the funds solicited are for 1995 recovery programs. There is ample evidence, however, that some donors see the Round Table pledging process as a multi-year exercise.16 There are numerous old multi-year projects, interrupted by the war, that have been reconfigured and included in pledged assistance.

The international community, in conjunction with the government, established a number of mechanisms to coordinate and channel assistance for rehabilitation, reconstruction and repatriation. Although there has been a disproportionate expenditure of resources on refugees and delays in direct support to government reconstruction programs, in some sectors the performance of these structures was good. The details of international assistance in key sectors are described and analyzed in the chapters that follow.
Endnotes

1) The UN is clearly a major player in the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase of humanitarian assistance to Rwanda, as it has been throughout the crisis. Within Rwanda, DHA’s Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) had, from July 1994 until the end of August 1995, primary responsibility for overall coordination of humanitarian assistance activities of UN agencies and their NGO “partners”. UNDP is another important coordinating and planning body, being primarily responsible for assisting the government prepare for and participate in the January 1995 Round Table Pledging Conference. UNHCR has been responsible largely for operations dealing with refugees in asylum countries. Its role in Rwanda has been confined to coordinate first-stage assistance to returning refugees. The UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda, UNAMIR, with UNICEF, WFP and the FAO, have planning and coordination roles that are more sectorally focused. Other coordinating bodies include umbrella NGO organizations such as ICVÁ (International Council of Voluntary Agencies), InterAction, and VOICE that provide interfaces between the NGO community, UN agencies, donors, and the government of Rwanda.

The principal bilateral donors for the return, rehabilitation and reconstruction phase have been the US, Germany, Japan, Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK and Canada. Multilateral donors have included the EU, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and the African Development Bank. While most of the assistance has come from governments, the infusion of funds from private donors to various relief agencies and UN organizations has not been insignificant.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and International Organization for Migration (IOM) have been the most visible and active of the international organizations during the return and rehabilitation “phase”. In terms of size and scope of programs for rehabilitation and reconstruction, the principal NGOs operating in Rwanda have been Catholic Relief Services (CRS/Caritas), Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA), CARE, World Vision, Save the Children Federation (SCF), Action Nord-Sud, Action internationale contre la faim (AICF), Médecins sans frontières (MSF), OXFAM, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Irish Concern and Lutheran World Federation (LWF).


3) According to a World Bank response to a draft of this report, one-fifth of the ERC was disbursed by July 1995, one half by the end of the fiscal year.

4) See United Nations Development Program, “Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme In Rwanda (PRORERWA), Executive Summary.”


6) Trust Fund financing is tracked under the “Financial Support” sub-program of the Rwanda Recovery Program. November information from Netherlands assistance to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda in 1995, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minister for Development Cooperation, the Netherlands.


9) See UNDP/RBE, Donors Contributions for Rwanda Since Geneva Round Table Conference, (facsimile) received 26 September 1995. (Throughout “initial pledge” is the US$707 million, as requested after the Geneva Conference. This figure has been used because it more closely approximates the requested amount, US$764 million).


12) In its analysis of EU disbursements of funds to the new government, the Economist Intelligence Unit “Country Report, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, 4th quarter 1994,” stated that in spite of EU’s recognition of the new government in September of 1994, and the provision of US$5 million for reconstruction, “…more aid worth Ecu200m is reportedly being blocked by France until the Mouvement républicain national pour la democratie et le développement (MRNND) is brought into the government…” The EU has disputed this analysis and claimed that there was no blockage by France (written comments by ECHO to first draft of this evaluation, November 14, 1995, Gomez-Reino, mimeo).

13) Interview with head of European Union Delegation, Mr. Kratz, May 1995.

14) The EU, US, Germany, Japan, the UK, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium.

15) Based on financial data from nine principal donors. This is roughly comparable to findings by another analysis (Team III Evaluation Study) that show that one-third of all assistance for the fiscal year 1994 (October 1993 - September 1994) was given within Rwanda. That analysis was of all grants reported to DHA and included in the DHA financial tracking system. The precise allocation of many grants was not specified for various reasons. Furthermore, some grants were made for operations that were clearly regional in scope. The analysis made for this report attempted to look in greater detail at the grants of some major donors only, and attempted to allocate all funds either for operations within Rwanda or for operations in countries of asylum. In some cases decisions were arbitrary. In such cases, attempts were made to get clarification from donor agencies. Furthermore, the period of analysis of interest here was the year from April 1994 (the beginning of the crisis) through March 1995. The classification into quarters is based upon the date that the grant was made. This obviously doesn’t always coincide with the period during which funds are used or resources provided. In addition to inside-outside comparisons, which suggest disproportionality, another classification of grants from nine key donors is on emergency assistance and refugee maintenance versus rehabilitation and reconstruction. Only about 11 percent of the grants of nine major donors between April 1994 and March 1995 was provided specifically for rehabilitation and reconstruction.

16) The original idea of the Round Table was to cover the needs for the calendar year 1995 only. Once it became clear that insufficient pledging would come forward, however, the strategy was changed; requests were made for funds covering two years (response of Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs to draft report, 13 November 1995).
Chapter 3

Support for Economic and Public Sector Management

The war destroyed the macro-economic and institutional infrastructure necessary for the successful and balanced growth of a modern, market-based economy. Banks were shut down, a significant amount of the money supply was taken out of circulation to refugee camps and the administrative capacity of the government was obliterated. In July, the fleeing interim government took 24 billion Rwanda francs and allegedly substantial amounts of hard currency that had been in coffers of the Central Bank. The amount of local currency looted represented twice that in circulation at the time. The Gross Domestic Product is estimated to have declined by more than half from 1993’s already low level; the rate of inflation reached 40 percent. The new government that formed in July 1994 found itself with very limited capacity: less than one-third of the civil service and only three percent of the professional staff had returned by the end of the year. Re-establishing conditions favoring growth and the development of Rwanda’s economy will require large investments in training, rebuilding the institutions of governance and repairing infrastructure. Re-creating the public sector, however, provides a unique opportunity for Rwanda’s new leaders and development partners seriously to address the inconsistencies and inefficiencies, such as high public wage bills and extensive public involvement in the private sector, that had begun to hinder Rwanda’s development under the previous regime.

Macro-economic and public policy reforms

“In a small country such as ours, without natural resources, the only viable option...is that of an outward-oriented economic strategy allowing for the development of a dynamic private sector that can begin and sustain the economic diversification process.”

Towards a New Rwanda (Declaration of the Rwandese government on the Principles of a Recovery Policy)

With the 1990 commencement of the structural adjustment process, former Rwandese authorities had acknowledged that their previous policies were no longer appropriate to new realities. By the mid-1980s, rates of economic growth had turned negative from the highly positive levels that had prevailed throughout the 1960s and 1970s. By the mid-1980s, the volume and value of exports, which grew tremendously during the earlier period, stagnated and fell. The collapse of the world coffee market, combined with the government’s initial inability to deal with the ensuing economic crisis, delivered a devastating blow. Largely because of the crisis in the coffee sector, the public finance deficit more than tripled between 1988 and 1990, when the first devaluation of the Rwanda franc occurred. The Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) encompassed two devaluations, elimination of official prices for most products, increased access to foreign exchange, the elimination of non-tariff barriers to imports, reduced regulation of commercial activity and allowable profit margins. Because of the large increases in military expenditure that occurred at the same time, however, Rwanda’s economy continued to decline as the 1990 civil war began to intensify, in spite of some moves towards economic liberalization.

The new government came to power with a basic set of principles regarding macro-economic policy and public administration as articulated in its first comprehensive policy document: greater market liberalization, disengagement of the State from commercial and productive activities,
greater regional trade, and reduced public expenditures. This economic philosophy was shaped by pragmatic analyses of the economic crisis, the views and priorities of donors, and the failure of highly interventionist approaches to development. However, proposed economic and public administration reforms did not represent a radical departure from pre-war policies. Instead, the reforms represented an amalgam of elements of the 1990 Structural Adjustment Program, new thinking, and measures aimed at wresting control of the money supply from the exiled former government. The economic reforms central to Ugandan reconstruction, in the wake of its long civil war, are likely to have served as an important model.

The new government proposes to expand the objectives of the stalled SAP. Basically, the government envisions the development of an outward-looking, export-oriented economy based on diversified exports controlled largely by the private sector. To finance these activities and provide the private sector access to foreign exchange for imports necessary to revive the economy, the government requested US$206.9 million for 1995 in the Rwanda Recovery Program (US$189.6 million for financial support and US$17.3 million for economic management and public administration). A natural concern is the extent to which the government takes “ownership” of the aforementioned policies, especially in a country for which donor intervention has traditionally played such a critical role in policy formulation. However, the new government has a very strong private sector constituency that would naturally seek to remove many of the regulations to its activities inherent in government intervention. It is, however, too early to predict how strongly the government will support these reforms as conditions change.

The market-oriented policies largely reflect the Uganda model of post-war reconstruction – that is, that an economy struggling in the aftermath of civil war simply cannot afford to maintain a large public bureaucracy. These policies have been reinforced by the international financial institutions most involved in assistance for the re-establishment of economic and public management capabilities. But they do not appear to have been forced upon the new government. During its first mission to Rwanda after the war (September 1994), the World Bank stressed the need to keep civil service recurrent expenditures down, preferably to half the pre-war levels. The World Bank team also suggested that the government temporarily fix a “realistic” exchange rate and quickly establish an interest rate policy. It noted the government’s intention to change the currency and to reform trade policy without giving its own views as to the advisability or the feasibility of these actions.

The IMF sent a mission to Kigali in November 1994 to review the government’s planned de-monetization and its proposed reforms of the exchange rate regime. In January 1995, the IMF outlined its policy recommendations for recovery of macro-economic and financial management. It proposed extensive short-term reliance on technical assistance in policy formulation and implementation, the preparation of a public budget, adoption of a tax code “to incorporate structural changes,” implementation of a new tariff system and increased reliance on indirect instruments of monetary policy, especially for the management of exchange rates. The IMF, like the World Bank, was particularly interested in keeping public recurrent costs down, and in ensuring that the government maintain an employment policy driven by new realities and new needs rather than one based on past staffing levels or on political convenience.

**Policy action by the government**

The conditions of demand and supply of Rwanda francs became highly volatile and unpredictable during and immediately following the war. The large sums of money in the hands of the former government outside the country, an estimated 24 billion Rwanda francs, constituted a double threat to the new government. First, they represented vast resources for the defunct government with which to procure weapons and ammunition and to feed its army and militia. Second, they provided a monetary lever by which the old government could destabilize the macro-economic balance within Rwanda. To eliminate these twin threats, the new government, with the approval of the IMF, undertook to de-monetize a portion of the currency in circulation. It issued new bills that were exchangeable only by people residing in the country in early January 1995. Presumably to
spare poorer refugees and to reduce the impact on people who could not reach a bank, coins and small denomination bills were not de-monetized. Of course, money held in bank accounts was untouched by this action. While there is some debate on the actual figures, the de-monetization supposedly constituted an anti-inflationary contraction in the money supply as well: 11 billion Rwanda francs were printed, but only 10.2 billion were replaced. IMF officials have expressed confidence in the new bills.

"The new people are much more market-friendly".
– Official of UN agency, Kigali

"While it is still too early to judge the real degree of commitment to economic reforms, once liberalization has been unleashed it is hard to bottle it up”.
– Rwandese official of development bank

In early March 1995, the government accepted the principle and practice of market determination of the rate of exchange for cash transactions. Throughout much of the period from July 1994 through early 1995, there was virtually no banking system. Currency exchange was done nearly exclusively through private currency traders who bought US dollars, for example, at between 300 and 250 Rwanda francs to the dollar. Virtually no trades were made at the official exchange rate of 138 francs. The acceptance of a flexible exchange rate regime, while congenial to reform-minded policy makers, was made easy because of a number of factors that might be expected to change in the future, thereby reducing commitment to market-determined rates. First, the government did not, nor does it yet, have the ability effectively to manage a fixed regime. Besides, throughout much of the period from July 1994 through early 1995, there was virtually no banking system. One year after the war, only two commercial banks were open in Kigali, with only a few of their branch offices outside of the city functioning. The Central Bank didn’t have the liquidity to engage in currency transactions either. Second, when relief workers and embassy officials began to arrive, there was an accompanying large infusion of foreign currency, mostly US dollars. A larger volume of foreign currency “chasing” Rwanda francs led to the latter’s appreciation on the open market. It is unlikely, though, that the relative under-supply of Rwanda francs will continue indefinitely into the future. Third, and perhaps most important, opposition to devaluation of the franc was limited because the new leaders were more likely to have their wealth stored in foreign currency than in Rwanda francs. As time passes, the constituency for a free market and lower exchange rates is likely to weaken. With increased demand for imports and salaries paid in Rwanda francs, there will be increased pressure on monetary authorities to maintain the value of the franc. In fact, a visit to Rwanda in December 1995 confirmed that pressure is building to curtail currency trading outside of the small number of accredited bureaux de change. This pressure is occurring at the same time that the value of the Rwanda franc is dropping and the gap between official and parallel market exchange rates is growing.

“What is the size of the civil service? Nobody knows for sure”.
– Official of development bank

On the fiscal side, it appears that the public sector is growing rapidly and that the government is unable to practice real fiscal conservatism. Control over the public sector wage bill has proven particularly difficult due to the nature of the coalition government. Each of the political parties represented in the government controls one or more ministry or agency, which are treated to some extent as independent power bases, making coordination more difficult. Furthermore, the Arusha Accords stipulated that a certain number of ministerial positions be awarded to each of the key political parties contesting power before the war. This provision, along with the perceived need to create a new Ministry for Rehabilitation, has produced an already-unwieldy structure that exacerbates the staffing problems faced by the government. As the government prepares for reconstruction, the challenge will be to find mechanisms by which the larger budgets and personnel requirements of reconstruction can yield, in the post-reconstruction period, to smaller recurrent budgets for development and public administration.
International interventions

The principal donors to have disbursed funds for financial support to the government and for economic and public management have been the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Union, the Netherlands, Canada, and the United States.9 Aid from the US, the Netherlands and Canada was largely responsible for unblocking World Bank funds by covering the government’s arrears through June 1995. The provision of counterpart funds has been ensured primarily by the EU, Belgium and Canada. Additionally, roughly US$12 million have been committed for re-equipment of key ministries, and to the Trust Fund for projects identified by the government and UNDP. As of mid-May 1995, US$4 million had been disbursed by the US in this category, to re-equip eight ministries. Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK (the last two through funding of the Trust Fund), had begun assistance programs to train magistrates for the Ministry of Justice, provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Planning, and ensure salary supplements to the civil service. The programs and amounts identified above do not provide the full picture of international support for the rehabilitation of Rwanda’s economic and public management capacities, though. Various UN agencies and NGOs, such as WFP, UNICEF, FAO, UNDP and World Vision, have provided ad hoc assistance to support the administrative capacities of the ministries or local government bodies with which they have been working.

Furthermore, UNDP, the World Bank and the IMF have sent consultative missions, conducted studies, and otherwise supported the process of identifying priority needs for economic and administrative management. UNDP, for example, was integrally involved with the preparation of the Rwanda Recovery Program and has co-managed the UN Trust Fund with the government. Further, the World Bank Assessment Mission of September 1994, one of the earliest major donor missions to Rwanda, set the tone for donor assistance. The implicit recommendation was that donors should move rapidly and unreservedly to support and strengthen the capacities of the new government, and that aid should rapidly shift away from the refugee camps to Rwanda itself.10 In November 1994 the World Bank sent a team to Rwanda to begin preliminary work on the Emergency Recovery Credit. The World Bank resident mission was re-opened in January 1995. Lastly, the IMF clearly has an important role to play in financial and economic management decisions being made by the new government. The IMF made its first mission to Kigali in late 1994; a subsequent mission in January 1995 reviewed Rwanda’s fiscal needs. Through these and other contacts with the government, the IMF provided consultation on a host of financial and economic management issues, the most pressing at the time being de-monetization. The IMF has pledged US$13 million in assistance to Rwanda. About US$8.0 million involves the freeing up of the Reserve Tranche and the Compensatory Contingency Financing Facility; part of the remaining US$5 million will fund a program of technical assistance to rebuild macro-economic and financial management capacities.

Problems and prospects

The initial steps to gain some degree of control over the economy appear to have been successful. It is, of course, very difficult in the Rwandese context to isolate the impact of macro-economic policy, and other factors such as the large influx of foreign currency, on the relative stability of the Rwanda franc. Nonetheless, de-monetization appears to have progressed smoothly and to have caused relatively few losses.11 There was no appreciable increase in inflation subsequent to de-monetization, and confidence in the new bills remains high. Further, devaluation, or more accurately, acceptance of a market-determined exchange rate, has not caused instability.

In spite of initial successes, there remain some areas of concern and issues requiring resolution. While the World Bank responded rapidly and effectively to the humanitarian crisis by granting US$20 million to UN agencies to lay the foundations of a broad-based reconstruction and development program, its relative slowness in releasing the US$50 million Emergency Recovery Credit has diminished its effectiveness. A large part of the credit is intended to restore the
economic foundation of the country and rehabilitate the private sector by reactivating the financial system and increasing the availability of credit. Delays in disbursement of the public sector component of the ERC have retarded overall reconstruction and may have contributed to deepening the economic and political crisis. The December 1995 resignation of Rwanda’s Central Bank governor, while not attributable to the World Bank/government of Rwanda impasse, is worrisome evidence of turmoil within the government’s macro-economic management apparatus.

“The very projects designed to help rehabilitate public administration are ‘poaching’ government staff’.

— Official of international development agency

The newly-created Ministry of Rehabilitation has been rapidly built up, being given priority over other ministries that have traditionally had the technical expertise necessary to carry out programs of rehabilitation. Overall, the UN, donors and NGOs have been largely responsible for the reinforcement of what has become a parallel structure or a “super ministry” – a “government within a government”. In fact, the Ministry of Rehabilitation wrote the country’s resettlement plan without consultation with line ministries. There is some concern within the international community that this ministry has usurped the role of more-technically-competent line ministries in other sectors, negatively affecting the quality of analysis, efficiency of resource use, and inter-ministerial relations. It is likely to have long-term public expenditure as well as political ramifications, as the Ministry fights to maintain its privileged position.

A relatively small amount of the funds for rehabilitation of economic and administrative capacity have been provided directly to the government. Although there are many reasons for this, the government’s limited absorptive capacity is a major factor. Further, the multitude of agencies working in Rwanda, with higher salaries and more congenial work environments, has reduced the number of qualified staff available to the government, thereby weakening rather than strengthening absorptive capacity. Of the over US$200 million pledged during the 1995 Round Table Conference for “financial support” and “public management,” halfway through the year only 12 percent (US$30 million) had been disbursed, one-third of which was for the payment of development bank arrears. By year’s end, most was committed, half had been disbursed, and one quarter had been mobilized in the country.

Financial and technical assistance, including consultative missions, have provided good support for macro-economic management. However, support for rehabilitating public management was early often ad hoc. Nonetheless, some of the important steps towards economic stability – control of the money supply, reform of exchange and interest rate regimes – and towards improved management of the public sector have been taken. This is evidence that the government, with its development partners, plans to exploit the unique opportunity to address seriously the inconsistencies and inefficiencies that had begun to retard Rwanda’s development under the previous regime. To the extent that donors are flexible in their response and the necessary funds are forthcoming, they can help steer Rwanda away from the highly interventionist policies of the past to a development in which the initiative of the private sector is effectively fostered and harnessed.
Endnotes

1) Interview with Mr. Niyitegeka Gerard, Central Bank Governor, Kigali, Rwanda, May 1995. At contemporary exchange rates of 140 Rwanda francs to 1 US dollar, 24 billion Rwanda francs represented roughly US$170 million. This of course does not take into account the certain decline in the value of the Rwanda franc were the entire 24 billion francs to be put into circulation.

2) See Government of Rwanda, Document-Cadre pour la Réhabilitation et le Renforcement d’Urgence des Capacités de Gestion Economique.

3) World coffee prices plummetted in 1990, but the government, fearful of losing its foreign exchange earnings, kept producer prices well above market levels. This imbalance quickly dried up the coffee stabilization fund, which had been designed for cyclical rather than long-term price movements, and put tremendous pressure on the state treasury. The November 1990 40 percent devaluation against the SDR was one of the first concrete measures of structural adjustment. (The SDR or Special Drawing Rights is an IMF-sponsored international currency for transactions between countries.)


5) This private sector orientation could be seen as early as 1992 in the highly market-oriented platform of one of the RPF’s early political allies, the Liberal Party.


7) The estimated in-country money supply at the time of de-monetization was in the order of 12 billion Rwanda francs.

8) Article 14 of Banque Nationale du Rwanda, Règlementation des Changes, which also cites the underlying legislation as Decret-loi No. SP1 du 03 mars 1995 portant Organisation et Gestion du Marché des Changes.

9) Ranked in order of Round Table funds disbursed by December 1995 for sub-program 1, “financial support”, and sub-program 3, “Administration”.

10) Interview with assistant team leader of World Bank Assessment Mission, Mr. Doyen, Washington, DC, April 1995.


12) Interview with member of World Bank Resettlement Mission team, Washington, DC, April 1995.

Chapter 4

Assistance to Agriculture

Post-war situation

War and genocide devastated the rural economy. By the time the fighting had ended, large tracts of farm land had been abandoned, the coffee harvest had declined by half,1 more than 80 percent of the cattle population had been lost and four-fifths of all small ruminants had disappeared. Much of the equipment and material for household-based enterprises had been destroyed or looted, and rural infrastructure was heavily damaged. An FAO/WFP assessment concluded that the 1994B season crop, which should have been harvested in June/July, yielded only about 45 percent of 1993B levels.2 Further, the government estimated hundreds of hectares of natural high-elevation forests had been damaged by displaced persons. Support systems for agriculture were almost completely destroyed. In the aftermath of the war, only two out of 60 researchers with the national agriculture research system remained in the country. None of the nine research stations and labs remained operational. The services of the Ministry of Agriculture – central administration, agriculture extension, and regional agriculture units – also suffered extensive losses. Without some assistance, rural people faced serious deprivation.3 More than an estimated 150,000 metric tons of imported grains and pulses were needed to cover the consumption needs of the affected populations through the end of 1994.4 Overall estimates of food aid requirements for Rwanda in 1995 are an additional 116,000 metric tons, valued at US$66.9 million.5

International interventions

The US, EU, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and the World Bank have been largely responsible for funding initial UN and relief agency agriculture rehabilitation programs, such as seeds and tools programs. Numerous NGOs have made important contributions at the local or community level. They include, most notably, CARE, CRS, ICRC, Action Nord-Sud, Lutheran World Federation, Trócaire and World Vision. The emergency Appeal included around US$54 million in programs aimed specifically at first-stage rehabilitation of the rural economy.

During the Round Table Conference, donors pledged US$79 million for long-term rehabilitation of agriculture and the rural economy, of which four percent had been disbursed half-way through the year. By year’s end, pledge levels had increased substantially, as had commitments and disbursements (see Table 3.1). However, less than half the originally pledged amount had been disbursed by December 1995, according to Ministry of Plan records. Combined with assistance provided through the Appeals process, however, this amounted to fairly large amounts of goods, resources and services provided for the rehabilitation of agriculture.

Determining the immediate needs of the rural population was clearly one of the most urgent priorities facing the government and relief agencies as they attempted to re-establish some degree of normalcy in the countryside. A number of nationwide assessments had important impacts on the level and nature of interventions. While the most comprehensive assessments of crop and food supply situations were those of the WFP/FAO missions,6 many of the larger, more experienced NGOs engaged in agriculture rehabilitation programs undertook assessments in their areas of intervention. Nonetheless, many of the initial interventions in agriculture and the rural economy
were made with little but impressionistic and anecdotal information of the situation on the ground.

Seeds and tools programs

"Seeds programs can be considered political."
— *Official of relief agency, New York*

"We generally did not target food aid for fear of creating conflict. Targeting requires greater political will than we were able to bring to bear on the situation. Everyone was ‘vulnerable’.”
— *Representative of UN agency, Kigali*

The primary emphasis in the rural sector was rehabilitating agriculture for food security. To this end, starting in August 1994 through a series of weekly coordination meetings, FAO, WFP, NGOs and the Ministry of Agriculture helped ensure all regions needing productive inputs, tools and food aid were covered. Early interventions for the rehabilitation of agricultural production, referred to as “seeds and tools” programs, were initially conceived for returning refugees and IDPs, but quickly became general in scope. Program implementers realized that many survivors who had never left their homes, or had briefly been away, had also lost their productive inputs and tools and were in need of assistance. While targeting was often discussed, in practice most agencies did a general distribution to all households in their region of intervention, often on a first-come-first-served basis. Targeting was considered neither feasible, cost effective, nor politically advisable in the context of an already highly-polarized and tense situation in much of the countryside. Upon request from relief agencies, local authorities at commune and secteur levels drew up lists of farming households under their jurisdiction as the basis for distribution. Depending on availability, each household on the list received a “package” of bean, sorghum, maize and vegetable seeds and one or two hoes. This was done over two seasons (1995A/B). In the first season of distribution, packages were generally undifferentiated. In the second season, types and quantities were more closely tailored to the needs and growing conditions of farmers.

Nine months after programs had begun, agencies and the government began seriously to debate the merits of general versus targeted distribution for subsequent seasons (1996A). One view was that

Table 4.1
**Principal Round Table Donors for Rehabilitation of Agriculture and Rural Economy**
(in millions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Pledged</th>
<th>Committed Disbursed (as of December 1995)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union*</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>122.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Where pledges left blank, donor had not detailed or made pledges specifically for agriculture through the Round Table Conference in January 1995. * European Union contributions to the
rehabilitation of tea factories and the provision of rolling stock for the tea sector, while classified as industrial contributions, here are counted as contributions to agriculture. Also, some donors have cross-referenced their Appeals contributions to the Round Table, while others have not. This might have the effect of improving the disbursement record of some donors, while neglecting the overall assistance of others.

Sources: Pledges as reported 16 May 1995, in Situation des engagements du PRRRSE, Round Table tracking document produced by government of Rwanda, Ministry of Plan. Commitments and Disbursements as reported in Situation des engagements du PRRD, 95/12/22, Rwandese Ministry of Plan.

distribution should be targeted to returnees and designated vulnerable groups, such as widows and child heads of households, if distribution should occur at all. On the other hand, some individuals and agency representatives felt strongly that assistance for food-agriculture rehabilitation should be reduced or ended. It was initially estimated that 50 percent of farmers were reached in the first season of seeds and tools distributions, while 80 percent were aided in the second season. Subsequent analyses avoided estimates by season and, instead, estimated 62 percent of farmers received seeds, and 72 percent received tools. Over 10,000 metric tons of bean, maize, vegetable and other seed, and 700,000 hoes, were distributed to 690,000 households over the first two seasons following the war.

Table 3.2
Seed Distribution, October 1994 - June 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crops</th>
<th>% farmers reached</th>
<th>Average qty. distrib. (kg)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.2 shows the extent of seed distribution from October 1994 to June 1995 as computed from an FAO/WFP survey. Bean seeds were not surprisingly the most heavily distributed; a very high proportion (90 percent) of farmers traditionally grow beans, and roughly half of them received distributed seeds. Levels for other crops were lower, but given that fewer farmers traditionally cultivate them, the coverage was roughly equivalent. For example, half the maize and sorghum farmers received seeds. Over two-thirds of the bean seeds received by the average household were actually sown; one quarter was eaten, and a very small proportion was sold. Results were not as good for maize or sorghum, of which only a little over half and somewhat under two-thirds, respectively, were planted.

As important as distribution of seeds was, the FAO/WFP survey results are that market and own stocks were extremely important sources of seeds for most farm households. For example, farmers bought roughly 37 percent of their bean seeds, used their own stocks for 35 percent, and received around 27 percent from seeds and tools programs.

In conjunction with the distribution of seeds and tools for resumption of agricultural production, relief agencies, guided by WFP, provided food aid for “seeds protection.” They did this on the premise that it was worthwhile to provide substantial amounts of food aid in order to ensure that the more expensive selected seeds would actually be planted and not eaten. At the same time and place that farmers were given seeds and agricultural implements, they were generally given food rations for a few weeks. Not all agencies stuck to the three-week “seeds protection” program; some chose to provide food aid to farmers for three months, until beans and some sweet potatoes were harvested. In most regions, the general distribution of food aid to farmers continued for two seasons as well.
The ability to distribute seeds and tools and “seeds protection” food aid so widely can be attributed to the joint coordination of NGOs by FAO, WFP and the Ministry of Agriculture, as well as to the experience in Rwanda of many of the key NGO partners, who alongside more than 20 other organizations helped guide distribution. Certainly, generous funding by key donors – EU, US, and the World Bank, among others – contributed to the broad geographical and household coverage.

**Seed multiplication capacity**

An important concern to agriculturalists was the possibility that Rwandese crops might have lost much of their genetic diversity through destruction of varieties adapted to local conditions. There is also a practical issue; farmers re-establishing their production need appropriate, clean and easily available seeds. Seeds provided in the first season of assistance came largely from outside of Rwanda, usually from Uganda and Burundi. Germination rates, adaptability to soils and resistance to diseases were relatively poor. Agriculturalists realized that rapid multiplication of known and tested seeds would be a more effective way to provide adapted seeds to farmers with insufficient stocks of their own.

In February 1995, a number of research and technical agencies, relief and development agencies, Belgium’s Seeds Service Project, and the Rwandese agricultural research system (ISAR) met to coordinate activities to re-establish a national seed program. The International Agriculture Research Centers (IARCs), through the Seeds of Hope Initiative, were to focus on the provision of “foundation stock” – that is, seeds that provide the input for the multiplication process. The Seeds Service Project was to provide the basic seed to be multiplied, which would be done largely by NGOs in collaboration with ISAR research stations.

The Seeds of Hope Initiative led to a number of activities: the multiplication of potato seed in Uganda through a regional potato research consortium; the contracting of Cargill Tanzania to multiply maize varieties used in Rwanda; and the multiplication of regionally-adapted “basic” seed for sorghum and beans for final multiplication and distribution within Rwanda. More than 18 tons of potato seed and 148 tons of maize seed were to be transported to Rwanda for further multiplication and distribution by the third quarter of 1995. Criticized by the government and by agencies working within Rwanda, the IARCs have been asked by the government, NGOs and the FAO to quickly focus on in-country research, multiplication and capacity building. In their absence, it is largely NGOs that are assisting with multiplication and rudimentary testing of seeds for distribution. World Vision, the most active of the NGOs, is operating multiplication fields in four ISAR field stations. In addition, CRS/Caritas Internationalis is engaged in a program of sweet potato and cassava multiplication in conjunction with diocesan organizations and farmer associations. CRS provides the basic inputs – seedstock, pesticide and fertilizer – through the diocese and buys multiplied seed from the farmers for onward distribution.

**Livestock management**

As of the preparation of this report, relatively little has been done to rehabilitate animal husbandry in spite of the devastation of domesticated animals. The FAO has been preoccupied with the problem of overstocking of cattle brought in by “old caseload” refugees returning from Uganda. Neither the FAO nor other agencies have been able to do much other than determine the general parameters of the problem and undertake limited, albeit key, vaccination campaigns. These have largely been focused on the north-east, where the influx of livestock has caused a dramatic animal health risk as well as a potentially disastrous environmental problem. The FAO, the African Development Bank and Belgium, primarily identified and/or pledged assistance for the rehabilitation of various animal husbandry schemes, but relatively few national-level programs have been funded. With funding from Belgium, equipment and technical assistance has been provided to the national poultry hatchery. Action Nord-Sud has been working on the overstocking problem in the north-east, and some credit arrangements have been undertaken by other NGOs that should allow farmers to acquire livestock, both cattle and, more importantly for the average farmer, small ruminants and poultry. The critical livestock problem is as much one of cattle overstocking in the north-east as of insufficient livestock in the rest of the country. Without the benefit of manure, households will be less able to maintain the fertility of their soils, which will
intensify problems of agricultural productivity and erosion.

**Export agriculture**

Rwanda’s capacity to produce, process and export its principal commodities has suffered greatly as a consequence of the war and of neglect during the post-conflict period. Coffee trees, already given little attention in the years preceding the war, were largely left untended. Tea bushes, especially those grown in swamp plantations, have been destroyed through water-logging; untended drainage ditches have filled with silt, retained water, and killed the bushes. The government realizes the critical importance of rapidly implementing programs for the rehabilitation of export agriculture. In the Rwanda Recovery Program, the government asked for US$700,000 for the rehabilitation of coffee processing centers and tea plantations. More recently, it has increased the farm gate price of parchment coffee, reflecting its commitment to provide incentives to producers. Only the EU and the African Development Bank have pledged funds specifically for the rehabilitation of export agriculture (US$24.9 million and US$2.2 million respectively). Five months into the year, US$15.4 million had been committed, but no funds had been disbursed.11 Some relief agencies, inclined to provide assistance for the harvest and eventually rehabilitation of export agriculture, felt constrained from so doing out of concern that it would be considered outside of their emergency mandates, and for fear of antagonizing traditional supporters of export sector projects.12 By the end of the year, the EU had increased its pledge to US$50 million, and had disbursed US$6.4 million for programs of coffee and tea rehabilitation; four tea factories and adjacent plantations were being rehabilitated.

"The Ministry of Agriculture played a good coordinating role in agriculture rehabilitation".  
– Official of development bank

The Ministry of Agriculture’s purview includes identifying needs within the agriculture sector, providing coordination for interventions by international agencies, and revising or instituting policy amenable to sustainable development of the agriculture sector. However, it has had little or no funds with which to carry out these activities. Before the inflow of some donor funds, WFP, UNICEF and FAO, along with numerous relief agencies, provided in-kind salary supplements, material and logistical assistance to the Ministry primarily on an ad hoc basis. It has also received some equipment purchased with a US grant of US$4 million to equip eight key ministries. The Ministry is operational down to the préfecture level, but is obviously unable to perform many of the functions that it performed before the war. Belgium has provided some technical assistance to the central bureau of the Ministry, the Swiss have rehabilitated forestry projects and support to the national agriculture research center’s forestry program, but otherwise, little direct aid to the Ministry of Agriculture has been mobilized.

**Problems and prospects**

While the consensus is that programs for the rehabilitation of agricultural production and the rural economy were relatively successful, there are areas of concern that require some additional consideration for further intervention in Rwanda as well as for other emergencies. The first season of seeds and tools distribution was plagued by delays in funding and by some poorly adapted seeds. Some early interventions were made with only scanty field information. General distribution of seeds and tools, as well as food aid through the first two seasons, has begun to induce dependency on the part of recipients. Continued untargeted, general distribution into the third season (1996A) will certainly exacerbate this dependency. The coffee and tea sectors, whose rehabilitation could rapidly have led to the very-much-needed monetization of the rural economy, have been largely ignored. Many farmers who have received material assistance for agriculture are squatters on land vacated by persons killed or having fled during the war. An unanticipated effect of continued seeds and tools distribution may be to entrench and appear to validate their hold on the land.

**Distribution of seeds and tools and food aid**
Delays in procuring and distributing seeds and tools during the first agricultural season following the war are understandable. Rwanda had only come out of the war two months before planting, and the international community was uncertain about the country’s future. When attention was finally turned to the need for seeds and tools, the planting period was imminent. It was evident that the alternative to providing seeds and tools to farmers to enable them to produce their own food was an unsustainable and massive food aid program to millions of people. In the scramble to respond to perceived needs of farmers for seeds, relief agencies were not careful to ensure the seeds were regionally-adapted and disease-free. The program of distribution of seeds for the 1995A season was not well-coordinated, and resulted in distribution of poorly-adapted seed, which often failed to germinate. The problems of timing, quality and adaptability resulted in sub-optimal yields. That the season turned out as well as it did may be as much a testament to the common sense of farmers as to the success of seeds and tools distribution. Instances have been cited of returning farmers planting favorite seeds that they had set aside when they were forced to leave their homes. In addition, farmers who had not received any seed from the seeds and tools program were nonetheless able to plant their crops. With greater local purchase of seed, and with the benefit of the first season’s experience, the second season was more successful.

“I am actively dissuading free distribution [of seeds and tools] for a third season. As of July, I expect the Ministry of Agriculture to discourage free distribution. Seeds should be kept for vulnerable groups”.
– Rwandese official of UN agency, Kigali

“The impact of food distribution is inhibiting agricultural production... People in the countryside expect food aid to continue”.
– Rwandese official of NGO, Kigali

There is little rationale to continue general distribution of seeds and tools or food aid into the third season, yet it is likely that there will be great pressure to do so. The Ministry of Agriculture could fall into the trap of paternalism, while farmers slip into a state of dependency. There is much anecdotal evidence that farmers have begun to take free seeds, tools and food distribution for granted. Some farmers who received seeds and tools did not need them to ensure survival. If this was true in the first season of distribution, it was much more so in the second, and will be even more true if general distribution is continued for a third season. A certain amount of redundancy is normal in such a situation, and is probably less costly than stricter targeting or the longer, more costly distribution of food aid. Having one or two hoes too many simply means that farm households are slightly more capitalized; the savings from receiving free hoes, for example, can be spent on other necessities. The greatest potential cost is the loss of initiative that comes from dependency. If the WFP and its implementing partners (NGOs and ICRC) follow through on WFP’s announced plan to more closely target the vulnerable and needy, based on a recent WFP/FAO survey, the potential for encouraging dependency should be mitigated.

Defining the target “vulnerable” group, however, is not easy. The FAO/WFP “Vulnerable Groups” survey defined the target group for continued seeds and food distribution as households having one or more of the following conditions: 1) small surface for farming (less than 0.6 hectares), without supplementary source of revenue and negligible number of animals (maximum of one cow or a few small ruminants), and no more than two active family members; 2) unable to cultivate during previous season; 3) living in regions affected by natural and/or man-made disasters; and 4) rural unemployed or landless. Roughly 15 percent of all Rwandese households were estimated to meet one or more of these conditions. However, as interpreted by one of the most important NGOs working in Rwanda, CRS, the classification of “vulnerable” was so broad as to be essentially unusable as a means to target free distribution of seeds, tools or food aid. Furthermore, the first “vulnerability” criterion of the FAO/WFP survey itself probably includes more farm households than the 15 percent designated vulnerable. A third of Rwandese farm households own less than half a hectare; 16 percent have less than a quarter hectare.

Seed multiplication
Multiplication of seeds under contract to farmers’ associations or individual farmers is one way of ensuring that returnees receive adapted seed. However, NGO contracting with these associations has not been without its problems. Some NGOs have found the arrangement with farmers’ associations to be highly problematic and have considered working with individual, perhaps more commercially-oriented farmers. This is probably a more workable arrangement. It is likely to be more efficient and to help develop the commercial sector of the rural economy. Multiplication of seeds on the ISAR stations may be more useful in reconstituting national-level support to agriculture. The programs run by NGOs in conjunction with ISAR are very basic, and should not go further without direct involvement of qualified Rwandese researchers. Further, the international community should seize the opportunity to fill the current vacuum in research and extension services with a new policy of support to agriculture.

Export agriculture

The international community’s failure rapidly to help Rwanda rehabilitate export agriculture represents an important missed opportunity. Rehabilitation of this sector would provide the much-needed infusion of cash into the rural economy while providing income to the government and hard currency to finance part of the import requirements of the country. Rwanda’s economy is small and highly rural, but it is not autarkic. Many of the investments that are required to increase the productivity of its various sectors, rural and urban, will require the purchase of inputs and technology from elsewhere. For this Rwanda needs foreign exchange that it will probably earn largely from the export of coffee and tea into the foreseeable future.

Relief agencies interested in rehabilitating export crops production have felt constrained because of the impression that these crops were “off-limits” to them. Rapidly ensuring fair market access for coffee growers, and farmers picking coffee from abandoned fields, is probably the most efficient and effective means to re- monetize the rural economy. Ironically, at the same time that relatively little is being done to reconstruct the coffee marketing and processing system, relief agencies are rushing to develop projects to inject funds into the rural economy. Well-timed and well-placed assistance to the coffee sector would have had important financial and psychological effects both at the household and the national level. The financial effects are self-evident. Psychologically, farmers and government officials alike would have felt that their destiny was largely in their own hands.

Property rights and land tenure

Many Tutsi from the old refugee caseload have squatted on and begun to farm land abandoned by mostly Hutu, who recently fled their homes for the asylum of refugee or IDP camps. In some cases, the land on which returnees have settled is their ancestral home, which was occupied by other Rwandese during their long exile. While the Arusha Accords preclude old-caseload returnees from claiming abandoned land, this is already occurring. The issue of land tenure and justice will have to be handled by the Rwandese themselves. However, the international community should be aware of the possible impact of seeds and tools programs on the attitudes of squatters. These individuals have received what amounts to tacit approval from local authorities to cultivate the land upon which they have settled. In spite of the fact that returnee farmers are aware of the rights of the original owners, the provision of inputs and agricultural implements is likely to entrench the hold of returnees on the land. Facilitating farming for Tutsi squatters will make it that much more difficult for them to cede the land to Hutu owners returning from exile. Perhaps this is a necessary tradeoff to rehabilitate production and to reduce national dependence on food aid, but its legacy could be a further deepening of ethnic tensions.

With the assistance of rehabilitation programs, farmers and rural tradespeople have restarted their activities, albeit under generally adverse conditions – insecurity, psychological and physical trauma, labor and capital shortages. Agricultural production for the 1995A season (on a population base estimated at 70 percent of pre-war levels) is considered to have been a little over half the average of the five previous years, and the prospects for the 1995B season appear to be good.17 Agriculture rehabilitation programs cannot take all the credit for recovery of the rural economy. Many farmers and most tradespeople and small and medium business owners relied upon their own resources or those of the community to restart their enterprises, with little help from the
outside. This is especially so of non-farm enterprises – carpentry shops, tailoring, brick and tile manufacturing firms, etc. – few of which have received any assistance. Nonetheless, rehabilitation programs played an important role in recapitalizing agriculture, ensuring food security both in the short and medium term, and providing a measure of confidence in the future.
Endnotes

1) The lost earnings from coffee alone are staggering. Had the coffee harvest occurred as normal, the 30,000 tons of coffee likely to have been exported would have earned three times as much as in 1993, up to US$92 million more than the normal annual earnings, owing to exceptionally high world prices for coffee.

2) Total area of 1994B was similar to 1993B but estimated output in 1994B was 60 percent of 1993B. Only 75 percent of output was harvested, which suggests that only 45 percent of 1993B levels was available for consumption in 1994B. FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Rwanda.

3) See FAO, “République du Rwanda: Diagnostique et propositions d’actions prioritaires pour la réhabilitation et la relance du secteur agricole”.

4) See Department of Humanitarian Affairs, “UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda (January-December 1995): Volume 1: The Rwanda Perspective”.

5) See Department of Humanitarian Affairs, “International Humanitarian Assistance to Rwanda and Burundi”.

6) The first mission was conducted 29 October-21 November, and the second 9-23 February 1995.

7) Interview with Mr. Collette, FAO Representative, Kigali, Rwanda, May 1995.


9) To include the International Agriculture Research Centers (IARCs) CIP, CIAT, CIMMYT, ICRISAT, as well as the FAO and the World Bank.

10) The FAO/WFP “Vulnerable Groups Identification Survey” found that in the post-war period only 40 percent as opposed to nearly half of all farmers were cultivating coffee.


13) Interviews with Mr. Van Brandt of the Belgian Cooperation, Kigali, Rwanda, May 1995.

14) Interviews with Mr. Roome, CARE International, and Mr. Van Brandt, Kigali, Rwanda, May 1995.

15) WFP comments on the first draft (R.Hauser, 15/11/95) insist that for 1996 season A no general distribution was carried out. Instead 140,000 households, constituting 15 percent of the rural population, was found by a joint WFP/FAO assessment to be vulnerable. It was to these households that free seeds and tools were distributed. Nonetheless, the criteria of vulnerability presented by CRS, a key actor in agriculture rehabilitation, were extremely inclusive.

16) According to “CRS Rwanda Emergency Situation Report No. 53”, September 8, 1995, The commonly-accepted criteria by which vulnerable groups are to be targeted are the following: (1) families having less than 60-70 ares of cultivable land; (2) households having no cattle; (3) families having a known unstable situation; (4) families not having produced last season; (5) families of widows/widowers. The population that meets criterion number 2, alone, is very large;
roughly 80 percent of rural households own neither cattle nor goats.

17) See UN Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Programme, FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Rwanda.
Chapter 5
Rehabilitating the Health Sector

Post-war situation

Rwanda’s health delivery system, like much of its social sector, was beginning to crumble even before the war. It was heavily dependent on both official and private external assistance. Its 250 commune-based health centers and dispensaries and 36 hospitals, nearly half of which were not directly under the management of the government, provided broad primary coverage. Additionally, there were nearly 200 private pharmacies and more than 25 private clinics (cabinets médicaux) and infirmaries, mostly in urban areas. There was also heavy reliance on the more than 7,000 traditional midwives and healers. With the deepening economic and political crisis of the later 1980s and early 1990s, earlier advances in health care were reversed. The war completed the demise.

By mid-July 1994, Rwanda’s entire health delivery system had collapsed and was in complete disarray. Over 80 percent of its health professionals were killed or had fled the country. Certainly many of the traditional healers were also killed or displaced, making even basic access to traditional healing difficult. Although the damage to buildings was relatively light, medicine stocks, equipment and vehicles were widely looted and vandalized. Consequently, medical facilities were largely non-existent at a time when they were desperately needed. Except for some medical care provided by medics from the Rwanda Patriotic Army and a few relief agencies such as ICRC and Médecins sans frontières (MSF) that had stayed in Rwanda throughout the crisis, the sick and injured were largely left untreated. The presence of hundreds of thousands of decomposing corpses scattered throughout the country posed high risks for the outbreak of epidemics.

This was the context into which the majority of NGOs, UN agencies and bilateral donors arrived, bringing with them trained health professionals, medicines, supplies and equipment. They re-established basic curative services in rural and urban areas and helped repair and restore damaged water systems. Non-governmental organizations undoubtedly were the most critical actors in the health sector at this stage. As the political situation stabilized and the Ministries of Rehabilitation and Health acquired rudimentary resources, the primary focus of international assistance shifted towards reconstruction and rehabilitation. Although the UN agencies had been supplying medicines, equipment and logistical support from the start, NGOs too began concentrating on restoring basic health care services, rehabilitating the physical plant and supplying materials and other support. One year after the end of the war, there were 66 NGOs, in addition to specialized UN agencies, involved in the health sector. Unfortunately, the relationship between NGOs and the government is often characterized by friction and distrust, despite the best of intentions.

International interventions

The massive efforts of the international community in the health sector can be briefly discussed under the following four areas: rebuilding primary health delivery systems, institutional capacity building, national campaigns, and rehabilitation of water and sanitation systems.

NGOs were instrumental in delivering primary health services to the population. Initially, their efforts, largely funded by donor agencies, were confined to urban areas; but as essential infrastructure was restored, they went to rural areas providing free medical assistance. Much of the
international assistance at this stage was channeled through NGOs. There is little doubt that international assistance was critical: it saved lives and alleviated pain and suffering.

“NGOs have had many problems because of logistics, inexperience and the CNN factor, but they did a hell of a job in providing medical services to the people. They did a marvelous job”.

– Official of a UN Agency

“I would be the first to admit that you (international community) did a lot of good to the people....There were no doctors, no nurses, no medicines. You gave people the help they needed.”

– A Rwandese government official

As early as May 1994, ICRC and some NGOs, such as MSF, began to operate and refurbish clinics and hospitals in Kigali and other areas of the country, primarily in the north-east that had come under the control of the RPA. As NGOs gained access to other areas of the country, they helped reconstruct medical structures and systems, review needs, and re-establish vaccination programs. UNICEF provided 150 health centers and NGOs with emergency health kits so they could re-establish basic primary health care. NGOs have been involved in repairing, rehabilitating and reactivating Rwanda’s 250 health centers and 30 out of its 34 hospitals by providing medical supplies, medicines, on-the-job training of auxiliary health workers, and assistance for health education and information campaigns. Overall, progress has been slow, due in large part to the acute shortage of trained health personnel.

Many problems, though not totally unexpected, plagued the activities of NGOs, which set up independent operations in the field in the absence of legitimate government structures. The failure to conduct proper needs assessments often resulted in inadequate geographic coverage and NGO competition for resources. Because many NGOs lacked previous experience in the region, they followed their own standards for providing health services, which were often not appropriate for local conditions. Chaotic and weak coordination among NGOs, as well as between the NGOs and the donor agencies, contributed to duplication of efforts and the waste of scarce medical resources so desperately needed in the country. Coordination between the NGOs improved over time. Nonetheless, many NGOs have continued to superimpose independent administrative structures on the health care system, that are neither efficient nor cost-effective. By May 1995, only about 10 NGOs were doing valuable, substantive work, according to the Minister of Health.

Donors have provided limited direct assistance to the government for strengthening its management, coordination and information systems capacities in the health sector. The August 1994 report “Recommendations of Immediate Health Sector Programming Actions: Rwanda,” prepared by UNICEF in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, WHO and UNFPA, and the activities it initiated, was an important exception. The US Public Health Service, the World Health Organization (WHO) and Save the Children (US and UK) have also provided management support and seconded technicians directly to the Ministry of Health (MOH) to assist in designing national health polices, guidelines, standards, and training curricula. With the exception of WHO and the joint US Public Health Service/MOH Training-of-Trainers workshop, training needs are largely being addressed “on the job,” which is not sufficient to develop a sustainable health delivery system.

UNICEF, WHO and the US have also provided basic equipment such as computers, cars and fuel to Ministry and regional health staff to enable them to operate. The EU, Canada and Belgium have also released old counterpart funds that helped finance Ministry operations from October 1994 through January 1995. In addition, WHO (with World Bank financing) is helping the government institutionalize a national epidemiological surveillance system for the prevention and control of communicable diseases.

The MOH has developed and adopted national health care policy practices and guidelines, with some support from WHO, and hoped to have government-wide approval by July 1995. National
policies are formulated around a decentralized health delivery system that emphasizes planning, operations, financial management and monitoring at the préfecture level under the office of the Regional Medical Officer. Further, with the assistance of UNICEF, WHO and Pharmaciens sans frontières (PSF), the MOH reopened the country’s central pharmaceutical office in September 1994. However, reconstituted drug stocks are inadequate to meet current needs and NGOs tend to use private funds to buy directly from PSF or other sources, primarily in Europe. Although medicines continue to be prescribed free-of-charge throughout the health system, the government is planning to charge modest user fees, partly to recover costs.

“The too much money is being put into the health sector... the investments are unlikely to be sustainable in terms of coverage of recurrent costs”.
– World Bank official

“The health sector is more than adequately covered”.
– Situation Report from Rwanda

The government is still almost totally dependent on international assistance for recurrent and capital expenditures for rehabilitation in the health sector. Until recently, NGOs, ICRC and UNHCR, along with WFP through food rations, ensured salary payments for the entire health sector. The MOH is now resuming salary payments for registered health personnel in the public sector. NGO salary support was expected to be phased out by July or August 1995. In May 1995, both NGOs and government officials were concerned about the registration of the remaining NGOs, their withdrawal timetable, and the government’s ability to assume regular salary payments throughout the health sector.3

The Ministry of Health, with assistance from UNICEF and WHO, has reconstituted the country’s vaccine stocks, immunization equipment, and the cold chain for the national expanded program of immunization (EPI). The cold chain is predominantly structured through NGO facilities, with NGO staff providing logistical and management support. The goal of the EPI program is to achieve 70 percent coverage for all EPI antigens in all préfectures.4 However, management problems between the central and regional health structures have hindered operational efficiency. National EPI policies and strategies have been well-designed at the central level and the logistical capacity to carry out the program is in place; however, because the administrative and management structures necessary to implement a national program do not exist, program implementation is problematic. In general, personnel at the préfecture and commune levels received directives without adequate guidelines, protocols, training or resources, resulting in poor or partial coverage in some areas.5

The Belgian Red Cross in cooperation with WHO prioritized the re-establishment of a safe blood supply through national blood banks in Kigali and Butare; Ruhengeri is expected to open a facility shortly. The National AIDS Prevention Program (Programme national de lutte contre le SIDA) is again receiving some direct support from WHO and the US. The US is supporting prevention programs which include educational campaigns for high-risk groups and social marketing of condoms. In addition, UNICEF is supporting an HIV/AIDS program launched by the Ministry of Youth that involves training 220 youth animators from Kigali in basic preventive approaches and promoting information and education through recreation activities. UNICEF is also supporting the school-based training of 5,000 adolescents between the ages of 15-19 who will provide basic information about HIV/AIDS to younger children. Several NGOs have included STD/AIDS awareness in their community education programs and CARITAS/Rwanda is providing direct support to two centers that care for HIV-infected children.

Implementation of STD/AIDS interventions has been unacceptably slow and prevention activities are far from adequate given the potential magnitude of the HIV-infection problem in Rwanda.6 With the unprecedented population movements that occurred amid sweeping physical violence, bloodshed and rape, it is assumed that the incidence of HIV infection has increased. Further, Rwanda is facing a serious AIDS problem among unaccompanied children. Under current
unaccompanied child center guidelines, adolescents are processed out of the centers at age 16 regardless of whether extended family members have been traced or not. Because many of these adolescents have no social support system or employment options, they join the ranks of unemployed youth trying to survive on the street and put themselves at greater risk of STD/HIV infection.

Fighting destroyed some water and sanitation facilities, but most were damaged through neglect during and immediately after the war. UNICEF, UNAMIR, ICRC, Oxfam and Britcon, along with others, worked to restore the water supply to Kigali, while other urban water systems continue to suffer from water cuts due to leakage, lack of power generators or a shortage of fuel for pumping stations. The Ministry of Public Works has estimated rehabilitation costs to reach US$5 million. This would cover: priority damage to water treatment and pumping stations and sanitation and distribution networks; repairs to urban water plants, generators, water counters and related gear; purchase of water treatment chemicals throughout 1995; repairs to water distribution networks in rural areas; and private company contracts for waste disposal in Kigali and other urban areas. Access to potable drinking water on a daily or alternate-day basis is reported to be 85 percent of pre-war levels in urban areas and 50 percent of pre-war levels in rural areas; sanitation coverage has been returned to 80 percent of its pre-war level.7 Several NGOs, such as the International Rescue Committee, the American Refugee Committee and AICF/US have been reactivating and improving gravity-fed water systems, borewell and shallow wells at the commune level, in addition to promoting community participation through organization of local health and water committees.

There is a continued need for assistance in the rehabilitation of existing water and sanitation systems. Several key partners including UNICEF, UNDP, the UK, Canada, Norway and Finland have supported capacity building for the appropriate ministries in the areas of policy development and service delivery in water, sanitation and hygiene. Germany and Britcon have provided direct assistance to Electrogaz, the national utilities company, in repairing and rebuilding the national electric grid line. At this writing, seven out of 10 towns, including Kigali, have been reconnected to the national grid. But the continuation of hostilities between the RPA and exiled military and militia continues to impede the restoration of power supply. In May 1995, for example, the generating station in Ruhengeri was blown up in an act of sabotage.

**Problems and prospects**

International emergency assistance in the health sector played an important role in managing disease outbreaks and avoiding widespread malnutrition. Humanitarian relief interventions in the health sector have contributed to re-establishment of a basic health delivery system in Rwanda and to rehabilitation of structures and equipment; however, performance has not been commensurate with cost. There are many problem areas that can be briefly identified here.

First, NGO program and technical constraints, including weak initial needs assessments, the absence of program strategy development, and ineffectual program monitoring and evaluation, weakened the responsiveness and effectiveness of health interventions. Established emergency operations were rolled into rehabilitation activities in the absence of proper planning and consultation with the MOH. The lack of reliable data and information has also undermined the design, coordination and implementation of many programs, resulting in project redundancy in some areas and the absence of assistance in others.8 The multiple layers of NGO assistance to IDPs in the south-west is the most obvious example.

The absence of program data or documentation has made it difficult, if not impossible, to justify program activities and spending levels, as well as to evaluate program process and impact. There was no evidence of initial assessment reports or project papers linked to current project activities and little evident effort to measure project achievements. Some of the major health NGOs have continued to conduct sentinel site surveillance activities, although data has been sparse –
particularly since the IDP camps were closed. Without data, project results are anecdotal and the considerable impact claims made by NGOs and UN agencies are unsubstantiated and often contradicted by the MOH. The need for systematic evaluation of NGO rehabilitation interventions is more than justified by the enormous resources consumed by such agencies.

Second, as emergency relief assistance shifted into the rehabilitation phase, donor agencies failed properly to recognize the government’s lack of institutional capacity and formally engage the MOH in the project assessment, design and approval process. The tendency of donor agencies to act unilaterally in financing NGO interventions, without full consultation with the government or recognition of MOH structures, has further damaged coordination and raised serious issues of accountability. Rehabilitation interventions have been implemented without consideration of the sustainability of the health care system or the appropriateness to the current social, economic and political framework. They continue to reinforce the fragmentation of health care services throughout the country, a situation created in the emergency phase.

Most humanitarian assistance interventions have continued too long and should have been transformed into long-term rehabilitation aid by the end of 1994, planned with respect to sustainability and appropriateness of emerging political and social structures. Many Rwandese health professionals view continued emergency interventions as a means by which international relief agencies “stay in business,” implementing programs that suit their particular needs rather than those of Rwanda. The most striking example is the absence of any systematic human resource training or development program in the health sector. Furthermore, many community mobilization projects have failed precisely because local residents recognized that with NGOs competing with one another, their participation and contribution is superfluous.

Third, given the enormous amount of resources disbursed through NGOs, MOH officials openly question donor agency and NGO accountability in the process. Financial reporting from donor agencies and NGOs that differentiates between emergency and rehabilitation budgets would assist the MOH in determining health sector rehabilitation needs and shifting priorities. Current priority needs, in the areas of human resource development, training, public health and curriculum development, and institutional capacity-building, are not being addressed adequately by donors or NGOs. Despite the fact that international aid organizations espouse the need to establish a rehabilitation and recovery approach that builds capacity and empowers people to meet their own needs, the continued presence of over 100 NGOs (health and non-health) and numerous UN and international organization programs contradicts the rhetoric. It is therefore necessary that NGOs’ roles and responsibilities in relation to the national health care system be clarified and reduced and program strategies be established in support of a strong, sustained national health delivery system.

The initially slow disbursement of assistance to the health sector pledged during the Round Table Conference heightened mistrust and tension between the government and the international community and placed unreasonable internal pressures on the government to act. Donors initially pledged roughly US$37.2 million for health and health-related rehabilitation projects. Nearly midway through 1995, only US$8.7 million had been disbursed. By year’s end, however, pledges had increased to US$58.7 million, and disbursements to US$31.25 million. The government had requested US$38.5 million. Roughly half the funds went directly to the government as opposed to being channeled through UN agencies, NGOs or the ICRC. The growing demands placed on NGOs by the government in the early stages of rehabilitation were due, in large part, to the absence of direct bilateral assistance and in spite of obvious NGO constraints in rebuilding the health infrastructure.

In conclusion, the overall impact of international assistance for the rehabilitation of the health sector has been mixed, but on balance positive in the short run. Health delivery services have largely been brought back to pre-war levels, but insufficient attention has been given to re-establishing indigenous capacity. The international community should help the government to establish a sustainable health care system adapted to Rwanda that provides for the basic needs of Rwandese over the long run.
Endnotes

1) Health statistics and basic indicator data are currently unavailable in-country. Estimates have been made for some health indicators within camps where populations were counted and monitored; however, within Rwanda, accounts of health sector rehabilitation are based on anecdotal evidence.

2) Interview with Ministry of Health officials, Kigali, Rwanda, and interviews with Rwandese health professionals in the Byumba, Butare, Kibuye and Kigali (urban) préfectures, June 1995.

3) Interviews with Ministry of Health officials and NGOs (ARC, IRC, IMC, MSF, Trocaire, Concern, World Vision, SCF/UK).

4) UNICEF does not have statistics on current coverage. It is planning to do a nationwide survey in December 1995 or January 1996 to measure progress towards the 70 percent goal. From telephone interview with Dr. Bertrand Demoulins, UNICEF, Kigali, Rwanda, July 1995.

5) Interviews with NGO staff and local health officials in the Butare préfecture, Rwanda, January and May 1995.

6) According to an interview with Family Health International (AIDSCAP), 30% of the sexually active population in Kigali city was infected with HIV. September 1995, Washington, DC. (Presumably this imprecise figure is extrapolated from surveys of women visiting pre-natal clinics.)

7) From UNICEF, “Rwanda Emergency Programme, Progress Report No. 1-May 1994-March 1995”. It is unclear how these figures were measured given the absence of available data. According to UNICEF, the figures were based on deliberations at the weekly WES coordination meetings that were attended by UN agencies, government officials and NGOs. However, figures from other sources indicate that urban and rural potable water coverage was substantially lower in 1989/90. World Bank African Development Indicators indicate that in 1990 urban and rural potable water coverage was 66 and 64 percent, respectively. United Nations Development Program figures for the same period are 75 and 65 percent, respectively, for urban and rural access to safe water, and 77 and 56 percent for urban and rural access to sanitation services.

8) UNICEF comments on draft report of this study suggest that UNICEF, WHO and the World Bank, an important donor, made use of “rough and ready” information systems, and that the evaluators may have sought unrealistic standards for data quality under such an emergency. “UNICEF Comments to Study IV of Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda”, November 1995.

9) As UNICEF noted in its comments on the first draft of this document, during the emergency institutional capacity building was given low priority compared to the first priority of saving lives. Capacity building has been given top priority in the post-crisis phase.

10) US$28.2 million for rehabilitation of health structures and systems and US$9 million for rehabilitation of schools and hospitals.
Chapter 6

Rehabilitating the Education Sector

Post-war situation

Rwanda’s education infrastructure was heavily damaged during the civil war and aftermath. Over three-quarters of the nearly 1,800 primary schools and some 100 secondary schools were physically damaged; school equipment and materials were looted or destroyed. More than half of the 19,000 school teachers were killed; many more fled or became internally displaced. With minimal resources and personnel, however, some primary schools resumed operations in September 1994. By March 1995, over 1,500 primary schools and a limited number of secondary schools had reopened.

Nearly one year after its total disruption, primary school enrollment was near 800,000, a higher-than-expected enrollment of the estimated one million children of primary school age. Préfectures in the north, Ruhengeri and Byumba, report the highest student enrollment while the Gikongoro, Kibungo and Bugeera préfectures in the south and south-east report the lowest. About 70 percent of primary school pupils were concentrated in the first three grades. The quality and coverage of primary education remains very limited because of severe teacher shortages, inadequate school facilities, and a lack of basic materials – greater than although similar to pre-war problems. An additional difficulty for Rwanda’s new education system has been the influx of students from neighboring countries, particularly Uganda, who speak other languages and come from different education systems.

Although the primary education system is considered functional, as one Rwandese educator noted, “There’s plenty of good intention and motivation but very few teachers with any decent qualifications, so it’s wrong to say ‘it works’.” After the war, the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education quickly organized remedial courses to enable graduating high school students to qualify for teaching positions, but, by the Ministry’s own account, over 60 percent of the 15,000 primary school teachers lack any formal pedagogic training. An IOC database on education shows wide prefectural variation in the proportion of qualified teachers, from 95 percent in urban Kigali to 36 percent in Byumba. Further, except for donations of some vehicles, office equipment and materials, school authorities from the central to commune level have little or no means with which to work.

International assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the education sector, initially focused on primary education, has played a limited but valuable role, emphasizing emergency supplies of material, rehabilitation of structures and food aid salary supplements to teachers. Because it represents the core of international assistance in the sector, primary education has also been the focus for this aspect of the evaluation.

International interventions

The Teacher Emergency Package (TEP) Program

The largest and most visible intervention was the joint UNICEF-UNESCO Teacher Emergency Packages (TEP) program, co-designed by UNHCR, which began in August 1994 as the primary intervention of the Emergency Education Program. TEP is a self-contained mobile “classroom” for
80 students and a teacher. The program is designed as a four-to-five-month bridge to provide teachers and students with immediate psychological support and to prevent the total breakdown of educational services. These “school-in-a-box” kits contain lesson plans in basic numeracy and literacy (in Kinyarwanda), exercise books, slates and chalk, pencils and erasers, and other basic school materials. The TEPs provided in Rwanda and the refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania represented adaptations from similar kits provided in Somalia. Cholera and mine awareness campaigns, as well as an Education-for-Peace component, were adapted for Rwandese needs and added to the basic TEP program. By March 1995, UNICEF and UNESCO, with the assistance of some NGOs, had distributed some 7,400 TEPs throughout the country (see Table 5.1). In addition, by March 1995, some 1,300 kits had been distributed in camps in Tanzania, Goma and Bukavu. As of May 1995, 640,000 Rwandese children had benefitted from TEP and approximately 7,500 teachers trained.

As an emergency intervention, the TEP provided an immediate structure for children and teachers that prevented a prolonged disruption in schooling and contributed to a return to normalcy. However, there were serious shortcomings. The first was in regional and school grade coverage. The TEP was distributed only to the lowest grades, covering about three-quarters of the children. Further, logistical problems hindered the rapid distribution of packets and caused some regional gaps in coverage. For instance, neither of two primary schools visited in the Nyagatare commune (Byumba Prefecture) in May 1995 had received the TEP package and local rehabilitation officials were unaware of the program. In addition, education officials and local authorities in the Kibuye and Cyangugu were aware of the intervention, but were unable to determine whether the TEP packages had been distributed to schools in their préfectures. In June 1995, the TEP packets were still being distributed to some communes despite the fact that more substantial education programs had since been reestablished.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Byumba</td>
<td>903</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kigali Ville</td>
<td>247</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kigali Rural</td>
<td>750</td>
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<tr>
<td>Butare</td>
<td>464</td>
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<td>Gitarama</td>
<td>885</td>
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<td>Kibungo</td>
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<td>Gisenyi</td>
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<td>Ruhengeri</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kibuye</td>
<td>451</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyangugu</td>
<td>571</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gikongoro</td>
<td>669</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7,387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Second, this late diffusion underscores questions about the TEP’s appropriateness to begin with. The program attempts to shape a prefabricated intervention to needs of the country. For instance, the limited teacher training that accompanies the TEP enables teachers to use the packet; however, that training should be adapted to the needs of the country’s existing education program. Children in Rwanda would have been better served if the international community had focused on rehabilitating the indigenous education system rather than investing scarce resources in the TEP program, particularly so many months after the emergency. Overall, the TEP program is better suited to a country at war or for children in refugee camps.

Salary payments and supplements
To assist in reopening primary schools, a number of organizations helped fund the salaries of teachers, administrators and civil servants. UNICEF funded one-time incentive payments of
US$30 to teachers and staff, to “jump start” primary schools, totaling US$800,000. The EU and Belgium helped finance salary payments through the release of old counterpart funds. The single largest effort to maintain some level of support to primary school teachers, however, was made through WFP food-for-work schemes.

From September 1994 through February 1995, WFP provided almost 4,000 metric tons of food as salary supplements to primary schoolteachers in a modified food-for-work program. The value of the food payment was roughly equivalent to 50 percent of primary teachers’ pre-war salaries. About 1,200 metric tons have also been provided to civil servants, including those in the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education. This critical initiative provided basic necessities to some 17,500 teachers, school administrators, civil servants and their families until their salaries could be paid. Initially, this food support was planned through June 1995, to be scaled back thereafter as the government began to pay salaries through the ordinary budget. However, by June 1995 WFP had determined it necessary to continue food support to primary teachers, ostensibly because of irregular salary payments. This latter phase is expected to cover June and July 1995. In addition, since June, the ICRC has provided food support to 20,000 secondary school students in boarding schools.7

In spite of their flexibility and versatility, the wisdom of food-for-work programs has been questioned in the Rwandese context of general food aid distribution. The extent to which widespread distribution erodes the incentive value of food payments is at issue. WFP continued the program for longer than it had originally planned for two reasons. First, the government and donors were unable to make sufficient funds available to pay teachers. Second, there was food in the pipeline, available partly because of overly optimistic projections about returnees who would need to be fed and partly because of the better-than-expected revival of agricultural production.

Rehabilitation interventions
Both UNICEF and UNESCO provided direct assistance to the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education to purchase basic office equipment, supplies and vehicles, and to reprint textbooks. Jointly, they supported training of teachers and Ministry personnel and are supporting the recreation of a national teacher training center, as well as non-formal education and literacy programs. UNHCR has concentrated its efforts on upgrading damaged schools.

In addition, numerous small-scale efforts to repair structural damage have been implemented by NGOs, though programmatically limited and geographically localized.8 Between Aide et Action and Jumelage Rhenanie-Palatinat, two of the larger efforts, some 450,000 students have been assisted with materials and have benefitted from school building repairs.9 The large number of interventions in rehabilitatating school facilities have not been well-coordinated or aligned with emerging national education guidelines. For instance, some “prestigious” schools with good visibility have been identified and prioritized for assistance, according to the directives of local officials rather than on the basis of the national plan. At no point have Ministry officials, donors, UN agencies and NGOs met to establish a uniform structure for wider program implementation and coverage. In order to rectify this, these groups must make the commitment to communicate and coordinate their efforts.

Problems and prospects
International assistance in education has been largely characterized by ad hoc emergency interventions with limited impact. The international community’s weakness in support of rehabilitation and restoration of education is due in part to the programming limitations of emergency funds. For the most part, education activities are excluded from these funds because they are not deemed life-saving. It is, however, in the best interest of donors to adapt and design funding mechanisms to provide immediate support to education. The international community’s continued rhetoric about healing would ring hollow if it overlooked the potential of education, which provides a structured return to daily life, which is the most important need among
Rwandese children and, by extension, their families and communities. Basic and accessible education services throughout the country are necessary to help break the cycle of violence and set Rwanda on a new path to peace and relative prosperity. Donors have an immediate window of opportunity to contribute to curriculum reforms, improve accessibility to education and assist the government in its efforts to create a future for the country’s youth. As one Rwandese mother put it, “Education is the biggest hope for our country.”

In the Rwanda Recovery Program, the government estimated that rehabilitation costs for primary and secondary education alone would be US$18 million (and another US$16.6 million for higher education). Initially, US$20 million was pledged through the 1995 Round Table to reconstruct the education system, but at time of the evaluation field visit (May 1995) no money had been disbursed, although Germany had committed US$5 million. By year’s end, pledges had reached US$50 million, of which US$36 million had been committed and US$4 million disbursed, primarily by the Netherlands (Rwanda National University) and Germany. Much more of the US$10.5 million in emergency funds, solicited by UNICEF and some of its NGO partners through the 1995 Appeal, has been forthcoming, as has been direct assistance from NGOs.

The government has demonstrated its commitment to education and its ability to initiate a national program. The international community should provide continued assistance directly to the government so that it can identify and address priority needs. Among the many needs, intensive short-term teacher training and in-service skill development programs are the most critical, until the graduates of long-term teacher colleges can be integrated into the system. Further, curricula and teaching programs must be adapted to the country’s new educational context. Although guidelines have yet to be established, it appears that a bilingual curriculum (French and English) will be instituted, beginning in the first grade. This represents a dramatic change from the education policies of the past, which have focused on a Kinyarwanda-language curriculum through primary school – effectively leaving the vast majority of Rwanda’s population unable to communicate with neighboring peoples. The international community should support efforts to open up and broaden the experiences of Rwanda’s youth, both for the sake of the country as well as for the prospects of the individual children. It is without question that Rwanda will export labor in years to come and those speaking other languages will be better able to secure a living for themselves.
Endnotes


2) Estimate from the national teacher’s association, Fédération des mouvements populaires.


7) See UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Situation Report,” June 15, 1995 referred to WFP plans to provide food assistance to 18,000 students in 6 préfectures. According to the ICRC ( “Comments on Study IV,” 2 November 1995 (facsimile)), this was turned over to ICRC, which has managed the secondary school feeding program.

8) For instance, all of the following NGOs are involved in rehabilitation in some way (not an exhaustive list): AMURT, IRC, ARC, Aide et Action, Salvation Army, World Vision, ADRA, Accord, WRC, CARITAS, AVSI, CWA, Concern, Tear Fund CRS, Feed-the-Children, Jumelage Rhenanie-Palatinat.

9) Interviews with Mr. Rudolf Fischer, Director, Jumelage Rhenanie-Palatinat, and Philippe Lambiliotte, director, Aide et Action, Kigali, Rwanda, May 1995.

10) Interview with Madame Constance Mukayuhi, Secrétaire générale of ASOFERWA, Kigali, Rwanda, May 1995.
Chapter 7

Assistance to Vulnerable Populations

Post-war situation

As is often the case in tragic situations, those least responsible for the crisis – women, children, the elderly and infirm – were the most deeply affected. Genocide and war altered the country’s demographic composition so radically that women now represent between 60-70 percent of the population. A government survey found that an average of two children per household were orphans.1 Children throughout Rwanda have been severely traumatized; according to a UNICEF survey, more than nine in 10 have experienced a death in the immediate family. (See Table 7.1 below) Adolescents are another group at risk; too old for unaccompanied children interventions, many now drift without social supports and are at risk of HIV and STDs, prostitution, petty crime and other violence. The elderly and infirm who lost family also lost their traditional social safety nets, which exacerbates their vulnerability. These populations constitute the most vulnerable, and require special attention during and after a complex emergency. This section, though, focuses on the special needs of the two most critical sub-groups – women and unaccompanied children – because of their large numbers as well as the long-term and wide-ranging implications of their well-being.

Table 7.1

Response of 64 Rwandese Children about the War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Someone in family was killed</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both parents were killed</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brother or sister killed</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw someone being killed/injured</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


International interventions

Assistance to women

Roughly two-thirds of the post-genocide population of Rwanda are female. By some estimates, between one-third and one-half of all women in the most hard-hit areas are widows.2 Thus, there is a disproportionate share of female-headed single-parent households. In many cases, these women lost their families, their belongings and homes in the genocide; their livelihoods were disrupted and many are still caring for their dead relative’s children in addition to their own surviving children. Several thousand women were brutally raped and are now having to cope with the birth of unwanted children.3 There is no doubt that women have suffered immeasurably.
Table 7.2

Demographic Effects of the War and Genocide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female share of the population</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>60-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female-headed households</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widows</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During the initial stages of rehabilitation assistance, women were not given special treatment as a group. Rather, it was assumed that they, like other beneficiaries, would benefit from the assistance provided to various sectors. The exceptions were WFP and CARITAS/CRS food support programs specifically targeted toward vulnerable groups, including female heads of households. Generally, food and non-food material aid was provided to families with the expectation that all members of the household would receive their fair share of and benefit from the aid. Much of the assistance has been provided at commune or secteur centers rather than at the household level— not surprising, given the magnitude of the problem. In general, women who heard about distributions and were able to present themselves at distribution points, were as likely to benefit as men. However, it would not be surprising if some women were initially reluctant to leave whatever temporary shelter they were able to create for themselves and the children under their care in order to receive assistance, increasing the chances that their needs were not met.

“Women have as much benefitted as men from assistance programs. In fact, many NGOs went out of their way to locatethem and help them. But they were not singled out”.  
– An official of Save the Children (UK)

"Frankly, we do not know how to help rape victims in this society”.
– An NGO staff member

"The plight of war widows is beyond imagination. They lost their husbands and children... and now many may lose their land”.
– A Rwandese educator

Women have traditionally been unable to own land; they have generally farmed the land, first of their fathers and then of their husbands. Under existing Rwandese law, property passes through male members of the household. As a result, widowed and orphaned daughters risk losing their property to male members of the deceased husband’s relatives. Consequently, there is an urgent need to change judicial guidelines and legal interpretations of laws pertaining to property, land and women’s rights. Save the Children UK and US (SCF/UK and SCF/US) and UNICEF are supporting the Ministries of Family and Rehabilitation and other women’s groups in their advocacy efforts in this area, as well as funding technical assistance to the judiciary. Local NGOs are disseminating information and creating awareness of the problem both in the community and among decision-makers. Ultimately though, the legal issue of women’s property rights requires resolution by Rwandese.

One year after the genocide, there were no comprehensive national programs of family support for the survivors. Over time, however, those NGOs working in the community began to recognize the distinctive needs of women – widows, victims of violence and rape, and heads of households – and developed ad hoc initiatives to support communities in caring for their most vulnerable. Examples include work done by the Salvation Army and IRC, as well as other international NGOs in partnership with local groups. Further, as women have begun to seek common solutions to the problems of reconstruction and reconciliation, grassroots women’s organizations and NGOs have begun to form. These local groups and associations have initiated a wide range of rehabilitation
programs specifically for women, but generally under the premise that what is good for women is also good for families, especially children. The emergence and resurgence of a variety of women’s associations and organizations in Rwanda is a potentially vast resource for all aspects of recovery and rehabilitation. These women’s groups have already developed extensive networks throughout the community and are one of the best conduits to reach some of the society’s most vulnerable groups. However, many of these associations are not formalized or officially recognized, making it difficult for international NGOs and UN agencies to discern their legitimacy; their lack of capacity has also been problematic. Where identifiable, women’s associations such as DUTERIMBERE (a national women’s self-help association pre-dating the war), are being supported by international NGOs. WHO initiated, in September 1995, a series of assessments on the extent and problem of victimized and traumatized women in Rwanda. The results of those assessments might help better target subsequent interventions.

**Unaccompanied children**

The regional problem of unaccompanied children – legal minors who have been orphaned or temporarily separated from their parents or primary care-givers – has reached previously unknown proportions. Published estimates of the number of unaccompanied children in the region vary between 95,000 and 150,000, although there is substantial debate on the numbers. Some relief agencies believe the number well exceeds the higher figure, while other organizations consider it vastly exaggerated.4 One year from the beginning of the crisis, over 26,000 children were living in 117 official unaccompanied children centers throughout the region; 67 of the centers were inside Rwanda, caring for 12,700 children.5 In addition, at the same time the Ministry of Rehabilitation estimated 135,000 children were living with foster families.6 An FAO/WFP survey conducted in August 1995, however, put the number at over 370,000.7

“This [issue] is a serious problem... But you should recognize that not all the children in the centers are orphans or were necessarily lost during the massacres. _Many parents deliberately left their children so that they would get food_.

— A **UN official**

"I do not believe that the centers for unaccompanied children are white elephants. They are still necessary, but we should reduce their number. We must promote family-based solutions".

— A **NGO representative**

There is a wide array of international and national NGOs implementing mostly ad hoc programs for unaccompanied children. The major NGOs working in the sector, include CUAMM, AVSI, Care Australia, Food-for-the-Hungry, CARITAS, Terre des hommes and World Vision International. Only the larger and more experienced agencies such as ICRC, UNICEF, SCF/UK and SCF/US have developed longer-term comprehensive national programs that support institutional capacity building. Overall, the primary areas of intervention are: operational support and improvement of day-to-day care in unaccompanied children centers; family tracing and reunification; foster care programs in the community; treatment of traumatized children and support for care-givers; and a variety of community-based activities aimed at providing family support.

**Registration, tracing and reunification**

Ultimately, the purpose of all programs targeting unaccompanied children is to reunite them with their parents, relatives, or guardians in the least amount of time and with the least distress to the children. This requires identifying who the children are, where they come from, and attempting to determine what happened to their parents or guardians. SCF/UK was designated as the lead agency in tracing and reunification by the government, while ICRC, with its traditional mandate for tracing missing persons in conflict situations, has the responsibility for centralizing data concerning unaccompanied children all over the Great Lakes region and abroad, and for cross-border operations. In addition, UNICEF initiated a joint photograph identification project with the other two agencies.
SCF/UK initiated a strategy involving registering all children and training commune-based social workers prior to beginning actual tracing activities. Unfortunately, because of the large numbers involved, the registration phase was not completed until June 1995. During this period, though, numerous NGOs, local organizations, church groups and others succeeded in reunifying children with their families simply by word-of-mouth, radio messages and organizational networking. One year after the crisis began, 8,500 children in Rwanda and the camps had been reunited with their families. By the end of the third quarter of 1995, UNICEF reported the figure had increased to 11,500. In the Butare area, as a result of a reunification program, child enrollment in the centers dropped by one-half during a five-month period. In retrospect, it is clear that SCF/UK should have initiated the reunification process sooner to prevent the proliferation of unaccompanied children centers. Both SCF/UK and UNICEF lacked the strong internal response capacities necessary rapidly to find experienced staff and set up operations. As a consequence, SCF/UK is now creating the necessary in-house information, management and technical systems.

**Foster care**

The government policy on unaccompanied children is that the physical, psychological and emotional needs of children are best met through care in a family setting and not in institutions. It has issued directives that no new unaccompanied children centers are to open and existing centers are to close down as soon as the care and responsibility for the children can be shifted into the community. International relief agencies strongly support this position but are finding that in practice centers are difficult to shut down. The process of implementing foster care programs is difficult given the size of the population, the enormous human resources demanded and the lack of long-term national strategies on unaccompanied children. International assistance can and has provided substantial material support, but its role has been marginal in supporting the government in creating a policy and legal framework to ensure guardianship within the community.

The de facto foster system, relatives or neighbors caring for unaccompanied children, places extreme financial and psychological pressure on the care-givers. Relief agencies agree that stress levels in the community are already high, and that it is unreasonable to assume that any but the most exceptional families have the capacity to care for additional children without some basic support. However, targeting individual families for official fostering is likely to create resentment and ultimately a breakdown in the spontaneous and existing response at the community level. It is therefore imperative to emphasize income-generating activities, rehabilitation programs and education at the commune level to enhance the community’s ability to respond.

Despite numerous ad hoc foster-care initiatives begun by NGOs, there is an absence of concrete assessment, planning and design of family-targeted support intervention. Although UNICEF and partner NGOs have disseminated information and implemented community mobilization programs to help decision-makers and foster families understand their roles and responsibilities toward these children, the coverage has been limited. Furthermore, the government advocacy and legal training-support program, designed by SCF/US, has yet to receive committed funding, preventing it from helping to resolve the policy and legal issues on foster care, adoption and child inheritance.

**Capacity building**

The necessary structures for providing sustainable care for unaccompanied children and orphans have never previously existed in Rwanda at the national level. Only since April 1995 has the Ministry of Rehabilitation begun determining and defining ministry responsibilities towards unaccompanied children. Therefore, assisting the government in creating institutional capacity will be slow. Nevertheless, SCF/UK and SCF/US have developed program strategies to provide direct technical and commodity assistance to the appropriate line ministries, but the need is much greater. SCF/UK continues to conduct training and workshops for other international organizations and works directly with the Ministries of Rehabilitation, Social Affairs and Family and Youth to establish each agency’s roles, responsibilities and policies vis-à-vis unaccompanied children.

SCF/US and UNICEF are also providing technical assistance and training in legal matters pertaining to unaccompanied children. Other programs support the psychological development of young children who are in prison with detained mothers; and provide technical support to train
prison directors and regional magistrates in areas of children’s rights, penal codes and international laws on genocide. Further, as the emergency “center-oriented” phase gives way to community integration and care through fostering and adoption, the need for community-based social worker training is enormous. SCF/UK and UNICEF implement regular social worker training programs throughout the country, but these do not begin to address the manpower needs in the community.

Problems and prospects

International interventions for unaccompanied children were critical in saving lives and improving the well-being of thousands of children and, by extension, their families and communities. Opportunities to provide specialized help to women cruelly affected by the war have received relatively scant attention, in spite of the unique nature of their experience. Yet supporting communities in addressing the special needs of women who were war victims, in particular, can accelerate the national process of reconciliation as well as speed overall socio-economic recovery. In addition, improving the conditions of women is the most effective way to enhance the lives of children – as there are far more orphaned children being cared for by neighbors and relatives than through official centers.

Women have suffered disproportionately and more community-based rehabilitation programs should be supported to meet their needs. For instance, except for ad hoc initiatives, there is no comprehensive home reconstruction program in Rwanda, which would be an opportunity to assist vulnerable groups while bringing communities together and promoting mutual responsibility. Further, special programs aimed at helping to rehabilitate the livelihoods of female-headed households, especially those headed by surviving victims of genocide, present good prospects for rejuvenating the economy. These include support for co-ops and small businesses in market gardening, retail food and beverage sales and handicrafts. Lastly, continued support is needed in reforming laws permitting women better to control the fruits of their labor and those pertaining to female inheritance.

Donors, however, have been slow in responding to the urgent funding needs for the care of unaccompanied children and support to vulnerable populations. At the Round Table Conference, the government requested US$19 million for programs targeted to vulnerable groups, especially unaccompanied children (25 percent) and women (16 percent). Donors initially pledged US$6.3 million for roughly the same categories of programs. By the end of 1995, pledges had risen to US$19 million, of which US$6 million had been disbursed, mostly through relief agencies. Canada has been a particularly active supporter of programs for particularly vulnerable groups.

The creation of unaccompanied children centers was a necessary, short-term response that was not intended to be a long-term solution. NGOs rushed into the country staking claim to, or opening up, new unaccompanied children centers and orphanages without any attention to long-term planning and without the guidance and direction of a strong coordinating body. Unfortunately, the establishment of centers has provided a livelihood to too many people to be easily discontinued. According to UNICEF, between December 1994 and March 1995, 2,324 new children were placed in institutions. The continued trend towards institutionalizing children is in direct contradiction to government policy to close existing centers and integrate care into the community.

Poorly-planned interventions have been particularly detrimental to traumatized children who, above all, needed stability, continuity and security. Extremely high UN agency and NGO staff rotations have also been noticeably disruptive to children, care-givers and social service programs. After a year, there was little evidence of the use of standardized criteria and practices or regular monitoring and follow-up in centers. Further, there was not much collaboration with and support to local organizations, particularly after the situation stabilized. Part of the problem was that local organizations were not organized and functional in the early stages. Nonetheless, transfer of technical management and operational capacity should be an integral part of any international strategy.
Another major shortcoming has been limited efforts at capacity building either at national level or within civil society. Current interventions are not sustainable unless the international community is willing to make long-term commitments to financial support of child-care institutions. There are currently several large NGOs that wish to terminate operations in Rwanda but are unwilling to do so, knowing the government does not yet have the adequate capacity. The problems are complicated and multi-faceted and, given the inexperience of officials, progress can be expected to be slow. International relief agencies must understand, however, that the long-term care of unaccompanied children and orphans are the concern and responsibility of Rwandese, and that ultimately programs for their care must be adapted to Rwanda’s socio-economic conditions.
Endnotes

1) From a family survey conducted in November 1994 by the Ministry of Family and the Promotion of Women. An FAO/WFP survey conducted in August 1995 estimated there were 1.79 minors on average per foster family. The same survey estimated 21% of Rwandese families were fostering minors.


3) Ministry officials, Church officials, NGOs and health service providers reported that rape was widespread and often public, causing not only pregnancy but discernable STD and many suspected cases of HIV positive. The incidence of rape-induced pregnancy is estimated at about 5,000.

The US undertook a limited survey (not necessarily a representative sample) of the incidence of rape-induced pregnancy in the préfectures of Kigali, Byumba and Butare. Of the 241 women seen and medically screened (sample found to include pregnant women and girls who made no claim to having been raped and women and girls who were raped but not pregnant), 146 (60.5%) had survived single, multiple or protracted rape; 71 (29.5%) were pregnant as a consequence. The median age was 22.2; 62% were unmarried and 34% presented symptomatic evidence of prevailing sexually-transmitted disease (gonorrhea and herpes most prevalent). Incidence of HIV infection not established.

4) The upper figure, however, may be exaggerated. The practice of placing children in centers, with benefactors or distant relatives when there is difficulty or danger, is common. It contributed to the registering of a large number of unaccompanied children who were later found not to have been separated from parents or guardians.


7) Working backward from the FAO/WFP “Vulnerable Groups Identification Survey”, estimate that 21 percent of Rwandese households were fostering an average of 1.79 children per household, the computed number of fostered children is 375,000: total number of rural households (984707) multiplied by the percentage of households fostering (21%) multiplied by the number of fostered children per household (1.79) = 375,439 fostered children.


9) Interview with SCF/UK Tracing Coordinator, Kigali, June 1995. Number of registered children includes children from official centers and some children in foster care programs.

Chapter 8
Psycho-Social Healing

Post-war situation

The brutal nature and extent of the slaughter, along with the ensuing mass migration, swiftly and profoundly damaged Rwanda’s social foundation. Vast segments of the population were uprooted, thousands of families lost at least one adult and hundreds of thousands of children were separated from their parents. Because neighbors, teachers, doctors and religious leaders took part in the carnage, essential trust in social institutions has been destroyed, replaced by pervasive fear, hostility and insecurity. The social upheaval has affected interpersonal and community interaction across ethnic, economic, generational and political lines. Some groups, unaccompanied children for instance, are relatively visible as “victims of violence,” whereas others such as women, and even those who were forced to kill, are less apparent.

International interventions

Given the magnitude of the trauma experienced by survivors of the genocide, relatively little attention has been paid to the problem of psycho-social healing. Donor efforts have concentrated primarily on trauma counseling for children. In addition, some organizations, mostly religious in nature, have attempted to confront the ethnic animosity directly through reconciliation workshops and community healing initiatives and indirectly within the context of their other programs.

Trauma counseling training

Most of the training programs in trauma counseling are directed at individuals working with the 4 million children under the age of 18, whom UNICEF has identified as being “of concern” Both UNICEF and several NGOs offer workshops for primary care-givers on the nature, symptoms and causes of trauma and on various techniques to promote healing. The intended audience includes foster parents, social workers, staff of unaccompanied children centers, teachers, health-care workers, religious educators and members of widows’ associations. While some forms of counseling are based on Western psycho-therapeutic models, others advocate more indigenous approaches to the healing process; some training focuses specifically on trauma recovery, while other forms consider the wider psycho-social environment including school, peer groups, family and the social milieu. Nevertheless, all training programs encourage participants to recount their experiences during the genocide, express their feelings through drama, song, art or dance, and to share the recovery process with other children and adults.

Because of the visibility of the 22,000 unaccompanied children living in centers, much of the training has been focused on these institutional settings. One year after the crisis began, UNICEF had trained 2,000 individuals across the country. A key UNICEF goal in this area is to train one person for each préfecture as a trauma advisor, who would provide information to the community, build networks of professionals knowledgeable in trauma issues, and work closely with the préfecture, health centers and NGOs. Far fewer programs address adult trauma in particular; exceptions include those of African Humanitarian Action (AHA) and Africare, which conduct programs for women, reaching out particularly to rape victims. Both of these programs are connected to health centers where reproductive services are combined with individual counseling.
by psychologists, doctors or social assistants.

**Reconciliation workshops**

Several NGOs have attempted to bring together individuals through workshops and dialogues that address the conflicts within Rwandese society. For instance, AHA held a symposium in February 1995 for over 50 government officials and NGO representatives to discuss reconstruction, psycho-social trauma and reconciliation. Religious organizations have held similar in-house seminars in efforts to heal the deep divide that splits the churches and crosses ecumenical lines. CRS, in conjunction with the Nairobi Peace Initiative, for example, conducted a two-day workshop in March 1995 for over 50 Catholic church leaders. In May 1995, a multi-denominational conference was held in Kigali to discuss the future role of the Christian church in Rwanda. Workshops generally included speakers offering various points of view on the healing process, open discussion, small group interaction and debate over specific issues. However, contention surrounding the Christian church’s role in the genocide serves to abrogate its traditional conciliatory function. Despite the relative singularity of the Christian church as an avenue to reconciliation, any forthcoming efforts are likely to be tainted with suspicion until its leaders becomes deeply introspective and forthright.

**Promotion of peace and community healing**

There are various other initiatives under way that promote peace and community healing. For instance, Reporters sans frontières (Switzerland) is proposing a peace radio program for the Great Lakes region beginning in July 1995 through its radio station in Bukavu, Zaire. The program would air shows featuring interviews with selected individuals, specific information on non-violent communication, and the results of questionnaires disseminated to refugee populations. In its current broadcasts, it tries to balance the negative misinformation campaigns in and around the camps with radio programs offering positive messages. Belgium and Switzerland have been instrumental in providing funding for radio programs aimed at reconciliation. Further, within primary schools, UNICEF’S “Education for Peace” Programme supports peaceful coexistence by substituting stereotyped and biased messages in the curriculum with those encouraging diversity and tolerance. In collaboration with the Ministry of Education, UNICEF trains teachers in conducting cooperative classrooms, dealing with traumatized children, and integrating discussions on peace and human rights into all disciplines. Finally, UNESCO has plans to build a Peace House in Kigali as a symbol of national reconciliation and as a focal point for its culture of peace activities.

The African Community Initiative Support Teams, sponsored by the All Africa Conference of Churches, was noteworthy in stimulating local initiatives in healing and community development. Eight teams of African and non-African members have facilitated open discussions of needs, views, ideas and methodologies, and arranged for subsequent technical assistance in areas such as micro-enterprise and development of cooperatives. In addition, several NGOs, such as Feed The Children, CARITAS and the Salvation Army, actively promote ethnic integration within their normal programs by providing a legitimate and organized venue for interaction. One example is the latter’s housing reconstruction programs, in which those who remained in the community are helping returnees rebuild their homes. Some agencies are also promoting cross-ethnic interaction between refugees and groups in Rwanda via message, gift or marketing exchanges. Food for the Hungry in Gisenyi, for instance, offers logistical support for women refugees to sell their crafts to other women’s associations in Rwanda.

The November 1995 International Conference on Genocide, convened by the Office of the President of Rwanda, and funded by donors, sought to help Rwandese and the world understand those factors that permitted violence of such a magnitude to take place. It brought Rwandese officials and representatives of local NGOs together with international scholars, trauma experts and survivors of genocides perpetrated in other countries and regions to seek solutions to the Rwandese crisis and to ensure that genocide not occur again. Nearly 100 recommendations were made relating to justice, compensation and rehabilitation of the livelihoods of survivors, repatriation, and the role of politicians in the process of reconciliation and peace-building in Rwanda. The critical issue, of course, is the political will to apply those recommendations that can
most likely lead to true reconciliation between the deeply-divided groups.

**Problems and prospects**

Attempting to comprehend the deep wounds within Rwandese society and, further, to find ways to assist in the healing process, is a formidable undertaking. It is extremely difficult for the international community to help in the early realization of community integration when lasting societal reconciliation appears remote. The lack of justice for the surviving victims of genocide and the continual nationwide fear of renewed violence pose seemingly insurmountable obstacles to peace at this time. In addition, there is evidence of rising anger and mistrust among Rwandese of each other, specific organizations and the international community in general. Some of this stems from a sense that the international community abandoned Rwanda during the time of most need.

Nevertheless, the international community’s early recognition of the need for psycho-social healing initiatives is commendable. Trauma counseling training programs have promoted children’s recovery and succeeded in sensitizing a small portion of the population to psychological trauma. Similarly, open discussion of conflicts is a necessary beginning to the long and arduous road to recovery in post-genocide Rwanda. However, because psycho-social rehabilitation is a new field and represents but one factor in the enormously complex recovery process, it is too early to detect a discernable effect on the country. The process of healing requires a great deal of time and patience. Direct endeavors are largely viewed as ineffective, premature and insensitive to the enormous suffering of the survivors of genocide. Given the difficulty of discussing the horror of the massacres, much less responsibility or atonement for acts of violence, community healing programs have not been very successful thus far. Informal efforts at reconciliation, within the context of other programs, have been more effective.

Some of the programs’ limitations can not be overlooked. First, very few trauma programs addressed the needs of women, who comprise 60 to 70 percent of the population. A significant portion of women are widowed and an estimated 16,000 women and girls have been raped. Having in many cases witnessed the brutal killings of their families, women clearly suffer from tremendous psychological injury and may have to deal with it on their own.

"In a normal situation, one can get support and assistance from school, extended family, work, the state. All these are gone. You can’t trust anyone... there is no protection. The teachers, the mayors, even the family have killed”.

— trauma training participant

"It’s terrible to have your husband killed, but when it was your husband’s best friend who killed him, it’s even worse”.

— genocide survivor

"Any outside NGO is a bit like a blind man digging in a garden, not knowing if you are hurting some by helping others”.

— NGO representative

Second, the international community may be misapplying its experience with post-traumatic stress disorder, first seriously researched among Vietnam veterans and later extended to other Western cultural settings. Its approaches to healing the wounds of war in Rwanda, therefore, may be unsuitable. One European psychotherapist noted that a “one-on-one Western style of psychotherapy is totally inappropriate” when an entire nation has been traumatized. Missed opportunities in exploring indigenous concepts of mental health and methods of healing conceivably stem from initial lack of knowledge of Rwandese society, psyche and culture, and the absence of adequate language skills, so vital to confidential communication. Very little research has been done on the corresponding social aspects of war such as gender variations, resiliency, indigenous coping strategies, social vulnerability or community mobilization. For instance, the valuable role community leaders and extended family members play as counselors may have been
overlooked as a crucial element of psycho-social healing.

Finally, and most importantly, the international community largely failed to analyze the context of the crisis and comprehend the implications for program activities. Many observers referred to the expatriates’ “business as usual” approach to relief and rehabilitation in Rwanda and their disregard for the extreme abnormality of the preceding events. Donors have missed opportunities to promote healing and have, at times, inadvertently inflamed existing tensions. Ultimately, however, as one Rwandese put it, “International assistance can be given by providing assistance and guidance, but healing is a cultural thing and must be done by us”8
Endnotes


2) In particular, Save the Children Federation (US), Concern, Trianglé génération humanitaire, CARE-Australia and Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale (AVSI).


5) Interview with RSF-CH representative, Kigali, Rwanda, May 1995.


7) Interview with Concern psychotherapist, Kigali, Rwanda, May 1995.

8) Interview with Women’s Solidarity Association representative, Kigali, Rwanda, May 1995.
Chapter 9

Promoting Human Rights and Building a Fair Judicial System

Post-war situation

The legal infrastructure and law enforcement system, which had collapsed in the aftermath of the civil war, remain in shambles. As of May 1995, court facilities had not been revived substantially; three of 11 courts of first instance did not have a functioning prosecutor’s office. Law enforcement duties continue to be performed primarily by members and officers of the military, either in their capacity as RPA soldiers or in their re-deployed status as gendarmes. There are almost no defense attorneys and only 40 of 800 individuals formerly employed as magistrates in the communal and préfecture tribunals prior to April 1994 remain. Prisons continue to be severely overcrowded, the government having squeezed approximately 41,000 prisoners into a central prison system capable of housing only 12,250 individuals. As of December 1995, another 15,000-20,000 prisoners are housed in “communal prisons” throughout the country. and arrests and detention continue. Since August 1994, hundreds of prisoners have died of asphyxiation and diarrhoea, primarily illnesses tied indirectly or directly to sanitary conditions created by overcrowding. In April 1995, an average of 1,500 additional persons were being arrested each week. The number declined to roughly 500 persons per week in September.

Prosecutors have generally complained of the army’s and the gendarmerie’s interference in the judicial process. Most of these complaints center on arrest and detention matters, an extremely sensitive and complex issue in post-genocide Rwanda. Complaints that have been publicly documented, for example, include the failure of representatives from the RPA or the gendarmerie to attend scheduled sessions of the Commissions de Triage, during which cases of the detained are reviewed to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support detention. For another example, the High Commissioner’s human rights field officers complain that either the RPA or gendarmes rearrest some of those whom the Commissions have released. The genocide in Rwanda also led to disruption of traditional law, called gacaca, that was often applied in the communes for non-serious crimes. Although a non-elected, transitional National Assembly has exhibited some degree of independence in its deliberations over Supreme Court nominations, its legitimacy as a body without an electoral base or any obvious constituency, is uncertain. Many of Rwanda’s leaders only recently returned to the country after many years in exile. Few have experience in governing a country and many have not grown up in Rwanda.

Constructing a viable judicial system and ensuring protection of human rights in present-day Rwanda are critical for several reasons. Refugees in neighboring countries are reluctant to return unless they are assured of justice and security at home. Additionally, conviction and punishment of those who were involved in the massacres by legally-constituted courts is likely to alleviate the desire to exact revenge on suspects and begin to address a culture of impunity. A failure to act would reinforce the perpetrators’ sense of impunity and spur further acts of violence. Moreover, the UN, as well as member states, has an obligation under the Genocide Convention to take action for the “prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.” But, above all, an effective judicial
system that guarantees basic human rights is a prerequisite to political stability and to evolution of a democratic ethos in Rwanda.

The international community has supported human rights initiatives in three key areas: establishment of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, reconstruction of the justice system, and the UN human rights field operation. The impetus for these initiatives was the findings of the UN Special Rapporteur and a Commission of Experts, who looked into alleged human rights violations.

**International Interventions**

**The Special Rapporteur and the Commission of Experts**

In May 1994, the UN Commission for Human Rights authorized the appointment of a Special Rapporteur to Rwanda to investigate the human rights situation and gather and compile information on possible violations of human rights including acts of genocide. The Special Rapporteur submitted his first report to the Commission in June 1994 indicating that gross violations of human rights had occurred in Rwanda. Further, in July 1994, an impartial three-member Commission of Experts (COE) found that both the RPF and Rwandese government forces had perpetrated serious breaches of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity. Forces of the former Hutu-dominated government were found also to have committed acts of genocide. The COE, however, stated that it had not uncovered any evidence to indicate that Tutsi elements perpetrated acts committed with the intent to destroy the Hutu ethnic group. Both the Special Rapporteur and the COE called for establishment of a war crimes tribunal. Based on the reports submitted by the Special Rapporteur and the preliminary report issued by the COE, as well as the reports of the UN Secretary-General and the request of the government of Rwanda, the Security Council established the International Tribunal for Rwanda on November 8, 1994 pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.12 While the mandate for the COE has now lapsed, the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda continues to perform several functions pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions, including following the progress of the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR), investigations into the genocide, and investigations into recent events such as the tragedy at the internally displaced persons camp at Kibeho.13

**International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda**

The International Tribunal for Rwanda (Tribunal), along with the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTFY), represent the first attempts of the international community to prosecute violations of international humanitarian law since the close of the Second World War.14 The Tribunal, established by the Security Council on November 8, 1994, consists of 11 judges. Pursuant to the Security Council resolution,15 six new trial judges were to be appointed to the two trial chambers of the Court. The Tribunal for Rwanda was to share its appellate chamber with the ICTFY, thus obviating the necessity of financing two appellate chambers for the two Tribunals. Arusha, Tanzania was chosen as the seat for the Tribunal, and the Security Council appointed the Prosecutor of the ICTFY to serve also as prosecutor for the Rwanda Tribunal.16 A Deputy Prosecutor has been appointed for Rwanda. A Director of Investigations was hired to direct the Tribunal’s investigations and establish a Prosecutor’s office in Kigali.17

The six trial judges of the Tribunal, having been elected by the UN General Assembly after governments submitted nominations to the Security Council, were sworn in at the Hague in June 1995. They were expected to take office on February 15, 1996.18 The judges are currently acting only on an “as needed” basis, for purposes of pre-trial proceedings.19 They have met, however, to establish court procedures and evidence rules and were scheduled to meet in plenary in mid-January 1996. The Tribunal is expected to prosecute only high-ranking civilian and military officials who were involved in organizing genocide in Rwanda. The Prosecutor has estimated that somewhere between 100 and 300 individuals fall into this category.

High officials of the Rwandese government have repeatedly voiced dissatisfaction with the Tribunal. These criticisms appear to fall into two categories. First are criticisms aimed at the...
provisions of the statute creating the Tribunal. Second are the criticisms that appear to flow from
the failure of Tribunal officials to communicate/coordinate adequately with both Rwandese
officials and the general population. At its creation in November 1994, the Rwandese government
strongly opposed the provision of the Security Council resolution that prohibited imposition of the
death penalty.20 Rwandese government officials also strongly advocated that Kigali be named the
seat of the Tribunal, arguing that Rwandese were entitled to direct access to Tribunal proceedings.
Instead, Arusha, Tanzania was chosen. Finally, the government advocated that the temporal
jurisdiction of the Tribunal begin as early as 1992 and 1993, instead of January 1994, so that
planners, instigators, and organizers of massacres of Tutsi, who were killed prior to the
commencement of the genocide in April 1994, could be brought to justice.21 Rwandese officials,
however, were unable to convince the Security Council on each of these points.22

Additionally, and perhaps unrealistically, both survivors and government officials believed that the
Tribunal would commence prosecutions before the end of 1994, and were disappointed when it
did not.23 When the anniversary of the genocide passed in April 1995, and still no progress
toward prosecutions was made evident to the Rwandese, further distrust and, ultimately,
disinterest on the part of both survivors and certain officials surfaced. This attitude has persisted
until at least the first week in November 1995, when the Rwandese government hosted its
conference on “Genocide, Impunity and Accountability” in Kigali.24 While the Prosecutor and
then his deputy were invited to participate in and make presentations to the conference, for reasons
that are unclear no one officially representing the Tribunal attended. Its absence provoked further,
unanswered criticism of the Tribunal. Many individuals sought for investigation and prosecution
by the Tribunal are residing in neighboring states, throughout Africa, as well as in Western Europe
and North America. The Tribunal’s ability to obtain their custody will, in effect, determine the
success or failure of its efforts. The Tribunal’s statute requires UN member states to cooperate
with its operations, including identification, location and arrest or detention of persons, and
production of evidence. The failure of national authorities to transfer defendants to the Tribunal
could result in the matter being referred to the Security Council.

At the time of the May 1995 evaluation field visit, the Tribunal was facing the problems of
logistics, funding and staffing, all of which caused long delays.25 While such delays were not
totally unexpected, the Tribunal for Rwanda seemed unable to profit from prior, relevant
experience and resources of other UN agencies. For example, it failed to avoid the same funding
conundrums as those experienced by the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Staffing the
Prosecutor’s office and all that this task entails – recruitment, hiring and deployment of personnel
– encountered significant delays for unclear reasons. By May 1995, there were only 5 prosecutors
and investigators serving the Tribunal, though 31 investigators, seconded from governments of
the US, the Netherlands and other countries, were expected to supplement the investigative staff.
The registry was not yet operating, and judges of the Trial Chambers had just been nominated by
the Security Council.

Hindered by an inadequate budget, the Prosecutor was at first unable to establish a visible
presence within Rwanda. Five investigators, for instance, fell far short of the number needed to
begin investigations within Rwanda and in other countries where suspects and witnesses may be
located. The Tribunal’s Director of Investigations stated that 100 investigators were needed to
gather relevant evidence. As might be expected, it has been difficult to identify relevant
qualifications for investigators who would be able both to function effectively in Rwanda and to
recognize and collect trial-quality evidence for prosecutions. As recently as September 1995, the
UN Secretary-General was expressing concern about the ability of the Tribunal to begin
proceedings before the end of the year.26

Problems with Tribunal finances appear to be two-fold. First, the amount of funds given to the
Tribunal was, at first, inadequate. Secondly, control over use of the funds was not at first fully
vested in the Tribunal, as would be necessary to ensure quick and efficient expenditures. The
Tribunal received US$2.9 million to cover the period of January through March 1995. In May
1995, an additional US$7 million was pledged by donor nations. Because of the Tribunal’s low
budget, restrictions were initially imposed limiting the length of personnel contracts to three
months. By year’s end, the financial situation had improved; US$9.5 million of the pledged amount of US$9.9 had been disbursed, primarily by the Netherlands (US$7 million). Further delays and inconvenience have been caused because the Prosecutor did not have the authority to hire staff or travel out of the country without the approval of the UN’s Office of Legal Counsel in New York. These problems were compounded when the UN Secretary-General froze all UN funds in September 1995. Until negotiations were completed, exempting the Tribunal from the generally-imposed freeze, recruitment and travel ceased at the Tribunal.

Since October 1995, when the Tribunal installed a new Director of Investigations, the pace of investigations has noticeably increased. Investigators no longer spend their days inside the office in Kigali, and reports of their visits to, for example, the communes and survivor organizations have been noted. Helpful relationships with relevant non-governmental organizations such as African Rights and Physicians for Human Rights have been recently developed and exploited for the Tribunal. As of December 1995, construction of the Tribunal building in Arusha, Tanzania had not begun. Nonetheless, a small office had been established, and the Registrar, along with one assistant, were staffing it. On December 12, 1995, the Tribunal issued its first eight indictments. News accounts reported that unidentified members of the Government of Rwanda were disappointed that only eight individuals had been indicted, after such a long period of time.

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council’s justification for exercising jurisdiction is the threat the current situation poses to international peace and security. In establishing the Tribunal, the Security Council also stated that its aim was, in part, to “contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.” The adoption of a Security Council resolution alone raised expectations that some effective action would be taken promptly to ensure the major violators of international humanitarian law would be prosecuted. Those expectations are far from being met. Delays in establishing the Tribunal and making it operational have postponed reconciliation; there can be no reconciliation without justice. An independent knowledgeable observer, speaking to the topic in October 1995, considered the Tribunal not to be a serious effort. The Prosecutor has taken important steps to address the Tribunal’s deficiencies. Nonetheless, there is still progress to be made to address the rapidity of investigations as well as the public perception, both inside and outside Rwanda, of the Prosecutor’s commitment to the success of this Tribunal, in the same manner it exists for the ICTFY. Should it succeed in these endeavors, it is hoped that trust in its work will grow.

**Administration of Justice**

The justice system of Rwanda was manipulated by the former regime, despite constitutional provisions ensuring its independence. Human rights abuses relating to arrests, detention, trial without counsel, and widespread corruption were frequent in the past. Inadequate education and training of judicial personnel, budgetary constraints and an authoritarian political culture further eroded the functioning of the legal system. Therefore, if Rwanda is to establish a system that helps ensure the rights of all citizens, it must construct a judicial system that substantially improves on that which existed previously in the country.

**Figure 9.1**

**Examples of International Assistance for the Judicial System**

a) Training of magistrates and judicial police by Citizens Network, a Belgian NGO, funded largely by Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. By May 1995, 150 IPJs (inspecteurs de police judiciaire) were already trained and another 120 IPJs and 30 army personnel joined the program.

b) Support for the salaries of the Ministry of Justice’s personnel by EU, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Canada.

c) Establishing a Legislation Review Commission to adopt Rwanda’s legal structure to Arusha Accords, funded by Germany.

d) Support for recruiting foreign magistrates to serve in Rwanda’s judicial system.

e) Support for the revival of the law school in Butare by Citizen’s Network.

f) Repair of court facilities by a project funded by Switzerland and Norway.

g) Supplies and equipment worth US$1 million for the justice system, funded by the US.
There is a broad consensus between the international community and the Rwandese government that substantial short- and long-term assistance is needed. Buildings must be repaired; office equipment for courts and prosecutors must be purchased; police, court and prosecutorial staff have to be trained; bar associations should be encouraged; and the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Justice has to be created and maintained. In December 1994, UNDP and the government estimated it would cost US$66 million over a two-year period to “restart” the justice system.

In January 1995, a total of US$44.6 million was pledged by donor nations for human rights and the administration of justice, not including those monies being spent on prison rehabilitation. Several assistance initiatives were under way. Various international agencies and donor countries suggested the funding of foreign judges and prosecutors to commence trials, but the National Assembly vetoed the proposal in July 1995. Foreign lawyers and prosecutorial investigators have now been proposed to try expeditiously the accused presently languishing in the overcrowded prisons. These programs, however, did not approach the level of assistance that was broadly recognized as required to “restart” the justice system. Nearly mid-way through the year, projects being executed totaled US$5 million of the US$44.6 million pledged. By the end of the year, US$28 million had been pledged for administration of justice programs alone (not including human rights initiatives), of which US$21 million had been committed, and US$13 million disbursed, largely by the Netherlands.

More than 55,000 persons were awaiting trial on genocide-related charges in September 1995, but no trials had taken place. Interviews with several magistrates indicated prosecutions were not likely to go forward soon. Understandably, these circumstances have led to uneasiness on the part of the international community. During the first week of November 1995, however, President Bizimungu hosted a conference in Kigali, entitled “Genocide, Impunity and Accountability.” During the conference, participants discussed ways and proposals to expedite domestic trials of the detainees in Rwandese prisons. By the end of the conference, government representatives indicated that they would be making decisions “soon” concerning initiatives agreed to in large part by the conference participants, including those that proposed realistic mechanisms for going forward with the cases of the detained.

In the interim, the role the RPA is playing within the functioning judicial system is unclear. The departure to Belgium of the chief prosecutor for Kigali, who alleged interference by the RPA, raises concern regarding the role of the army in the judicial system. One judge who was interviewed expressed concern over his personal safety should prosecutions result in the dismissal of defendants who were arrested by the RPA. Nonetheless, the September swearing in of the Supreme Court’s president and five vice-presidents was an important step in the right direction. Official appointment of existing magistrates should be expected in the near future.

Obviously, it will take time before the modest programs initiated and supported by the international community bear tangible results. More concerted efforts are necessary before the country’s judicial system can be revived, much less reorganized and reconstructed to meet minimum standards for human rights. The real challenge is not of marshaling sufficient human and technical resources, but of institutionalizing a new political culture in which differences are settled through discussion, accommodation, and sound civil institutions, not through violence and bloodshed. The international community can play a limited, though significant, role in assisting the government to meet this challenge.

**Human Rights Field Operation for Rwanda (HRFOR)**

The human rights field operation for Rwanda (HRFOR) was the first field operation to be undertaken under the auspices of the UNHCHR and to be administratively supported by the UN Center for Human Rights in Geneva. In late August 1994, the UNHCHR reached an agreement with Rwandese officials to deploy 147 human rights field officers, one for each of the country’s communes.

The objectives of the field operation were to: (a) carry out investigations into violations of human
rights and humanitarian law; (b) monitor the human rights situation and, through its presence, prevent future human rights violations; (c) cooperate with other international agencies in establishing confidence, and thus facilitate the return of the refugees and displaced persons and the rebuilding of civic society; and (d) implement programs of technical cooperation in the field of human rights, particularly in the area of administration of justice. To pursue these objectives, the field operation established three substantive units: the Field Coordination Unit, the Technical Cooperation Unit, responsible for local training and education programs, and the Legal Analysis and Coordination Unit (LACU), responsible for special investigations. The UN Center for Human Rights recruited and hired most field officers and has provided overall management and logistical support for the operation. In October 1995, the original chief of Mission for HRFOR was succeeded by a new one.

At its outset in September 1994, HRFOR was faced with a difficult dilemma. The UN, non-governmental human rights organizations and governments demanded from the High Commissioner the immediate deployment of a human rights monitoring mission, but failed to provide him with adequate funding for even the minimal prerequisites. The High Commissioner complied with the request with minimal support. However, the resource availability improved gradually. Further, recruitment and training of the personnel for HRFOR have been widely criticized. The chief of mission was not involved in the original selection of staff and relevant background and experience were initially absent in many of the monitors. Moreover, there were no official announcements of the openings for HRFOR in relevant newspapers and periodicals and thus the recruitment was largely confined to those, primarily within the UN system, who heard of the positions by word-of-mouth. These circumstances, coupled with the lack of an established code of conduct for monitors, led to difficulties. The High Commissioner’s office, in cooperation with the European Commission, appears to have instigated more stringent recruitment standards, and the sophistication of field monitors has presumably increased, although there is still room for substantial improvement.

Similarly, field monitors arriving in Kigali received no orientation or training until at least December 1994. At that time, a small grant to the Center for Human Rights provided field officer training in Geneva and Kigali by the US National Peace Corps Association. The training program focused, at first, on preparing field officers to work in a foreign environment, with little emphasis on operational aspects of their work. It did not adequately cover major international human rights instruments nor international and domestic enforcement mechanisms. As HRFOR further developed its training program over the year, it grew to include additional topics like the major human rights instruments. By April 1995, a total of 152 HRFOR personnel, including 114 field officers, had participated in at least some form of the training program. As each new group of field monitors arrived in Kigali, trainings were adjusted consistent with ongoing innovations within HRFOR. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether the content of the training program is still adequate. In fact, several monitors, who have been surveyed thus far, indicate that important deficiencies remain.

At the January 1995 Round Table Conference and in subsequent revisions early in the year, donors committed approximately US$9 million to human rights monitoring. By the end of the year, US$14 million had been committed to HRFOR, all of which had been disbursed, largely by the EU and UK.

Investigating genocide

An eight-member team of experts arrived in Rwanda in late October 1994 to support the Special Rapporteur and the COE, as part of the HRFOR unit then called the Special Investigations Unit (SIU). After about a month, they were succeeded by an American trial lawyer, who, in turn, was replaced by a Swiss Prosecutor and forensic scientists, at first from Spain. From the very beginning, the SIU lacked a well-defined purpose and direction. It was expected to investigate violations of international humanitarian law, but, as one former SIU member put it, “for whom or for what purpose was unclear.” Prior to November 1994, the majority of the members of this HRFOR unit believed they were collecting evidence for prosecutions of the planners and organizers of the genocide for the hoped-for International Tribunal as well as to support the work
of the COE and the Special Rapporteur.\textsuperscript{45} In December 1994, after the creation of the International Tribunal for Rwanda on November 8, 1994, Justice Richard Goldstone, the Tribunal’s Prosecutor, met with HRFOR in Kigali to request essentially that all investigations aimed at collecting evidence of those to be tried by the Tribunal be henceforth conducted by Tribunal staff only.\textsuperscript{46} Further, he requested that evidence collected to date by HRFOR be organized and turned over to the Tribunal. Therefore at that time, SIU was left with a mandate to work for the Special Rapporteur and the COE, to the extent their work did not touch on prosecutions within the mandate of the Tribunal.\textsuperscript{47}

Prior to the meeting between Justice Goldstone and HRFOR in December 1994, the SIU had encountered several problems with fulfilling its own understanding of its mandate. The SIU was to work in support of the COE and the Special Rapporteur, but report to the Center in Geneva, and to the HRFOR mission chief in Rwanda. Because neither the Center nor the mission chief in Kigali was supervising investigations, no one could offer any significant direction; nor, apparently, did anyone assume responsibility for effectively addressing, in any manner, the significant multi-faceted problems encountered by the SIU.

The SIU did not have sufficient manpower. Nor did it have the array of necessary technical expertise and equipment to conduct a thorough and competent investigation of the genocide. Of the personnel that the SIU had, some were inadequately schooled in what the collection of evidence for purposes of prosecutions entailed. The performance of SIU was further hampered by uncertainty over whether it had the authority to request official records and papers from government officials, both within and outside Rwanda. An analysis of the chain of command is relevant to determining criminal responsibility; evidence of the perpetrators’ specific intent to destroy the Tutsi as an ethnic group is required to establish genocide. Thus, for example, official documents relating to the internal military structures, plans, and preparations of the parties to the conflict could prove essential to successful prosecutions for violations of international humanitarian law. However, without access to government officials and their documents located both inside and outside of Rwanda, proper collection of critical evidence for prosecutions was all but impossible.\textsuperscript{48} Within this context, the members of the SIU focused their investigative work on collecting witnesses’ statements and physical evidence at 25 massacre sites. The collection of this information was relevant, but insufficient for the high-caliber investigative process envisioned by members of the SIU.

The leadership of HRFOR at the time seemed unable to resolve the resource-expertise-personnel problems as well as the problems associated with access to official records, even those located inside of Rwanda. While the High Commissioner for Human Rights communicated in one letter to the United States the need for more expert personnel and adequate resources for the work of the SIU,\textsuperscript{49} neither this effort nor any effort on the part of the HRFOR Chief of Mission significantly advanced these issues. Consequently, it is not surprising that some SIU members and, ultimately, the Prosecutor’s office of the International Tribunal were disappointed in the quality and quantity of much of the evidence collected by HRFOR as well as in the manner in which it had been collected. Its usefulness was, by most accounts, very limited.\textsuperscript{51} Nonetheless, the High Commissioner’s office reports that at the time he handed over most of the HRFOR-collected evidence to the Deputy Prosecutor of the International Tribunal in March 1995, the Deputy Prosecutor qualified them as “most valuable.” \textsuperscript{52}

Between December and mid-March 1995, the SIU was entrusted to carry out investigations for the purposes of the Special Rapporteur\textsuperscript{53} and “serve as liaison with the Tribunal for the cases it is investigating and with the national trials initiated by the government of Rwanda.” Consequently, the field officers, as their last task with regard to coordination with the International Tribunal, gathered information concerning the location of mass grave sites and witness identification. Because SIU distributed forms at this time for use by the field officers, uniform information of those sites as well as the identity of some of the witnesses to the genocide was adequately collected, although there have been criticisms of this effort as well. \textsuperscript{54} In April 1995, after a visit of the Special Rapporteur, the SIU became LACU, and its mandate was refocussed. However, HRFOR, primarily through its field officers, became involved in
documenting the Rwanda genocide through a variety of activities, instigated somewhat by the Field Coordination Unit of HRFOR (FCU) coordinating with LACU and the newly-appointed Coordinator for the Special Rapporteur. Such activities continue to include working with préfecture-level judicial personnel, including gendarmes, to investigate individual cases of those already detained in Rwanda who are accused of participation in the genocide, and documenting stories of how the genocide was implemented in various communities. Additionally, when field officers come upon mass grave sites they believe have been previously undiscovered, that information is recorded and passed to HRFOR Kigali, for notification to the Tribunal.55

Monitoring human rights
Since the beginning of 1995, the focus of field operations has shifted from investigation of violations of international humanitarian law to monitoring the ongoing human rights situation and cooperation with other international agencies in the re-establishment of confidence in Rwanda.56 The growing realization that the assurance of basic human rights could encourage refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their communities contributed to this shift. Field officers hear complaints about human rights violations, investigate them and then file their reports, which are aggregated at the level of the préfecture and forwarded to the FCU or its predecessor unit, the Monitoring Unit. The FCU authors a report based on a summary of the information contained in these reports. The chief of mission periodically sends this summary to the High Commissioner.

Until October 1995, there was no discernible strategy developed by the leadership of HRFOR for the use of these reports. According to the High Commissioner’s office, the reports were made available by him, “as appropriate,” to the Secretary-General, governments, UN agencies and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.58 While this “as appropriate” distribution has been criticized as ineffective with regard to enhancing accountability for human rights violations in present-day Rwanda,59 HRFOR failed either to adopt or articulate a policy concerning the reasons for its distribution policy. Consequently, it was not clear if these reports formed the basis for any action or decisions.60

In addition to the controversy surrounding the distribution of HRFOR reports concerning its monitoring activities, the reliability of the information contained in the reports was questioned, at first privately and later publicly.61 HRFOR was unable to defend itself against such criticisms because it had not developed a comprehensive methodology for the collection of information. In April 1995, HRFOR hired a senior officer to head the Field Coordination Unit. He has overhauled reporting forms and, as of October 1995, has begun usefully to centralize information in an effort to address the reliability problem. These revisions are aimed at collecting specific kinds of information, documenting the source of the information, and, it is hoped, requiring verification of the information on incidents investigated by field officers.

Additionally, HRFOR did not develop centralizing policies, strategies or guidelines for its field officers or unit leaders in Kigali concerning interaction with local or national officials with regard to the investigation and follow-up of alleged human rights violations.62 Moreover, because there was no agreement or mission-wide understanding on these points within HRFOR, different officers in the field acted in different ways. For example, some reported the results of their investigations to the relevant Kigali-level unit, assuming that the field report was all that was required. Others attempted to work with local officials to encourage official or joint investigations of incidents and appropriate follow-up. Still others merely handed copies of reports to local officials without discussion.63 In sum, this ad hoc means of country-wide monitoring resulted in little systemic analysis or effective nationwide action with regard to addressing current violations.64

As of October 1995, the new chief of mission undertook to review and overhaul the structure and substantive work of HRFOR, both in the field and in its center. Establishing effective working relationships with ministerial-level officials to exchange vital information and secure immediate action from them concerning allegations of current human rights violations appears to be a priority. A major problem with the monitoring of current human rights violations is that it is considered
partial and unfair by the Rwandese government, which feels it is being subjected to critical scrutiny while the perpetrators of genocide are being fed by the international community. At least two explanations for this criticism have been advanced. The first opines that the government’s position is inaccurate, but entirely understandable for reasons caused by HRFOR: HRFOR has failed adequately to publicize its work concerning providing assistance to the judicial system and information collected about the genocide. Another explanation argues that the Rwandese government’s perception is accurate because HRFOR did in fact focus its work on current violations with little regard for the desperate need to take a leading role on justice issues as they relate to addressing perpetrators of genocide. Those who agree with the later position often cite HRFOR work on monitoring arrests and detention of alleged genocide perpetrators as an example. Instead of assuming the difficult and complex task of working with local officials to develop acceptable, but realistic, arrest procedures in light of the conditions in Rwanda, at times field officers simply protested the legality of a particular arrest, demanded that individual’s release, and reported a human rights violation when the individual remained detained. A welcomed evolution recently began with HRFOR’s efforts to work systematically with Rwandese officials on arrest and detention procedures.

**A special note on HRFOR monitoring of the return of refugees and of detention centers in Rwanda**

Monitoring the return of refugees and the detention centers in Rwanda are two important tasks for HRFOR that deserve special consideration. HRFOR’s monitoring of returnees from neighboring countries until April 1995 was characterized by the same local discretion as was its other monitoring activities. Effectiveness therefore depended on the persistence and talent of individual field officers. When Zaire expelled approximately 14,000 Rwandese in August 1995, HRFOR tried to implement a coherent strategy. Field officers initially played a supporting role to UNHCR teams with regard to the logistics of moving and tracking returnees to all relevant locations, especially prisons. Later, field officers traveled to communes and worked with local authorities to assist in the re-entry process. They monitored property disputes, alleged killings, numbers of individuals detained, and living conditions in the communes. At the national level, the FCU contacted the relevant ministries to coordinate activities.

HRFOR has also been monitoring conditions and inmates in the central prisons, the communal prisons, and the military prisons. Field monitors have reported serious maltreatment issues in both commune and central prisons and, at times, have been able to convince local authorities of their duty to investigate and discipline. They have also raised with local authorities the issue of illegal detention of detainees accused of non-genocide-related crimes. The coordination between HRFÖR and ICRC in prison monitoring has been problematic since the inception of the mission. There were several reasons for it, one of which is the special, independent mandate that ICRC must follow. Nonetheless, only recently did HRFOR create written reporting procedures to be used by HRFOR and provide them to ICRC for better coordination.

**Technical Cooperation Program**

The technical cooperation unit of HRFOR has become increasingly important. It has attempted to coordinate foreign assistance for the rebuilding of Rwanda’s judicial system. By March 1995, the Technical Cooperation Unit had completed a nationwide survey of short- and long-term material and personnel needs for the rehabilitation of the judicial system, conducted in cooperation with UNDP and the Ministry of Justice. Subsequently, field officers were utilized for distribution to the préfectures of the material assistance that was provided to meet short-term needs. More elaborate material assistance that is so desperately needed to date has failed to materialize, in large part for reasons beyond the control of HRFOR. In this context, HRFOR and UNDP may have jointly miscalculated the government of Rwanda’s desire for a proposed plan to deploy 50 foreign legal experts who would have provided assistance to the judicial system as legal advisors. For the moment, the program has been suspended until it is re-examined by the new Minister of Justice.

The technical cooperation unit has organized training and seminars on human rights for the local
population, women and government officials. Many times these events are conducted in cooperation with other UN agencies (UNHCR, for example) or with non-governmental organizations. Topics have been varied, including women’s rights, rights set out in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and how to include human rights education in the primary school curriculum. In June 1995, the unit sponsored a major seminar on human rights and press freedoms. More recently, the unit implemented a series of workshops in each préfecture on arrest and detention procedures. Increasingly, HRFOR has taken responsibility for the training of gendarmes at the National Gendarmerie School in Ruhengeri. Finally, the technical cooperation unit also has organized a field officer on each team to work with local judicial officials on developing the work of the Commissions de Triage72 and on assisting them in their investigations of those who are detained. The success of these efforts appears to rely more on the training and background of the individual field officer than on a specific strategy or program developed by the unit although the Rwandese judicial personnel seem to appreciate the assistance.

Problems and prospects

The International Tribunal

The International Tribunal is the one area where the primary responsibility for action lies squarely with the international community, not with the Rwandese government. Rapid, decisive and committed action to investigate and try suspected war criminals, whatever their past and present affiliation, is a prerequisite for internal peace and prosperity. Yet the process of establishing the Tribunal, undertaking investigations and issuing indictments has been slow. The problems are many, not the least of which is the unwillingness of some countries to comply fully with international humanitarian law or even accept that genocide occurred. The funding problems, which lead to recruitment problems, have been addressed to the extent that adequate personnel have been hired.73 Much more needs to be done. There remain of course moral issues and issues of justice that must be addressed if all Rwandese, Hutu and Tutsi alike, are to receive the intended message of Rwanda war crimes trials. One is the real possibility that lesser war criminals, most likely tried through the Rwandese judicial system, will receive harsher sentences than their leaders, who will mostly be tried in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The Rwandese penal code allows for capital punishment, international humanitarian law does not. The other is the need for prosecutors meticulously to avoid to appear to be carrying out “victor’s justice.”

Administration of justice

Since it involves delicate issues of sovereignty, assistance to the judicial system will continue to be difficult and sensitive. The government has already shown its unwillingness to use as judges or even as legal advisers foreign jurists, apparently claiming in the first instance a constitutional bar on foreign judges.74 The October 1995 suspension at the government’s request of a UN plan to send 50 foreign jurists as legal advisers, rather than as judges and investigators, further diminishes the latitude for international action, and is a further sign of government mistrust of the international community and unwillingness to relinquish any part of its sovereignty. Positive steps towards restarting the judicial process were the October 17 swearing in of the new Supreme Court, which was a pre-requisite for establishment of lower courts and hosting of the conference on “Genocide, Impunity and Accountability.” It remains for the government of Rwanda to demonstrate political willingness to progress beyond these two developments. The international community can be most effective in two ways: (1) Continuing the provision of financial assistance to train judicial and police personnel and rebuild physical infrastructure; and (2) Applying pressure on the government to ensure the development of a fair judicial system as well as significant progress towards processing the cases of the detained.

The Human Rights Field Operation

A perception exists among experts and informed people that the human rights operation in Rwanda has failed to accomplish its stated mission.75 Its impact on the prevention of human rights violations and promotion of human rights has been minimal.76 As a former field officer put it to the evaluation team, “We simply failed, period...” In the judgement of the team, such a perception is fully justified.
However, it should be recognized that several factors, many of which were beyond the control of HRFOR, contributed to its poor performance. The informants, for example, identified the following sets of factors: a broad and ambiguous mandate, poor preparations prior to deployment, limited logistics and resource support, inept leadership, absence of a coherent strategy, poor coordination between headquarters and field staff, bureaucratic infighting within the UN system, apathy if not hostility of the Rwandese government, and a highly politically-charged environment. Obviously, the entire blame for the failure cannot be laid on HRFOR leadership and the Center for Human Rights.

As mentioned earlier, a new chief assumed leadership of the field operation in Rwanda in October 1995. Initial reports indicate that he is reexamining and re-evaluating the entire operation to make it more relevant and effective. It is too early to tell the outcome of his efforts.
1) Some RPA soldiers became newly-deployed gendarmes. Sponsored by several UN agencies, soldiers have been receiving training at the national school for gendarmes located in Ruhengeri. See, for example, UN High Commissioner For Human Rights, “Update on the Activities of the HRFOR 16 September-13 October 1995”, p. 22 (“UNHCHR Update”, October 1995).


3) See Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights in Rwanda”, December 1995, p. 3; UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Update on Activities of the HRFOR 26 August 1995–15 September 1995”, p. 5 (UNHCHR Update, September 1995). The number of 12,250 is the capacity of the central prison system as provided by Rwandese officials, although experienced agencies have opined that suitable capacity should be several thousand less under applicable international standards.

4) “Communal prisons” refers to those structures employed to house prisoners in communes. Some of these buildings were simply commandeered by civilian or military officials to house detainees. The total capacity of these “communal prisons” has never been publicly estimated by HRFOR, even though ICRC probably has a rough estimate. Nonetheless, there are sporadic reports from human rights field monitors that certain of them are severely overcrowded. See for example, “UNHCHR Update”, October 1995, p. 15; “UNHCHR Update”, August 1995, p. 7.

5) Discussions with several ICRC delegates and NGO medical assistance employees deployed in the préfectures in Rwanda.


8) It should be noted that gendarmes are legally part of what can be loosely called the “justice system.”


11) See “UNHCHR Update”, September 1995, p. 6. It is unclear from the UNHCHR reports whether these “rearrests” result from the receipt of additional information concerning the detainee, or, as the reports imply, occur because of the unfounded exercise of police power by the RPA and/or the gendarmerie. Additionally, at least in its earlier efforts to monitor these issues, it was unclear if field officers were adequately trained to evaluate the function performed by the Commissions. But see, for example, “UNHCHR Report”, October 1995, p. 19. The Commissions were not to determine whether anyone was guilty or innocent of involvement in the genocide, but rather whether sufficient evidence, at the time an individual’s case was considered, existed to meet the standard for pre-trial detention.

12) See UN Doc. S/res/955/1994. The vote was 13 in favor of the resolution; one against
(Rwanda) and one abstention (China). It is generally believed that Rwanda voted against the resolution because it precluded application of the death penalty.


14) It should be noted that the Tokyo and Nuremberg Tribunals were established by the Allied Powers, not by the United Nations.


16) The term of the Prosecutor is scheduled to end as of July 1996.

17) The original Director of Investigations was replaced in October 1995.

18) There was criticism of the ICTFY because both trial judges and appellate judges took office soon after appointment, even though, at the time, there were few, if any, functions for them to perform.

19) A trial judge signed the first order issuing from the Rwanda Tribunal at the end of November 1995.

20) Rwandese law permits the death penalty to be imposed for murder, although the last time a judicially-imposed execution was carried out was more than 10 years ago, in 1982, according to Amnesty International. If the Tribunal for Rwanda focuses on the planners and organizers of the genocide, the persons who are most guilty of atrocities may receive a less severe penalty than those who were acting at their direction. This anomaly has made it much more difficult for Rwandese authorities and survivors to accept its legitimacy. It is very unlikely that the Rwandese will accept non-capital penalties for those believed to be guilty of planning and organizing the genocide.

21) For example, it is doubtful that the actions of Leon Mugesera, a Rwandese academic who became famous as of 1991 and 1992 for his speeches inciting Hutu to massacre Tutsi, could fall within the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, Revised 1995 Edition, p. 111.

22) It should also be noted that many Rwandese are unhappy that the Tribunal will provide prisons for the convicted. They believe that those whom the International Tribunal ultimately convicts will be imprisoned in cells that, in many instances, will be more comfortable than the homes of the majority of Rwandese.

23) Fueling this disappointment at the time was certainly the fact that the Tribunal was an organ of the same UN system that had deserted them in April 1994. Failure to begin prosecutions promptly was perceived by many as another indication that the UN did not take seriously the genocide perpetrated by the former government.

24) The participants of the conference were high government officials and representatives of significant sectors of the Rwandese population, as well as some international experts. One purpose of the conference was to explore the efficacy of a variety of mechanisms, including the International Tribunal, to address accountability for the genocide in Rwanda.

25) It should be noted that the bulk of the Tribunal work at this preliminary stage rests with the Prosecutor’s office, although both the Registrar and the Trial Chambers have a fairly large amount of preparatory work to accomplish during this time period. Nonetheless, the May 1995 evaluation focussed on the progress of the Prosecutor’s office.


30) This criticism does not intend to imply that the quality of investigations should be sacrificed for speed, but only to suggest that there may be something wrong at the pace at which the work is being accomplished.

31) Not necessarily the reality.

32) USAID provided funds for this conference.

33) According to an October 1995 progress report by the UN Secretary-General, the human rights field operation had deployed 130 members with three legal experts being assisted to work with the Ministry of Justice. Part of the field operation has been staffed and funded by the European Community. The European Community, which entered into an agreement with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, currently provides 35 percent of the salary-budget and approximately 35 field monitors. See Roel von Meijenfeldt, “At the Frontline for Human Rights: Final Report," October 1995, pp. 27, 30.


35) Formerly, this unit was called the Monitoring Unit.

36) Formerly referred to as the Special Investigations Unit or SIU.

37) The EU contingent of field officers was identified, interviewed and selected by the European Commission, according to criteria agreed to by its representatives and UNHCHR. See Roel von Meijenfeldt, “At the Frontline for Human Rights: Final Report,” October 1995, pp. 29.

38) In Rwanda, such prerequisites included the costs of providing transportation, radios, reference books, interpreters, offices, etc.


40) Seven out of 12 monitors surveyed were “satisfied” with the selection process, at least with regard to the EU contingent. See Roel von Meijenfeldt, “At the Frontline for Human Rights: Final Report,” October 1995, Appendix H, p. 4. No survey has been conducted among non-EU monitors.


43) See Adam Stapleton, Amateurs Posing As Professionals,” in Human Rights Tribune,

44) Amnesty International described this confusion as related to the question of “which of the many different UN bodies was responsible for investigating the genocide.” See Amnesty International, Rwanda and Burundi: A Call for Action by the International Community, September 1995 (AI Index: AFR 02/24/95), p. 7. Another part of the confusion was the role the deployed field monitors were to play in the investigation process. See, for example, Adam Stapleton, “Amateurs Posing As Professionals,” in Human Rights Tribune, p. 13-15 at p. 14.

45) It should be noted that the mandates of the Special Rapporteur and the COE were, at least in part, linked in some fashion to the UN deliberations on whether, after their investigations were completed, sufficient evidence of genocide in Rwanda existed so as to warrant the creation of an International Tribunal.

46) Additionally, there was discussion between the Tribunal and HRFOR concerning preservation of massacre sites for the Tribunal’s own expert staff.

47) The COE, by UN mandate, was to cease to exist in December 1994, after it had submitted its final report to the UN Secretary-General.

48) There has been some disagreement on whether the SIU was supposed to collect this documentation. From “Response of the High Commissioner on Human Rights to Recommendations Contained in ‘Rebuilding Post-War Rwanda: Evaluating the Impact of International Assistance with Regard to Human Rights,’’” p. 4.


53) Included within the mandate of the Special Rapporteur was the responsibility to investigate and report on the human rights situation in Rwanda. After the International Tribunal for Rwanda was created, he was still responsible for “investigating the genocide, but only in cooperation with the International Tribunal. See “Rapport sur la situation des droits de l’homme au Rwanda soumis par le Rapporteur spécial, M. René Degni-Segui, en application du paragraphe 20 de la résolution s-3/1 du 25 mai 1994.” UN Doc. E/Cn.4/1996/7 (28 June 1995), paras. 53–55, 56–57.


56) One human rights monitor reported that in January 1995, the chief of mission stated that investigating current abuses was the most important part of the HRFOR mandate. It should be noted, however, that the High Commissioner’s office disputes that such a “shift” ever occurred,
maintaining it was a co-equal part of the HRFOR mandate. From “Response of the High Commissioner on Human Rights to Recommendations Contained in ‘Rebuilding Post-War Rwanda: Evaluating the Impact of International Assistance with Regard to Human Rights’ ”, p. 6.

57) These reports appear to be written approximately every three weeks.

58) From “Response of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Recommendations Contained in ‘Rebuilding Post-War Rwanda: Evaluating the Impact of International Assistance with Regard to Human Rights’ ”, p. 7. However, the High Commissioner’s office fails to note whether these reports were regularly provided to the Government of Rwanda for comment, and if so, when and whether its response was distributed.


63) Interviews with local Rwandese officials in Gisenyi and Kibuye in May 1995 indicated that they had not received reports on human rights violations from the UN field operation in their areas. Nor were the local NGOs informed by field officers about the human rights situation.


68) The assistance included primarily office supplies like typewriters, paper, carbons, folders, pens, etc.

69) Such assistance would include rehabilitation of judicial buildings and expensive items such as cars.

70) Conflict among UN agencies over control of the funds donated for this assistance has been cited as the reason for the delay. See Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights in Rwanda-1995,”
December 1995,

72) The Commission de Triage, created by the Minister of Justice, is mandated to meet regularly in each locality to consider the release of detainees who question the sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence lodged against them.


75) The team interviewed a cross-section of experts, former human rights monitors, NGO representatives, officials of donor agencies and government officials throughout 1995. With the exception of officials of HRFOR, the Center for Human Rights and two European Commission representatives, respondents were uniformly critical of the performance of the field operation.

76) The documents provided by the Center for Human Rights describe only the activities of the field operation. They give no data or evidence about the impact of field operation activities.
Chapter 10

Return of Refugees and Internally displaced Persons

Since 1959, successive purges of political and ethnic rivals have resulted in periodic mass displacements and forced exile. As a result, by August 1994, there were largely three categories of displaced Rwandese people: (a) old caseload refugees, primarily Tutsi who had left Rwanda beginning in 1959 and began returning in large numbers in July 1994, (b) new caseload refugees, primarily Hutu, who fled during the crisis of 1994, and (c) internally displaced persons from the recent crisis, also Hutu, who had largely settled in camps in south-west Rwanda. For each “caseload,” the international community has had highly complex issues to address in assisting with return and reintegration.

Old caseload refugees

Beginning in 1959, and periodically throughout the next 30 years, hundreds of thousands of Tutsi Rwandese fled the country, escaping ethnic and political violence. By 1993, there were an estimated 600,000 refugees and Rwandese of undetermined status in a refugee-like situation, living mainly in Tanzania, Zaire, Burundi and Uganda. (This figure includes the descendants of the first to flee.)

A consistent feature of Rwandese in exile during this time was the intention to return home. This was reinforced by exclusionary policies to marginalize Rwandese refugees in nearly all sectors of national life in Zaire, Uganda and Burundi. Even Tanzania, which had provided the most secure environment for refugees, including citizenship, was beginning to reconsider its open-door policy in the face of its own mounting political and economic pressures.

Old caseload refugees began returning to Rwanda after the victory of RPF forces in July 1994. The government estimates that one year after the war ended a total of over 700,000 old caseload refugees had returned. The push factors that generated this migration were rooted in the population pressures, competition for scarce resources and ethnic distrust in impoverished host countries. Furthermore, in the case of Zaire, the large influx of potentially hostile Hutu refugees
was an important impetus for Zairian and Rwandese Tutsi migration to Rwanda. The major pull factor has been the collapse of the Hutu state and establishment of a government led by the RPF, a movement primarily made up of Rwandese soldiers who served as a special unit in the Ugandan National Resistance Army while in exile. Old caseload returnees form a large constituency and base of support for the current government and, consequently, their resettlement is a major priority. Although the government stated in the Rwanda Recovery Program that, as its third objective, it “...intends to ensure the return of all Rwandese at present living outside the country or displaced within it and provide them with support...” resettlement of the old caseload in particular is considered both a political and moral imperative.

The primary obstacle in the resettlement of the old caseload is the extreme shortage of land. The government has reaffirmed its commitment to the agreement made during the Arusha peace negotiations that abrogates the right to claim property abandoned before 1982. Although the government, assisted by international donors, has begun to prepare new settlement sites in areas with lower population density, including the national parks, many are still without homes. Others are occupying houses left empty by new caseload refugees and internally displaced persons.

The old caseload returnees have benefited from international assistance through direct aid to families, rehabilitation of commune structures and services, and assistance to government ministries – particularly the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration. The way stations, initially intended to facilitate the return of new caseload returnees, in fact primarily assisted the old caseload return. Donors have provided some much-needed technical assistance and advisors to the government in identifying and preparing land for new settlements. However, the slow process of disbursing funds pledged for repatriation and reintegration during the Round Table Conference constrains the capacity of the government to facilitate the process. Although many old caseload refugees returned with capital assets, the delay in assistance for reintegration depletes those savings and creates an unhealthy dependence on donor assistance. Lastly, the over 700,000 head of cattle that the old caseload returnees brought with them, largely from Uganda, have already created serious environmental problems, particularly in the north-east. This problem received too little international attention too late.

**New caseload refugees**

The magnitude of the new refugee flow into asylum countries has been discussed above. The sheer numbers of refugees necessitated the use of existing structures and familiar systems to expedite distribution of assistance and maintain order in the camps. Thus, at the outset, UNHCR organized the camps on the basis of administrative structures present in Rwanda (préfecture, commune, sector and cell) and employed community leaders to distribute relief supplies. By all accounts, alternatives such as registration and use of international relief workers to distribute aid down to the family level would have been impossible given the massive numbers of refugees, the inhospitable setting, and the speed of the exodus. UNHCR and the NGOs working in the camps claim to have been aware of the negative consequences of the standard operational practice of using refugee leaders to distribute supplies, but insist there were no real alternatives. In retrospect it does appear that the best alternatives (extensive background checks and screening, use of local or expatriate staff, etc.) would have entailed long delays during preparation and exceedingly high initial cost.
The unintended effect of this policy, however, was to reassert the authority of the former government, military, militia and community leaders. The consequences have had far-reaching impact on the current situation. First, the leadership has succeeded in leveraging some of the donor community’s assistance into human and material resources for a potential future armed invasion into Rwanda. In addition, refugees hired by NGOs are required to give a portion of their wages to the exiled government. Second, the camps are used as a recruiting ground to increase the ranks of the military. These recruits are being trained by many of the people responsible for last year’s genocide who are hiding in the camps. Thus, a key element for the former Rwandese leadership in preparing for an invasion is maintaining the refugee population in the camps. This became very clear following the forcible return of some 13,000-15,000 refugees by the Zairian government in late August 1995. The former leadership resisted the forced repatriation and, moreover, has publicly denounced the intentions of the international community to repatriate Rwandese refugees in Zaire by the end of 1995.

**Repatriation July – December 1994**

Overall, return has been minimal in spite of the international community’s programs for repatriation. The largest repatriation took place at the end of July and during August 1994. It probably accounted for most of the numbers; the exceptionally high disease-related mortality rate in the Goma camps and the absence of acute conflict inside Rwanda also made repatriation a relatively attractive option. UNHCR, although not promoting repatriation, began providing transportation in cooperation with IOM, food baskets and domestic items for refugees wanting to return home. Relief agencies established way stations inside Rwanda and, beginning in December, multi-sectoral assistance in the home communes.

By late August, however, the number of refugees returning dropped significantly, while the number of people leaving Rwanda increased. By then, the cholera epidemic and chaos in Goma had subsided, allowing the leadership quickly to assert its authority over the camp population. During this period, a UNHCR-supported fact-finding mission on security conditions inside Rwanda stated that a systematic retaliation against returnees was being carried out with the knowledge and support of the central government in Kigali.

This report, never publicly released, compelled UNHCR to halt abruptly all repatriation plans, citing protection concerns. It was not until 28 December that formal repatriation efforts commenced.

In August, the number of security incidents in the camps increased dramatically. By November, 15 relief agencies working in Goma threatened to withdraw their operations if improvements were not made in camp security. Zairian troops were sent in to quell the troublemakers and were able, to some degree, to coerce greater cooperation by the camp leaders with the humanitarian assistance community. Throughout the fall, despite the absence of formal assistance in the camps, a small number of refugees managed to escape the threat of violence there and voluntarily repatriate, assisted with transportation once inside Rwanda. It was not until September, however, that UNHCR conducted negotiations with Zairian authorities to improve security in the camps.

There are very large discrepancies in the figures from different sources for new caseload returnees in 1994. The government estimates that some 600,000 new caseload refugees returned, though the US Committee for Refugees reports 100,000.8 UNHCR itself surprisingly does not have its own new caseload return figures and thus uses the government estimates in its own reporting. Based on
an overall estimate of 800,000 returnees (old and new caseload, combined) between April and December, however, UNHCR has deduced that the new caseload return in 1994 never exceeded 200,000.9 These discrepancies may be attributed to government interest in overstating the numbers, highlighting the urgency so as to increase the level of international assistance for refugee reintegration. Moreover, the argument that nearly one-third of the recent refugees have returned grants greater legitimacy to the essentially military government and supports the accusation that many of the refugees remaining outside the country are guilty of genocide.

**Repatriation 1995**

By January, events around the region underscored the unfeasibility of continued support to the refugee camps so close to Rwanda’s borders. In Burundi, heightened conflict between Hutu and Tutsi resulted in more killings and further population displacement, with clear implications for the Rwanda situation, especially inasmuch as Rwandese refugees were being used as a weapon in the violence. At the same time, there was growing evidence of large arms flows into, and into the vicinity of, donor-supported refugee camps in Zaire. This fostered greater distrust and distance between the government and relief agencies. It has also greatly exacerbated regional instability. Further, the vulnerability of relief workers to the violence in the camps had yet to be resolved. Perhaps most imposing, continued support of the refugee camps, costing donors upwards of US$1 million a day, was becoming increasingly less viable.10

UNHCR developed a repatriation plan recommending a broad range of measures directed at both sides of the border, including:

(a) prepare areas for return, ensure implementation of minimum rehabilitation, coordinate with local authorities, UNAMIR and human rights monitors to enhance the security of returnees and involve NGOs in the establishment of community services and the distribution of relief supplies; (b) where necessary, establish Open Relief Centers at communal levels to act as points for distribution of relief materials and to accommodate at night those returnees and IDPs who find it unsafe to live in isolated homesteads; and (c) mobilize international assistance for reintegration projects and overall reconstruction programs for the country with special emphasis on the preparation of new sites and settlement areas for those refugees who left the country some 30 years ago and who upon their return have had to occupy the property of others.11

UNHCR’s plan underscores assistance to the old caseload in moving to new settlements as a critical factor in the process of national reconciliation. The UNHCR plan also emphasizes increasing security in the refugee camps, disseminating accurate information on conditions inside Rwanda and promoting visits by refugee leaders to home communes. The plan also promotes visits by ambassadors of donor countries to the camps. Additionally, the plan calls for a safe corridor inside Rwanda for those returning home.

Despite the plans, repatriation programs have had little impact on new caseload return during most of 1995, and insufficient progress has been made in implementing the broad measures recommended for creating conditions conducive for return.. Although improvements have been made through the rehabilitation of communes, and Open Relief Centers were established as part of Opération Retour, new sites and settlements for old caseload returnees are not in place and old caseload refugees continue to occupy other people’s homes and land. Moreover, conditions inside the camps remain insecure and, as of April 1995, there had not yet been any aggressive information campaign to counter the propaganda and rumors disseminated by the leadership. Finally, the concept of a safe corridor inside Rwanda for returnees is becoming increasingly unlikely in the wake of heightened tensions and insecurity throughout the country.

As the figure above shows, new caseload refugee population remains high, especially in Zaire and Tanzania. Most recently available statistics from UNCHR show the total population in November 1995 at 1.74 million (Zaire, 1.06 million; Tanzania, 527,000; Burundi, 153,000; Uganda, 4,000).12 Average monthly repatriation rates for new caseload refugees in 1995 have been around 6,000 or 7,000, which is well below the UNHCR anticipated (targeted) daily average of 6,000, much less the figure of 10,000 per day agreed upon at the Carter Center-initiated Cairo Summit.13
Presumably the Cairo Summit agreement, signed by the heads of state of Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zaire and Uganda, referred to new caseload returns. Registered new caseload returns in 1995 have averaged 250 persons per day. Since the Zairian government’s attempt to return refugees forcibly in August, the average has only increased to 400.

**Internally displaced persons**

By July 15 1994, UNHCR estimated that 1.2 to 1.5 million people had fled into the French safe zone in south-west Rwanda, the majority to displaced persons camps.14 The French zone was perceived by many as a place of asylum for large numbers of people involved in the massacres. A month later, in anticipation of the French withdrawal from the zone, some 60,000 of the 800,000 IDPs, only about half of whom were in identifiable camps, left the south-west for Zaire.15

The presence of large numbers of IDPs delayed the process of recovery from the tragic events of the year. The camps posed a potentially explosive threat to national security and essentially prolonged the transition from emergency to rehabilitation and reconstruction. The government maintained that massive repatriation of refugees would not be feasible until the IDP camps had been disbanded. The donor community agreed to the need for the closures, but was slow in responding to the urgency expressed by the government of Rwanda to close the camps. In early September 1994, in anticipation of the IDP return, UNREO adopted a strategy that shifted the emphasis from planning relief and repatriation to facilitating IDP return. Government ministries, donors and relief agencies together established a task force and mode of operation. By the end of October, 93,000 IDPs had returned home.16

Partially in response to several forced closings by the RPA, UNREO launched Opération Retour at the end of December, in an effort to contribute more to the process. The operation entailed a phased approach involving returnee registration and transport to the Open Relief Centers (ORCs) in the communities where food, medical care and protection would be provided. This was accompanied by a gradual reduction in food rations in the camps and an increase in food distributions as well as in seeds and tools to home areas. Local government authorities met with returnees in ORCs to explain their rights and the responsibilities of the local officials.17

According to UNHCR, as a result of Opération Retour directly or indirectly, nearly half of the remaining 350,000 IDPs returned home in January, many unassisted. In the remaining camps, UNREO and community leaders intensified their information campaigns about conditions and available services. In February, however, it became increasingly clear that Opération Retour was not yielding the same results as it did the previous month. Although the government maintained its commitment to voluntary return, the international community sensed that the attitude of some government officials was hardening, leading to foreseeable forced camp closures. The government in turn was frustrated by the international community’s seeming indifference to the security threat posed by the camps and subsequently announced that they would gradually, over a period of three months, close the remaining 11 camps.

The watershed event occurred following the first anniversary of the genocide. In an effort to close Kibeho, the remaining camp in the south-west, vast numbers of people were killed in an unanticipated exchange between those entrenched in the camp and RPA forces.18 The impact of the incident was far-reaching. The relationship between the government and the international community deteriorated even further. The immediate reaction of the international community to Kibeho – temporary suspension of assistance – in contrast to its lack of response to the genocide, further enraged the government. Furthermore, Kibeho gave credence to refugee extremists’ allegations of the government’s insidious intentions. The international community, in failing to respond adequately to the concerns of the government, shares responsibility for the escalation of tensions that led to the stand-off. Further complicating the situation was the role played by some NGOs in actively discouraging people in the camps from leaving.
Problems and prospects

The above discussion shows that old caseload refugees have returned spontaneously, and internally displaced persons’ camps have been closed and IDPs returned to their home communes (albeit in some cases with great violence) largely without international assistance. Old caseload refugees returned on their own because of the changed circumstances, while forced closures, persuasion, and individual motives facilitated return of the internally displaced. On the other hand, despite the efforts of the international community, very little has been accomplished in the repatriation of the two million new caseload refugees living in refugee camps in neighboring countries.

Explanatory factors
Several factors explain the limited movement toward the return of the new caseload refugees: (a) the various levels of complicity of many in the exile community and their families in the genocide; (b) the control of the camps by old leadership hostile to the present government and its intimidation of refugees who want to return; (c) the domination of the Rwandese government by former RPA insurgents; (d) concern for safety and security inside Rwanda; (e) disputes between old and new refugees about the ownership of land; and (f) a lack of clear policy on culpability for the crimes of genocide. These factors have been widely discussed and debated both inside and outside Rwanda.

The multi-donor evaluation team conducted interviews with a cross-section of refugee populations to learn their perceptions and concerns. The interviewees identified three main factors that adversely affected their decisions to return.19 The first was the intimidation in refugee camps, which they ranked as the number one constraining factor. The leadership maintains a powerful grip on the camp population by ordering people to remain, and by killing, torturing and maiming those accused of planning to return.20 Added to the threat of physical violence and even death is the social pressure that defines repatriation as treason against the Hutu community and its leaders. In the same way that a Hutu identity was created by forcing complicity in the genocide, “Hutuness” is now being defined as loyalty to the former regime. A return to Rwanda not only compromises the anonymity, resources and power of the camp leaders, but by default grants legitimacy to the new government.

Refugees ranked physical security inside Rwanda as the second major constraining factor. The many accounts, both actual and false, of violent reprisals, arbitrary arrests and detentions significantly discouraged repatriation. Many fear the government passively allows reprisals by RPA soldiers against recent returnees. Moreover, refugees cited the apprehension of being wrongly accused of having taken part in the genocide, in the absence of clear policy lines determining degree of guilt necessary for prosecution. The increase in the reported number of arrests and detentions accompanying the return of IDPs, and the incident at Kibeho, gave credence to their fears. Clearly, the historical relationship between ethnicity and the state in Rwanda plays a powerful role in shaping perceptions.

The concern for property rights was ranked third among the refugees interviewed. They based their concern on the critical issue of disputed claims and reported occupation of their houses by other returnees and, even more contentious, by RPA soldiers. Reports of returnee arrests and detentions of those accused of crimes for abrogating their property rights exacerbate their fear. Furthermore, widows who have lost their male relatives, under Rwandese law, do not have clear legal rights to property ownership. Officially, the government maintains two contending principles on the right to house and land ownership, recognizing both (a) the property rights of new caseload returnees; and (b) the rights of old caseload returnees to land, and reintegration into economic life. Even in the absence of significant repatriation of new caseload refugees, the problem of land and housing is acute due to the sheer numbers of old caseload returnees.

The role of the international community
The international community cannot be held solely accountable for the non-return of refugees. Nonetheless, many of its acts of omission and commission have contributed to the repatriation stalemate and political instability in the region where the camps are located. The inability of the
international community to disarm the former Rwandese military forces in or around the camps allows the former leadership to maintain control over the camps and intimidate refugees who want to return. Delay in providing better security in refugee camps (resolved only in March 1995 with deployment of the Zairian Presidential Guard) has further undermined attempts to permit free departure of refugees. In addition, the conceivably inadvertent employment of suspected criminals to distribute aid in the camps reinforces the power of the leadership and helps sustain the military. Moreover, delay in establishing the International Tribunal creates the perception that the international community lacks commitment to bringing the leaders of genocide to justice.

The ineffectiveness of human rights monitors, the nebulous mandate of UNAMIR, and the absence of a functioning judiciary and a civilian police force heightened the refugees’ sense of insecurity inside Rwanda. The international community has delayed aid to rehabilitate these critically important institutions. Furthermore, it has failed to exert sufficient pressure on the government to adopt policy guidelines for determining degrees of guilt in last year’s genocide and disseminating these guidelines to the refugee population. In contrast, an example of effective and coordinated action in addressing the security issue is the town of Cyangugu, on the border adjoining Bukavu. The presence of the Ethiopian battalion, the relative competence of the human rights monitoring team there and the commitment of the local préfet to supporting human rights has helped keep returnees from going back to refugee camps.21

Delay in disbursing funds to the government for resettlement of old caseload returnees has also extended the period of potential conflict over individual property rights. There are various reasons for the delays. But, of the US$82.2 million pledged by donors through the Round Table Conference, only US$25 million had been disbursed by September 1995.22 The large number of old caseload returnees occupying homes vacated by the new caseload is a significant deterrent to return. Housing programs by UNCHS/Habitat and relief and development agencies have begun to address this sticking point for new caseload return. Nonetheless, disputes over property continue in an atmosphere of tension and uncertainty. Further, the international community has not focused enough attention on the situation of women returnees, nor have donors exerted enough pressure on the government to address the legal rights of women to family property.

**Future prospects**

It should be recognized that unless the present political crisis is satisfactorily resolved, we should not expect substantial voluntary return of refugees from neighboring countries. Even if the crisis is resolved, which is very unlikely to happen soon, large-scale return is improbable because of the struggle for scarce resources and a long history of political and ethnic conflict.

However, the international community can take a few steps that might encourage some refugees to return home. First, it can help undermine the control of the existing leadership in refugee camps by insisting that the ex-leaders cannot hold any political office, administrative position, or be employed by NGOs. With the cooperation and assistance of asylum countries, it should try to separate extremist leaders from the rest of the refugee populations. Second, the international community can counter current disinformation by launching massive information campaigns about the security situation in Rwanda. Third, an effort can be made to send delegations of present Rwandese leaders, government officials and representatives of the international community to meet with refugees. The purpose of these encounters would be to address the issue of safety and security within Rwanda, and to help allay refugees’ fears. Fourth, the international community can encourage the present government to form peace committees in the communities to which refugees might return. These committees can comprise government officials, leaders of both ethnic communities and staff of national and international voluntary organizations. Fifth, the international community can help the government frame precise guidelines to set levels of culpability in the genocide. Finally, as suggested elsewhere in this report, the international community should speed the delivery of promised assistance to Rwanda for rehabilitation and reconstruction.
Endnotes

1) The term “caseload” is used by convention even though it does not always accurately describe the status of exiles, especially those who left Rwanda up to 30 years ago, some of who are no longer, or never were, supported by UNHCR. Hence, “old caseload” essentially refers largely to Tutsi who fled into exile before 1994.

2) Significant numbers of Tutsi also resided in West Africa, Canada, Belgium and other European countries. However, the exact number of Tutsi refugees has been the topic of much debate. Tutsi refugees left Rwanda in a succession of forced migrations in large numbers during the crises of 1959-61, 1963-64 and 1973. The present government of Rwanda estimates an old caseload population of almost 1.1 million. See Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration, “Problèmes du Rapatriement et de la Réinstallation des Refugiés Rwandais: Propositions de Solutions” and André Guichaoua, The Problem of the Rwandese Refugees and the Banyarwanda Populations in the Great Lakes Region, UNHCR, 1992.

3) From government of Rwanda, Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration, “Returnee Figures According to the Rwandese Government,” 1995. Some of the returnees, especially those from Zaire, were probably officially Zairian citizens of Rwandese origin, who felt obliged to flee the wave of potentially hostile Hutu exiles. Colonial authorities relocated 200,000 Rwandese to the highlands of Kivu in the mid-1940s; their numbers would have grown to at least 400,000 by the beginning of the recent refugee crisis.

4) See government of Rwanda, “Programme of National Reconciliation and Socio-Economic Rehabilitation and Recovery.”

5) The risk of reigniting tensions over occupancy may be a significant factor in the governmentís perceived reluctance to promote repatriation.


7) Based on an April 1995 briefing given by the fact-finding mission’s head, and attended by the evaluation team leader. Supported by interviews with UNHCR officials in Kigali and Bukavu, May 1995.


10) Interview with UNHCR officials in Kigali, Rwanda, May 1995. The figure of US$400,000 reported earlier refers solely to EU (ECHO) funds disbursed in refugee camps.

11) See UNHCR, “Voluntary Repatriation to Rwanda: UNHCR’s Position and Strategy”; and Department of Humanitarian Affairs, ”UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda, January–December 1995.”


13) The figure of 6,000 per day is reported in USAID, “Final Repatriation Sitrep – Oct 15,” (facsimile), October 1995.

15) From various UNHCR Situation Reports, July 1994.


17) From DHA, “Terms of Reference for the IDP Task Force and Integrated Operations Center” and interviews with a senior DHA official and the Minister of Rehabilitation and Social Integration, May 1995.


19) Gender-matching interviews were conducted with approximately 50 refugees in the Goma, Bukavu and Ngara camps during site visits made in April–May 1995. There were marked differences between the responses of men and women. The men ranked insecurity inside Rwanda as the primary factor constraining return. According to the men, repatriation was not possible as long as the RPF-led government was in power. The team felt that the women responded more openly and less polemically. Twenty women were asked to rank those factors that prevented them from leaving the camps. All 20 ranked intimidation first followed by concern for security inside Rwanda and uncertainty over property rights. According to the women interviewed, camp leaders have ordered the people to remain in the camps until they are told to leave.


21) Interviews with UNHCR officials, human rights monitors and former OFDA DART team member, April-May 1995.

22) As noted in Jeff Drumtra, “Site Visit Notes: Rwandese Refugees: Updated Findings and Recommendations”, October 25, 1995, US Committee for Refugees. Round Table pledges for sub-program 3 of the Rwanda Recovery Program amounted to US$130.8 million by year’s end, of which US$36 million was committed and US$33 million disbursed.
Chapter 11
Cross-Cutting Issues and a Vision for the Future

Four critical issues of great relevance to the overall success of rehabilitation and reconstruction are reviewed in this chapter. Although these issues have been touched on in different sections of the report, they are discussed here to underscore their importance. Three are factors shaping the impact and effectiveness of international assistance. The fourth pertains to the long-term stability and prosperity of Rwanda. The international community and Rwanda itself face major policy choices in order to address these issues.

The consequences of the genocide

Post-genocide Rwanda is dramatically different from pre-genocide Rwanda. The systematic attempt on the part of some Hutu to exterminate the Tutsi group has transformed the social, political and economic landscape of Rwanda. The systematic killing of over half a million people has changed the demographic profile of the country, led to the migration of over two million people to neighboring states, and shattered Rwanda’s social structure. It has also profoundly affected existing political and cultural institutions. But, above all, it has undermined the social trust that binds people together. Just as the Holocaust redefined the Jewish identity, so has the Rwanda genocide left a profound impact on the psyches of both Tutsi and Hutu.

The international community took steps to investigate the genocide and punish the instigators by establishing an international Tribunal; however, it has largely failed to incorporate the implications of genocide in the design and implementation of assistance programs in Rwanda. It has treated and continues to treat the present crisis like other civil wars in which the international community intervened and assisted the suffering population. Such an approach has distorted assistance priorities, undermined the effectiveness of the assistance programs and alienated the present government. For example, the international community has tended to overlook the plight of the survivors of the genocide. There are still few nationwide programs targeted to them, especially for the widows, rape victims or the bereaved families. By and large, the survivors have not been treated any differently from other segments of the population. On the other hand, the international community has spent immense resources on the refugees. It is not that the refugees do not deserve assistance but that such assistance should be balanced with assistance to survivors.

The international community’s apparent lack of understanding of the psychological impact of genocide has also contributed to the distrust – and even open hostility – of the Rwandese government towards the UN human rights field operation. As mentioned earlier, a primary role of these field operation officers has been to hear complaints about human rights violations, investigate them, and forward their findings to the High Commissioner. Management and implementation problems have plagued the operation since its beginning. More importantly, its legitimacy has been vastly compromised because it is perceived as one-sided, focusing on current human rights violations instead of on crimes against humanity. Although the situation has slightly improved with the continuing reorientation of the field operation, much damage has already been done to its credibility and effectiveness.
Overall, limited mandates of the bilateral and multilateral agencies, the established modalities for allocating resources, and the procedures for delivering aid in the field are institutional factors that have led to the inability of the international community to respond adequately to the unique consequences of genocide. However, beyond institutional roadblocks, the cultural insensitivity of the international community at times devalued the tragic social and human dimensions of the genocide as perceived by Rwandese. Perhaps the most lamentable example has been the rush to promote reconciliation over the understandable resistance of those who had suffered immensely.

**Relationship between NGOs and the government**

Within weeks after the collapse of the previous regime, hundreds of NGOs came to Rwanda and its neighboring countries to deliver humanitarian assistance. Despite many shortcomings, these organizations have provided invaluable assistance in delivering and maintaining essential social services, caring for refugees and internally displaced persons and reaching out to vulnerable groups in the countryside. There were around 150 NGOs operating in Rwanda in December 1995 before the Rwandese government expelled or restricted the activity of approximately 56, leaving 102 NGOs operational within the country.3

While some tensions always existed between the government and NGOs, not surprisingly they became more visible and serious. During the acute crisis, NGOs enjoyed unprecedented freedom and access. They formulated their own strategies and activities based on their perceptions of the needs of beneficiaries and their capacities and mandates. The fragile government was hardly in a position to exercise any control. But as it began consolidating its position, it started asserting its authority over NGOs. It insisted that they work within the framework of its policies, priorities and procedures. The government now requires that they register with the Ministry of Rehabilitation and formulate their programs in consultation with the concerned ministries. While most NGOs have submitted their applications for registration and are working within the guidelines established by the government, many are still resisting the new requirements.4 In some cases this resistance has proven costly. In December, the government expelled 38 organizations that it said had failed to comply with the law and/or were considered to be ineffective.

The vast resources at the command of the NGO community are at the heart of the problem. NGOs, often funded by donor agencies, are able to design and implement their programs, while the government has little or no funds to pay salaries of its employees. On a more mundane plane, NGOs tend to enjoy excellent office and transport facilities. In contrast, many government officials are still struggling for basic furniture, telephones, typewriters and in many cases, even paper. Obviously, some resent the presence of NGOs. The situation has been further aggravated by two additional factors. First, many NGOs have inadvertently lured experienced staff from the government by offering higher salaries and fringe benefits, thereby further undermining institutional capabilities of line ministries. Unaware, some have even created parallel structures in the field. Second, because senior staff of NGOs have generally come from Europe and North America, a relatively large expatriate community has emerged in Kigali, whose affluent lifestyle arouses understandable envy among local elites.

There are some encouraging developments, however. In the case of some ministries such as Agriculture, a working partnership has emerged between the Ministry and concerned NGOs. Such partnership is also evolving in the case of Health and Education Ministries. Many NGOs are reducing their operations and expatriate staff, increasing training opportunities for indigenous staff and implementing capacity-building measures. It appears that established NGOs with professional staff are earnestly trying to adjust to the new realities. The government also seems more appreciative of the contributions of some NGOs and the leverage they have with donor agencies.
Unrealistic expectations for repatriation

The voluntary return of Rwandese refugees is viewed by the international community as a cornerstone for any durable solution to the present crisis. The presence of two million refugees on the borders indeed poses a serious security threat and undermines the economic and political stability of the country. It also constitutes a severe drain on humanitarian assistance, which the international community can ill afford in the present climate. Consequently, the international community is fully supportive of voluntary repatriation of refugees within the next year or two. As late as September 1995, under duress from the Zairian government, UNHCR promised to try to facilitate the repatriation of all refugees by the end of the year. Currently, only a few hundred refugees return to Rwanda by official channels each day. UNHCR’s goal is to promote the return of 6,000 refugees per day: 3,000 from Zaire, 2,000 from Tanzania and 1,000 from Burundi.5 An agreement between regional heads of state at the Cairo Summit seeks to increase that number to 10,000 a day, which reflects frustration with the huge and politically volatile refugee population more than realism.

While the numbers sought by UNHCR and the Cairo Summit seem highly unrealistic, changes in the leadership structure in the camps and general improvements in security in Rwanda can accelerate the pace of repatriation. The camps need to be restructured to break the hold of the present leadership over the refugees, and prevent them from intimidating and punishing those who want to go back. Further, disinformation campaigns need to be countered. At the same time, the government needs to improve the human rights situation, ensure that the land and properties of the refugees be restored, and spell out its position on the degrees of culpability for genocide. Procedures for the arrest and prosecution of the participants need to be clarified. The international community by itself cannot institute these changes; it has to depend on the cooperation of the governments of Rwanda and its neighboring countries. As the matters stand, there is little room for optimism.

Even if the suggested changes occur, a substantial proportion of the refugee population is still unlikely to repatriate soon for three reasons. First, between 10 to 15 percent of the refugees in the camps (adult and adolescent) may have participated directly in mass killing.6 These refugees and their families would be understandably reluctant to return. Second, transmigration of people has been quite common in the Great Lakes region in the past. Many Kinyarwanda-speaking “ethnic Rwandese” live in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire. Consequently, refugees are not in totally foreign milieus; there are bonds of history and language that help mitigate refugees’ nostalgia. Finally, the experience of past complex emergencies unmistakably shows that it usually takes years, even decades, before significant voluntary repatriation takes place. Even then, rather than going back to their country of origin, many refugees settle in host countries or move to third countries. It is, therefore, imperative that the international community demonstrate more realism in planning its initiatives for the refugees than it has done so far by considering a wider range of solutions to the crisis. It should prepare itself for the eventuality that a significant percentage of refugees might not return and would need assistance for resettlement in other countries.

Long-term development of Rwanda

The vast humanitarian assistance that has poured into Rwanda and neighboring countries has undoubtedly saved thousands of lives, provided essential services to millions of people and imparted some confidence in the future. However, humanitarian assistance alone cannot solve the present crisis; it has provided only a temporary “window of opportunity.” At this juncture, the international community can continue to assist Rwanda and its neighbors in searching for a durable solution or waste its chance in the fond hope that the problem will somehow be solved without its critical support.

In examining the question of long-term development of Rwanda, two considerations should be kept in mind. First, the success of Rwanda’s march towards a politically stable and economically
sustainable society will depend upon a complex set of conditions and circumstances. For example, it will be shaped by its distinctive social, cultural and economic institutions, emerging regional alignments and interests, and the vision shown by its leadership. The international donor community can influence such factors, but cannot control them. Second, the transition process is not likely to be a smooth one. Rather, as has been the case with many complex emergencies, the process is most likely to be characterized by periods of ups and downs, stagnation, and even regression. There is a need to take a long-term perspective.

A broad consensus seems to be emerging that the country should give top priority to building an effective judicial system based on the rule of law; ensuring physical security to returning refugees and survivors of genocide; and promoting rapid economic growth in agriculture and small business sectors. In this regard, donors should avoid a “business as usual” approach to rehabilitation and reconstruction that uses past social and economic policies as models for Rwanda’s future. Unlike the past, when the primary focus was on economic growth, the country will have to follow a strategy of integrated development that emphasizes human resources. The government will also have to face the problem of ethnicity and political participation, and encourage a culture of tolerance and respect for democratic principles and human rights.

However, it appears increasingly probable that efforts at the national level alone are not sufficient to solve the refugee return problem. Because of growing political and ethnic tensions in Burundi, the presence of two million Rwandese refugees in neighboring states, and the high population density of the country, a regional approach will be key to longer-term resolution of the crisis. Such an approach may require resettlement of populations, redrawning of national boundaries and/or greater regional political and economic integration. Whether Rwanda, its neighbors and the international community will take the bold steps necessary to achieve a durable regional solution to this complex problem is a question that history alone can answer.
Endnotes

1) There are now numerous articles on this subject. Probably, the most in-depth discussion is to be found in African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance.


4) By April 1995, 88 had actually been registered.


6) These estimates are based on interviews with key informants. There are no hard data on the subject.
Chapter 12

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

This section is broken down into: a) recommendations for continued reconstruction assistance to Rwanda; and b) general lessons learned from the Rwanda crisis for future complex emergencies.

Recommendations for Rwanda

The following recommendations are addressed to the donor community. They include general recommendations for overall rehabilitation and reconstruction as well as sector-specific assistance.

General recommendations

1. Provide a larger share of assistance directly to the government of Rwanda
   At the beginning of the Rwanda emergency, it was necessary to channel international assistance through NGOs, private contractors and intergovernmental agencies in the absence of a functioning state infrastructure. Moreover, even with the transition of the Rwandese Patriotic Front into the government, international donors were reluctant to recognize its legitimacy and provide funds to an essentially military government. Although now acknowledging the resiliency and territorial control of the new regime, the international community is still hesitant about providing anything but limited direct assistance to the resource-starved government. The government often does not have adequate funds to pay salaries to civil servants struggling to perform their duties in the absence of basic furniture, typewriters, telephones and even paper. Most of the government ministries are unable to discharge even minimal responsibilities. Although the situation has improved recently, the fact remains that unless the government is provided with the necessary resources, the donor community should not realistically expect greater accountability and transparency from it.

   **Recommendation:** International donors should channel a greater proportion of pledged assistance directly to government ministries and local government structures to strengthen national institutional capacity.

2. Expedite procedures for delivering rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance
   As indicated earlier, the international response to the Rwanda refugee emergency was swift and substantial. International agencies delivered the much-vaunted assistance with remarkable speed. Assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction inside Rwanda, however, is constrained by donors’ administrative procedures that can delay aid for several months to two years. In addition to the negative impact on economic recovery, the delay in funds for longer-term reconstruction programs has ramifications for political and social stability. The UN Trust Fund for Rwanda, supported largely by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, is an example of a mechanism designed to expedite aid directly to the government. Its ability to expedite assistance should be reviewed more closely.

   **Recommendation:** Donor agencies should suspend their normal administrative procedures for rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance in order rapidly to disburse funds for the activities they committed themselves to at the Round Table
Conference. This may involve creation of new mechanisms for activities that are neither emergency nor development in the conventional sense.

**Sector-specific recommendations**

1. **Agriculture**
   Donor agencies should:
   
a) Terminate programs of general distribution of free agricultural inputs and food aid, such as “seeds and tools” or “Agpaks.” These programs were necessary for food production and food security over the first two seasons, but their continuation will likely distort the market for agricultural inputs and create structural dependence on foreign assistance.

   b) Assist the government in clarifying land tenure legislation and property rights, especially the rights of women to inherit land and to own land left by a deceased husband. Assistance in codifying and enforcing property rights of old and new caseload refugees and returnees will accelerate productive investments in agriculture.

   c) Accelerate programs aimed at rehabilitating production and marketing channels for coffee and tea in order to boost income of small farmers. Rapid rehabilitation of the coffee sub-sector would provide a cost-effective means to remonetize the rural economy, possibly precluding the need for more cumbersome one-time income-generation projects. Programs to develop non-traditional exports should also be accelerated.

   d) Accelerate programs for re-stocking livestock on small farms. Much of the livestock population was destroyed during the war. Currently, there is a serious regional imbalance, with extreme overstocking in the east and insufficient livestock throughout the rest of Rwanda. The symbiosis between crop agriculture and animal husbandry is critical to Rwanda’s agriculture.

2. **Social Sectors (Education and Health)**
   Donors should:
   
a) Require that donor-funded relief and development agencies coordinate their activities in the social sectors with the government within the framework of national priorities and policies.

   b) Demand that agencies that are managing the delivery of health services require from recipients some form of cost recovery for medicine and consultation. Donors should also assist the government in developing and implementing cost-recovery mechanisms that are integrated into the emerging national health delivery system.

   c) Accelerate assistance to rebuild the education system, particularly primary school education and vocational training. Re-emphasize teacher training and curriculum development that promote peaceful coexistence and counter ethnic distrust and hatred. Access to primary education must be expanded dramatically.

3. **Vulnerable Groups**
   Donors should:
   
   (a) Develop and implement economic rehabilitation programs for women who have lost their husbands and other male family members. Such programs, for example, may provide assistance to such women for repairing their burned or vandalized houses, loans for agriculture and micro-enterprise activities and even financial support for a transitional period.

   b) Support a comprehensive program to remove legal and other barriers to women’s ownership of productive resources, particularly land. Improve women’s access to credit, loans and other economic assistance. Such reforms are difficult in the best of times and conditions. They will require exceptional ingenuity, persistence and persuasiveness in the Rwandese context.
c) Fund women’s organizations that create economic opportunities for women, provide training and financial assistance and engage in self-help activities.

d) Enhance the capacity of families, single female-headed households and communities to cope with the support and care of orphans and unaccompanied children, and complement NGO-implemented community-based income-generation activities.

4. Human Rights
   Donors should:

   a) Give the new leadership of the Human Rights Field Operation six months of assured funding and condition continued funding on the formulation and implementation of new strategies and activities that will produce results by the field operation.

   b) Commission an in-depth evaluation of the field operation’s effectiveness, outputs and impact to be conducted in May-June 1996 by a consortium of international human rights organizations.

5. International Tribunal and Administration of Justice
   The donor community should (with great speed):

   a) Ensure that the International Tribunal has an adequate budget to enter into long-term financial arrangements for administration and staff costs.

   b) Second qualified prosecutors and investigators to assist in carrying out the work of the Tribunal.

   c) Recommend that the Prosecutor is given the authority to hire staff and incur administrative expenses without the approval of the Legal Counsel’s Office in New York, thereby speeding up investigations and prosecution.

   d) Encourage the Prosecutor to formalize communication with other UN bodies, particularly the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees and that of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as the UN Special Rapporteur to facilitate cooperative arrangements for conducting investigations.

   e) Make support to the reconstruction of the justice system (ultimately an independent judiciary) a top priority, and develop a systematic approach to that end. Adjudication of suspected war criminals is proceeding exceedingly slowly, in part because of lack of funds. Without rehabilitation of the justice system, reconciliation and peace cannot be expected.

6. Repatriation and Resettlement of Refugees
   In order to improve the chances of refugee repatriation and resettlement, the donor agencies should:

   a) As an interim step, support the relocation of refugees away from the borders of Rwanda in order to reduce the security threat to the country. Such a relocation may also encourage innocent refugees to return to Rwanda.

   b) Request the government to form “peace committees” in each community to monitor and protect the security of returnees. Such committees could comprise representatives from the Hutu and Tutsi communities, local government officials and community leaders.

   c) Encourage and support the government to define precisely the degrees of responsibility for genocide and spell out procedures for arrest and prosecution of those who participated in it. Such information should be widely disseminated in refugee camps to induce innocent people to return to Rwanda.
d) Demand that the government enforce its stated policy of restoring land to new caseload refugees, and publish and widely disseminate in refugee camps regulations related to the ownership and recovery of property.

e) Promote programs to send delegations consisting of senior officials of donor agencies and the government to refugee camps to assure the safe return and rehabilitation of refugees who have not actively participated in the genocide.

**Lessons learned for future complex emergencies**

The scope of these lessons for international interventions in future complex emergencies is limited in two ways. First, they are grounded in the Rwanda experience. Only those lessons that follow from the findings of the evaluation are presented here. Second, they pertain to the rehabilitation, reconstruction and development phase only.

1. **New mechanisms are needed for rapid delivery of rehabilitation assistance**

   During the initial response phase, the international community expeditiously delivered massive humanitarian assistance to Rwanda and the neighboring countries. Relief programming by-passed all but the most essential administrative regulations. Post-emergency programming, however, reverted back to established processes for financing development projects, which usually takes one to two years. Although there were examples of rehabilitation assistance being delivered through emergency mechanisms, these remained few and ad hoc. The delay in releasing pledged assistance means that much-needed resources are not available for meeting urgent rehabilitation needs. Consequently, both the people and the government are frustrated, which exacerbates conditions that threaten increasing instability and renewed conflict. Thus the Rwanda crisis suggests the need for rapid delivery of rehabilitation assistance.

   It is suggested the international donor community should:

   a) Develop rapid and flexible procedures for disbursing reconstruction funds along the same lines as procedures for emergency assistance.

   b) Delegate more authority and resources to field-level operations to design and fund quick-impact projects.

   c) Channel a greater proportion of resources in the form of untied aid to local and central government agencies, based on mutual agreement about such agencies’ strategies and plans, and ex-post monitoring and evaluation.

2. **Self-regulation of the NGO community would improve impact**

   During the emergency, NGOs provided invaluable assistance in establishing and maintaining the delivery of essential services, caring for refugees and internally displaced persons and reaching out to the communities. They are now playing a critical role in rehabilitation and reconstruction. Nevertheless, the overabundance and inexperience of many organizations have undermined some of the positive aspects. For example, some NGOs, particularly in the health sector, lacked the essential experience and expertise to function effectively in developing societies. Others initially failed to coordinate their operations with fellow NGOs and relief agencies. Some agencies lured experienced staff from the government by offering higher salaries and fringe benefits, thus undermining institutional capabilities of ministries. The sheer numbers of North American and European NGOs overwhelmed Kigali with relatively affluent expatriates, creating resentment among local elites. Above all, some NGOs have refused or shown reluctance to register their organizations officially, thereby creating unnecessary tension between themselves and the government. There is little doubt that had the members of the NGO community followed a well-formulated code of conduct for their operations and better coordinated their activities with others, they would have utilized their resources more efficiently and produced greater impact in Rwanda.
Impact of NGOs in the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase of complex emergencies would be improved if donors would:

a) Assist NGOs to develop and adopt a comprehensive code of conduct addressing a wide range of policy and operational issues, including: coordination and division of labor among NGOs; standards of qualifications and experience for relief workers; adherence to standardized salaries for local staff; minimum requirements for operating in each sector; commitment to local capacity-building; and timely, appropriate exit strategies.

b) Require NGOs to establish a consortium with a recognized coordinating body immediately upon arrival at a disaster site. Such a consortium would cooperate with DHA’s overall coordination structure and facilitate an exchange of information about program strategies, priorities and activities.

c) Mandate greater accountability for funding NGO activities, including: justification for expatriate staff; cooperation and transparency with local and national authorities; commitment to local institutional capacity-building; and development of assessment, planning and exit strategies.

d) Condition funding on adherence to the code of conduct and commitment to coordinate operations with other NGOs and relief agencies. As there are costs associated with coordination, such expenses should be allowable.

The above suggestions apply equally to other relief agencies, UN and donor agencies as well. However, given the numbers and importance of NGOs in project implementation, the lessons are particularly germane for them.

3. Complex emergencies require focus on political and social reconstruction

Because of its understandable concern about the political legitimacy of the present Rwandese government, the international donor community initially showed a marked reluctance to provide it with resources to rebuild its institutional capacity and to establish even rudimentary administrative structures. For example, it has been slow to assist in strengthening the judicial system, law enforcement agencies, local governmental agencies and other public sector organizations essential for the functioning of a modern state. Moreover, in contrast to easing the plight of unaccompanied children, the donor community did little to initiate and fund programs to heal the wounds of war and address the distinctive needs of some of the other main victims of violence – widows, rape victims and the disabled. Such negligence prolonged political uncertainty and created obstacles to the government’s ability to address the problems of reintegration, social welfare, local disputes, human rights, overcrowding of prisons, and prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators of genocide. The Rwanda crisis undoubtedly indicates the need to focus international assistance on issues of governance and civil society.

During the recovery phase, the international community should

a) Support programs for strengthening human rights, an independent judiciary, indigenous dispute resolution processes, and a responsible and responsive law enforcement system. The reluctance of some donors to provide assistance to restoration of a civilian police force needs to be reconsidered.

b) Integrate psycho-social healing components into education and health programs.

c) Build and assist existing civil institutions – such as trade unions, business and trade organizations, professional associations and human rights groups – to build broad-based capacity.

d) Fund quick-impact projects for victims of violence, particularly women and children.

4. Mechanisms for sharing background information about the crisis need to be institutionalized

A lack of in-depth knowledge of the historical, political, social and economic context of the crisis in Rwanda undermined the effectiveness of international interventions in Rwanda. Two specific
examples can be cited. First, in their ignorance of the extent of involvement of political leaders in the genocide, relief agencies used former leaders to deliver assistance in refugee camps. This enabled the very people who commanded the genocide to re-establish their command over the refugees. As discussed in an earlier chapter, these leaders have obstructed the return of the refugees, impeding the process of rehabilitation. Second, many human rights observers were totally ignorant of the political history and social and ethnic structures of the country. Consequently, they failed to establish any rapport with the local leaders and population, which proved self-defeating. The Rwanda crisis thus underscores the need for sharing information about contextual variables – historical, social, cultural, political and economic – among donor and NGO technical and managerial staff in the field.

To meet the above information needs, the international community can:

a) Develop systematic intra- and inter-organizational information-sharing procedures. This would involve collection of short background papers, briefing notes, situational analyses, and political and military intelligence and their dissemination in succinct form among field staff.

b) Conduct periodic on-site educational training seminars that provide substantive briefings to expatriate staff on the historical, political, social and cultural context of the crisis.

c) Regularly involve the government, local authorities, indigenous NGOs and community leaders in the planning and implementation of international interventions so that they reflect local knowledge and experience.

d) Encourage international NGOs to partner with and draw upon local NGOs, which could be a valuable source of information on culture, history and indigenous politics.

e) Strengthen and implement Relief Web/Response Net electronic bulletin board concepts that would disseminate information to and from a broad cross-section of people, including field staff and headquarters.
Bibliography


UNHCR. 1995. UNHCR Assistance Programme to Returnees in Rwanda. Photocopy.


Appendix

List of Organizations/Officials Interviewed in the Field

Action International Contre la Faim
ActionAid
AFL-CIO Representative to Rwanda
African Humanitarian Assistance
Africare
Aide et Action
All African Council of Churches
American Refugee Committee
Amnesty International
Assemblée Nationale de Transition
Association des Volontaires de la Paix
Association des Veuves du Genocide d’Avril
ASOFERWA
Belgian Cooperation
CARE, US
CARE, Canada
CARE, Australia
Catholic Relief Services
Church World Action
Citizen’s Network
Concern
DHA
Equilibre
European Union
Feed the Children
Food for the Hungry
Government of Rwanda, Office of Prime Minister
Government of Rwanda, Central Bank
Government of Rwanda, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock
Government of Rwanda, Ministry of Family and Promotion of Women
Government of Rwanda, Ministry of Health
Government of Rwanda, Ministry of Justice
Government of Rwanda, Ministry of Plan
Government of Rwanda, Ministry of Rehabilitation
Government of Rwanda, Ministry of Women’s Affairs
Government of Rwanda, Local Bourgmesters and Magistrates
HCHRFOR Personnel and Monitors
International Medical Corps
Institut des Sciences Agronomiques du Rwanda
International Rescue Committee
International Council for Voluntary Action
International Committee of the Red Cross
Jumelage Rhenanie-Palatinat
Lutheran World Federation
Médecins sans frontières
Nairobi Peace Initiative
Organization of African Unity
OXFAM
Reporters sans frontières
Rwanda Patriotic Front
Salvation Army
Save the Children, UK
Solidarités
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General
Trocaire
Tribunal Deputy Prosecutor
Tribunal Chief Investigator
UNAMIR
UNAMIR, MILOPS
UNDP
UN Food and Agriculture Organization
UNHCHR
UNHCR
UNICEF
UNREO
UN World Food Program
US Embassy, Burundi
US Embassy, Rwanda
USAID
Women’s Solidarity Association
World Vision International
Zairean Military
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHA</td>
<td>African Humanitarian Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AICF/US</td>
<td>Action internationale contre la faim (International Action Against Hunger)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal</td>
<td>The UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>American Refugee Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVSI</td>
<td>Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internationale</td>
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<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Commission of Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWA</td>
<td>Church World Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHA</td>
<td>Department of Humanitarian Affairs (less frequently, UNDHA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMP</td>
<td>Fédération des mouvements populaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRFOR</td>
<td>Human Rights Field Operation Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IARC</td>
<td>International Agriculture Research Center</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTFY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICVA</td>
<td>International Council of Voluntary Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>International Medical Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPJ</td>
<td>Inspecteur de police judiciaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAR</td>
<td>Institut des sciences agronomiques du Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>LACU</td>
<td>Legal Analysis and Coordination Unit</td>
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<td>MOH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins sans frontières</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORC</td>
<td>Open Relief Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSF</td>
<td>Pharmaciens sans frontières</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPF/A</td>
<td>Rwandese Patriotic Front/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCF</td>
<td>Save the Children Fund (UK); and Save the Children Federation (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIU</td>
<td>Special Investigations Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEP</td>
<td>Teacher Emergency Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tribunal</td>
<td>International Tribunal for Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCHS</td>
<td>United Nations Center for Human Settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCHR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNREO</td>
<td>United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>VOICE</td>
<td>Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>United Nations World Food Program</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>United Nations World Health Organization</td>
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